Court File No. CV-13-10000-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF EXTREME FITNESS, INC.

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES OF EXTREME FITNESS, INC.

March 26, 2013

AIRD & BERLIS LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
Toronto, Ontario M5J 2T9

Steven L. Graff (LSUC # 31871V)
Tel: 416.865.7726
Fax: 416.863.1515
Email: sgraff@airdberlis.com

Ian Aversa (LSUC # 55449N)
Tel: 416.865.3082
Fax: 416.863.1515
Email: iaversa@airdberlis.com

James A. Desjardins (LSUC # 62493E)
Tel: 416.865.4641
Fax: 416.863.1515
Email: jdesjardins@airdberlis.com

Lawyers for Extreme Fitness, Inc.

SERVICE LIST

TO: **AIRD & BERLIS LLP**
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
Toronto, ON M5J 2T9

Steven L. Graff
Tel: 416-865-7726
Fax: 416-863-1515
Email: sgraff@airdberlis.com

Ian Aversa
Tel: 416-865-3082
Fax: 416-863-1515
Email: iaversa@airdberlis.com

James A. Desjardins
Tel: 416-865-4641
Fax: 416-863-1515
Email: jdesjardins@airdberlis.com

Lawyers for Extreme Fitness, Inc.

AND TO: **FTI CONSULTING CANADA INC.**
TD Waterhouse Tower
79 Wellington Street West
Toronto Dominion Centre, Suite 2010
Toronto, ON M5K 1G8

Steven Bissell
Tel: 416-649-8054
Fax: 416-649-8101
Email: steven.bissell@fticonsulting.com

Brogan Taylor
Tel: 416-649-8074
Fax: 416-649-8101
Email: brogan.taylor@fticonsulting.com

Monitor

AND TO: **GOODMANS LLP**
Bay Adelaide Centre
333 Bay Street, Suite 3400
Toronto, ON M5H 2S7

Melaney J. Wagner
Tel: 416-597-4258
Fax: 416-979-1234
Email: mwagner@goodmans.ca

Caroline Descours
Tel: 416-597-6275
Fax: 416-979-1234
Email: cdescours@goodmans.ca

Lawyers for the Monitor

AND TO: **THORNTON GROUT FINNIGAN LLP**
100 Wellington Street West, Suite 3200
Toronto, ON M5K 1K7

Grant B. Moffat
Tel: 416-304-0599
Fax: 416-304-1313
Email: gmoffat@tgf.ca

Alana Shepherd
Tel: 416-304-0597
Fax: 416-304-1313
Email: ashepherd@tgf.ca

Lawyers for National Bank of Canada

AND TO: **BLAKE, CASSELS & GRAYDON LLP**
Commerce Court West
199 Bay Street, Suite 4000
Toronto, ON M5L 1A9

Steven J. Weisz
Tel: 416-863-2616
Fax: 416-863-2653
Email: steven.weisz@blakes.com

Ian Binnie
Tel: 416-863-3250
Fax: 416-863-2653
Email: ian.binnie@blakes.com

Marc Flynn
Tel: 416-863-2685
Fax: 416-863-2653
Email: marc.flynn@blakes.com

Lawyers for Golub Capital Incorporated

AND TO: **MILLER THOMSON LLP**
One London Place
255 Queens Avenue, Suite 2010
London, ON N6A 5R8

Alissa Mitchell
Tel: 519-931-3510
Fax: 519-858-8511
Email: amitchell@millerthomson.com

Lawyers for GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc.

AND TO: **SISKINDS LLP**
680 Waterloo Street
London, ON N6A 3V8

Henry Berg
Tel: 519-660-7786
Fax: 519-660-7787
Email: henry.berg@siskinds.com

Lawyers for GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc.

AND TO: **ALVAREZ & MARSAL CANADA INC.**
Royal Bank Plaza South Tower
200 Bay Street, Suite 2900
Toronto, ON M5J 2J1

Alan J. Hutchens
Tel: 416-847-5159
Fax: 416-847-5201
Email: ahutchens@alvarezandmarsal.com

Greg A. Karpel
Tel: 416-847-5170
Fax: 416-847-5201
Email: gkarpel@alvarezandmarsal.com

AND TO: **BORDEN LADNER GERVAIS LLP**
Scotia Plaza
40 King Street West
Toronto, ON M5H 3Y4

Roger Jaipargas
Tel: 416-367-6266
Fax: 416-361-7067
Email: rjaipargas@blg.com

Lawyers for 2079843 Ontario Inc., 2044922 Ontario Ltd. and 2125879 Ontario Inc.

AND TO: **BERKOW, COHEN LLP**
Barristers
141 Adelaide Street West, Suite 400
Toronto, ON M5H 3L5

Alexandra Lev-Farrell
Tel: 416-364-4900
Fax: 416-364-3865
Email: alev-farrell@berkowcohen.com

Lawyers for Bentall Kennedy (Canada) LP

AND TO: **BLANEY McMURTY LLP**
Barristers and Solicitors
1500 - 2 Queen Street East
Toronto, ON M5C 3G5

John C. Wolf
Tel: 416-593-2994
Fax: 416-596-2044
Email: jwolf@blaney.com

Bradley Phillips
Tel: 416-593-3940
Fax: 416-593-5437
Email: bphillips@blaney.com

Lawyers for First Capital (Cedarbrae) Corporation

AND TO: **DAOUST VUKOVICH LLP**
20 Queen Street West, Suite 3000
Toronto, ON M5H 3R3

Wolfgang Kaufmann
Tel: 416-597-3952
Fax: 416-597-8897
Email: wolfgang@dv-law.com

Lawyers for Adgar Investments and Development Ltd.

AND TO: **HARRISON PENSA LLP**
Barristers & Solicitors
450 Talbot Street
London, ON N6A 4K3

K. Daniel Reason
Tel: 519-679-9660
Fax: 519-667-3362
Email: dreason@harrisonpensa.com

Lawyers for Heffner Auto Finance Corp., Heffner Auto Sales and Leasing Inc. and Heffner Leasing Limited

AND TO: **EXTREME FITNESS, INC.**
8281 Yonge Street
Thornhill, ON L3T 2C7

AND TO: **EXTREME FITNESS HOLDING CORP.**
c/o Falconhead Capital LLC
450 Park Avenue #3
New York, NY 10022

AND TO: **EXTREME FITNESS ULC**
c/o Golub Capital Incorporated
666 Fifth Avenue, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10103

AND TO: **ROYAL BANK OF CANADA**
180 Wellington Street West, 3rd Floor
Toronto, ON M5J 1J1

AND TO: **LIFE FITNESS INTERNATIONAL SALES, INC.**
5100 North River Road
Schiller Park, IL 60176

AND TO: **COINAMATIC COMMERCIAL LAUNDRY INC.**
301 Matheson Boulevard West
Mississauga, ON L5R 3G3

AND TO: **INDCOM LEASING INC.**
5061 Ure Street
Oldcastle, ON N0R 1L0

AND TO: **ESSEX CAPITAL LEASING CORP.**
3280 Devon Drive
Windsor, ON N8X 4L4

AND TO: **CLE LEASING ENTERPRISES LTD.**
3390 South Service Road, 2nd Level
Burlington, ON L7N 3J5

AND TO: **DSM LEASING LTD.**
1300 Bay Street, Suite 400
Toronto, ON M5R 3K8

AND TO: **ENERCARE SOLUTIONS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP**
2 East Beaver Creek Road, Building 2
Richmond Hill, ON L4B 2N3

-and-

4000 Victoria Park Avenue
North York, ON M2H 3B4

AND TO: **DELL FINANCIAL SERVICES CANADA LIMITED**
155 Gordon Baker Road, Suite 501
North York, ON M2H 3N5

AND TO: **BMW CANADA INC.**
50 Ultimate Drive
Richmond Hill, ON L4S 0C8

AND TO: **DE LAGE LANDEN FINANCIAL SERVICES CANADA INC.**
100-1235 North Service Road West
Oakville, ON L6M 2W2

AND TO: **XEROX FINANCIAL SERVICES CANADA LTD.**
c/o Xerox Canada Ltd.
33 Bloor Street East
Toronto, ON M4W 3H1

Stephanie Grace
Tel: (416) 413-2805
Fax: (416) 972-5530
Email: stephanie.grace@xerox.com

AND TO: **CIT FINANCIAL LTD.**
5035 South Service Road
Burlington, ON L7R 4C8

AND TO: **1079268 ONTARIO INC.**
4211 Yonge St., Suite 200
Toronto, ON M2P 2A9

AND TO: **MICHAEL S. SINGER**
Solicitor
23 Lesmill Road, Suite 300
Toronto, ON M3B 3P6

Lawyer for 1079268 Ontario Inc.

AND TO: **DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE**
The Exchange Tower
130 King Street West, Suite 3400
Toronto, ON M5X 1K6

Diane Winters
Tel: (416) 973-3172
Fax: (416) 973-0810
Email: diane.winters@justice.gc.ca

Christopher Lee
Tel: (416) 954-8247
Fax: (416) 973-0810
Email: christopher.lee@justice.gc.ca

Lawyers for Canada Revenue Agency

AND TO: **HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF THE PROVINCE OF ONTARIO AS REPRESENTED BY THE MINISTER OF FINANCE**
(Income Tax, PST)
PO Box 620
33 King Street West, 6th Floor
Oshawa, ON L1H 8E9

Kevin J. O'Hara
Email: kevin.ohara@ontario.ca

COURTESY COPIES

Morry Offman
Email: morryoffman@msn.com

Steve DaCosta
Email: stevedacosta@rogers.blackberry.net

14155878.6

INDEX

Court File No. CV-13-10000-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF EXTREME FITNESS, INC.

APPLICATION UNDER THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES OF EXTREME FITNESS, INC.

1. *Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List])
2. *Consumers Packaging Inc. (Re)* (2001), 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.)
3. *Canwest Publishing Inc. (Re)* (2010), 68 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List])])
4. *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.)
5. *White Birch Paper Holding Company (Re)*, 2010 QCCS 4915
6. *Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)*, [2009] O.J. No. 4788 (Ont. S.C.J. [Comm. List
7. *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522
8. *Planet Organic Health Corp., Re,* Approval and Vesting Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Morawetz dated June 4, 2010, Court File No. 10-8699-00CL
9. *White Birch Paper Holding Company (Re),* (2010) 72 C.B.R. (5th) 63 (Que. S. Ct.)
10. *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re.,* Approval and Vesting Order of Honourable Mr. Justice Mongeon dated September 28, 2010, Court File No. 500-11-038474-108
11. *Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re.,* (2001), 31 CBR (4th) 302 (Ont. S.C.J.)

12. *Nexient Learning Inc., Re.*, (2009), 62 C.B.R. (5th) 248

13. *Hayes Forest Services Ltd., Re.*, (2009) 57 C.B.R. (5th) 52 (BCSC)

14. Houlden, L. W., G. B. Morawetz and Janis Sarra. *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada*, vol. 4, 4th ed. Toronto: Carswell, 2009 (loose-leaf updated 2013)

15. *Re AbitibiBowater Inc.*, 2009 QCCS 6461

16. *Re Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd.* (2009), 55 C.B.R. (5th) 241 (Ont. S.C. [Comm. List.])

17. *Re PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc.*, 2012 ONSC 3367

18. *Re Northstar Aerospace, Inc.*, 2012 ONSC 4423

19. *Cinram International Inc., et al. (Re)*, Administrative Reserve / Distribution / Transition Order of Honourable Mr. Justice Morawetz dated October 19, 2012, Court File No. CV12-9767-00CL

20. *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., et al. (Re)*, Administrative Reserve and Transition Order of Honourable Madam Justice Pepall dated July 6, 2010, Court File No. CV-10-8533-00CL

TAB 1

Case Name:

Nortel Networks Corp. (Re)

RE:IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel Networks Global Corporation, Nortel Networks International Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation, Applicants
APPLICATION UNDER the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

[2009] O.J. No. 3169

55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

2009 CanLII 39492

2009 CarswellOnt 4467

Court File No. 09-CL-7950

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

G.B. Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009.
Judgment: June 29, 2009.
Released: July 23, 2009.

(59 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Application of Act -- Debtor company -- Motion by applicants for approval of bidding procedure and Sale Agreement allowed -- Applicants had been granted CCAA protection and were involved in insolvency procedures in four other countries -- Bidding procedures set deadline for entry and involved auction -- Sale Agreement was for some of applicants' business units -- Neither proposal involved formal plan of compromise with creditors or vote, but CCAA was flexible and could be broadly interpreted to ensure objective of preserving business was met -- Proposal was warranted, beneficial and there was no viable alternative.

Motion by the applicants for the approval of their proposed bidding process and Sale Agreement. The applicants had been granted CCAA protection and were involved in insolvency proceedings in four other countries. The Monitor approved of the proposal. The bidding process set a deadline for bids and involved an auction. The Sale Agreement was for some of the applicants' business units. The applicants argued the proposal was the best way to preserve jobs and company value. The purchaser was to assume both assets and liabilities. There was no formal plan for compromise with creditors or vote planned.

HELD: Motion allowed. The CCAA was flexible and could be broadly interpreted to ensure that its objectives of preserving the business were achieved. The proposal was warranted and beneficial and there was no viable alternative. A sealing order was also made with respect to Appendix B, which contained commercially sensitive documents.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11(4)

Counsel:

Derrick Tay and Jennifer Stam, for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al.

Lyndon Barnes and Adam Hirsh, for the Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation and Nortel Networks Limited.

J. Carfagnini and J. Pasquariello, for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor.

M. Starnino, for the Superintendent of Financial Services and Administrator of PBGF.

S. Philpott, for the Former Employees.

K. Zych, for Noteholders.

Pamela Huff and Craig Thorburn, for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward, for UK Pension Protection Fund.

Leanne Williams, for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane, for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors.

Arthur O. Jacques and Tom McRae, for Felske and Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee).

Robin B. Schwill and Matthew P. Gottlieb, for Nortel Networks UK Limited.

A. Kauffman, for Export Development Canada.

D. Ullman, for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit, for IBM.

ENDORSEMENT

G.B. MORAWETZ J.:--

INTRODUCTION

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

2 I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CMDA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

7 The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is $650 million.

BACKGROUND

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

9 At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its

CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

(a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and
(b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:

(a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
(b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
(c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

20 The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

ISSUES AND DISCUSSION

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

28 The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

29 The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused, [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337. ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;
(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and
(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 43; *Re PSINet Ltd.* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

> Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

32 In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Re Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc.* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA

is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

> The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 165 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, *Re PSINet, supra*, *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, *Re Stelco Inc.* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J.) at para. 1, *Re Tiger Brand Knitting Co.* (2005) 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315, *Re Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hardrock Paving Co.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 and *Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

> The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.
>
> ... we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Re Canadian Red Cross Society, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited, supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

> [If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees.

Re PSINet Limited, supra, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

> I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Re Boutique San Francisco Inc.* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (Quebec S. C.), *Re Winnipeg Motor Express Inc.* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Re Calpine Canada Energy Limited* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan "will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale ... be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C.C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

44 I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering L.P. v. Forest and Marine Financial Limited Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319.

46 At paragraphs 24-26 of the *Forest and Marine* decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

> 24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may

grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring" ... Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

> The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged ...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the means contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary ...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

(a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
(b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
(c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a *bona fide* reason to object to a sale of the business?
(d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision

is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

(a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;
(b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;
(c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;
(d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;
(e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;
(f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and
(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3rd) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

DISPOSITION

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

56 I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

58 In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that,

if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

cp/e/qllxr/qlpxm/qlltl/qlaxw/qlced

TAB 2

Indexed as:

Consumers Packaging Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a plan of compromise or arrangement of Consumers Packaging Inc., Consumers International Inc. and 64489 Canada Inc.

[2001] O.J. No. 3908

150 O.A.C. 384

27 C.B.R. (4th) 197

12 C.P.C. (5th) 208

2001 CarswellOnt 3482

108 A.C.W.S. (3d) 765

Docket No. M27743

Ontario Court of Appeal
Toronto, Ontario

McMurtry C.J.O., Finlayson and Austin JJ.A.

Heard: September 27, 2001.
Judgment: October 10, 2001.

(10 paras.)

Bankruptcy -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Sale of assets -- Appeals.

Motion by Ardagh PLC for leave to appeal and appeal from a decision that approved a sale of assets of Consumers Packaging Inc. to Owens-Illinois Inc. Consumers filed for protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. Consumers was authorized, through an independent restructuring committee and its chief restructuring officer to fix a date upon which interested third parties were to submit firm, fully financed offers to purchase all or any part of its business. Ardagh and Owens participated in the bid process. Owens was the preferred bid since it provided more cash to Consumers' creditors, had the least completion risk, was not conditional on financing, was likely to close in a reasonable period of time, resulted in the continuation of Consumers' business and retained a vast majority of its employees. Ardagh's restructuring proposal was not backed by financing commitments, required further due diligence by its lenders and offered less by way of recovery to Consumers' creditors. It was the unanimous view of the monitor, the Committee and the Officer that Ardagh's proposal was not viable and would, if pursued, result in its liquidation causing a lower return to creditors, the loss of jobs and cessation of business operations. The judge approved Owens' bid on the basis that it was the only presently viable option better than a liquidation with substantially reduced realization of value.

HELD: Motion for leave to appeal dismissed. Granting leave to appeal would be prejudicial to the prospects of restructuring the business for the benefit of the stakeholders in light of the significant time and financial constraints faced by Consumers and was contrary to the objectives of the Act. The sale of certain of Consumers' assets to Owens allowed the preservation of its business and was consistent with the purposes of the Act.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.7.

Appeal From:

On appeal from the order of Justice James M. Farley dated August 31, 2001.

Counsel:

Peter F.C. Howard, Patrick O'Kelly and Craig Martin, for Ardagh PLC.
Robert S. Harrison and Carole J. Hunter, for the Ad Hoc Noteholders Committee.
Daniel V. MacDonald and Paul G. Macdonald, for Consumers Packaging Inc., Consumers International Inc. and 164489 Canada Inc.
L. Joseph Latham and Elizabeth Moore, for the Toronto-Dominion Bank Syndicate.
Lily I. Harmer, for the United Steelworkers of America.
Marc Lavigne, for Anchor Glass Container Corp.
Dale Denis, for Owens-Illinois, Inc.
Terrence J. O'Sullivan, for KPMG Inc.

The following judgment was delivered by

1 THE COURT:-- Ardagh PLC ("Ardagh"), seeks leave to appeal and if leave is granted appeals the Order of The Honourable Mr. Justice Farley dated August 31, 2001 which approved a sale of certain assets of Consumers Packaging Inc. and Consumers International Inc. and 164489 Canada Inc. (hereinafter collectively "Consumers") to Owens-Illinois, Inc. ("Owens-Illinois").

2 Consumers had filed for protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") on May 23, 2001 and Farley J. made an initial order on that date approving an amendment and forbearance agreement between Consumers and its institutional lenders and arranging interim credit. KPMG Inc. was appointed Monitor under s. 11.7 of the CCAA. On June 18, 2001 Farley J. authorized Consumers through an Independent Restructuring Committee and its Chief Restructuring Officer to fix a date upon which interested third parties were to submit firm, fully financed offers to purchase all or any part of Consumers' business. Both Ardagh and Owens-Illinois participated in the bid process. The Independent Restructuring Committee, the Chief Restructuring Officer and the Monitor agreed on behalf of Consumers that Owens-Illinois was the preferred bid. On the sale approval motion heard August 31, 2001, Farley J. found as a fact that Consumers was "quite sick" and "financially fragile" and that there "exists a material risk that [Consumers] will be destabilized by a withdrawal of funding by the [consortium of lenders] which have been continuously adamant about a September 2001 deadline for pay out."

3 On the evidence before us, the Owens-Illinois bid approved by Farley J. on August 31, 2001 was the result of a fair and open process developed by Consumers and its professional advisors and carried out, after May 23, 2001, under the supervision of the court and with the participation of Ardagh. The Owens-Illinois bid provides more cash to Consumers' creditors than a proposal from Ardagh, has the least completion risk, is not conditional on financing, is likely to close in a

reasonable period of time, is made by a credible purchaser (the largest glass bottle manufacturing company in the world) and will result in the continuation of Consumers' Canadian business, the retention of a vast majority of Consumers' 2,400 Canadian employees and the assumption by the purchaser of significant obligations under Consumers' employee pension plan. It is supported by all parties before this court with the exception of Ardagh.

4 The respondents on this motion submit that the restructuring proposals put forward by Ardagh were not backed by financing commitments, required further due diligence by Ardagh and its lenders, could not be completed in a timely way, offered less by way of recovery to Consumers' creditors and were no more than proposals to negotiate. It appears to have been the unanimous view of the Monitor, Consumers' Independent Restructuring Committee and Consumers' Chief Restructuring Officer that Ardagh's proposals were not viable and would, if pursued, result in the liquidation of Consumers, resulting in lower return to creditors, loss of jobs and cessation of business operations. This view was accepted by Farley J. who stated in his endorsement approving the Owens-Illinois bid that it was the "only presently viable option better than a liquidation with substantially reduced realization of value".

5 In our opinion, leave to appeal should not be granted. The authorities are clear that, due to the nature of CCAA proceedings, leave to appeal from orders made in the course of such proceedings should be granted sparingly: see Algoma Steel Inc. (Re), a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal, delivered May 25, 2001, [2001] O.J. No. 1943 at p. 3. Leave to appeal should not be granted where, as in the present case, granting leave would be prejudicial to the prospects of restructuring the business for the benefit of the stakeholders as a whole, and hence would be contrary to the spirit and objectives of the CCAA. The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA. There is a real and substantial risk that granting leave to appeal in the present case will result in significant prejudice to Consumers and its stakeholders, in light of the significant time and financial constraints currently faced by Consumers. Both Farley J. and KPMG Inc., the court-appointed Monitor in the CCAA proceedings, have concluded that the Owens-Illinois bid represents the only presently viable option available to Consumers, which would be better than a liquidation.

6 The transactions contemplated by the Owens-Illinois bid are expected to close on September 28, 2001. If the Owens-Illinois bid does not close before the end of September, 2001, it is uncertain if, and for how long, Consumers would be able to continue its operations. The financial institutions that are prepared to finance these transactions have appeared before this court and have advised, both before and throughout the CCAA proceedings, that they will not fund the operations of Consumers beyond the end of September, the time at which Consumers' credit requirements seasonally increase on an annual basis. There is no evidence on the record, and certainly none from Ardagh, as to the manner in which the operations of Consumers would be funded until the Ardagh proposal contained in its bid, if successful, could be implemented.

7 Further, despite its protestations to the contrary, it is evident that Ardagh is a disappointed bidder that obtained its security interest in the assets of Consumers in order to participate in their restructuring and obtain a controlling equity position in the restructured entity. There is authority from this court that an unsuccessful bidder has no standing to appeal or to seek leave to appeal. As a general rule, unsuccessful bidders do not have standing to challenge a motion to approve a sale to another bidder (or to appeal from an order approving the sale) because the unsuccessful bidders "have no legal or proprietary right as technically they are not affected by the order": see the statement of Farley J., dealing with a receiver's motion to approve a sale, that is quoted with approval by O'Connor J.A. of this court in Skyepharma plc v. Hyal Pharmaceutical Corp. (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 234 at 238 (C.A.). O'Connor J.A. went on to say at p. 242:

> There is a sound policy reason for restricting, to the extent possible, the involvement of prospective purchasers in sale approval motions. There is often a

> measure of urgency to complete court approved sales. This case is a good example. When unsuccessful purchasers become involved, there is a potential for greater delay and additional uncertainty. This potential may, in some situations, create commercial leverage in the hands [of] a disappointed would be purchaser which could be counterproductive to the best interests of those for whose benefit the sale is intended.

8 The position of Ardagh is not advanced by the fact that it did not challenge the order of Farley J. of June 18, 2001 which set out the parameters for the bidding. Instead it participated in the bidding process which it now attacks as being ultra vires the CCAA.

9 Finally, while we do not propose to become involved in the merits of the appeal, we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose and flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered.

10 Accordingly, leave to appeal is refused with costs.

McMURTRY C.J.O.
FINLAYSON J.A.
AUSTIN J.A.

cp/e/nc/qlrme

Case Name:

Canwest Publishing Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended AND IN THE MATTER OF a plan of compromise or arrangement of Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc., Applicants

[2010] O.J. No. 2190

2010 ONSC 2870

68 C.B.R. (5th) 233

2010 CarswellOnt 3509

Court File No. CV-10-8533-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

S.E. Pepall J.

May 21, 2010.

(19 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Sanction by court -- Application by limited partners for order authorizing them to enter into asset purchase agreement and related relief allowed -- Through sales and solicitation process, limited partners received offer whereby new limited partnership would acquire assets, assume certain liabilities and offer employment to substantially all employees -- Proposed disposition met statutory requirements, solicitation process was reasonable, sufficient efforts made to attract best possible bid and proposed transaction preferable to bankruptcy -- As senior lenders' CCAA plan was fair and reasonable, statutory requirements complied with, and no available commercial going concern alternatives if sales agreement unable to close, senior lenders' CCAA plan conditionally sanctioned.

Application by limited partners for an order authorizing them to enter into an asset purchase agreement based on a bid from the ad hoc committee of a percentage of senior subordinated noteholders and related relief. The court previously approved a support agreement between the limited partners and administrative agent for the senior lenders and authorized the limited partners to file a senior lenders' plan and commence a sale and investor solicitation process to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the support transaction. The financial advisor commenced the sales and solicitation process and received qualified bids. The ad hoc committee bid was determined to be the superior offer and the monitor recommended that the bid be accepted. The bid contemplated that a holding company would effect a transaction through a new limited partnership which would acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the limited partners, the shares of the newspaper corporation and assume certain liabilities for a purchase price

of $1.1 billion. In addition, the new limited partnership agreed to offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the limited partners and assume the pension liabilities and other benefits of the employees of the limited partners it employed and retirees. The new limited partnership planned to continue to operate all of the businesses of the limited partners in substantially the same manner they currently operated. The bid allowed for the full payout of debts owed by the limited partners to secured lenders and an additional $150 million for the unsecured creditors.

HELD: Application allowed. The limited partners were authorized to enter into the agreement as the proposed disposition of assets met the statutory and common law requirements, the process through which the agreement was reached was reasonable, sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid and the proposed transaction was preferable to bankruptcy. As the senior lenders' CCAA plan was fair and reasonable, there had been strict compliance with the statutory requirements, and there was no available commercial going concern alternatives if the sales agreement was unable to close, the senior lenders' CCAA plan was conditionally sanctioned.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 6, s. 6(3), s. 6(5), s. 6(6), s. 11, s. 36

Counsel:

Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb and Betsy Putnam, for the Applicant LP Entities.

Mario Forte, for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors.

David Byers and Maria Konyukhova, for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Andrew Kent and Hilary Clarke, for the Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders Syndicate.

M.P. Gottlieb and J.A. Swartz, for the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders Robert Chadwick and Logan Willis for 7535538 Canada Inc.

Deborah McPhail, for the Superintendant of Financial Services (FSCO).

Thomas McRae, for Certain Canwest Employees.

Endorsement

S.E. PEPALL J.:--

Relief Requested

1 The LP Entities seek an order: (1) authorizing them to enter into an Asset Purchase Agreement based on a bid from the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders ("the AHC Bid"); (2) approving an amended claims procedure; (3) authorizing the LP Entities to resume the claims process; and (4) amending the SISP procedures so that the LP Entities can advance the Ad Hoc Committee transaction (the AHC Transaction") and the Support Transaction concurrently. They also seek an order authorizing them to call a meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan on June 10, 2010. Lastly, they seek an order conditionally sanctioning the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan.

AHC Bid

2 Dealing firstly with approval of the AHC Bid, in my Initial Order of January 8, 2010, I approved the Support Agreement between the LP Entities and the Administrative Agent for the Senior Lenders and authorized the LP Entities to file a Senior Lenders' Plan and to commence a sale and investor solicitation process (the SISP). The objective of the SISP was to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the Support Transaction.

3 On January 11, 2010, the Financial Advisor, RBC Capital Markets, commenced the SISP. Qualified Bids (as that term was defined in the SISP) were received and the Monitor, in consultation with the Financial Advisor and the LP CRA, determined that the AHC Bid was a Superior Cash Offer and that none of the other bids was a Superior Offer as those terms were defined in the SISP.

4 The Monitor recommended that the LP Entities pursue the AHC Transaction and the Special Committee of the Board of Directors accepted that recommendation.

5 The AHC Transaction contemplates that 7535538 Canada Inc. ("Holdco") will effect a transaction through a new limited partnership (Opco LP) in which it will acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the LP Entities and the shares of National Post Inc. and assume certain liabilities including substantially all of the operating liabilities for a purchase price of $1.1 billion. At closing, Opco LP will offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and will assume all of the pension liabilities and other benefits for employees of the LP Entities who will be employed by Opco LP, as well as for retirees currently covered by registered pension plans or other benefit plans. The materials submitted with the AHC Bid indicated that Opco LP will continue to operate all of the businesses of the LP Entities in substantially the same manner as they are currently operated, with no immediate plans to discontinue operations, sell material assets or make significant changes to current management. The AHC Bid will also allow for a full payout of the debt owed by the LP Entities to the LP Secured Lenders under the LP credit agreement and the Hedging Creditors and provides an additional $150 million in value which will be available for the unsecured creditors of the LP Entities.

6 The purchase price will consist of an amount in cash that is equal to the sum of the Senior Secured Claims Amount (as defined in the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement), a promissory note of $150 million (to be exchanged for up to 45% of the common shares of Holdco) and the assumption of certain liabilities of the LP Entities.

7 The Ad Hoc Committee has indicated that Holdco has received commitments for $950 million of funded debt and equity financing to finance the AHC Bid. This includes $700 million of new senior funded debt to be raised by Opco LP and $250 million of mezzanine debt and equity to be raised including from the current members of the Ad Hoc Committee.

8 Certain liabilities are excluded including pre-filing liabilities and restructuring period claims, certain employee related liabilities and intercompany liabilities between and among the LP Entities and the CMI Entities. Effective as of the closing date, Opco LP will offer employment to all full-time and part-time employees of the LP Entities on substantially similar terms as their then existing employment (or the terms set out in their collective agreement, as applicable), subject to the option, exercisable on or before May 30, 2010, to not offer employment to up to 10% of the non-unionized part-time or temporary employees employed by the LP Entities.

9 The AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented pursuant to a plan of compromise or arrangement between the LP Entities and certain unsecured creditors (the "AHC Plan"). In brief, the AHC Plan would provide that Opco LP would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities. The Senior Lenders would be unaffected creditors and would be paid in full. Unsecured creditors with proven claims of $1,000 or less would receive cash. The balance of the consideration would be satisfied by an unsecured demand note of $150 million less the amounts paid to the $1,000 unsecured creditors. Ultimately, affected unsecured creditors with proven claims would receive shares in Holdco and Holdco would apply for the listing of its common shares on the

Toronto Stock Exchange.

10 The Monitor recommended that the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement based on the AHC Bid be authorized. Certain factors were particularly relevant to the Monitor in making its recommendation:

- the Senior Lenders will received 100 cents on the dollar;
- the AHC Transaction will preserve substantially all of the business of the LP Entities to the benefit of the LP Entities' suppliers and the millions of people who rely on the LP Entities' publications each day;
- the AHC Transaction preserves the employment of substantially all of the current employees and largely protects the interests of former employees and retirees;
- the AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented through a Plan under which $150 million in cash or shares will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors;
- unlike the Support Transaction, there is no option not to assume certain pension or employee benefits obligations.

11 The Monitor, the LP CRA and the Financial Advisor considered closing risks associated with the AHC Bid and concluded that the Bid was credible, reasonably certain and financially viable. The LP Entities agreed with that assessment. All appearing either supported the AHC Transaction or were unopposed.

12 Clearly the SISP was successful and in my view, the LP Entities should be authorized to enter the Ad Hoc Committee Asset Purchase Agreement as requested.

13 The proposed disposition of assets meets the section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.*[1] decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable and the Monitor was content with it. Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid; the SISP was widely publicized; ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy. The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well. The LP Entities' Senior Lenders were either consulted and/or had the right to approve the various steps in the SISP. The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive. Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors. The consideration to be received is reasonable and fair. The Financial Advisor and the Monitor were both of the opinion that the SISP was a thorough canvassing of the market. The AHC Transaction was the highest offer received and delivers considerably more value than the Support Transaction which was in essence a "stalking horse" offer made by the single largest creditor constituency. The remaining subsequent provisions of section 36 of the CCAA are either inapplicable or have been complied with. In conclusion the AHC Transaction ought to be and is approved.

Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order

14 Turning to the Claims Procedure Order, as a result of the foregoing, the scope of the claims process needs to be expanded. Claims that have been filed will move to adjudication and resolution and in addition, the scope of the process needs to be expanded so as to ensure that as many creditors as possible have an opportunity to participate in the meeting to consider the Ad Hoc Committee Plan and to participate in distributions. Dates and timing also have to be adjusted. In these circumstances the requested Claims Procedure Order should be approved. Additionally, the Meeting Order required to convene a meeting of unsecured creditors on June 10, 2010 to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan is granted.

SISP Amendment

15 It is proposed that the LP Entities will work diligently to implement the AHC Transaction while concurrently pursuing such steps as are required to effect the Support Transaction. The SISP procedures must be amended. The AHC Transaction which is to be effected through the Ad Hoc Committee Plan cannot be completed within the sixty days contemplated by the SISP. On consent of the Monitor, the LP Administrative Agent, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP Entities, the SISP is amended to extend the date for closing of the AHC Transaction and to permit the proposed dual track procedure. The proposed amendments to the SISP are clearly warranted as a practical matter and so as to procure the best available going concern outcome for the LP Entities and their stakeholders. Paragraph 102 of the Initial Order contains a comeback clause which provides that interested parties may move to amend the Initial Order on notice. This would include a motion to amend the SISP which is effectively incorporated into the Initial Order by reference. The Applicants submit that I have broad general jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA to make such amendments. In my view, it is unnecessary to decide that issue as the affected parties are consenting to the proposed amendments.

Dual Track and Sanction of Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan

16 In my view, it is prudent for the LP Entities to simultaneously advance the AHC Transaction and the Support Transaction. To that end, the LP Entities seek approval of a conditional sanction order. They ask for conditional authorization to enter into the Acquisition and Assumption Agreement pursuant to a Credit Acquisition Sanction, Approval and Vesting Order.

17 The Senior Lenders' meeting was held January 27, 2010 and 97.5% in number and 88.7% in value of the Senior Lenders holding Proven Principal Claims who were present and voting voted in favour of the Senior Lenders' Plan. This was well in excess of the required majorities.

18 The LP Entities are seeking the sanction of the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan on the basis that its implementation is conditional on the delivery of a Monitor's Certificate. The certificate will not be delivered if the AHC Bid closes. Satisfactory arrangements have been made to address closing timelines as well as access to advisor and management time. Absent the closing of the AHC Transaction, the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable as between the LP Entities and its creditors. If the AHC Transaction is unable to close, I conclude that there are no available commercial going concern alternatives to the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan. The market was fully canvassed during the SISP; there was ample time to conduct such a canvass; it was professionally supervised; and the AHC Bid was the only Superior Offer as that term was defined in the SISP. For these reasons, I am prepared to find that the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable and may be conditionally sanctioned. I also note that there has been strict compliance with statutory requirements and nothing has been done or purported to have been done which was not authorized by the CCAA. As such, the three part test set forth in the *Re: Canadian Airlines Corp.*[2] has been met. Additionally, there has been compliance with section 6 of the CCAA. The Crown, employee and pension claims described in section 6 (3),(5), and (6) have been addressed in the Senior Lenders' Plan at sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.

Conclusion

19 In conclusion, it is evident to me that the parties who have been engaged in this CCAA proceeding have worked diligently and cooperatively, rigorously protecting their own interests but at the same time achieving a positive outcome for the LP Entities' stakeholders as a whole. As I indicated in Court, for this they and their professional advisors should be commended. The business of the LP Entities affects many people - creditors, employees, retirees, suppliers, community members and the millions who rely on their publications for their news. This is a good chapter in the LP Entities' CCAA story. Hopefully, it will have a happy ending.

S.E. PEPALL J.

cp/e/qlafr/qljxr/qlana

1 [1991] O.J. 1137.

2 2000 ABQB 442, leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238, affirmed 2001 ABCA 9, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60.

TAB 3

Case Name:

Canwest Publishing Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended AND IN THE MATTER OF a plan of compromise or arrangement of Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc., Applicants

[2010] O.J. No. 2190

2010 ONSC 2870

68 C.B.R. (5th) 233

2010 CarswellOnt 3509

Court File No. CV-10-8533-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

S.E. Pepall J.

May 21, 2010.

(19 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Sanction by court -- Application by limited partners for order authorizing them to enter into asset purchase agreement and related relief allowed -- Through sales and solicitation process, limited partners received offer whereby new limited partnership would acquire assets, assume certain liabilities and offer employment to substantially all employees -- Proposed disposition met statutory requirements, solicitation process was reasonable, sufficient efforts made to attract best possible bid and proposed transaction preferable to bankruptcy -- As senior lenders' CCAA plan was fair and reasonable, statutory requirements complied with, and no available commercial going concern alternatives if sales agreement unable to close, senior lenders' CCAA plan conditionally sanctioned.

Application by limited partners for an order authorizing them to enter into an asset purchase agreement based on a bid from the ad hoc committee of a percentage of senior subordinated noteholders and related relief. The court previously approved a support agreement between the limited partners and administrative agent for the senior lenders and authorized the limited partners to file a senior lenders' plan and commence a sale and investor solicitation process to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the support transaction. The financial advisor commenced the sales and solicitation process and received qualified bids. The ad hoc committee bid was determined to be the superior offer and the monitor recommended that the bid be accepted. The bid contemplated that a holding company would effect a transaction through a new limited partnership which would acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the limited partners, the shares of the newspaper corporation and assume certain liabilities for a purchase price

of $1.1 billion. In addition, the new limited partnership agreed to offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the limited partners and assume the pension liabilities and other benefits of the employees of the limited partners it employed and retirees. The new limited partnership planned to continue to operate all of the businesses of the limited partners in substantially the same manner they currently operated. The bid allowed for the full payout of debts owed by the limited partners to secured lenders and an additional $150 million for the unsecured creditors.

HELD: Application allowed. The limited partners were authorized to enter into the agreement as the proposed disposition of assets met the statutory and common law requirements, the process through which the agreement was reached was reasonable, sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid and the proposed transaction was preferable to bankruptcy. As the senior lenders' CCAA plan was fair and reasonable, there had been strict compliance with the statutory requirements, and there was no available commercial going concern alternatives if the sales agreement was unable to close, the senior lenders' CCAA plan was conditionally sanctioned.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 6, s. 6(3), s. 6(5), s. 6(6), s. 11, s. 36

Counsel:

Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb and Betsy Putnam, for the Applicant LP Entities.

Mario Forte, for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors.

David Byers and Maria Konyukhova, for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Andrew Kent and Hilary Clarke, for the Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders Syndicate.

M.P. Gottlieb and J.A. Swartz, for the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders Robert Chadwick and Logan Willis for 7535538 Canada Inc.

Deborah McPhail, for the Superintendant of Financial Services (FSCO).

Thomas McRae, for Certain Canwest Employees.

Endorsement

S.E. PEPALL J.:--

Relief Requested

1 The LP Entities seek an order: (1) authorizing them to enter into an Asset Purchase Agreement based on a bid from the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders ("the AHC Bid"); (2) approving an amended claims procedure; (3) authorizing the LP Entities to resume the claims process; and (4) amending the SISP procedures so that the LP Entities can advance the Ad Hoc Committee transaction (the AHC Transaction") and the Support Transaction concurrently. They also seek an order authorizing them to call a meeting of unsecured creditors to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan on June 10, 2010. Lastly, they seek an order conditionally sanctioning the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan.

AHC Bid

2 Dealing firstly with approval of the AHC Bid, in my Initial Order of January 8, 2010, I approved the Support Agreement between the LP Entities and the Administrative Agent for the Senior Lenders and authorized the LP Entities to file a Senior Lenders' Plan and to commence a sale and investor solicitation process (the SISP). The objective of the SISP was to test the market and obtain an offer that was superior to the terms of the Support Transaction.

3 On January 11, 2010, the Financial Advisor, RBC Capital Markets, commenced the SISP. Qualified Bids (as that term was defined in the SISP) were received and the Monitor, in consultation with the Financial Advisor and the LP CRA, determined that the AHC Bid was a Superior Cash Offer and that none of the other bids was a Superior Offer as those terms were defined in the SISP.

4 The Monitor recommended that the LP Entities pursue the AHC Transaction and the Special Committee of the Board of Directors accepted that recommendation.

5 The AHC Transaction contemplates that 7535538 Canada Inc. ("Holdco") will effect a transaction through a new limited partnership (Opco LP) in which it will acquire substantially all of the financial and operating assets of the LP Entities and the shares of National Post Inc. and assume certain liabilities including substantially all of the operating liabilities for a purchase price of $1.1 billion. At closing, Opco LP will offer employment to substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and will assume all of the pension liabilities and other benefits for employees of the LP Entities who will be employed by Opco LP, as well as for retirees currently covered by registered pension plans or other benefit plans. The materials submitted with the AHC Bid indicated that Opco LP will continue to operate all of the businesses of the LP Entities in substantially the same manner as they are currently operated, with no immediate plans to discontinue operations, sell material assets or make significant changes to current management. The AHC Bid will also allow for a full payout of the debt owed by the LP Entities to the LP Secured Lenders under the LP credit agreement and the Hedging Creditors and provides an additional $150 million in value which will be available for the unsecured creditors of the LP Entities.

6 The purchase price will consist of an amount in cash that is equal to the sum of the Senior Secured Claims Amount (as defined in the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement), a promissory note of $150 million (to be exchanged for up to 45% of the common shares of Holdco) and the assumption of certain liabilities of the LP Entities.

7 The Ad Hoc Committee has indicated that Holdco has received commitments for $950 million of funded debt and equity financing to finance the AHC Bid. This includes $700 million of new senior funded debt to be raised by Opco LP and $250 million of mezzanine debt and equity to be raised including from the current members of the Ad Hoc Committee.

8 Certain liabilities are excluded including pre-filing liabilities and restructuring period claims, certain employee related liabilities and intercompany liabilities between and among the LP Entities and the CMI Entities. Effective as of the closing date, Opco LP will offer employment to all full-time and part-time employees of the LP Entities on substantially similar terms as their then existing employment (or the terms set out in their collective agreement, as applicable), subject to the option, exercisable on or before May 30, 2010, to not offer employment to up to 10% of the non-unionized part-time or temporary employees employed by the LP Entities.

9 The AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented pursuant to a plan of compromise or arrangement between the LP Entities and certain unsecured creditors (the "AHC Plan"). In brief, the AHC Plan would provide that Opco LP would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities. The Senior Lenders would be unaffected creditors and would be paid in full. Unsecured creditors with proven claims of $1,000 or less would receive cash. The balance of the consideration would be satisfied by an unsecured demand note of $150 million less the amounts paid to the $1,000 unsecured creditors. Ultimately, affected unsecured creditors with proven claims would receive shares in Holdco and Holdco would apply for the listing of its common shares on the

Toronto Stock Exchange.

10 The Monitor recommended that the AHC Asset Purchase Agreement based on the AHC Bid be authorized. Certain factors were particularly relevant to the Monitor in making its recommendation:

- the Senior Lenders will received 100 cents on the dollar;
- the AHC Transaction will preserve substantially all of the business of the LP Entities to the benefit of the LP Entities' suppliers and the millions of people who rely on the LP Entities' publications each day;
- the AHC Transaction preserves the employment of substantially all of the current employees and largely protects the interests of former employees and retirees;
- the AHC Bid contemplates that the transaction will be implemented through a Plan under which $150 million in cash or shares will be available for distribution to unsecured creditors;
- unlike the Support Transaction, there is no option not to assume certain pension or employee benefits obligations.

11 The Monitor, the LP CRA and the Financial Advisor considered closing risks associated with the AHC Bid and concluded that the Bid was credible, reasonably certain and financially viable. The LP Entities agreed with that assessment. All appearing either supported the AHC Transaction or were unopposed.

12 Clearly the SISP was successful and in my view, the LP Entities should be authorized to enter the Ad Hoc Committee Asset Purchase Agreement as requested.

13 The proposed disposition of assets meets the section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.*[1] decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable and the Monitor was content with it. Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid; the SISP was widely publicized; ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy. The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well. The LP Entities' Senior Lenders were either consulted and/or had the right to approve the various steps in the SISP. The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive. Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors. The consideration to be received is reasonable and fair. The Financial Advisor and the Monitor were both of the opinion that the SISP was a thorough canvassing of the market. The AHC Transaction was the highest offer received and delivers considerably more value than the Support Transaction which was in essence a "stalking horse" offer made by the single largest creditor constituency. The remaining subsequent provisions of section 36 of the CCAA are either inapplicable or have been complied with. In conclusion the AHC Transaction ought to be and is approved.

Claims Procedure Order and Meeting Order

14 Turning to the Claims Procedure Order, as a result of the foregoing, the scope of the claims process needs to be expanded. Claims that have been filed will move to adjudication and resolution and in addition, the scope of the process needs to be expanded so as to ensure that as many creditors as possible have an opportunity to participate in the meeting to consider the Ad Hoc Committee Plan and to participate in distributions. Dates and timing also have to be adjusted. In these circumstances the requested Claims Procedure Order should be approved. Additionally, the Meeting Order required to convene a meeting of unsecured creditors on June 10, 2010 to vote on the Ad Hoc Committee Plan is granted.

SISP Amendment

15 It is proposed that the LP Entities will work diligently to implement the AHC Transaction while concurrently pursuing such steps as are required to effect the Support Transaction. The SISP procedures must be amended. The AHC Transaction which is to be effected through the Ad Hoc Committee Plan cannot be completed within the sixty days contemplated by the SISP. On consent of the Monitor, the LP Administrative Agent, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP Entities, the SISP is amended to extend the date for closing of the AHC Transaction and to permit the proposed dual track procedure. The proposed amendments to the SISP are clearly warranted as a practical matter and so as to procure the best available going concern outcome for the LP Entities and their stakeholders. Paragraph 102 of the Initial Order contains a comeback clause which provides that interested parties may move to amend the Initial Order on notice. This would include a motion to amend the SISP which is effectively incorporated into the Initial Order by reference. The Applicants submit that I have broad general jurisdiction under section 11 of the CCAA to make such amendments. In my view, it is unnecessary to decide that issue as the affected parties are consenting to the proposed amendments.

Dual Track and Sanction of Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan

16 In my view, it is prudent for the LP Entities to simultaneously advance the AHC Transaction and the Support Transaction. To that end, the LP Entities seek approval of a conditional sanction order. They ask for conditional authorization to enter into the Acquisition and Assumption Agreement pursuant to a Credit Acquisition Sanction, Approval and Vesting Order.

17 The Senior Lenders' meeting was held January 27, 2010 and 97.5% in number and 88.7% in value of the Senior Lenders holding Proven Principal Claims who were present and voting voted in favour of the Senior Lenders' Plan. This was well in excess of the required majorities.

18 The LP Entities are seeking the sanction of the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan on the basis that its implementation is conditional on the delivery of a Monitor's Certificate. The certificate will not be delivered if the AHC Bid closes. Satisfactory arrangements have been made to address closing timelines as well as access to advisor and management time. Absent the closing of the AHC Transaction, the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable as between the LP Entities and its creditors. If the AHC Transaction is unable to close, I conclude that there are no available commercial going concern alternatives to the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan. The market was fully canvassed during the SISP; there was ample time to conduct such a canvass; it was professionally supervised; and the AHC Bid was the only Superior Offer as that term was defined in the SISP. For these reasons, I am prepared to find that the Senior Lenders' CCAA Plan is fair and reasonable and may be conditionally sanctioned. I also note that there has been strict compliance with statutory requirements and nothing has been done or purported to have been done which was not authorized by the CCAA. As such, the three part test set forth in the *Re: Canadian Airlines Corp.*[2] has been met. Additionally, there has been compliance with section 6 of the CCAA. The Crown, employee and pension claims described in section 6 (3),(5), and (6) have been addressed in the Senior Lenders' Plan at sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.

Conclusion

19 In conclusion, it is evident to me that the parties who have been engaged in this CCAA proceeding have worked diligently and cooperatively, rigorously protecting their own interests but at the same time achieving a positive outcome for the LP Entities' stakeholders as a whole. As I indicated in Court, for this they and their professional advisors should be commended. The business of the LP Entities affects many people - creditors, employees, retirees, suppliers, community members and the millions who rely on their publications for their news. This is a good chapter in the LP Entities' CCAA story. Hopefully, it will have a happy ending.

S.E. PEPALL J.

cp/e/qlafr/qljxr/qlana

1 [1991] O.J. 1137.

2 2000 ABQB 442, leave to appeal refused 2000 ABCA 238, affirmed 2001 ABCA 9, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 12, 2001, [2001] S.C.C.A. No. 60.

TAB 4

Indexed as:
Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp.

Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair Corp., Canadian Pension Capital Ltd. and Canadian Insurers Capital Corp.

[1991] O.J. No. 1137

4 O.R. (3d) 1

83 D.L.R. (4th) 76

46 O.A.C. 321

7 C.B.R. (3d) 1

27 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1178

1991 CanLII 2727

Action No. 318/91

Court of Appeal for Ontario

Goodman, Mckinlay and Galligan JJ.A.

July 3, 1991

Counsel:

J.B. Berkow and Steven H. Goldman, for appellants.

John T. Morin, Q.C., for Air Canada.

L.A.J. Barnes and Lawrence E. Ritchie, for Royal Bank of Canada.

Sean F. Dunphy and G.K. Ketcheson for Ernst & Young Inc., receiver of Soundair Corp., respondent.

W.G. Horton, for Ontario Express Ltd.

Nancy J. Spies, for Frontier Air Ltd.

---

1 GALLIGAN J.A.:-- This is an appeal from the order of Rosenberg J. made on May 1, 1991 (Gen. Div.). By that order, he approved the sale of Air Toronto to Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Air Limited and he dismissed a motion to approve an offer to purchase Air Toronto by 922246 Ontario Limited.

2 It is necessary at the outset to give some background to the dispute. Soundair Corporation (Soundair) is a corporation engaged in the air transport business. It has three divisions. One of them is Air Toronto. Air Toronto operates a scheduled airline from Toronto to a number of mid-sized cities in the United States of America. Its routes serve as feeders to several of Air Canada's routes. Pursuant to a connector agreement, Air Canada provides some services to Air Toronto and benefits from the feeder traffic provided by it. The operational relationship between Air Canada and Air Toronto is a close one.

3 In the latter part of 1989 and the early part of 1990, Soundair was in financial difficulty. Soundair has two secured creditors who have an interest in the assets of Air Toronto. The Royal Bank of Canada (the Royal Bank) is owed at least $65,000,000. The appellants Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively called CCFL) are owed approximately $9,500,000. Those creditors will have a deficiency expected to be in excess of $50,000,000 on the winding-up of Soundair.

4 On April 26, 1990, upon the motion of the Royal Bank, O'Brien J. appointed Ernst & Young Inc. (the receiver) as receiver of all of the assets, property and undertakings of Soundair. The order required the receiver to operate Air Toronto and sell it as a going concern. Because of the close relationship between Air Toronto and Air Canada, it was contemplated that the receiver would obtain the assistance of Air Canada to operate Air Toronto. The order authorized the receiver:

> (b) to enter into contractual arrangements with Air Canada to retain a manager or operator, including Air Canada, to manage and operate Air Toronto under the supervision of Ernst & Young Inc. until the completion of the sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada or other person ...

Also because of the close relationship, it was expected that Air Canada would purchase Air Toronto. To that end, the order of O'Brien J. authorized the receiver:

> (c) to negotiate and do all things necessary or desirable to complete a sale of Air Toronto to Air Canada and, if a sale to Air Canada cannot be completed, to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person, subject to terms and conditions approved by this Court.

5 Over a period of several weeks following that order, negotiations directed towards the sale of Air Toronto took place between the receiver and Air Canada. Air Canada had an agreement with the receiver that it would have exclusive negotiating rights during that period. I do not think it is necessary to review those negotiations, but I note that Air Canada had complete access to all of the operations of Air Toronto and conducted due diligence examinations. It became thoroughly acquainted with every aspect of Air Toronto's operations.

6 Those negotiations came to an end when an offer made by Air Canada on June 19, 1990, was considered unsatisfactory by the receiver. The offer was not accepted and lapsed. Having regard to the tenor of Air Canada's negotiating stance and a letter sent by its solicitors on July 20, 1990, I think that the receiver was eminently reasonable when it decided that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada.

7 The receiver then looked elsewhere. Air Toronto's feeder business is very attractive, but it only has value to a national airline. The receiver concluded reasonably, therefore, that it was commercially necessary for one of Canada's two national airlines to be involved in any sale of Air Toronto. Realistically, there were only two possible purchasers whether direct or indirect. They were Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International.

8 It was well known in the air transport industry that Air Toronto was for sale. During the months

following the collapse of the negotiations with Air Canada, the receiver tried unsuccessfully to find viable purchasers. In late 1990, the receiver turned to Canadian Airlines International, the only realistic alternative. Negotiations began between them. Those negotiations led to a letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. On March 6, 1991, the receiver received an offer from Ontario Express Limited and Frontier Airlines Limited, who are subsidiaries of Canadian Airlines International. This offer is called the OEL offer.

9 In the meantime, Air Canada and CCFL were having discussions about making an offer for the purchase of Air Toronto. They formed 922246 Ontario Limited (922) for the purpose of purchasing Air Toronto. On March 1, 1991, CCFL wrote to the receiver saying that it proposed to make an offer. On March 7, 1991, Air Canada and CCFL presented an offer to the receiver in the name of 922. For convenience, its offers are called the 922 offers.

10 The first 922 offer contained a condition which was unacceptable to the receiver. I will refer to that condition in more detail later. The receiver declined the 922 offer and on March 8, 1991, accepted the OEL offer. Subsequently, 922 obtained an order allowing it to make a second offer. It then submitted an offer which was virtually identical to that of March 7, 1991, except that the unacceptable condition had been removed.

11 The proceedings before Rosenberg J. then followed. He approved the sale to OEL and dismissed a motion for the acceptance of the 922 offer. Before Rosenberg J., and in this court, both CCFL and the Royal Bank supported the acceptance of the second 922 offer.

12 There are only two issues which must be resolved in this appeal. They are:

(1) Did the receiver act properly when it entered into an agreement to sell Air Toronto to OEL?
(2) What effect does the support of the 922 offer by the secured creditors have on the result?

13 I will deal with the two issues separately.

I. DID THE RECEIVER ACT PROPERLY IN AGREEING TO SELL TO OEL?

14 Before dealing with that issue there are three general observations which I think I should make. The first is that the sale of an airline as a going concern is a very complex process. The best method of selling an airline at the best price is something far removed from the expertise of a court. When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver. The third observation which I wish to make is that the conduct of the receiver should be reviewed in the light of the specific mandate given to him by the court.

15 The order of O'Brien J. provided that if the receiver could not complete the sale to Air Canada that it was "to negotiate and sell Air Toronto to another person". The court did not say how the receiver was to negotiate the sale. It did not say it was to call for bids or conduct an auction. It told the receiver to negotiate and sell. It obviously intended, because of the unusual nature of the asset being sold, to leave the method of sale substantially in the discretion of the receiver. I think, therefore, that the court should not review minutely the process of the sale when, broadly speaking, it appears to the court to be a just process.

16 As did Rosenberg J., I adopt as correct the statement made by Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co.

v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.), at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., of the duties which a court must perform when deciding whether a receiver who has sold a property acted properly. When he set out the court's duties, he did not put them in any order of priority, nor do I. I summarize those duties as follows:

1. It should consider whether the receiver has made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.
2. It should consider the interests of all parties.
3. It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers are obtained.
4. It should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

17 I intend to discuss the performance of those duties separately.

1. Did the receiver make a sufficient effort to get the best price and did it act providently?

18 Having regard to the fact that it was highly unlikely that a commercially viable sale could be made to anyone but the two national airlines, or to someone supported by either of them, it is my view that the receiver acted wisely and reasonably when it negotiated only with Air Canada and Canadian Airlines International. Furthermore, when Air Canada said that it would submit no further offers and gave the impression that it would not participate further in the receiver's efforts to sell, the only course reasonably open to the receiver was to negotiate with Canadian Airlines International. Realistically, there was nowhere else to go but to Canadian Airlines International. In doing so, it is my opinion that the receiver made sufficient efforts to sell the airline.

19 When the receiver got the OEL offer on March 6, 1991, it was over ten months since it had been charged with the responsibility of selling Air Toronto. Until then, the receiver had not received one offer which it thought was acceptable. After substantial efforts to sell the airline over that period, I find it difficult to think that the receiver acted improvidently in accepting the only acceptable offer which it had.

20 On March 8, 1991, the date when the receiver accepted the OEL offer, it had only two offers, the OEL offer which was acceptable, and the 922 offer which contained an unacceptable condition. I cannot see how the receiver, assuming for the moment that the price was reasonable, could have done anything but accept the OEL offer.

21 When deciding whether a receiver had acted providently, the court should examine the conduct of the receiver in light of the information the receiver had when it agreed to accept an offer. In this case, the court should look at the receiver's conduct in the light of the information it had when it made its decision on March 8, 1991. The court should be very cautious before deciding that the receiver's conduct was improvident based upon information which has come to light after it made its decision. To do so, in my view, would derogate from the mandate to sell given to the receiver by the order of O'Brien J. I agree with and adopt what was said by Anderson J. in Crown Trust v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 112 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R.:

> Its decision was made as a matter of business judgment on the elements then available to it. It is of the very essence of a receiver's function to make such judgments and in the making of them to act seriously and responsibly so as to be prepared to stand behind them.
>
> If the court were to reject the recommendation of the Receiver in any but the most exceptional circumstances, it would materially diminish and weaken the role and function of the Receiver both in the perception of receivers and in the perception of any others who might have occasion to deal with them. It would

> lead to the conclusion that the decision of the Receiver was of little weight and that the real decision was always made upon the motion for approval. That would be a consequence susceptible of immensely damaging results to the disposition of assets by court-appointed receivers.

(Emphasis added)

22 I also agree with and adopt what was said by Macdonald J.A. in Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), at p. 11 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

> In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a binding agreement.

(Emphasis added)

23 On March 8, 1991, the receiver had two offers. One was the OEL offer which it considered satisfactory but which could be withdrawn by OEL at any time before it was accepted. The receiver also had the 922 offer which contained a condition that was totally unacceptable. It had no other offers. It was faced with the dilemma of whether it should decline to accept the OEL offer and run the risk of it being withdrawn, in the hope that an acceptable offer would be forthcoming from 922. An affidavit filed by the president of the receiver describes the dilemma which the receiver faced, and the judgment made in the light of that dilemma:

> 24. An asset purchase agreement was received by Ernst & Young on March 7, 1991 which was dated March 6, 1991. This agreement was received from CCFL in respect of their offer to purchase the assets and undertaking of Air Toronto. Apart from financial considerations, which will be considered in a subsequent affidavit, the Receiver determined that it would not be prudent to delay acceptance of the OEL agreement to negotiate a highly uncertain arrangement with Air Canada and CCFL. Air Canada had the benefit of an "exclusive" in negotiations for Air Toronto and had clearly indicated its intention to take itself out of the running while ensuring that no other party could seek to purchase Air Toronto and maintain the Air Canada connector arrangement vital to its survival. The CCFL offer represented a radical reversal of this position by Air Canada at the eleventh hour. However, it contained a significant number of conditions to closing which were entirely beyond the control of the Receiver. As well, the CCFL offer came less than 24 hours before signing of the agreement with OEL which had been negotiated over a period of months, at great time and expense.

(Emphasis added)
I am convinced that the decision made was a sound one in the circumstances faced by the receiver on March 8, 1991.

24 I now turn to consider whether the price contained in the OEL offer was one which it was provident to accept. At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after ten months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable. In a deteriorating economy, I doubt that it would have been wise to wait any longer.

25 I mentioned earlier that, pursuant to an order, 922 was permitted to present a second offer. During the hearing of the appeal, counsel compared at great length the price contained in the second

922 offer with the price contained in the OEL offer. Counsel put forth various hypotheses supporting their contentions that one offer was better than the other.

26 It is my opinion that the price contained in the 922 offer is relevant only if it shows that the price obtained by the Receiver in the OEL offer was not a reasonable one. In Crown Trust v. Rosenberg, supra, Anderson J., at p. 113 O.R., p. 551 D.L.R., discussed the comparison of offers in the following way:

> No doubt, as the cases have indicated, situations might arise where the disparity was so great as to call in question the adequacy of the mechanism which had produced the offers. It is not so here, and in my view that is substantially an end of the matter.

27 In two judgments, Saunders J. considered the circumstances in which an offer submitted after the receiver had agreed to a sale should be considered by the court. The first is Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 247:

> If, for example, in this case there had been a second offer of a substantially higher amount, then the court would have to take that offer into consideration in assessing whether the receiver had properly carried out his function of endeavouring to obtain the best price for the property.

28 The second is Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 243:

> If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate.

29 In Re Selkirk (1987), 64 C.B.R. (N.S.) 140 (Ont. Bkcy.), at p. 142, McRae J. expressed a similar view:

> The court will not lightly withhold approval of a sale by the receiver, particularly in a case such as this where the receiver is given rather wide discretionary authority as per the order of Mr. Justice Trainor and, of course, where the receiver is an officer of this court. Only in a case where there seems to be some unfairness in the process of the sale or where there are substantially higher offers which would tend to show that the sale was improvident will the court withhold approval. It is important that the court recognize the commercial exigencies that would flow if prospective purchasers are allowed to wait until the sale is in court for approval before submitting their final offer. This is something that must be discouraged.

(Emphasis added)

30 What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.

31 If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.

32 It is necessary to consider the two offers. Rosenberg J. held that the 922 offer was slightly better or marginally better than the OEL offer. He concluded that the difference in the two offers did not show that the sale process adopted by the receiver was inadequate or improvident.

33 Counsel for the appellants complained about the manner in which Rosenberg J. conducted the hearing of the motion to confirm the OEL sale. The complaint was, that when they began to discuss a comparison of the two offers, Rosenberg J. said that he considered the 922 offer to be better than the OEL offer. Counsel said that when that comment was made, they did not think it necessary to argue further the question of the difference in value between the two offers. They complain that the finding that the 922 offer was only marginally better or slightly better than the OEL offer was made without them having had the opportunity to argue that the 922 offer was substantially better or significantly better than the OEL offer. I cannot understand how counsel could have thought that by expressing the opinion that the 922 offer was better, Rosenberg J. was saying that it was a significantly or substantially better one. Nor can I comprehend how counsel took the comment to mean that they were foreclosed from arguing that the offer was significantly or substantially better. If there was some misunderstanding on the part of counsel, it should have been raised before Rosenberg J. at the time. I am sure that if it had been, the misunderstanding would have been cleared up quickly. Nevertheless, this court permitted extensive argument dealing with the comparison of the two offers.

34 The 922 offer provided for $6,000,000 cash to be paid on closing with a royalty based upon a percentage of Air Toronto profits over a period of five years up to a maximum of $3,000,000. The OEL offer provided for a payment of $2,000,000 on closing with a royalty paid on gross revenues over a five-year period. In the short term, the 922 offer is obviously better because there is substantially more cash up front. The chances of future returns are substantially greater in the OEL offer because royalties are paid on gross revenues while the royalties under the 922 offer are paid only on profits. There is an element of risk involved in each offer.

35 The receiver studied the two offers. It compared them and took into account the risks, the advantages and the disadvantages of each. It considered the appropriate contingencies. It is not necessary to outline the factors which were taken into account by the receiver because the manager of its insolvency practice filed an affidavit outlining the considerations which were weighed in its evaluation of the two offers. They seem to me to be reasonable ones. That affidavit concluded with the following paragraph:

> 24. On the basis of these considerations the Receiver has approved the OEL offer and has concluded that it represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for the Air Toronto division of SoundAir.

36 The court appointed the receiver to conduct the sale of Air Toronto and entrusted it with the responsibility of deciding what is the best offer. I put great weight upon the opinion of the receiver. It swore to the court which appointed it that the OEL offer represents the achievement of the highest possible value at this time for Air Toronto. I have not been convinced that the receiver was wrong when he made that assessment. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the 922 offer does not demonstrate any failure upon the part of the receiver to act properly and providently.

37 It follows that if Rosenberg J. was correct when he found that the 922 offer was in fact better, I agree with him that it could only have been slightly or marginally better. The 922 offer does not lead to an inference that the disposition strategy of the receiver was inadequate, unsuccessful or

improvident, nor that the price was unreasonable.

38 I am, therefore, of the opinion that the receiver made a sufficient effort to get the best price and has not acted improvidently.

2. Consideration of the interests of all parties

39 It is well established that the primary interest is that of the creditors of the debtor: see Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, and Re Selkirk (1986, Saunders J.), supra. However, as Saunders J. pointed out in Re Beauty Counsellors, supra, at p. 244 C.B.R., "it is not the only or overriding consideration".

40 In my opinion, there are other persons whose interests require consideration. In an appropriate case, the interests of the debtor must be taken into account. I think also, in a case such as this, where a purchaser has bargained at some length and doubtless at considerable expense with the receiver, the interests of the purchaser ought to be taken into account. While it is not explicitly stated in such cases as Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, Re Selkirk (1986, Saunders J.), supra, Re Beauty Counsellors, supra, Re Selkirk (1987, McRae J.), supra, and Cameron, supra, I think they clearly imply that the interests of a person who has negotiated an agreement with a court-appointed receiver are very important.

41 In this case, the interests of all parties who would have an interest in the process were considered by the receiver and by Rosenberg J.

3. Consideration of the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offer was obtained

42 While it is accepted that the primary concern of a receiver is the protecting of the interests of the creditors, there is a secondary but very important consideration and that is the integrity of the process by which the sale is effected. This is particularly so in the case of a sale of such a unique asset as an airline as a going concern.

43 The importance of a court protecting the integrity of the process has been stated in a number of cases. First, I refer to Re Selkirk (1986), supra, where Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

> In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interest of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with commercial efficacy and integrity.
>
> In that connection I adopt the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Appeal Division) in Cameron v. Bank of N.S. (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303, 86 A.P.R. 303 (C.A.), where he said at p. 11:
>
> In my opinion if the decision of the receiver to enter into an agreement of sale, subject to court approval, with respect to certain assets is reasonable and sound under the circumstances at the time existing it should not be set aside simply because a later and higher bid is made. To do so would literally create chaos in the commercial world and receivers and purchasers would never be sure they had a finding agreement. On the contrary, they would know that other bids could be received and considered up until the application for court approval is heard -- this would be an intolerable situation.
>
> While those remarks may have been made in the context of a bidding situation rather than a private sale, I consider them to be equally applicable to a negotiation

> process leading to a private sale. Where the court is concerned with the disposition of property, the purpose of appointing a receiver is to have the receiver do the work that the court would otherwise have to do.

44 In Salima Investments Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal (1985), 41 Alta. L.R. (2d) 58, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 473 (C.A.), at p. 61 Alta. L.R., p. 476 D.L.R., the Alberta Court of Appeal said that sale by tender is not necessarily the best way to sell a business as an ongoing concern. It went on to say that when some other method is used which is provident, the court should not undermine the process by refusing to confirm the sale.

45 Finally, I refer to the reasoning of Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 124 O.R., pp. 562-63 D.L.R.:

> While every proper effort must always be made to assure maximum recovery consistent with the limitations inherent in the process, no method has yet been devised to entirely eliminate those limitations or to avoid their consequences. Certainly it is not to be found in loosening the entire foundation of the system. Thus to compare the results of the process in this case with what might have been recovered in some other set of circumstances is neither logical nor practical.

(Emphasis added)

46 It is my opinion that the court must exercise extreme caution before it interferes with the process adopted by a receiver to sell an unusual asset. It is important that prospective purchasers know that, if they are acting in good faith, bargain seriously with a receiver and enter into an agreement with it, a court will not lightly interfere with the commercial judgment of the receiver to sell the asset to them.

47 Before this court, counsel for those opposing the confirmation of the sale to OEL suggested many different ways in which the receiver could have conducted the process other than the way which he did. However, the evidence does not convince me that the receiver used an improper method of attempting to sell the airline. The answer to those submissions is found in the comment of Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

> The court ought not to sit as on appeal from the decision of the Receiver, reviewing in minute detail every element of the process by which the decision is reached. To do so would be a futile and duplicitous exercise.

48 It would be a futile and duplicitous exercise for this court to examine in minute detail all of the circumstances leading up to the acceptance of the OEL offer. Having considered the process adopted by the receiver, it is my opinion that the process adopted was a reasonable and prudent one.

4. Was there unfairness in the process?

49 As a general rule, I do not think it appropriate for the court to go into the minutia of the process or of the selling strategy adopted by the receiver. However, the court has a responsibility to decide whether the process was fair. The only part of this process which I could find that might give even a superficial impression of unfairness is the failure of the receiver to give an offering memorandum to those who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto.

50 I will outline the circumstances which relate to the allegation that the receiver was unfair in failing to provide an offering memorandum. In the latter part of 1990, as part of its selling strategy, the receiver was in the process of preparing an offering memorandum to give to persons who expressed an interest in the purchase of Air Toronto. The offering memorandum got as far as draft form, but was never released to anyone, although a copy of the draft eventually got into the hands of

CCFL before it submitted the first 922 offer on March 7, 1991. A copy of the offering memorandum forms part of the record and it seems to me to be little more than puffery, without any hard information which a sophisticated purchaser would require in order to make a serious bid.

51 The offering memorandum had not been completed by February 11, 1991. On that date, the receiver entered into the letter of intent to negotiate with OEL. The letter of intent contained a provision that during its currency the receiver would not negotiate with any other party. The letter of intent was renewed from time to time until the OEL offer was received on March 6, 1991.

52 The receiver did not proceed with the offering memorandum because to do so would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of its letter of intent with OEL.

53 I do not think that the conduct of the receiver shows any unfairness towards 922. When I speak of 922, I do so in the context that Air Canada and CCFL are identified with it. I start by saying that the receiver acted reasonably when it entered into exclusive negotiations with OEL. I find it strange that a company, with which Air Canada is closely and intimately involved, would say that it was unfair for the receiver to enter into a time-limited agreement to negotiate exclusively with OEL. That is precisely the arrangement which Air Canada insisted upon when it negotiated with the receiver in the spring and summer of 1990. If it was not unfair for Air Canada to have such an agreement, I do not understand why it was unfair for OEL to have a similar one. In fact, both Air Canada and OEL in its turn were acting reasonably when they required exclusive negotiating rights to prevent their negotiations from being used as a bargaining lever with other potential purchasers. The fact that Air Canada insisted upon an exclusive negotiating right while it was negotiating with the receiver demonstrates the commercial efficacy of OEL being given the same right during its negotiations with the receiver. I see no unfairness on the part of the receiver when it honoured its letter of intent with OEL by not releasing the offering memorandum during the negotiations with OEL.

54 Moreover, I am not prepared top find that 922 was in any way prejudiced by the fact that it did not have an offering memorandum. It made an offer on March 7, 1991, which it contends to this day was a better offer than that of OEL. 922 has not convinced me that if it had an offering memorandum its offer would have been any different or any better than it actually was. The fatal problem with the first 922 offer was that it contained a condition which was completely unacceptable to the receiver. The receiver properly, in my opinion, rejected the offer out of hand because of that condition. That condition did not relate to any information which could have conceivably been in an offering memorandum prepared by the receiver. It was about the resolution of a dispute between CCFL and the Royal Bank, something the receiver knew nothing about.

55 Further evidence of the lack of prejudice which the absence of an offering memorandum has caused 922 is found in CCFL's stance before this court. During argument, its counsel suggested, as a possible resolution of this appeal, that this court should call for new bids, evaluate them and then order a sale to the party who put in the better bid. In such a case, counsel for CCFL said that 922 would be prepared to bid within seven days of the court's decision. I would have thought that, if there were anything to CCFL's suggestion that the failure to provide an offering memorandum was unfair to 922, it would have told the court that it needed more information before it would be able to make a bid.

56 I am satisfied that Air Canada and CCFL have, and at all times had, all of the information which they would have needed to make what to them would be a commercially viable offer to the receiver. I think that an offering memorandum was of no commercial consequence to them, but the absence of one has since become a valuable tactical weapon.

57 It is my opinion that there is no convincing proof that if an offering memorandum had been widely distributed among persons qualified to have purchased Air Toronto, a viable offer would have come forth from a party other than 922 or OEL. Therefore, the failure to provide an offering memorandum was neither unfair nor did it prejudice the obtaining of a better price on March 8, 1991,

than that contained in the OEL offer. I would not give effect to the contention that the process adopted by the receiver was an unfair one.

58 There are two statements by Anderson J. contained in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg, supra, which I adopt as my own. The first is at p. 109 O.R., p. 548 D.L.R.:

> The court should not proceed against the recommendations of its Receiver except in special circumstances and where the necessity and propriety of doing so are plain. Any other rule or approach would emasculate the role of the Receiver and make it almost inevitable that the final negotiation of every sale would take place on the motion for approval.

The second is at p. 111 O.R., p. 550 D.L.R.:

> It is equally clear, in my view, though perhaps not so clearly enunciated, that it is only in an exceptional case that the court will intervene and proceed contrary to the Receiver's recommendations if satisfied, as I am, that the Receiver has acted reasonably, prudently and fairly and not arbitrarily.

In this case the receiver acted reasonably, prudently, fairly and not arbitrarily. I am of the opinion, therefore, that the process adopted by the receiver in reaching an agreement was a just one.

59 In his reasons for judgment, after discussing the circumstances leading to the 922 offer, Rosenberg J. said this [at p. 31 of the reasons]:

> They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

I agree.

60 The receiver made proper and sufficient efforts to get the best price that it could for the assets of Air Toronto. It adopted a reasonable and effective process to sell the airline which was fair to all persons who might be interested in purchasing it. It is my opinion, therefore, that the receiver properly carried out the mandate which was given to it by the order of O'Brien J. It follows that Rosenberg J. was correct when he confirmed the sale to OEL.

II. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPPORT OF THE 922 OFFER BY THE TWO SECURED CREDITORS

61 As I noted earlier, the 922 offer was supported before Rosenberg J., and in this court, by CCFL and by the Royal Bank, the two secured creditors. It was argued that, because the interests of the creditors are primary, the court ought to give effect to their wish that the 922 offer be accepted. I would not accede to that suggestion for two reasons.

62 The first reason is related to the fact that the creditors chose to have a receiver appointed by the court. It was open to them to appoint a private receiver pursuant to the authority of their security documents. Had they done so, then they would have had control of the process and could have sold Air Toronto to whom they wished. However, acting privately and controlling the process involves some risks. The appointment of a receiver by the court insulates the creditors from those risks. But insulation from those risks carries with it the loss of control over the process of disposition of the assets. As I have attempted to explain in these reasons, when a receiver's sale is before the court for confirmation the only issues are the propriety of the conduct of the receiver and whether it acted providently. The function of the court at that stage is not to step in and do the receiver's work or

change the sale strategy adopted by the receiver. Creditors who asked the court to appoint a receiver to dispose of assets should not be allowed to take over control of the process by the simple expedient of supporting another purchaser if they do not agree with the sale made by the receiver. That would take away all respect for the process of sale by a court-appointed receiver.

63 There can be no doubt that the interests of the creditor are an important consideration in determining whether the receiver has properly conducted a sale. The opinion of the creditors as to which offer ought to be accepted is something to be taken into account. But, if the court decides that the receiver has acted properly and providently, those views are not necessarily determinative. Because, in this case, the receiver acted properly and providently, I do not think that the views of the creditors should override the considered judgment of the receiver.

64 The second reason is that, in the particular circumstances of this case, I do not think the support of CCFL and the Royal Bank of the 922 offer is entitled to any weight. The support given by CCFL can be dealt with summarily. It is a co-owner of 922. It is hardly surprising and not very impressive to hear that it supports the offer which it is making for the debtors' assets.

65 The support by the Royal Bank requires more consideration and involves some reference to the circumstances. On March 6, 1991, when the first 922 offer was made, there was in existence an interlender agreement between the Royal Bank and CCFL. That agreement dealt with the share of the proceeds of the sale of Air Toronto which each creditor would receive. At the time, a dispute between the Royal Bank and CCFL about the interpretation of that agreement was pending in the courts. The unacceptable condition in the first 922 offer related to the settlement of the interlender dispute. The condition required that the dispute be resolved in a way which would substantially favour CCFL. It required that CCFL receive $3,375,000 of the $6,000,000 cash payment and the balance, including the royalties, if any, be paid to the Royal Bank. The Royal Bank did not agree with that split of the sale proceeds.

66 On April 5, 1991, the Royal Bank and CCFL agreed to settle the interlender dispute. The settlement was that if the 922 offer was accepted by the court, CCFL would receive only $1,000,000 and the Royal Bank would receive $5,000,000 plus any royalties which might be paid. It was only in consideration of that settlement that the Royal Bank agreed to support the 922 offer.

67 The Royal Bank's support of the 922 offer is so affected by the very substantial benefit which it wanted to obtain from the settlement of the interlender dispute that, in my opinion, its support is devoid of any objectivity. I think it has no weight.

68 While there may be circumstances where the unanimous support by the creditors of a particular offer could conceivably override the proper and provident conduct of a sale by a receiver, I do not think that this is such a case. This is a case where the receiver has acted properly and in a provident way. It would make a mockery out of the judicial process, under which a mandate was given to this receiver to sell this airline, if the support by these creditors of the 922 offer were permitted to carry the day. I give no weight to the support which they give to the 922 offer.

69 In its factum, the receiver pointed out that, because of greater liabilities imposed upon private receivers by various statutes such as the Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, and the Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, it is likely that more and more the courts will be asked to appoint receivers in insolvencies. In those circumstances, I think that creditors who ask for court-appointed receivers and business people who choose to deal with those receivers should know that if those receivers act properly and providently their decisions and judgments will be given great weight by the courts who appoint them. I have decided this appeal in the way I have in order to assure business people who deal with court-appointed receivers that they can have confidence that an agreement which they make with a court-appointed receiver will be far more than a platform upon which others may bargain at the court approval stage. I think that persons who enter into agreements with court-appointed receivers, following a disposition procedure that is appropriate given the nature

of the assets involved, should expect that their bargain will be confirmed by the court.

70 The process is very important. It should be carefully protected so that the ability of court-appointed receivers to negotiate the best price possible is strengthened and supported. Because this receiver acted properly and providently in entering into the OEL agreement, I am of the opinion that Rosenberg J. was right when he approved the sale to OEL and dismissed the motion to approve the 922 offer.

71 I would, accordingly, dismiss the appeal. I would award the receiver, OEL and Frontier Airlines Limited their costs out of the Soundair estate, those of the receiver on a solicitor-and- client scale. I would make no order as to the costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

72 MCKINLAY J.A. (concurring in the result):-- I agree with Galligan J.A. in result, but wish to emphasize that I do so on the basis that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. It is most important that the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers be protected in the interests of both commercial morality and the future confidence of business persons in their dealings with receivers. Consequently, in all cases, the court should carefully scrutinize the procedure followed by the receiver to determine whether it satisfies the tests set out by Anderson J. in Crown Trust Co. v. Rosenberg (1986), 60 O.R. (2d) 87, 39 D.L.R. (4th) 526 (H.C.J.). While the procedure carried out by the receiver in this case, as described by Galligan J.A., was appropriate, given the unfolding of events and the unique nature of the assets involved, it is not a procedure that is likely to be appropriate in many receivership sales.

73 I should like to add that where there is a small number of creditors who are the only parties with a real interest in the proceeds of the sale (i.e., where it is clear that the highest price attainable would result in recovery so low that no other creditors, shareholders, guarantors, etc., could possibly benefit therefrom), the wishes of the interested creditors should be very seriously considered by the receiver. It is true, as Galligan J.A. points out, that in seeking the court appointment of a receiver, the moving parties also seek the protection of the court in carrying out the receiver's functions. However, it is also true that in utilizing the court process the moving parties have opened the whole process to detailed scrutiny by all involved, and have probably added significantly to their costs and consequent shortfall as a result of so doing. The adoption of the court process should in no way diminish the rights of any party, and most certainly not the rights of the only parties with a real interest. Where a receiver asks for court approval of a sale which is opposed by the only parties in interest, the court should scrutinize with great care the procedure followed by the receiver. I agree with Galligan J.A. that in this case that was done. I am satisfied that the rights of all parties were properly considered by the receiver, by the learned motions court judge, and by Galligan J.A.

74 GOODMAN J.A. (dissenting):-- I have had the opportunity of reading the reasons for judgment herein of Galligan and McKinlay JJ.A. Respectfully, I am unable to agree with their conclusion.

75 The case at bar is an exceptional one in the sense that upon the application made for approval of the sale of the assets of Air Toronto two competing offers were placed before Rosenberg J. Those two offers were that of Frontier Airlines Ltd. and Ontario Express Limited (OEL) and that of 922246 Ontario Limited (922), a company incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Air Toronto. Its shares were owned equally by Canadian Pension Capital Limited and Canadian Insurers Capital Corporation (collectively CCFL) and Air Canada. It was conceded by all parties to these proceedings that the only persons who had any interest in the proceeds of the sale were two secured creditors, viz., CCFL and the Royal Bank of Canada (the Bank). Those two creditors were unanimous in their position that they desired the court to approve the sale to 922. We were not referred to nor am I aware of any case where a court has refused to abide by the unanimous wishes of the only interested creditors for the approval of a specific offer made in receivership proceedings.

76 In British Columbia Development Corp. v. Spun Cast Industries Inc. (1977), 5 B.C.L.R. 94, 26 C.B.R. (N.S.) 28 (S.C.), Berger J. said at p. 95 B.C.L.R., p. 30 C.B.R.:

> Here all of those with a financial stake in the plant have joined in seeking the court's approval of the sale to Fincas. This court does not having a roving commission to decide what is best for investors and businessmen when they have agreed among themselves what course of action they should follow. It is their money.

77 I agree with that statement. It is particularly apt to this case. The two secured creditors will suffer a shortfall of approximately $50,000,000. They have a tremendous interest in the sale of assets which form part of their security. I agree with the finding of Rosenberg J., Gen. Div., May 1, 1991, that the offer of 922 is superior to that of OEL. He concluded that the 922 offer is marginally superior. If by that he meant that mathematically it was likely to provide slightly more in the way of proceeds it is difficult to take issue with that finding. If on the other hand he meant that having regard to all considerations it was only marginally superior, I cannot agree. He said in his reasons [pp. 17-18]:

> I have come to the conclusion that knowledgeable creditors such as the Royal Bank would prefer the 922 offer even if the other factors influencing their decision were not present. No matter what adjustments had to be made, the 922 offer results in more cash immediately. Creditors facing the type of loss the Royal Bank is taking in this case would not be anxious to rely on contingencies especially in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry.

78 I agree with that statement completely. It is apparent that the difference between the two offers insofar as cash on closing is concerned amounts to approximately $3,000,000 to $4,000,000. The Bank submitted that it did not wish to gamble any further with respect to its investment and that the acceptance and court approval of the OEL offer, in effect, supplanted its position as a secured creditor with respect to the amount owing over and above the down payment and placed it in the position of a joint entrepreneur but one with no control. This results from the fact that the OEL offer did not provide for any security for any funds which might be forthcoming over and above the initial downpayment on closing.

79 In Cameron v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1981), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 45 N.S.R. (2d) 303 (C.A.), Hart J.A., speaking for the majority of the court, said at p. 10 C.B.R., p. 312 N.S.R.:

> Here we are dealing with a receiver appointed at the instance of one major creditor, who chose to insert in the contract of sale a provision making it subject to the approval of the court. This, in my opinion, shows an intention on behalf of the parties to invoke the normal equitable doctrines which place the court in the position of looking to the interests of all persons concerned before giving its blessing to a particular transaction submitted for approval. In these circumstances the court would not consider itself bound by the contract entered into in good faith by the receiver but would have to look to the broader picture to see that the contract was for the benefit of the creditors as a whole. When there was evidence that a higher price was readily available for the property the chambers judge was, in my opinion, justified in exercising his discretion as he did. Otherwise he could have deprived the creditors of a substantial sum of money.

80 This statement is apposite to the circumstances of the case at bar. I hasten to add that in my opinion it is not only price which is to be considered in the exercise of the judge's discretion. It may very well be, as I believe to be so in this case, that the amount of cash is the most important element in determining which of the two offers is for the benefit and in the best interest of the creditors.

81 It is my view, and the statement of Hart J.A. is consistent therewith, that the fact that a creditor has requested an order of the court appointing a receiver does not in any way diminish or derogate

from his right to obtain the maximum benefit to be derived from any disposition of the debtor's assets. I agree completely with the views expressed by McKinlay J.A. in that regard in her reasons.

82 It is my further view that any negotiations which took place between the only two interested creditors in deciding to support the approval of the 922 offer were not relevant to the determination by the presiding judge of the issues involved in the motion for approval of either one of the two offers nor are they relevant in determining the outcome of this appeal. It is sufficient that the two creditors have decided unanimously what is in their best interest and the appeal must be considered in the light of that decision. It so happens, however, that there is ample evidence to support their conclusion that the approval of the 922 offer is in their best interests.

83 I am satisfied that the interests of the creditors are the prime consideration for both the receiver and the court. In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd. (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. said at p. 243:

> This does not mean that a court should ignore a new and higher bid made after acceptance where there has been no unfairness in the process. The interests of the creditors, while not the only consideration, are the prime consideration.

84 I agree with that statement of the law. In Re Selkirk (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.) Saunders J. heard an application for court approval for the sale by the sheriff of real property in bankruptcy proceedings. The sheriff had been previously ordered to list the property for sale subject to approval of the court. Saunders J. said at p. 246 C.B.R.:

> In dealing with the request for approval, the court has to be concerned primarily with protecting the interests of the creditors of the former bankrupt. A secondary but important consideration is that the process under which the sale agreement is arrived at should be consistent with the commercial efficacy and integrity.

85 I am in agreement with that statement as a matter of general principle. Saunders J. further stated that he adopted the principles stated by Macdonald J.A. in Cameron, supra, at pp. 92-94 O.R., pp. 531-33 D.L.R., quoted by Galligan J.A. in his reasons. In Cameron, the remarks of Macdonald J.A. related to situations involving the calling of bids and fixing a time limit for the making of such bids. In those circumstances the process is so clear as a matter of commercial practice that an interference by the court in such process might have a deleterious effect on the efficacy of receivership proceedings in other cases. But Macdonald J.A. recognized that even in bid or tender cases where the offeror for whose bid approval is sought has complied with all requirements a court might not approve the agreement of purchase and sale entered into by the receiver. He said at pp. 11-12 C.B.R., p. 314 N.S.R.:

> There are, of course, many reasons why a court might not approve an agreement of purchase and sale, viz., where the offer accepted is so low in relation to the appraised value as to be unrealistic; or, where the circumstances indicate that insufficient time was allowed for the making of bids or that inadequate notice of sale by bid was given (where the receiver sells property by the bid method); or, where it can be said that the proposed sale is not in the best interest of either the creditors or the owner. Court approval must involve the delicate balancing of competing interests and not simply a consideration of the interests of the creditors.

86 The deficiency in the present case is so large that there has been no suggestion of a competing interest between the owner and the creditors.

87 I agree that the same reasoning may apply to a negotiation process leading to a private sale but the procedure and process applicable to private sales of a wide variety of businesses and

undertakings with the multiplicity of individual considerations applicable and perhaps peculiar to the particular business is not so clearly established that a departure by the court from the process adopted by the receiver in a particular case will result in commercial chaos to the detriment of future receivership proceedings. Each case must be decided on its own merits and it is necessary to consider the process used by the receiver in the present proceedings and to determine whether it was unfair, improvident or inadequate.

88 It is important to note at the outset that Rosenberg J. made the following statement in his reasons [p. 15]:

> On March 8, 1991 the trustee accepted the OEL offer subject to court approval. The receiver at that time had no other offer before it that was in final form or could possibly be accepted. The receiver had at the time the knowledge that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and had not fulfilled the promise of its letter of March 1. The receiver was justified in assuming that Air Canada and CCFL's offer was a long way from being in an acceptable form and that Air Canada and CCFL's objective was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada.

89 In my opinion there was no evidence before him or before this court to indicate that Air Canada with CCFL had not bargained in good faith and that the receiver had knowledge of such lack of good faith. Indeed, on this appeal, counsel for the receiver stated that he was not alleging Air Canada and CCFL had not bargained in good faith. Air Canada had frankly stated at the time that it had made its offer to purchase which was eventually refused by the receiver that it would not become involved in an "auction" to purchase the undertaking of Air Canada and that, although it would fulfil its contractual obligations to provide connecting services to Air Toronto, it would do no more than it was legally required to do insofar as facilitating the purchase of Air Toronto by any other person. In so doing Air Canada may have been playing "hard ball" as its behaviour was characterized by some of the counsel for opposing parties. It was nevertheless merely openly asserting its legal position as it was entitled to do.

90 Furthermore there was no evidence before Rosenberg J. or this court that the receiver had assumed that Air Canada and CCFL's objective in making an offer was to interrupt the finalizing of the OEL agreement and to retain as long as possible the Air Toronto connector traffic flowing into Terminal 2 for the benefit of Air Canada. Indeed, there was no evidence to support such an assumption in any event although it is clear that 922 and through it CCFL and Air Canada were endeavouring to present an offer to purchase which would be accepted and/or approved by the court in preference to the offer made by OEL.

91 To the extent that approval of the OEL agreement by Rosenberg J. was based on the alleged lack of good faith in bargaining and improper motivation with respect to connector traffic on the part of Air Canada and CCFL, it cannot be supported.

92 I would also point out that, rather than saying there was no other offer before it that was final in form, it would have been more accurate to have said that there was no unconditional offer before it.

93 In considering the material and evidence placed before the court I am satisfied that the receiver was at all times acting in good faith. I have reached the conclusion, however, that the process which he used was unfair insofar as 922 is concerned and improvident insofar as the two secured creditors are concerned.

94 Air Canada had been negotiating with Soundair Corporation for the purchase from it of Air Toronto for a considerable period of time prior to the appointment of a receiver by the court. It had given a letter of intent indicating a prospective sale price of $18,000,000. After the appointment of

the receiver, by agreement dated April 30, 1990, Air Canada continued its negotiations for the purchase of Air Toronto with the receiver. Although this agreement contained a clause which provided that the receiver "shall not negotiate for the sale ... of Air Toronto with any person except Air Canada", it further provided that the receiver would not be in breach of that provision merely by receiving unsolicited offers for all or any of the assets of Air Toronto. In addition, the agreement, which had a term commencing on April 30, 1990, could be terminated on the fifth business day following the delivery of a written notice of termination by one party to the other. I point out this provision merely to indicate that the exclusivity privilege extended by the Receiver to Air Canada was of short duration at the receiver's option.

95 As a result of due diligence investigations carried out by Air Canada during the month of April, May and June of 1990, Air Canada reduced its offer to 8.1 million dollars conditional upon there being $4,000,000 in tangible assets. The offer was made on June 14, 1990 and was open for acceptance until June 29, 1990.

96 By amending agreement dated June 19, 1990 the receiver was released from its covenant to refrain from negotiating for the sale of the Air Toronto business and assets to any person other than Air Canada. By virtue of this amending agreement the receiver had put itself in the position of having a firm offer in hand with the right to negotiate and accept offers from other persons. Air Canada in these circumstances was in the subservient position. The receiver, in the exercise of its judgment and discretion, allowed the Air Canada offer to lapse. On July 20, 1990 Air Canada served a notice of termination of the April 30, 1990 agreement.

97 Apparently as a result of advice received from the receiver to the effect that the receiver intended to conduct an auction for the sale of the assets and business of the Air Toronto Division of Soundair Corporation, the solicitors for Air Canada advised the receiver by letter dated July 20, 1990 in part as follows:

> Air Canada has instructed us to advise you that it does not intend to submit a further offer in the auction process.

98 This statement together with other statements set forth in the letter was sufficient to indicate that Air Canada was not interested in purchasing Air Toronto in the process apparently contemplated by the receiver at that time. It did not form a proper foundation for the receiver to conclude that there was no realistic possibility of selling Air Toronto to Air Canada, either alone or in conjunction with some other person, in different circumstances. In June 1990 the receiver was of the opinion that the fair value of Air Toronto was between $10,000,000 and $12,000,000.

99 In August 1990 the receiver contacted a number of interested parties. A number of offers were received which were not deemed to be satisfactory. One such offer, received on August 20, 1990, came as a joint offer from OEL and Air Ontario (an Air Canada connector). It was for the sum of $3,000,000 for the good will relating to certain Air Toronto routes but did not include the purchase of any tangible assets or leasehold interests.

100 In December 1990 the receiver was approached by the management of Canadian Partner (operated by OEL) for the purpose of evaluating the benefits of an amalgamated Air Toronto/Air Partner operation. The negotiations continued from December of 1990 to February of 1991 culminating in the OEL agreement dated March 8, 1991.

101 On or before December, 1990, CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to make a bid for the Air Toronto assets. The receiver, in August of 1990, for the purpose of facilitating the sale of Air Toronto assets, commenced the preparation of an operating memorandum. He prepared no less than six draft operating memoranda with dates from October 1990 through March 1, 1991. None of these were distributed to any prospective bidder despite requests having been received therefor, with the exception of an early draft provided to CCFL without the receiver's knowledge.

102 During the period December 1990 to the end of January 1991, the receiver advised CCFL that the offering memorandum was in the process of being prepared and would be ready soon for distribution. He further advised CCFL that it should await the receipt of the memorandum before submitting a formal offer to purchase the Air Toronto assets.

103 By late January CCFL had become aware that the receiver was negotiating with OEL for the sale of Air Toronto. In fact, on February 11, 1991, the receiver signed a letter of intent with OEL wherein it had specifically agreed not to negotiate with any other potential bidders or solicit any offers from others.

104 By letter dated February 25, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL made a written request to the Receiver for the offering memorandum. The receiver did not reply to the letter because he felt he was precluded from so doing by the provisions of the letter of intent dated February 11, 1991. Other prospective purchasers were also unsuccessful in obtaining the promised memorandum to assist them in preparing their bids. It should be noted that exclusivity provision of the letter of intent expired on February 20, 1991. This provision was extended on three occasions, viz., February 19, 22 and March 5, 1991. It is clear that from a legal standpoint the receiver, by refusing to extend the time, could have dealt with other prospective purchasers and specifically with 922.

105 It was not until March 1, 1991 that CCFL had obtained sufficient information to enable it to make a bid through 922. It succeeded in so doing through its own efforts through sources other than the receiver. By that time the receiver had already entered into the letter of intent with OEL. Notwithstanding the fact that the receiver knew since December of 1990 that CCFL wished to make a bid for the assets of Air Toronto (and there is no evidence to suggest that at any time such a bid would be in conjunction with Air Canada or that Air Canada was in any way connected with CCFL) it took no steps to provide CCFL with information necessary to enable it to make an intelligent bid and, indeed, suggested delaying the making of the bid until an offering memorandum had been prepared and provided. In the meantime by entering into the letter of intent with OEL it put itself in a position where it could not negotiate with CCFL or provide the information requested.

106 On February 28, 1991, the solicitors for CCFL telephoned the receiver and were advised for the first time that the receiver had made a business decision to negotiate solely with OEL and would not negotiate with anyone else in the interim.

107 By letter dated March 1, 1991 CCFL advised the receiver that it intended to submit a bid. It set forth the essential terms of the bid and stated that it would be subject to customary commercial provisions. On March 7, 1991 CCFL and Air Canada, jointly through 922, submitted an offer to purchase Air Toronto upon the terms set forth in the letter dated March 1, 1991. It included a provision that the offer was conditional upon the interpretation of an interlender agreement which set out the relative distribution of proceeds as between CCFL and the Royal Bank. It is common ground that it was a condition over which the receiver had no control and accordingly would not have been acceptable on that ground alone. The receiver did not, however, contact CCFL in order to negotiate or request the removal of the condition although it appears that its agreement with OEL not to negotiate with any person other than OEL expired on March 6, 1991.

108 The fact of the matter is that by March 7, 1991, the receiver had received the offer from OEL which was subsequently approved by Rosenberg J. That offer was accepted by the receiver on March 8, 1991. Notwithstanding the fact that OEL had been negotiating the purchase for a period of approximately three months the offer contained a provision for the sole benefit of the purchaser that it was subject to the purchaser obtaining:

> ... a financing commitment within 45 days of the date hereof in an amount not less than the Purchase Price from the Royal Bank of Canada or other financial institution upon terms and conditions acceptable to them. In the event that such a

> financing commitment is not obtained within such 45 day period, the purchaser or OEL shall have the right to terminate this agreement upon giving written notice of termination to the vendor on the first Business Day following the expiry of the said period.

The purchaser was also given the right to waive the condition.

109 In effect the agreement was tantamount to a 45-day option to purchase excluding the right of any other person to purchase Air Toronto during that period of time and thereafter if the condition was fulfilled or waived. The agreement was, of course, stated to be subject to court approval.

110 In my opinion the process and procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL. Although it was aware from December 1990 that CCFL was interested in making an offer, it effectively delayed the making of such offer by continually referring to the preparation of the offering memorandum. It did not endeavour during the period December 1990 to March 7, 1991 to negotiate with CCFL in any way the possible terms of purchase and sale agreement. In the result no offer was sought from CCFL by the receiver prior to February 11, 1991 and thereafter it put itself in the position of being unable to negotiate with anyone other than OEL. The receiver, then, on March 8, 1991 chose to accept an offer which was conditional in nature without prior consultation with CCFL (922) to see whether it was prepared to remove the condition in its offer.

111 I do not doubt that the receiver felt that it was more likely that the condition in the OEL offer would be fulfilled than the condition in the 922 offer. It may be that the receiver, having negotiated for a period of three months with OEL, was fearful that it might lose the offer if OEL discovered that it was negotiating with another person. Nevertheless it seems to me that it was imprudent and unfair on the part of the receiver to ignore an offer from an interested party which offered approximately triple the cash down payment without giving a chance to the offeror to remove the conditions or other terms which made the offer unacceptable to it. The potential loss was that of an agreement which amounted to little more than an option in favour of the offeror.

112 In my opinion the procedure adopted by the receiver was unfair to CCFL in that, in effect, it gave OEL the opportunity of engaging in exclusive negotiations for a period of three months notwithstanding the fact that it knew CCFL was interested in making an offer. The receiver did not indicate a deadline by which offers were to be submitted and it did not at any time indicate the structure or nature of an offer which might be acceptable to it.

113 In his reasons Rosenberg J. stated that as of March 1, CCFL and Air Canada had all the information that they needed and any allegations of unfairness in the negotiating process by the receiver had disappeared. He said [p. 31]:

> They created a situation as of March 8, where the receiver was faced with two offers, one of which was in acceptable form and one of which could not possibly be accepted in its present form. The receiver acted appropriately in accepting the OEL offer.

If he meant by "acceptable in form" that it was acceptable to the receiver, then obviously OEL had the unfair advantage of its lengthy negotiations with the receiver to ascertain what kind of an offer would be acceptable to the receiver. If, on the other hand, he meant that the 922 offer was unacceptable in its form because it was conditional, it can hardly be said that the OEL offer was more acceptable in this regard as it contained a condition with respect to financing terms and conditions "acceptable to them".

114 It should be noted that on March 13, 1991 the representatives of 922 first met with the receiver to review its offer of March 7, 1991 and at the request of the receiver withdrew the inter-lender condition from its offer. On March 14, 1991 OEL removed the financing condition from its offer. By order of Rosenberg J. dated March 26, 1991, CCFL was given until April 5, 1991 to submit

a bid and on April 5, 1991, 922 submitted its offer with the interlender condition removed.

115 In my opinion the offer accepted by the receiver is improvident and unfair insofar as the two creditors are concerned. It is not improvident in the sense that the price offered by 922 greatly exceeded that offered by OEL. In the final analysis it may not be greater at all. The salient fact is that the cash down payment in the 922 offer constitutes approximately two-thirds of the contemplated sale price whereas the cash down payment in the OEL transaction constitutes approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the contemplated sale price. In terms of absolute dollars, the down payment in the 922 offer would likely exceed that provided for in the OEL agreement by approximately $3,000,000 to $4,000,000.

116 In Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd., supra, Saunders J. said at p. 243 C.B.R.:

> If a substantially higher bid turns up at the approval stage, the court should consider it. Such a bid may indicate, for example, that the trustee has not properly carried out its duty to endeavour to obtain the best price for the estate. In such a case the proper course might be to refuse approval and to ask the trustee to recommence the process.

117 I accept that statement as being an accurate statement of the law. I would add, however, as previously indicated, that in determining what is the best price for the estate the receiver or court should not limit its consideration to which offer provides for the greater sale price. The amount of down payment and the provision or lack thereof to secure payment of the balance of the purchase price over and above the down payment may be the most important factor to be considered and I am of the view that is so in the present case. It is clear that that was the view of the only creditors who can benefit from the sale of Air Toronto.

118 I note that in the case at bar the 922 offer in conditional form was presented to the receiver before it accepted the OEL offer. The receiver in good faith, although I believe mistakenly, decided that the OEL offer was the better offer. At that time the receiver did not have the benefit of the views of the two secured creditors in that regard. At the time of the application for approval before Rosenberg J. the stated preference of the two interested creditors was made quite clear. He found as a fact that knowledgeable creditors would not be anxious to rely on contingencies in the present circumstances surrounding the airline industry. It is reasonable to expect that a receiver would be no less knowledgeable in that regard and it is his primary duty to protect the interests of the creditors. In my view it was an improvident act on the part of the receiver to have accepted the conditional offer made by OEL and Rosenberg J. erred in failing to dismiss the application of the receiver for approval of the OEL offer. It would be most inequitable to foist upon the two creditors who have already been seriously hurt more unnecessary contingencies.

119 Although in other circumstances it might be appropriate to ask the receiver to recommence the process, in my opinion, it would not be appropriate to do so in this case. The only two interested creditors support the acceptance of the 922 offer and the court should so order.

120 Although I would be prepared to dispose of the case on the grounds stated above, some comment should be addressed to the question of interference by the court with the process and procedure adopted by the receiver.

121 I am in agreement with the view expressed by McKinlay J.A. in her reasons that the undertaking being sold in this case was of a very special and unusual nature. As a result the procedure adopted by the receiver was somewhat unusual. At the outset, in accordance with the terms of the receiving order, it dealt solely with Air Canada. It then appears that the receiver contemplated a sale of the assets by way of auction and still later contemplated the preparation and distribution of an offering memorandum inviting bids. At some point, without advice to CCFL, it abandoned that idea and reverted to exclusive negotiations with one interested party. This entire

process is not one which is customary or widely accepted as a general practice in the commercial world. It was somewhat unique having regard to the circumstances of this case. In my opinion the refusal of the court to approve the offer accepted by the receiver would not reflect on the integrity of procedures followed by court-appointed receivers and is not the type of refusal which will have a tendency to undermine the future confidence of business persons in dealing with receivers.

122 Rosenberg J. stated that the Royal Bank was aware of the process used and tacitly approved it. He said it knew the terms of the letter of intent in February 1991 and made no comment. The Royal Bank did, however, indicate to the receiver that it was not satisfied with the contemplated price nor the amount of the down payment. It did not, however, tell the receiver to adopt a different process in endeavouring to sell the Air Toronto assets. It is not clear from the material filed that at the time it became aware of the letter of intent, it knew that CCFL was interested in purchasing Air Toronto.

123 I am further of the opinion that a prospective purchaser who has been given an opportunity to engage in exclusive negotiations with a receiver for relatively short periods of time which are extended from time to time by the receiver and who then makes a conditional offer, the condition of which is for his sole benefit and must be fulfilled to his satisfaction unless waived by him, and which he knows is to be subject to court approval, cannot legitimately claim to have been unfairly dealt with if the court refuses to approve the offer and approves a substantially better one.

124 In conclusion I feel that I must comment on the statement made by Galligan J.A. in his reasons to the effect that the suggestion made by counsel for 922 constitutes evidence of lack of prejudice resulting from the absence of an offering memorandum. It should be pointed out that the court invited counsel to indicate the manner in which the problem should be resolved in the event that the court concluded that the order approving the OEL offer should be set aside. There was no evidence before the court with respect to what additional information may have been acquired by CCFL since March 8, 1991 and no inquiry was made in that regard. Accordingly, I am of the view that no adverse inference should be drawn from the proposal made as a result of the court's invitation.

125 For the above reasons I would allow the appeal with one set of costs to CCFL-922, set aside the order of Rosenberg J., dismiss the receiver's motion with one set of costs to CCFL-922 and order that the assets of Air Toronto be sold to numbered corporation 922246 on the terms set forth in its offer with appropriate adjustments to provide for the delay in its execution. Costs awarded shall be payable out of the estate of Soundair Corporation. The costs incurred by the receiver in making the application and responding to the appeal shall be paid to him out of the assets of the estate of Soundair Corporation on a solicitor-and-client basis. I would make no order as to costs of any of the other parties or interveners.

Appeal dismissed.

TAB 5

C

2010 CarswellQue 10954, 2010 QCCS 4915, EYB 2010-180748, J.E. 2010-2002, 72 C.B.R. (5th) 49

White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re

In the Matter of the Plan of Arrangement and Compromise of : White Birch Paper Holding Company, White Birch Paper Company, Stadacona General Partner Inc., Black Spruce Paper Inc., F. F. Soucy General Partner Inc., 3120772 Nova Scotia Company, Arrimage de gros Cacouna inc. and Papier Masson ltée (Petitioners) v. Ernst & Young Inc. (Monitor) and Stadacona Limited Partnership, F. F. Soucy Limited Partnership and F. F. Soucy Inc. & Partners, Limited Partnership (Mises en cause) and Service d'impartition Industriel Inc., KSH Solutions Inc. and BD White Birch Investement LLC (Intervenant) and Sixth Avenue Investment Co. LLC, Dune Capital LLC and Dune Capital International Ltd. (Opposing parties)

Cour supérieure du Québec

Robert Mongeon, J.C.S.

Heard: 24 september 2010
Oral reasons: 24 september 2010[FN*]
Written reasons: 15 october 2010
Docket: C.S. Montréal 500-11-038474-108

Proceedings: refused leave to appeal *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re* (2010), 2010 QCCA 1950 (Que. C.A.)

Counsel: None given.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous

Corporation experienced financial difficulties and placed itself under protection of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — In context of its restructuring, corporation contemplated sale of all its assets — Bidding process was launched and several investors filed offers — Corporation entered into asset sale agreement with winning bidder — US bankruptcy court approved process without modifications — Court approved process with some modifications and set date of September 17, 2010, as limit to submit bid — On September 17, unsuccessful bidder filed new bid — At outcome of bidding process, corporation decided to sell its assets once again to winning bidder — On September 24, corporation brought motion seeking court's approval of sale — Motion granted — Evidence showed that no stakeholder objected to sale and that all parties agreed to participate in bidding process — Once bidding process was started, there was no turning back unless process was defective — Court was not convinced that winning bid should be set aside just because unsuccessful bidder lost — Court was

of view that bidding process met criteria established by jurisprudence — In addition, monitor supported position of winning bidder — Therefore, sale should be approved as is.

Faillite et insolvabilité --- Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Divers

Société a connu des difficultés financières et s'est mise sous la protection de la Loi sur les arrangements avec les créanciers des compagnies — Dans le cadre de sa restructuration, la société a considéré vendre tous ses actifs — Processus d'appel d'offres a été lancé et plusieurs investisseurs ont déposé leurs offres — Société a signé une entente de vente d'actifs avec le soumissionnaire gagnant — Tribunal américain de faillite a approuvé le processus sans modifications — Tribunal a approuvé le processus avec quelques modifications et a fixé la date du 17 septembre 2010 comme étant la date limite pour soumettre une soumission — Soumissionnaire déçu a déposé une nouvelle offre le 17 septembre — Au terme du processus d'appel d'offres, la société a décidé de vendre ses actifs une fois de plus au soumissionnaire gagnant — Société a déposé, le 24 septembre, une requête visant à obtenir l'approbation de la vente par le tribunal — Requête accueillie — Preuve démontrait qu'aucune partie intéressée ne s'était opposée à la vente et que toutes les parties avaient convenu de participer au processus d'appel d'offres — Une fois le processus d'appel d'offres lancé, il n'était pas question de l'interrompre à moins que le processus ne s'avère déficient — Tribunal n'était pas convaincu que le soumissionnaire gagnant devrait être exclu simplement parce que le soumissionnaire déçu avait perdu — Tribunal était d'avis que le processus d'appel d'offres satisfaisait aux critères établis par la jurisprudence — De plus, le contrôleur était en faveur de la position défendue par le soumissionnaire gagnant — Par conséquent, la vente devrait être approuvée telle quelle.

Cases considered by *Robert Mongeon, J.C.S.*:

AbitibiBowater inc., Re (2010), 2010 QCCS 1742, 2010 CarswellQue 4082 (Que. S.C.) — considered

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re (2010), 68 C.B.R. (5th) 233, 2010 CarswellOnt 3509, 2010 ONSC 2870 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Cie Montréal Trust c. Jori Investments Inc. (1980), 1980 CarswellQue 85, 13 R.P.R. 116 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

Eugène Marcoux Inc. c. Côté (1990), [1990] R.D.I. 551, [1990] R.J.Q. 1221 (Que. C.A.) — referred to

Maax Corporation, Re (July 10, 2008), Doc. 500-11-033561-081 (Que. S.C.) — referred to

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 56 C.B.R. (5th) 224, 2009 CarswellOnt 4838 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Statutes considered:

Code de procédure civile, L.R.Q., c. C-25

art. 689 — referred to

art. 730 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 36 — considered

s. 36(1) — considered

s. 36(3) — considered

s. 36(3)(a) — considered

s. 36(3)(b) — considered

s. 36(3)(c) — considered

s. 36(3)(d) — considered

s. 36(3)(f) — considered

s. 36(6) — considered

MOTION by corporation seeking court's approval of sale.

***Robert Mongeon, J.C.S.*:**

BACKGROUND

1 On 24 February 2010, I issued an Initial Order under the CCAA protecting the assets of the Debtors and Mis-en-cause (the WB Group). Ernst & Young was appointed Monitor.

2 On the same date, Bear Island Paper Company LLC (Bear Island) filed for protection of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy code before the US Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

3 On April 28, 2010, the US Bankruptcy Court issued an order approving a Sale and Investor Solicitation Process (« SISP ») for the sale of substantially all of the WB Group's assets. I issued a similar order on April 29, 2010. No one objected to the issuance of the April 29, 2010 order. No appeal was lodged in either jurisdiction.

4 The SISP caused several third parties to show some interest in the assets of the WG Group and led to the execution of an Asset Sale Agreement (ASA) between the WB Group and BD White Birch Investment LLC (« BDWB »). The ASA is dated August 10, 2010. Under the ASA, BDWB would acquire all of the assets of the Group and would:

> a) assume from the Sellers and become obligated to pay the Assumed Liabilities (as defined in the ASA);
>
> b) pay US$90 million in cash;
>
> c) pay the Reserve Payment Amount (as defined);
>
> d) pay all fees and disbursements necessary or incidental for the closing of the transaction; and
>
> e) deliver the Wind Down Amount (as defined).

the whole for a consideration estimated between $150 and $178 million dollars.

5 BDWB was to acquire the Assets through a Stalking Horse Bid process. Accordingly, Motions were brought before the US Bankruptcy Court and before this Court for orders approving:

a) the ASA

b) BDWB as the stalking horse bidder

c) The Bidding Procedures

6 On September 1, 2010, the US Bankruptcy Court issued an order approving the foregoing without modifications.

7 On September 10, 2010, I issued an order approving the foregoing with some modifications (mainly reducing the Break-Up Fee and Expense Reimbursement clauses from an aggregate total sought of US$5 million, down to an aggregate total not to exceed US$3 million).

8 My order also modified the various key dates of implementation of the above. The date of September 17 was set as the limit to submit a qualified bid under stalking horse bidding procedures, approved by both Courts and the date of September 21st was set as the auction date. Finally, the approval of the outcome of the process was set for September 24, 2010[FN1].

9 No appeal was lodged with respect to my decision of September 10, 2010.

10 On September 17, 2010, Sixth Avenue Investment Co. LLC (« Sixth Avenue ») submitted a qualified bid.

11 On September 21, 2010, the WB Group and the Monitor commenced the auction for the sale of the assets of the group. The winning bid was the bid of BDWB at US$236,052,825.00.

12 BDWB's bid consists of:

i) US$90 million in cash allocated to the current assets of the WB Group;

ii) $4.5 million of cash allocated to the fixed assets;

iii) $78 million in the form of a credit bid under the First Lien Credit Agreement allocated to the WB Group's Canadian fixed assets which are collateral to the First Lien Debt affecting the WB Group;

iv) miscellaneous additional charges to be assumed by the purchaser.

13 Sixth Avenue's bid was equivalent to the BDWB winning bid less US$500,000.00, that is to say US$235,552,825.00. The major difference between the two bids being that BDWB used credit bidding to the extent of $78 million whilst Sixth Avenue offered an additional $78 million in cash. For a full description of the components of each bid, see the Monitor's Report of September 23, 2010.

14 The Sixth Avenue bidder and the BDWB bidder are both former lenders of the WB Group regrouped in

new entities.

15 On April 8, 2005, the WB Group entered into a First Lien Credit Agreement with Credit Suisse AG Cayman Islands and Credit Suisse AG Toronto acting as agents for a number of lenders.

16 As of February 24, 2010, the WB Group was indebted towards the First Lien Lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement in the approximate amount of $438 million (including interest). This amount was secured by all of the Sellers' fixed assets. The contemplated sale following the auction includes the WB Group's fixed assets and unencumbered assets.

17 BDWB is comprised of a group of lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement and hold, in aggregate approximately 65% of the First Lien Debt. They are also « Majority Lenders » under the First Lien Credit Agreement and, as such, are entitled to make certain decisions with respect to t he First Lien Debt including the right to use the security under the First Lien Credit Agreement as tool for credit bidding.

18 Sixth Avenue is comprised of a group of First Lien Lenders holding a minority position in the First Lien Debt (approximately 10%). They are not « Majority Lenders » and accordingly, they do not benefit from the same advantages as the BDWB group of First Lien Lenders, with respect to the use of the security on the fixed assets of the WB Group, in a credit bidding process[FN2].

19 The bidding process took place in New York on September 21, 2010. Only two bidders were involved: the winning bidder (BDWB) and the losing bidder[FN3] (Sixth Avenue).

20 In its Intervention, BDWB has analysed all of the rather complex mechanics allowing it to use the system of credit bidding as well as developing reasons why Sixth Avenue could not benefit from the same privilege. In addition to certain arguments developed in the reasons which follow, I also accept as my own BDWB's submissions developed in section (e), paragraphs [40] to [53] of its Intervention as well as the arguments brought forward in paragraphs [54] to [60] validating BDWB's specific right to credit bid in the present circumstances.

21 Essentially, BDWB establishes its right to credit bid by referring not only to the September 10 Court Order but also by referring to the debt and security documents themselves, namely the First Lien Credit Agreement, the US First Lien Credit Agreement and under the Canadian Security Agreements whereby the « Majority Lender » may direct the « Agents » to support such credit bid in favour of such « Majority Lenders ». Conversely, this position is not available to the « Minority Lenders ». This reasoning has not been seriously challenged before me.

22 The Debtors and Mis-en-cause are now asking me to approve the sale of all and/or substantially all the assets of the WB Group to BDWB. The disgruntled bidder asks me to not only dismiss this application but also to declare it the winning bidder or, alternatively, to order a new auction.

23 On September 24, 2010, I delivered oral reasons in support of the Debtors' Motion to approve the sale. Here is a transcript of these reasons.

REASONS (delivered orally on September 24, 2010)

24 I am asked by the Petitioners to approve the sale of substantially all the WB Group's assets following a bid process in the form of a « Stalking Horse » bid process which was not only announced in the originating pro-

ceedings in this file, I believe back in early 2010, but more specifically as from May/June 2010 when I was asked to authorise the Sale and Investors Solicitation Process (SISP). The SISP order led to the canvassing of proposed bidders, qualified bidders and the eventual submission of a « Stalking Horse » bidder. In this context, a Motion to approve the « Stalking Horse » Bid process to approve the assets sale agreement and to approve a bidding procedure for the sale of substantially all of the assets of the WB Group was submitted and sanctioned by my decision of September 10, 2010.

25 I note that throughout the implementation of this sale process, all of its various preliminary steps were put in place and approved without any contestation whatsoever by any of the interested stakeholders except for the two construction lien holders KSH[FN4] and SIII[FN5] who, for very specific reasons, took a strong position towards the process itself (not that much with the bidding process but with the consequences of this process upon their respective claims.

26 The various arguments of KSH and SIII against the entire Stalking Horse bid process have now become moot, considering that both BDWB and Sixth Avenue have agreed to honour the construction liens and to assume the value of same (to be later determined).

27 Today, the Motion of the Debtors is principally contested by a group which was identified as the « Sixth Avenue » bidders and more particularly, identified in paragraph 20 of the Motion now before me. The « Stalking Horse » bidder, of course, is the Black Diamond group identified as « BD White Birch Investment LLC ». The Dune Group of companies who are also secured creditors of the WB Group are joining in, supporting the position of Sixth Avenue. Their contestation rests on the argument that the best and highest bid at the auction, which took place in New York on September 21, should not have been identified as the Black Diamond bid. To the contrary, the winning bid should have been, according to the contestants, the « Sixth Avenue » bid which was for a lesser dollar amount ($500,000.00), for a larger cash amount (approximately $78,000,000.00 more cash) and for a different allocation of the purchase price.

28 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Monitor, in its report of August 23, supports the « Black Diamond » winning bid and the Monitor recommends to the Court that the sale of the assets of the WB Group be made on that basis.

29 The main argument of « Sixth Avenue » as averred, sometimes referred to as the « bitter bidder », comes from the fact that the winning bid relied upon the tool of credit bidding to the extent of $78,000,000.00 in arriving at its total offer of $236,052,825.00.

30 If I take the comments of « Sixth Avenue », the use of credit bidding was not only a surprise, but a rather bad surprise, in that they did not really expect that this would be the way the « Black Diamond » bid would be ultimately constructed. However, the possibility of reverting to credit bidding was something which was always part of the process. I quote from paragraph 7 of the Motion to Approve the Sale of the Assets, which itself quotes paragraph 24 of the SISP Order, stating that:

> 24. Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, including without limitation, the bidding requirements herein, the agent under the White Birch DIP Facility (the « DIP Agent ») and the agent to the WB Group's first lien term loan lenders (the First Lien Term Agent »), on behalf of the lenders under White Birch DIP Facility and the WB Group's first lien term loan lenders, respectively, shall be deemed Qualified Bidders and any bid submitted by such agent on behalf of the respective lenders in respect of all or a portion of the Assets shall be deemed both Phase 1 Qualified Bids and Phase 2 Qualified Bids. The DIP Agent and First

> Lien Term Agent, on behalf of the lenders under the White Birch DIP Facility and the WB Group's first lien term loan lenders, respectively, shall be permitted in their sole discretion, to credit bid up to the full amount of any allowed secure claims under the White Birch DIP Facility and the first lien term loan agreement, respectively, to the extent permitted under Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable law.

31 The words « and other applicable law » could, in my view, tolerate the inclusion of similar rules of procedure in the province of Quebec.[FN6]

32 The possibility of reverting to credit bidding was also mentioned in the bidding procedure sanctioned by my decision of September 10, 2010 as follows and I now quote from paragraph 13 of the Debtors' Motion:

> 13. « Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, the applicable agent under the DIP Credit Agreement and the application agent under the First Lien Credit Agreement shall each be entitled to credit bid pursuant to Section 363(k) of the Bankruptcy Code and other applicable law.

33 I draw from these excerpts that when the « Stalking Horse » bid process was put in place, those bidders able to benefit from a credit bidding situation could very well revert to the use of this lever or tool in order to arrive at a better bid[FN7]

34 Furthermore, many comments were made today with respect to the dollar value of a credit bid versus the dollar value of a cash bid. I think that it is appropriate to conclude that if credit bidding is to take place, it goes without saying that the amount of the credit bid should not exceed, but should be allowed to go as, high as the face value amount of the credit instrument upon which the credit bidder is allowed to rely. The credit bid should not be limited to the fair market value of the corresponding encumbered assets. It would then be just impossible to function otherwise because it would require an evaluation of such encumbered assets, a difficult, complex and costly exercise.

35 Our Courts have always accepted the dollar value appearing on the face of the instrument as the basis for credit bidding. Rightly or wrongly, this is the situation which prevails.

36 Many arguments were brought forward, for and against the respective position of the two opposing bidders. At the end of the day, it is my considered opinion that the « Black Diamond » winning bid should prevail and the « Sixth Avenue » bid, the bitter bidder, should fail.

37 I have dealt briefly with the process. I don't wish to go through every single step of the process but I reiterate that this process was put in place without any opposition whatsoever. It is not enough to appear before a Court and say: « Well, we've got nothing to say now. We may have something to say later » and then, use this argument to reopen the entire process once the result is known and the result turns out to be not as satisfactory as it may have been expected. In other words, silence sometimes may be equivalent to acquiescence. All stakeholders knew what to expect before walking into the auction room.

38 Once the process is put in place, once the various stakeholders accept the rules, and once the accepted rules call for the possibility of credit bidding, I do not think that, at the end of the day, the fact that credit bidding was used as a tool, may be raised as an argument to set aside a valid bidding and auction process.

39 Today, the process is completed and to allow "Sixth Avenue" to come before the Court and say: "My bid is essentially better than the other bid and Court ratify my bid as the highest and best bid as opposed to the win-

ning bid" is the equivalent to a complete eradication of all proceedings and judgments rendered to this date with respect to the Sale of Assets authorized in this file since May/June 2010 and I am not prepared to accept this as a valid argument. Sixth Avenue should have expected that BDWB would want to revert to credit bidding and should have sought a modification of the bidding procedure in due time.

40 The parties have agreed to go through the bidding process. Once the bidding process is started, then there is no coming back. Or if there is coming back, it is because the process is vitiated by an illegality or non-compliance of proper procedures and not because a bidder has decided to credit bid in accordance with the bidding procedures previously adopted by the Court.

41 The Court cannot take position today which would have the effect of annihilating the auction which took place last week. The Court has to take the result of this auction and then apply the necessary test to approve or not to approve that result. But this is not what the contestants before me ask me to do. They are asking me to make them win a bid which they have lost.

42 It should be remembered that "Sixth Avenue" agreed to continue to bid even after the credit bidding tool was used in the bidding process during the auction. If that process was improper, then "Sixth Avenue" should have withdrawn or should have addressed the Court for directions but nothing of the sort was done. The process was allowed to continue and it appears evident that it is only because of the end result which is not satisfactory that we now have a contestation of the results.

43 The arguments which were put before me with a view to setting aside the winning bid (leaving aside those under Section 36 of the CCAA to which I will come to a minute) have not convinced me to set it aside. The winning bid certainly satisfies a great number of interested parties in this file, including the winning bidders, including the Monitor and several other creditors.

44 I have adverse representations from two specific groups of creditors who are secured creditors of the White Birch Group prior to the issue of the Initial Order which have, from the beginning, taken strong exceptions to the whole process but nevertheless, they constitute a limited group of stakeholders. I cannot say that they speak for more interests than those of their own. I do not think that these creditors speak necessarily for the mass of unsecured creditors which they allege to be speaking for. I see no benefit to the mass of creditors in accepting their submissions, other than the fact that the Monitor will dispose of US$500,000.00 less than it will if the winning bid is allowed to stand.

45 I now wish to address the question of Section 36 CCAA.

46 In order to approve the sale, the Court must take into account the provisions of Section 36 CCAA and in my respectful view, these conditions are respected.

47 Section 36 CCAA reads as follows:

> 36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.
>
> (2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the se-

cured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

(3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(c) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(d) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(e) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(f) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

(4) If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

(a) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and

(b) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

(5) For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes

(a) a director or officer of the company;

(b) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and

(c) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (*a*) or (*b*).

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

2005, c. 47, s. 131; 2007, c. 36, s. 78.

(added underlining)

48 The elements which can be found in Section 36 CCAA are, first of all, not limitative and secondly they

need not to be all fulfilled in order to grant or not grant an order under this section.

49 The Court has to look at the transaction as a whole and essentially decide whether or not the sale is appropriate, fair and reasonable. In other words, the Court could grant the process for reasons others than those mentioned in Section 36 CCAA or refuse to grant it for reasons which are not mentioned in Section 36 CCAA.

50 Nevertheless, I was given two authorities as to what should guide the Court in similar circumstances, I refer firstly to the comments of Madame Justice Sarah Peppall in *Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re*, 2010 CarswellOnt 3509 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), and she writes at paragraph 13:

> The proposed disposition of assets meets the Section 36 CCAA criteria and those set forth in the *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* decision. Indeed, to a large degree, the criteria overlap. The process was reasonable as the Monitor was content with it (and this is the case here). Sufficient efforts were made to attract the best possible bid (this was done here through the process, I don't have to review this in detail); the SISP was widely publicized (I am given to understand that, in this present instance, the SISP was publicized enough to generate the interest of many interested bidders and then a smaller group of Qualified Bidders which ended up in the choice of one « Stalking Horse » bidder); ample time was given to prepare offers; and there was integrity and no unfairness in the process. The Monitor was intimately involved in supervising the SISP and also made the Superior Cash Offer recommendation. The Monitor had previously advised the Court that in its opinion, the Support Transaction was preferable to a bankruptcy (this was all done in the present case.) The logical extension of that conclusion is that the AHC Transaction is as well (and, of course, understand that the words « preferable to a bankruptcy » must be added to this last sentence). The effect of the proposed sale on other interested parties is very positive. (It doesn't mean by saying that, that it is positive upon all the creditors and that no creditor will not suffer from the process but given the representations made before me, I have to conclude that the proposed sale is the better solution for the creditors taken as a whole and not taken specifically one by one) Amongst other things, it provides for a going concern outcome and significant recoveries for both the secured and unsecured creditors.

51 Here, we may have an argument that the sale will not provide significant recoveries for unsecured creditors but the question which needs to be asked is the following: "Is it absolutely necessary to provide interest for all classes of creditors in order to approve or to set aside a "Stalking Horse bid process"?

52 In my respectful view, it is not necessary. It is, of course, always better to expect that it will happen but unfortunately, in any restructuring venture, some creditors do better than others and sometimes, some creditors do very badly. That is quite unfortunate but it is also true in the bankruptcy alternative. In any event, in similar circumstances, the Court must rely upon the final recommendation of the Monitor which, in the present instance, supports the position of the winning bidder.

53 In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, Mister Justice Morawetz, in the context of a Motion for the Approval of an Assets Sale Agreement, Vesting Order of approval of an intellectual Property Licence Agreement, etc. basically took a similar position (2009 CarswellOnt 4838 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), at paragraph 35):

> The duties of the Court in reviewing a proposed sale of assets are as follows:
>
> 1) It should consider whether sufficient effort has been made to obtain the best price and that the debtor has not acted improvidently;

2) It should consider the interests of all parties;

3) It should consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which offers have been obtained;

4) and it should consider whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process.

54 I agree with this statement and it is my belief that the process applied to the present case meets these criteria.

55 I will make no comment as to the standing of the « bitter bidder ». Sixth Avenue mayo have standing as a stakeholder while it may not have any, as a disgruntled bidder.

56 I am, however, impressed by the comments of my colleague Clément Gascon, j.s.c. in *Abitibi Bowater*, in his decision of May 3rd, 2010 where, in no unclear terms he did not think that as such, a bitter bidder should be allowed a second strike at the proverbial can.

57 There may be other arguments that could need to be addressed in order to give satisfaction to all the arguments provided to me by counsel. Again, this has been a long day, this has been a very important and very interesting debate but at the end of the whole process, I am satisfied that the integrity of the « Stalking Horse » bid process in this file, as it was put forth and as it was conducted, meets the criteria of the case law and the CCAA. I do not think that it would be in the interest of any of the parties before me today to conclude otherwise. If I were to conclude otherwise, I would certainly not be able to grant the suggestion of « Sixth Avenue », to qualify its bid as the winning bid; I would have to eradicate the entire process and cause a new auction to be held. I am not prepared to do that.

58 I believe that the price which will be paid by the winning bidder is satisfactory given the whole circumstances of this file. The terms and conditions of the winning bid are also acceptable so as a result, I am prepared to grant the Motion. I do not know whether the Order which you would like me to sign is available and I know that some wording was to be reviewed by some of the parties and attorneys in this room. I don't know if this has been done. Has it been done? Are KSH and SIII satisfied or content with the wording?

Attorney:

I believe, Mister Justice, that KSH and SIII have.....their satisfaction with the wording. I believe also that Dow Jones, who's present, ...their satisfaction. However, AT&T has communicated that they wish to have some minor adjustments.

The Court:

Are you prepared to deal with this now or do you wish to deal with it during the week-end and submit an Order for signature once you will have ironed out the difficulties, unless there is a major difficulty that will require further hearing?

Attorney:

I think that the second option you suggested is probably the better one. So, we'd be happy to reach an agreement and then submit it to you and we'll recirculate everyone the wording.

The Court:

Very well.

The Motion to Approve the Sale of substantially all of the WB Group assets (no. 87) is *granted,* in accordance with the terms of an Order which will be completed and circulated and which will be submitted to me for signature as of Monday, next at the convenience of the parties;

The Motion of Dow Jones Company Inc. (no. 79) will be continued sine die;

The Amended Contestation of the Motion to Approve the Sale (no. 84) on behalf of « Sixth Avenue » is *dismissed* without costs (I believe that the debate was worth the effort and it will serve no purpose to impose any cost upon the contestant);

Also for the position taken by Dunes, there is no formal Motion before me but Mr. Ferland's position was important to the whole debate but I don't think that costs should be imposed upon his client as well;

The Motion to Stay the Assignment of a Contract from AT&T (no. 86) will be continued sine die;

The Intervention and Memorandum of arguments of BD White Birch Investment LLC is *granted*, without costs.

> 689. The purchase price must be paid within five days, at the expiry of which time interest begins to run.
>
> Nevertheless, when the immovable is adjudged to the seizing creditor or any hypothecary creditor who has filed an opposition or whose claim is mentioned in the statement certified by the registrar, he may retain the purchase-money to the extent of the claim until the judgment of distribution is served upon him.
>
> 730. A purchaser who has not paid the purchase price must, within ten days after the judgment of homologation is transmitted to him, pay the sheriff the amounts necessary to satisfy the claims which have priority over his own; if he fails to do so, any interested party may demand the resale of the immovable upon him for false bidding.
>
> When the purchaser has fulfilled his obligation, the sheriff must give him a certificate that the purchase price has been paid in full.

See also Denis Ferland and Benoit Emery, 4ème edition, volume 2 (Éditions Yvon Blais (2003)):

> La loi prévoit donc que, lorsque l'immeuble est adjugé au saisissant ou à un créancier hypothécaire qui a fait opposition, ou dont la créance est portée à l'état certifié par l'officier de la publicité des droits, l'adjudicataire peut retenir le prix, y compris le prix minimum annoncé dans l'avis de vente (art. 670, al. 1, e), 688.1 C.p.c.), jusqu'à concurrence de sa créance et tant que ne lui a pas été signifié le jugement de distribution prévu à l'article 730 C.p.c. (art. 689, al 2 C.p.c.). Il n'aura alors à payer, dans les cinq jours suivant la signification de ce jugement, que la différence entre le prix d'adjudication et le montant de sa créance pour satisfaire aux créances préférées à la sienne (art. 730, al. 1 C.p.c.). La Cour d'appel a déclaré, à ce sujet, que puisque le deuxième alinéa de l'article 689 C.p.c. est une exception à la règle du paiement lors de la vente

> par l'adjudicataire du prix minimal d'adjudication (art. 688.1, al. 1 C.p.c.) et à celle du paiement du solde du prix d'adjudication dans les cinq jours suivants (art. 689, al. 1 C.p.c.), il doit être interprété de façon restrictive. Le sens du mot « créance », contenu dans cet article, ne permet alors à l'adjudicataire de retenir que la partie de sa créance qui est colloquée ou susceptible de l'être, tout en tenant compte des priorités établies par la loi.

See, finally, *Cie Montréal Trust c. Jori Investments Inc.*, J.E. 80-220 (Que. S.C.) [1980 CarswellQue 85 (Que. S.C.)], *Eugène Marcoux Inc. c. Côté*, [1990] R.J.Q. 1221 (Que. C.A.)

See paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 of BDWB's Intervention.

As for the right to credit bid in a sale by auction under the CCAA, see *Maax Corporation, Re* (July 10, 2008), Doc. 500-11-033561-081 (Que. S.C.) (Buffoni J.)

See also Re: *Brainhunter* (OSC Commercial List, no.09-8482-00CL, January 22, 2010)

Motion granted.

FN* Leave to appeal refused at *White Birch Paper Holding Co., Re* (2010), 2010 CarswellQue 11534, 2010 QCCA 1950 (Que. C.A.).

FN1 See my Order of September 10, 2010.

FN2 For a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship of BDWB members and Sixth Avenue members as lenders under the original First Lien Credit Agreement of April 8, 2005, see paragraphs 15 to 19 of BDWB's Intervention.

FN3 Sometimes referred to as the « bitter bidder » or « disgruntled bidder » See *AbitibiBowater inc., Re*, 2010 QCCS 1742 (Que. S.C.) (Gascon J.)

FN4 KSH Solutions Inc.

FN5 Service d'Impartition Industriel Inc.

FN6 The concept of credit bidding is not foreign to Quebec civil law and procedure. See for example articles 689 and 730 of the Quebec code of Civil Procedure which read as follows:

FN7 The SISP, the bidding procedure and corresponding orders recognize the principle of credit bidding at the auction and these orders were not the subject of any appeal procedure.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 6

Case Name:

Canwest Global Communications Corp. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, as amended AND IN THE MATTER OF a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Canwest Global Communications Corp. and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A"

[2009] O.J. No. 4788

Court File No. CV-09-8241-OOCL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

S.E. Pepall J.

November 12, 2009.

(43 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Applications -- Sanction by court -- Application by a group of debtor companies for approval of an agreement that would enable them to restructure their business affairs, allowed -- Applicants were under the protection of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Agreement was approved because it facilitated the restructuring of the applicants to enable them to become viable and competitive industry participants and it was fair -- Related transaction regarding the transfer of the business and assets of a newspaper that the applicants had an interest in did not require Court approval under s. 36 of the Act because it was an internal corporate reorganization which was in the ordinary course of business -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 36.

Application by a group of debtor companies and entities for an order approving a Transition and Reorganization Agreement between them and other related parties. The applicants were granted protection under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act on October 6, 2009. They were engaged in the newspaper, digital media and television business. The Agreement pertained to the restructuring of the applicants' business affairs. It was an internal reorganization transaction that was designed to realign shared services and assets within the corporate family that the applicants belonged to. The Agreement was entered into after extensive negotiations between the parties who were affected by it. The Monitor, who was appointed under the Act, concluded that this transaction had several advantages over a liquidation.

HELD: Application allowed. Court approval under s. 36 of the Act was required if a debtor company under the protection of the Act proposed to sell or dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business. It did not apply to a transaction regarding the transfer of the assets and business of a newspaper that the applicants had an interest in because it was an internal corporate reorganization which was in the ordinary course of business. The Agreement was approved because it facilitated the restructuring of the applicants to enable them to become viable and competitive industry participants and it was fair. It also allowed a substantial number of the businesses operated by the applicants to

continue as going concerns. The Agreement did not prejudice the applicants' major creditors. In the absence of the Agreement the newspaper would have to shut down and most of its employees would lose their employment. The stay that was granted under the Act was extended to enable the applicants to continue to work with their various stakeholders on the preparation and filing of a proposed plan of arrangement.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,

Bulk Sales Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.14,

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 2(1), s. 2(1), s. 36, s. 36(1), s. 36(4), s. 36(7)

Counsel:

Lyndon Barnes and Jeremy Dacks for the Applicants.

Alan Merskey for the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of Canwest.

David Byers and Maria Konyukhova for the Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Benjamin Zarnett for the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

Peter J. Osborne for Proposed Management Directors of National Post.

Andrew Kent and Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia, Agent for Senior Secured Lenders to LP Entities.

Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Amanda Darroch for Communication Workers of America.

Alena Thouin for Superintendent of Financial Services.

REASONS FOR DECISION

S.E. PEPALL J.:--

Relief Requested

1 The CMI Entities move for an order approving the Transition and Reorganization Agreement by and among Canwest Global Communications Corporation ("Canwest Global"), Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Societe en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"), Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc ("CPI"), Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP") and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post (the "National Post Company") dated as of October 26, 2009, and which includes the New Shared Services Agreement and the National Post Transition Agreement.

2 In addition they ask for a vesting order with respect to certain assets of the National Post Company and a stay extension order.

3 At the conclusion of oral argument, I granted the order requested with reasons to follow.

Backround Facts

(a) Parties

4 The CMI Entities including Canwest Global, CMI, CTLP, the National Post Company, and certain subsidiaries were granted *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA")* protection on Oct 6, 2009. Certain others including the Limited Partnership and CPI did not seek such protection. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise.

5 The National Post Company is a general partnership with units held by CMI and National Post Holdings Ltd. (a wholly owned subsidiary of CMI). The National Post Company carries on business publishing the National Post newspaper and operating related on line publications.

(b) History

6 To provide some context, it is helpful to briefly review the history of Canwest. In general terms, the Canwest enterprise has two business lines: newspaper and digital media on the one hand and television on the other. Prior to 2005, all of the businesses that were wholly owned by Canwest Global were operated directly or indirectly by CMI using its former name, Canwest Mediaworks Inc. As one unified business, support services were shared. This included such things as executive services, information technology, human resources and accounting and finance.

7 In October, 2005, as part of a planned income trust spin-off, the Limited Partnership was formed to acquire Canwest Global's newspaper publishing and digital media entities as well as certain of the shared services operations. The National Post Company was excluded from this acquisition due to its lack of profitability and unsuitability for inclusion in an income trust. The Limited Partnership entered into a credit agreement with a syndicate of lenders and the Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent. The facility was guaranteed by the Limited Partner's general partner, Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI"), and its subsidiaries, CPI and Canwest Books Inc. (CBI") (collectively with the Limited Partnership, the "LP Entities"). The Limited Partnership and its subsidiaries then operated for a couple of years as an income trust.

8 In spite of the income trust spin off, there was still a need for the different entities to continue to share services. CMI and the Limited Partnership entered into various agreements to govern the provision and cost allocation of certain services between them. The following features characterized these arrangements:

-- the service provider, be it CMI or the Limited Partnership, would be entitled to reimbursement for all costs and expenses incurred in the provision of services;

-- shared expenses would be allocated on a commercially reasonable basis consistent with past practice; and

-- neither the reimbursement of costs and expenses nor the payment of fees was intended to result in any material financial gain or loss to the service provider.

9 The multitude of operations that were provided by the LP Entities for the benefit of the National Post Company rendered the latter dependent on both the shared services arrangements and on the operational synergies that developed between the National Post Company and the newspaper and digital operations of the LP Entities.

10 In 2007, following the Federal Government's announcement on the future of income fund distributions, the Limited Partnership effected a going-private transaction of the income trust. Since July, 2007, the Limited Partnership has been a 100% wholly owned indirect subsidiary of Canwest Global. Although repatriated with the rest of the Canwest enterprise in 2007, the LP Entities have separate credit facilities from CMI and continue to participate in the shared services arrangements. In spite of this mutually beneficial interdependence between the LP Entities and the CMI Entities, given the history, there are misalignments of personnel and services.

(c) Restructuring

11 Both the CMI Entities and the LP Entities are pursuing independent but coordinated restructuring and reorganization plans. The former have proceeded with their *CCAA* filing and prepackaged recapitalization transaction and the latter have entered into a forbearance agreement with certain of their senior lenders. Both the recapitalization transaction and the forbearance agreement contemplate a disentanglement and/or a realignment of the shared services arrangements. In addition, the term sheet relating to the CMI recapitalization transaction requires a transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the Limited Partnership.

12 The CMI Entities and the LP Entities have now entered into the Transition and Reorganization Agreement which addresses a restructuring of these inter-entity arrangements. By agreement, it is subject to court approval. The terms were negotiated amongst the CMI Entities, the LP Entities, their financial and legal advisors, their respective chief restructuring advisors, the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders, certain of the Limited Partnership's senior lenders and their respective financial and legal advisors.

13 Schedule A to that agreement is the New Shared Services Agreement. It anticipates a cessation or renegotiation of the provision of certain services and the elimination of certain redundancies. It also addresses a realignment of certain employees who are misaligned and, subject to approval of the relevant regulator, a transfer of certain misaligned pension plan participants to pension plans that are sponsored by the appropriate party. The LP Entities, the CMI Chief Restructuring Advisor and the Monitor have consented to the entering into of the New Shared Services Agreement.

14 Schedule B to the Transition and Reorganization Agreement is the National Post Transition Agreement.

15 The National Post Company has not generated a profit since its inception in 1998 and continues to suffer operating losses. It is projected to suffer a net loss of $9.3 million in fiscal year ending August 31, 2009 and a net loss of $0.9 million in September, 2009. For the past seven years these losses have been funded by CMI and as a result, the National Post Company owes CMI approximately $139.1 million. The members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders had agreed to the continued funding by CMI of the National Post Company's short-term liquidity needs but advised that they were no longer prepared to do so after October 30, 2009. Absent funding, the National Post, a national newspaper, would shut down and employment would be lost for its 277 non-unionized employees. Three of its employees provide services to the LP Entities and ten of the LP Entities' employees provide services to the National Post Company. The National Post Company maintains a defined benefit pension plan registered under the Ontario Pension Benefits Act. It has a solvency deficiency as of December 31, 2006 of $1.5 million and a wind up deficiency of $1.6 million.

16 The National Post Company is also a guarantor of certain of CMI's and Canwest Global's secured and unsecured indebtedness as follows:

Irish Holdco Secured Note -- $187.3 million

CIT Secured Facility -- $10.7 million

CMI Senior Unsecured Subordinated Notes -- US$393.2 million

Irish Holdco Unsecured Note -- $430.6 million

17 Under the National Post Transition Agreement, the assets and business of the National Post Company will be transferred as a going concern to a new wholly-owned subsidiary of CPI (the "Transferee"). Assets excluded from the transfer include the benefit of all insurance policies, corporate charters, minute books and related materials, and amounts owing to the National Post Company by any of the CMI Entities.

18 The Transferee will assume the following liabilities: accounts payable to the extent they have not been due for more than 90 days; accrued expenses to the extent they have not been due for more than 90 days; deferred revenue; and any amounts due to employees. The Transferee will assume all liabilities and/or obligations (including any unfunded liability) under the National Post pension plan and benefit plans and the obligations of the National Post Company under contracts, licences and permits relating to the business of the National Post Company. Liabilities that are not expressly assumed are excluded from the transfer including the debt of approximately $139.1 million owed to CMI, all liabilities of the National Post Company in respect of borrowed money including any related party or third party debt (but not including approximately $1,148,365 owed to the LP Entities) and contingent liabilities relating to existing litigation claims.

19 CPI will cause the Transferee to offer employment to all of the National Post Company's employees on terms and conditions substantially similar to those pursuant to which the employees are currently employed.

20 The Transferee is to pay a portion of the price or cost in cash: (i) $2 million and 50% of the National Post Company's negative cash flow during the month of October, 2009 (to a maximum of $1 million), less (ii) a reduction equal to the amount, if any, by which the assumed liabilities estimate as defined in the National Post Transition Agreement exceeds $6.3 million.

21 The CMI Entities were of the view that an agreement relating to the transfer of the National Post could only occur if it was associated with an agreement relating to shared services. In addition, the CMI Entities state that the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the Transferee is necessary for the survival of the National Post as a going concern. Furthermore, there are synergies between the National Post Company and the LP Entities and there is also the operational benefit of reintegrating the National Post newspaper with the other newspapers. It cannot operate independently of the services it receives from the Limited Partnership. Similarly, the LP Entities estimate that closure of the National Post would increase the LP Entities' cost burden by approximately $14 million in the fiscal year ending August 31, 2010.

22 In its Fifth Report to the Court, the Monitor reviewed alternatives to transitioning the business of the National Post Company to the LP Entities. RBC Dominion Securities Inc. who was engaged in December, 2008 to assist in considering and evaluating recapitalization alternatives, received no expressions of interest from parties seeking to acquire the National Post Company. Similarly, the Monitor has not been contacted by anyone interested in acquiring the business even though the need to transfer the business of the National Post Company has been in the public domain since October 6, 2009, the date of the Initial Order. The Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders will only support the short term liquidity needs until October 30, 2009 and the National Post Company is precluded from borrowing without the Ad Hoc Committee's consent which the latter will not provide. The LP Entities will not advance funds until the transaction closes. Accordingly, failure to transition would likely result in the forced cessation of operations and the commencement of liquidation proceedings. The estimated net recovery from a liquidation range from a negative amount to an amount not materially higher than the transfer price before costs of liquidation. The senior secured creditors of the National Post Company, namely the CIT Facility lenders and Irish Holdco, support the transaction as do the members of the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders.

23 The Monitor has concluded that the transaction has the following advantages over a liquidation:

-- it facilitates the reorganizaton and orderly transition and subsequent termination of the shared services arrangements between the CMI Entities and the LP Entities;

-- it preserves approximately 277 jobs in an already highly distressed newspaper publishing industry;

-- it will help maintain and promote competition in the national daily newspaper market for the benefit of Canadian consumers; and

-- the Transferee will assume substantially all of the National Post Company's trade payables (including those owed to various suppliers) and various employment costs associated with the transferred employees.

Issues

24 The issues to consider are whether:

(a) the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post is subject to the requirements of section 36 of the *CCAA;*
(b) the Transition and Reorganization Agreement should be approved by the Court; and
(c) the stay should be extended to January 22, 2010.

Discussion

(a) Section 36 of the *CCAA*

25 Section 36 of the *CCAA* was added as a result of the amendments which came into force on September 18, 2009. Counsel for the CMI Entities and the Monitor outlined their positions on the impact of the recent amendments to the *CCAA* on the motion before me. As no one challenged the order requested, no opposing arguments were made.

26 Court approval is required under section 36 if:

(a) a debtor company under CCAA protection
(b) proposes to sell or dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business.

27 Court approval under this section of the Act[1] is only required if those threshold requirements are met. If they are met, the court is provided with a list of non-exclusive factors to consider in determining whether to approve the sale or disposition. Additionally, certain mandatory criteria must be met for court approval of a sale or disposition of assets to a related party. Notice is to be given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition. The court may only grant authorization if satisfied that the company can and will make certain pension and employee related payments.

28 Specifically, section 36 states:

(1) Restriction on disposition of business assets -- A debtor company in respect

of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.

(2) Notice to creditors -- A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.

(3) Factors to be considered -- In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,

(*a*) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;

(*b*) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;

(*c*) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;

(*d*) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;

(*e*) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

(*f*) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

(4) Additional factors -- related persons -- If the proposed sale or disposition is to a person who is related to the company, the court may, after considering the factors referred to in subsection (3), grant the authorization only if it is satisfied that

(*a*) good faith efforts were made to sell or otherwise dispose of the assets to persons who are not related to the company; and

(*b*) the consideration to be received is superior to the consideration that would be received under any other offer made in accordance with the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition.

(5) Related persons -- For the purpose of subsection (4), a person who is related to the company includes

(*a*) a director or officer of the company;

(*b*) a person who has or has had, directly or indirectly, control in fact of the company; and

(*c*) a person who is related to a person described in paragraph (*a*) or (*b*).

(6) Assets may be disposed of free and clear -- The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds

of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

(7) Restriction -- employers -- The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.[2]

29 While counsel for the CMI Entities states that the provisions of section 36 have been satisfied, he submits that section 36 is inapplicable to the circumstances of the transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company because the threshold requirements are not met. As such, the approval requirements are not triggered. The Monitor supports this position.

30 In support, counsel for the CMI Entities and for the Monitor firstly submit that section 36(1) makes it clear that the section only applies to a debtor company. The terms "debtor company" and "company" are defined in section 2(1) of the *CCAA* and do not expressly include a partnership. The National Post Company is a general partnership and therefore does not fall within the definition of debtor company. While I acknowledge these facts, I do not accept this argument in the circumstances of this case. Relying on case law and exercising my inherent jurisdiction, I extended the scope of the Initial Order to encompass the National Post Company and the other partnerships such that they were granted a stay and other relief. In my view, it would be inconsistent and artificial to now exclude the business and assets of those partnerships from the ambit of the protections contained in the statute.

31 The CMI Entities' and the Monitor's second argument is that the Transition and Reorganization Agreement represents an internal corporate reorganization that is not subject to the requirements of section 36. Section 36 provides for court approval where a debtor under *CCAA* protection proposes to sell or otherwise dispose of assets "outside the ordinary course of business". This implies, so the argument goes, that a transaction that is in the ordinary course of business is not captured by section 36. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement is an internal corporate reorganization which is in the ordinary course of business and therefore section 36 is not triggered state counsel for the CMI Entities and for the Monitor. Counsel for the Monitor goes on to submit that the subject transaction is but one aspect of a larger transaction. Given the commitments and agreements entered into with the Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders and the Bank of Nova Scotia as agent for the senior secured lenders to the LP Entities, the transfer cannot be treated as an independent sale divorced from its rightful context. In these circumstances, it is submitted that section 36 is not engaged.

32 The *CCAA* is remedial legislation designed to enable insolvent companies to restructure. As mentioned by me before in this case, the amendments do not detract from this objective. In discussing section 36, the Industry Canada Briefing Book[3] on the amendments states that "The reform is intended to provide the debtor company with greater flexibility in dealing with its property while limiting the possibility of abuse."[4]

33 The term "ordinary course of business" is not defined in the *CCAA* or in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*[5]. *As noted by Cullity J. in Millgate Financial Corp. v. BCED Holdings Ltd.*[6], authorities that have considered the use of the term in various statutes have not provided an exhaustive definition. As one author observed in a different context, namely the *Bulk Sales Act*[7], courts have typically taken a common sense approach to the term "ordinary course of business" and have considered the normal business dealings of each particular seller[8]. In *Pacific Mobile Corp.*[9], the Supreme Court of Canada stated:

> It is not wise to attempt to give a comprehensive definition of the term "ordinary course of business" for all transactions. Rather, it is best to consider the circumstances of each case and to take into account the type of business carried on by the debtor and creditor.

> We approve of the following passage from Monet J.A.'s reasons, [1982] C.A. 501, discussing the phrase "ordinary course of business" ...
>
> 'It is apparent from these authorities, it seems to me, that the concept we are concerned with is an abstract one and that it is the function of the courts to consider the circumstances of each case in order to determine how to characterize a given transaction. This in effect reflects the constant interplay between law and fact.'

34 In arguing that section 36 does not apply to an internal corporate reorganization, the CMI Entities rely on the commentary of Industry Canada as being a useful indicator of legislative intent and descriptive of the abuse the section was designed to prevent. That commentary suggests that section 36(4),which deals with dispositions of assets to a related party, was intended to:

> ... prevent the possible abuse by "phoenix corporations". Prevalent in small business, particularly in the restaurant industry, phoenix corporations are the result of owners who engage in serial bankruptcies. A person incorporates a business and proceeds to cause it to become bankrupt. The person then purchases the assets of the business at a discount out of the estate and incorporates a "new" business using the assets of the previous business. The owner continues their original business basically unaffected while creditors are left unpaid.[10]

35 In my view, not every internal corporate reorganization escapes the purview of section 36. Indeed, a phoenix corporation to one may be an internal corporate reorganization to another. As suggested by the decision in *Pacific Mobile Corp*[11]., a court should in each case examine the circumstances of the subject transaction within the context of the business carried on by the debtor.

36 In this case, the business of the National Post Company and the CP Entities are highly integrated and interdependent. The Canwest business structure predated the insolvency of the CMI Entities and reflects in part an anomaly that arose as a result of an income trust structure driven by tax considerations. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement is an internal reorganization transaction that is designed to realign shared services and assets within the Canwest corporate family so as to rationalize the business structure and to better reflect the appropriate business model. Furthermore, the realignment of the shared services and transfer of the assets and business of the National Post Company to the publishing side of the business are steps in the larger reorganization of the relationship between the CMI Entities and the LP Entities. There is no ability to proceed with either the Shared Services Agreement or the National Post Transition Agreement alone. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement provides a framework for the CMI Entities and the LP Entities to properly restructure their inter-entity arrangements for the benefit of their respective stakeholders. It would be commercially unreasonable to require the CMI Entities to engage in the sort of third party sales process contemplated by section 36(4) and offer the National Post for sale to third parties before permitting them to realign the shared services arrangements. In these circumstances, I am prepared to accept that section 36 is inapplicable.

(b) Transition and Reorganization Agreement

37 As mentioned, the Transition and Reorganization Agreement is by its terms subject to court approval. The court has a broad jurisdiction to approve agreements that facilitate a restructuring: *Re Stelco Inc.*[12] Even though I have accepted that in this case section 36 is inapplicable, court approval should be sought in circumstances where the sale or disposition is to a related person and there is an apprehension that the sale may not be in the ordinary course of business. At that time, the court will confirm or reject the ordinary course of business characterization. If confirmed, at minimum, the court will determine whether the proposed transaction facilitates the restructuring and is fair. If rejected, the court will determine whether the proposed transaction meets the requirements of section 36. Even if the court confirms that the proposed transaction is in the ordinary course of business and

therefore outside the ambit of section 36, the provisions of the section may be considered in assessing fairness.

38 I am satisfied that the proposed transaction does facilitate the restructuring and is fair and that the Transition and Reorganization Agreement should be approved. In this regard, amongst other things, I have considered the provisions of section 36. I note the following. The CMI recapitalization transaction which prompted the Transition and Reorganization Agreement is designed to facilitate the restructuring of CMI into a viable and competitive industry participant and to allow a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities to continue as going concerns. This preserves value for stakeholders and maintains employment for as many employees of the CMI Entities as possible. The Transition and Reorganization Agreement was entered into after extensive negotiation and consultation between the CMI Entities, the LP Entities, their respective financial and legal advisers and restructuring advisers, the Ad Hoc Committee and the LP senior secured lenders and their respective financial and legal advisers. As such, while not every stakeholder was included, significant interests have been represented and in many instances, given the nature of their interest, have served as proxies for unrepresented stakeholders. As noted in the materials filed by the CMI Entities, the National Post Transition Agreement provides for the transfer of assets and certain liabilities to the publishing side of the Canwest business and the assumption of substantially all of the operating liabilities by the Transferee. Although there is no guarantee that the Transferee will ultimately be able to meet its liabilities as they come due, the liabilities are not stranded in an entity that will have materially fewer assets to satisfy them.

39 There is no prejudice to the major creditors of the CMI Entities. Indeed, the senior secured lender, Irish Holdco., supports the Transition and Reorganization Agreement as does the Ad Hoc Committee and the senior secured lenders of the LP Entities. The Monitor supports the Transition and Reorganization Agreement and has concluded that it is in the best interests of a broad range of stakeholders of the CMI Entities, the National Post Company, including its employees, suppliers and customers, and the LP Entities. Notice of this motion has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the order.

40 In the absence of the Transition and Reorganization Agreement, it is likely that the National Post Company would be required to shut down resulting in the consequent loss of employment for most or all the National Post Company's employees. Under the National Post Transition Agreement, all of the National Post Company employees will be offered employment and as noted in the affidavit of the moving parties, the National Post Company's obligations and liabilities under the pension plan will be assumed, subject to necessary approvals.

41 No third party has expressed any interest in acquiring the National Post Company. Indeed, at no time did RBC Dominion Securities Inc. who was assisting in evaluating recapitalization alternatives ever receive any expression of interest from parties seeking to acquire it. Similarly, while the need to transfer the National Post has been in the public domain since at least October 6, 2009, the Monitor has not been contacted by any interested party with respect to acquiring the business of the National Post Company. The Monitor has approved the process leading to the sale and also has conducted a liquidation analysis that caused it to conclude that the proposed disposition is the most beneficial outcome. There has been full consultation with creditors and as noted by the Monitor, the Ad Hoc Committee serves as a good proxy for the unsecured creditor group as a whole. I am satisfied that the consideration is reasonable and fair given the evidence on estimated liquidation value and the fact that there is no other going concern option available.

42 The remaining section 36 factor to consider is section 36(7) which provides that the court should be satisfied that the company can and will make certain pension and employee related payments that would have been required if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement. In oral submissions, counsel for the CMI Entities confirmed that they had met the requirements of section 36. It is agreed that the pension and employee liabilities will be assumed by the Transferee. Although present, the representative of the Superintendent of Financial Services was unopposed to

the order requested. If and when a compromise and arrangement is proposed, the Monitor is asked to make the necessary inquiries and report to the court on the status of those payments.

Stay Extension

43 The CMI Entities are continuing to work with their various stakeholders on the preparation and filing of a proposed plan of arrangement and additional time is required. An extension of the stay of proceedings is necessary to provide stability during that time. The cash flow forecast suggests that the CMI Entities have sufficient available cash resources during the requested extension period. The Monitor supports the extension and nobody was opposed. I accept the statements of the CMI Entities and the Monitor that the CMI Entities have acted, and are continuing to act, in good faith and with due diligence. In my view it is appropriate to extend the stay to January 22, 2010 as requested.

S.E. PEPALL J.

cp/e/qlrxg/qljxr/qlced/qlaxw

1 Court approval may nonetheless be required by virtue of the terms of the Initial or other court order or at the request of a stakeholder.

2 The reference to paragraph 6(4)a should presumably be 6(6)a.

3 Industry Canada "Bill C-55: Clause by Clause Analysis-Bill Clause No. 131-CCAA Section 36".

4 Ibid.

5 *R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 as amended.*

6 (2003), 47 C.B.R. (4th) 278 at para. 52.

7 R.S.O. 1990, c. B.14, as amended.

8 D.J. Miller "Remedies under the Bulk Sales Act: (Necessary, or a Nuisance?)", Ontario Bar Association, October, 2007.

9 [1985] 1 S.C.R. 290.

10 Supra, note 3.

11 *Supra, note 9.*

12 (2005), 15 C.B.R. (5th) 288 (Ont. C.A.).

TAB 7

Indexed as:

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, appellant;
v.
Sierra Club of Canada, respondent, and
The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, respondents.

[2002] 2 S.C.R. 522

[2002] S.C.J. No. 42

2002 SCC 41

File No.: 28020.

Supreme Court of Canada

2001: November 6 / 2002: April 26.

Present: McLachlin C.J. and Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.

ON APPEAL FROM THE FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL (92 paras.)

Practice -- Federal Court of Canada -- Filing of confidential material -- Environmental organization seeking judicial review of federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Crown corporation for construction and sale of nuclear reactors -- Crown corporation requesting confidentiality order in respect of certain documents -- Proper analytical approach to be applied to exercise of judicial discretion where litigant seeks confidentiality order -- Whether confidentiality order should be granted -- Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, r. 151.

Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance to Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), a Crown corporation, for the construction and sale to China of two CANDU reactors. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where AECL is the main contractor and project manager. Sierra Club maintains that the authorization of financial assistance [page523] by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act ("CEAA"), requiring an environmental assessment as a condition of the financial assistance, and that the failure to comply compels a cancellation of the financial arrangements. AECL filed an affidavit in the proceedings which summarized confidential documents containing thousands of pages of technical information concerning the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities. AECL resisted Sierra Club's application for production of the confidential documents on the ground, inter alia, that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have the authority to disclose them. The Chinese authorities authorized disclosure of the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, under which they would only be made available to the parties and the court, but with no restriction on public access to the judicial

proceedings. AECL's application for a confidentiality order was rejected by the Federal Court, Trial Division. The Federal Court of Appeal upheld that decision.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the confidentiality order granted on the terms requested by AECL.

In light of the established link between open courts and freedom of expression, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a confidentiality order is whether the right to freedom of expression should be compromised in the circumstances. The court must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with Charter principles because a confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression. A confidentiality order should only be granted when (1) such an order is necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (2) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings. Three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of the test. First, the risk must be real and substantial, well grounded in evidence, posing a serious threat to the commercial interest in question. Second, the important commercial interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality, where there is a general principle at stake. Finally, the judge is required to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available to such an order but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

[page524]

Applying the test to the present circumstances, the commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality, which is sufficiently important to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met. The information must have been treated as confidential at all relevant times; on a balance of probabilities, proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by disclosure of the information; and the information must have been accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential. These requirements have been met in this case. Disclosure of the confidential documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of AECL, and there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

Under the second branch of the test, the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial. Disclosure of the confidential documents would cause AECL to breach its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. If a confidentiality order is denied, AECL will be forced to withhold the documents in order to protect its commercial interests, and since that information is relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders AECL's capacity to make full answer and defence. Although in the context of a civil proceeding, this does not engage a Charter right, the right to a fair trial is a fundamental principle of justice. Further, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the confidential documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents, assisting in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression. Finally, given the technical nature of the information, there may be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

The deleterious effects of granting a confidentiality order include a negative effect on the open court principle, and therefore on the right to freedom of expression. The more detrimental the confidentiality order would be to the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons, the harder it will

be to justify the confidentiality order. In the hands of the parties and their experts, the confidential documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the highly technical nature of the documents, the important value of the search for the truth which underlies [page525] both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the confidential documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order.

Under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions relate to the public distribution of the documents, which is a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, the second core value of promoting individual self-fulfilment would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order. The third core value figures prominently in this appeal as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. By their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection, so that the public interest is engaged here more than if this were an action between private parties involving private interests. However, the narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the confidential documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts. The core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. The salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects and the order should be granted. A balancing of the various rights and obligations engaged indicates that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on AECL's right to a fair trial and freedom of expression, while the deleterious effects on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal.

Cases Cited

Applied: Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480; Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835; R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76; M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697; referred to: AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and [page526] Welfare), [2000] 3 F.C. 360, aff'g (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428; Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278; R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; R. v. O.N.E., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77; F.N. (Re), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35; Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd. (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 1, 2(b).
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, ss. 5(1)(b), 8, 54, 54(2)(b).
Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, rr. 151, 312.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (QL), affirming a decision of the Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 178 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (QL). Appeal allowed.

J. Brett Ledger and Peter Chapin, for the appellant.
Timothy J. Howard and Franklin S. Gertler, for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada.
Graham Garton, Q.C., and J. Sanderson Graham, for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada.

[Quicklaw note: Please see complete list of solicitors appended at the end of the judgment.]

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J.:--

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important [page527] issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

2 For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and accordingly would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

3 The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited ("AECL") is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a $1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

4 The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("CEAA"), which requires that an environmental assessment be undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

5 The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

6 In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant [page528] filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Mr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under Rule 312 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-

106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

[page529]

9 As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order, otherwise it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Mr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

10 The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

11 Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106

> 151. (1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.
>
> (2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments Below

A. Federal Court, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

12 Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to Rule 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondent would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought [page530] interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

14 Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the [page531] appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

17 In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

18 Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

19 Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

[page532]

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited

version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

21 At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under Rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under Rule 312.

22 With respect to Rule 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b) which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the CEAA was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the CEAA. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under Rule 312.

23 On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered Rule 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in [page533] the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

24 In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare), [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the CEAA, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

25 Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

26 Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without [page534] reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

28 In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence, or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

29 Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326. There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

[page535]

31 Robertson J.A. stated that although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

32 He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets", this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

> (1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a prima facie right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one

> must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

[page536]

33 In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a Web site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

35 A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under Rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

(1) The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles

36 The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

> The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the [page537] freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

37 A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835. Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right

to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the Dagenais framework utilizes overarching Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under Rule 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in Dagenais, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 Dagenais dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at [page538] religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the Charter. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-Charter common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103. At p. 878 of Dagenais, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) Such a ban is necessary in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
> (b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In New Brunswick, supra, this Court modified the Dagenais test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": New Brunswick, at para. 33; [page539] however he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the Charter. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the Criminal Code, closely mirrors the Dagenais common law test:

> (a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;
> (b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and
> (c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

43 This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in R. v. Mentuck, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 442, 2001 SCC 76, and its companion case R. v. O.N.E., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 478, 2001 SCC 77. In Mentuck, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while Dagenais dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the [page540] accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both Dagenais and New Brunswick was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the Charter than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the Charter and the Oakes test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in Dagenais, but broadened the Dagenais test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve any important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

> A publication ban should only be ordered when:
>
> (a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and
> (b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to [page541] allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve Charter rights, and that the ability to invoke the Charter is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

> The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflec[t] the substance of the Oakes test", we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the Dagenais framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

48 Mentuck is illustrative of the flexibility of the Dagenais approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with Charter principles, in my view, the Dagenais model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in Dagenais, New Brunswick and Mentuck, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the Charter right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with Charter principles. [page542] However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

50 Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence, or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a Charter right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, at para. 84, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone [page543] demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the Charter: New Brunswick, supra, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is seen to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice", guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: New Brunswick, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

53 Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of Dagenais and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under Rule 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

[page544]

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

54 As in Mentuck, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well grounded in the evidence, and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

55 In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest", the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in F.N. (Re), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35, at para. 10, the open court rule only yields "where the public interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

56 In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest". It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second [page545] branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in Eli Lilly and Co. v. Novopharm Ltd. (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 439.

57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. Application of the Test to this Appeal

(1) Necessity

58 At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would

impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself, or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the Confidential Documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

60 Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health and Welfare) (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (F.C.T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed [page546] by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been "accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the AB Hassle test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

62 The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the CEAA and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (at para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

63 Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunged of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be [page547] filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expungement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

64 There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this

relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal, in the sense that, at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

65 Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese [page548] authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

66 The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are reasonably alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

67 A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits "may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

68 With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

69 As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free [page549] expression, which in turn is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order

70 As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case, or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a Charter right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: Ryan, supra, at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected Charter right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: Mentuck, supra, at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

71 The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the CEAA is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

72 Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and [page550] permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

(b) Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order

74 Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: New Brunswick, supra, at paras. 22-23. Although as a general principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the particular deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

75 Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good; (2) promoting self-fulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit; and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, [page551] at p. 976; R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at pp. 762-64, per Dickson C.J. Charter jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the Charter: Keegstra, at pp. 760-61. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to Charter principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

76 Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: Edmonton Journal, supra, at pp. 1357-58, per Wilson J. Clearly the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

77 However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be promoted by

the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination. In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or [page552] documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

78 As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would in turn assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focusses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would [page553] restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

81 The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in Edmonton Journal, supra, at p. 1339:

> It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

82 On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

83 Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will always be engaged where the open court [page554] principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the substance of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below where he stated, at para. 87:

> While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

84 This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the CEAA. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

85 However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish public interest, from media interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public nature of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case. [page555] I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in Keegstra, supra, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values, "we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity".

86 Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application as a whole is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

> Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in Edmonton Journal, supra, at pp. 1353-54:

> One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at

large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to prejudge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

[page556]

87 In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

88 In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the CEAA, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations, or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the CEAA, or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the CEAA are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive information released into the public domain, with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

89 In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the CEAA, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on either the public interest in freedom of expression or the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the [page557] scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

90 In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

91 In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the CEAA, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its

deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

92 Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under Rule 151 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998.

[page558]

Solicitors for the appellant: Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt, Toronto.
Solicitors for the respondent Sierra Club of Canada: Timothy J. Howard, Vancouver; Franklin S. Gertler, Montréal.
Solicitor for the respondents the Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada: The Deputy Attorney General of Canada, Ottawa.

cp/e/qllls

TAB 8

Court File No. 10-8699-00CL

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	FRIDAY, THE 4th
	)	
JUSTICE MORAWETZ	)	DAY OF JUNE, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF PLANET ORGANIC HEALTH CORP. AND DARWEN HOLDINGS LTD.

APPLICANTS

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by Planet Organic Health Corp. and Darwen Holdings Ltd., (collectively, the "Applicants") for an order approving the acquisition (the "Acquisition") contemplated by an acquisition agreement among the Applicants and the Creditor (as that term is defined in the Acquisition Agreement) made as of May 19, 2010 and appended to the Affidavit of Darren Krissie sworn May 20, 2010 and as amended pursuant to the First Amendment to Acquisition Agreement dated June 1, 2010 and appended to the Affidavit of Darren Krissie sworn on June 3, 2010, together with such non-material amendments as may be consented to by the Monitor (defined below) (collectively, the "Acquisition Agreement"), and vesting in the Creditor all right, title and interest in and to the assets described in the Acquisition Agreement (the "Assets"), was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the material filed, including the Motion Record of the Applicants, the Third Report of the court-appointed monitor, Deloitte & Touche Inc. (the "Monitor"), the Responding Motion Record of 8000 Bathurst Street Realty Inc. and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants, counsel for the Monitor, counsel for the Creditor, counsel for 8000

Bathurst Street Realty Inc., and such other counsel as were present, and on being advised that the Service List was served with the Motion Record herein:

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that, if necessary, the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record is hereby abridged so that this motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

2. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that capitalized terms used herein that are not otherwise defined shall have the meanings set out in the Acquisition Agreement.

Approval and Vesting

3. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Acquisition including, without limitation, the payment and acquisition contemplated in section 2.1 of the Acquisition Agreement is hereby approved, and that the Acquisition Agreement is in the best interests of the Applicants and their stakeholders. The execution of the Acquisition Agreement by the Applicants is hereby authorized and approved, and the Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of, or to further evidence or document, the Acquisition and for the conveyance of the Assets to the Creditor.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS that, upon satisfaction (or, where applicable, waiver) of the conditions set out in Article 6 of the Acquisition Agreement, the Monitor shall file with this Court a certificate substantially in the form attached as Schedule A hereto stating that all conditions precedent set out in Article 6 of the Acquisition Agreement have been satisfied (or, where applicable, waived by the Applicants or the Creditor in accordance with the terms of the Acquisition Agreement) (the "Monitor's Certificate"). For the purposes of the preparation of the Monitor's Certificate, the Monitor shall be entitled to rely upon information provided by the Applicants with respect to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions set out in Article 6 of the Acquisition Agreement.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that upon the delivery of a Monitor's Certificate to the Creditor, all right, title and interest in and to the Assets described in the Acquisition Agreement shall vest absolutely in the Creditor, free and clear of and from any and

all security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs, mortgages, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens, executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured or otherwise (collectively, the "Claims"), whether such Claims came into existence prior to, subsequent to, or as a result of any previous orders of this Court, contractually, by operation of law or otherwise, including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order of the Honourable Justice Mr. Justice Morawetz dated April 29, 2010; and (ii) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations including without limitation pursuant to the *Personal Property Security Act* (Ontario), the *Personal Property Security Act* (Alberta), *Personal Property Security Act* (British Columbia), *Personal Property Security Act* (Nova Scotia), *Personal Property Security Act* (Saskatchewan) or any other personal property registry system (all of which are collectively referred to as the "Encumbrances") and, for greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Assets shall, upon the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Creditor, be and are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Assets.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS that, subject to and in accordance with the restrictions in section 11.3 of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (Canada) ("CCAA"), the Applicants are authorized and directed to assign the contracts, leases, agreements and other arrangements of which the Creditor takes an assignment on closing pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the Acquisition Agreement (the "Contracts") and that such assignments are hereby approved and are valid and binding upon the counterparties notwithstanding any restriction or prohibition on assignment contained in any such Contracts.

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that from and after the Closing Date, subject to the CCAA, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived all defaults then existing or previously committed by the Applicants under, or caused by the Applicants under, and the non-compliance by the Applicants with, any of the Contracts arising solely by reason of the insolvency of the Applicants or as a result of any actions taken pursuant to the Acquisition Agreement or in these proceedings, and all notices of default and demands given in connection with any such defaults under, or non-compliance with, the Contracts shall be deemed to have been rescinded and shall be of no further force or effect.

8. THIS COURT ORDERS that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the Canada *Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act* ("PIPEDA"), and pursuant to any other similar provincial legislation, the Applicants are authorized and permitted to disclose and transfer to the Creditor all human resources and payroll information in the Applicants' records pertaining to the Applicants' past and current employees. The Creditor shall maintain and protect the privacy of such information and shall be entitled to use the personal information provided to it in a manner which is in all material respects in compliance with PIPEDA and other similar provincial legislation.

Cash Reserve

9. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall establish a cash reserve in the amount of $2,031,281, as required under the Acquisition Agreement, on the Closing Date, using funds from the Cash and Cash Equivalents (the "Cash Reserve"), which Cash Reserve shall be held by the Monitor in a segregated account ("Cash Reserve Account") in trust for the benefit of Persons entitled to be paid the Cash Reserve Costs and the Creditor for the purpose of paying the Cash Reserve Costs in accordance with this Order.

10. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Cash Reserve Costs shall consist of the following obligations of the Applicants outstanding on the Closing Date:

(a) obligations secured by the Administration Charge to the extent required for the completion of the CCAA Proceeding in an amount not to exceed $300,000;

(b) obligations secured by the Directors' Charge including, legal fees and costs incurred by the directors and officers of the Applicants in connection with the conduct of the directors' and officers' claims process contemplated by the D&O Claims Procedure Order, that arose prior to the Closing Date, in an aggregate amount not to exceed $500,000;

(c) claims under subsections 6(5)(a) of the CCAA to the extent not paid by the Applicants on or before the Closing Date or assumed by the Creditor on the Closing Date, which amounts are expected not to exceed $75,000; and

(d) the obligation of the Applicants to pay the PCG Transaction Fee as defined in the Acquisition Agreement;

11. THIS COURT ORDERS that, as soon as reasonably possible following and in any event within fifteen (15) days of, the Closing Date, or by such later date as may be ordered by the

Court, the Monitor shall quantify, based on the books and records of the Creditor, the precise amount of each of the Cash Reserve Costs under paragraph 10(c) hereof. For such purpose, the Monitor shall be given access to the books and records of the Applicants and shall be entitled to rely exclusively thereon and, in particular, shall not be responsible for any errors therein or the impact of such errors on the Monitor's quantification of any such Cash Reserve Cost. Upon being provided with the Monitor's quantification of each such Cash Reserve Cost, the Creditor shall have ten (10) days to decide whether to agree to the Monitor's quantification of such Cash Reserve Cost, failing which agreement the amount of any such Cash Reserve Cost still in dispute shall be determined, on application of the Monitor, on notice to the Creditor, any affected directors and officers of the Applicants and any affected beneficiary of the Administration Charge, by Order of the Court. Once the amount of any such Cash Reserve Cost has either been agreed to or determined by the Court, as set forth above, the Monitor shall pay such claim from the Cash Reserve Account.

12. THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS that, from time to time after the Closing Date, the Monitor shall reduce the amount of the Cash Reserve as and to the extent that the Monitor, the Creditor, any affected directors and officers of the Applicants and any affected beneficiary of the Administration Charge agree, or a Court determines, that it, or portions of it, are no longer required to satisfy Cash Reserve Costs by distributing to the Creditor the amount of such reductions. All right, title and interest in and to any amounts in the Cash Reserve Account that are not used to pay Cash Reserve Costs in accordance with this Order shall vest absolutely in the Creditor as at the Closing Date and shall be distributed to the Creditor in accordance with this paragraph.

13. THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS that nothing in this Order shall affect the rights of counsel to the Applicants, the Monitor and counsel to the Monitor to use and apply the retainers received by them from the Applicants.

General

14. THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding:

(a) the pendency of these proceedings;

(b) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) in respect of any of the Applicants and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and

(c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of any of the Applicants;

the vesting of the Assets in the Creditor and the payment of any amounts contemplated by the Acquisition Agreement pursuant to this Order including, without limitation, the payment and acquisition contemplated in section 2.1(1) of the Acquisition Agreement, shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of any of the Applicants and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of the applicable Applicant, nor shall it constitute nor be deemed to be a fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance or other transfer at undervalue under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall it constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation.

15. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Acquisition is exempt from the application of the *Bulk Sales Act* (Ontario).

16. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Tripp Baird sworn May 20, 2010 shall be segregated from other documents filed in connection with this motion and shall be sealed until the filing with the Court of the Monitor's Certificate in relation to the Acquisition or upon further Order of the Court.

17. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Applicants shall, subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA, have the right to permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of its business or operations in accordance with Acquisition Agreement.

18. THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants and their agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants, as may be

necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order or to assist the Receiver and its agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

19. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the actions and conduct of the Monitor in the CCAA proceedings from April 29, 2010 to the date of the Third Report, as more particularly set out in the First, Second and Third Reports, and the First, Second and Third Reports, be and are hereby approved and that the Monitor has satisfied all of its obligations from April 29, 2010 up to and including the date of the Third Report.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

JUN 0 4 2010

PER / PAR: DS

Schedule A – Form of Monitor's Certificate

Court File No. 10-8699-00CL

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

(COMMERCIAL LIST)

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF PLANET ORGANIC HEALTH CORP. AND DARWEN HOLDINGS LTD.

MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE

RECITALS

A. Pursuant to an Order of the Honourable Mr. Justice Morawetz of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (the "Court") dated April 29, 2010, Deloitte & Touche Inc. was appointed as the monitor of the Applicants (the "Monitor").

B. Pursuant to an Order of the Court dated June 4, 2010, the Court approved the acquisition agreement among Planet Organic Health Corp. and Darwen Holdings Ltd. (collectively, the "Applicants") and 7562578 Canada Inc. (the "Creditor") made as of May 19, 2010 and as amended pursuant to the First Amendment to Acquisition Agreement dated June 1, 2010, together with such non-material amendments as may be consented to by the Monitor (collectively, the "Acquisition Agreement") and provided for the vesting in the Creditor of all right, title and interest in and to the Assets, which vesting is to be effective with respect to the Assets upon the delivery by the Monitor to the Creditor of a certificate with this Court confirming that (i) the conditions to Closing as set out in Article 6 of the Acquisition Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Applicants and the Creditor, (ii) the Applicants have been released from the guarantee agreement dated as of July 3, 2007 (the "Guarantee") in respect of

the amended and restated term loan agreement dated as of November 30, 2007 (as amended) (the "Term B Credit Agreement"), and (iii) the Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

C. Unless otherwise indicated herein, terms with initial capitals have the meanings set out in the Acquisition Agreement.

THE MONITOR CERTIFIES the following:

1. The conditions to Closing as set out in Article 6 of the Acquisition Agreement have been satisfied or waived by the Applicants and the Creditor.

2. The Applicants have been released from the Guarantee in respect of the Term B Credit Agreement.

3. The Transaction has been completed to the satisfaction of the Monitor.

4. This Certificate was delivered by the Monitor at ● [TIME] on ● [DATE].

Deloitte & Touche Inc., in its capacity as Monitor of the Applicants, and not in its personal capacity

Per: _____

Name:

Title:

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF PLANET ORGANIC HEALTH CORP. and DARWEN HOLDINGS LTD.

Court File No. 10-8699-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)
Proceeding commenced at Toronto

MONITOR'S CERTIFICATE

GOODMANS LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
Bay Adelaide Centre
333 Bay Street, Suite 3400
Toronto, ON M5H 2S7

Brian Empey (LSUC#: 30640G)
Tel: 416.597.4194
Email: bempey@goodmans.ca

Brendan O'Neill (LSUC#: 43331J)
Tel: 416.849.6017
Email: boneill@goodmans.ca
Fax: 416.979.1234

Lawyers for the Monitor

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF PLANET ORGANIC HEALTH CORP. and DARWEN HOLDINGS LTD.

Court File No. 10-8699-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)
Proceeding commenced at Toronto

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 2100
P.O.Box 874
Toronto, Ontario M5J 2T3

Frank Spizzirri (LSUC#: 37327F)
Tel.: 416.865.6940
Email: frank.spizzirri@bakermckenzie.com

Michael Nowina (LSUC#: 49633O)
Tel.: 416.865.2312
Email: michael.nowina@bakermckenzie.com
Fax: 416.863.6275

Lawyers for the Applicants

TAB 9

Case Name:

White Birch Paper Holding (Arrangement in respect of)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT AND COMPROMISE OF: WHITE BIRCH PAPER HOLDING COMPANY
and
WHITE BIRCH PAPER COMPANY, STADACONA GENERAL PARTNER INC., BLACK SPRUCE PAPER INC., F.F. SOUCY GENERAL PARTNER INC., 3120772 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY, ARRIMAGE DE GROS CACOUNA INC. and PAPIER MASSON LTÉE, Debtors
and
ERNST & YOUNG INC., Monitor
and
STADACONA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, F.F. SOUCY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP and F.F. SOUCY INC. & PARTNERS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Mises en cause

[2010] Q.J. No. 29832

EYB 2010-181372

2010 CarswellQue 11311

72 C.B.R. (5th) 63

No.: 500-11-038474-108

Quebec Superior Court
District of Montreal

The Honourable Robert Mongeon, J.S.C.

Heard: September 28, 2010.
Judgment: September 28, 2010.

(28 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Administration of estate -- Reports -- To court -- Administrative officials and appointees -- Monitors -- Duties and powers -- Sale of assets -- Approval -- The service and notice of the Motion being sufficient, the Court dispenses with further service thereof -- Motion to approve the sale granted.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, s. 11.3, s. 36

Forest Act, s. 38

Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, s. 7(3)(c)

Counsel:

No Counsel mentioned.

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

CONSIDERING the Debtors' "*Motion to Approve the Sale of Substantially All the WB Group's Assets*" (the "**Motion**") in respect of a sale transaction contemplated by an asset sale agreement (the "**Sale Agreement**") dated August 10, 2010 and amended on August 23, August 31, 2010 and September 23, 2010, amongst White Birch Paper Company and the other entities identified therein as sellers (collectively, the "**Sellers**"), as sellers, and BD White Birch Investment LLC (the "**Purchaser**") and such other Person(s) as it may designate (each, a "**Designated Purchaser**"), as purchaser, for the sale of substantially all of the Assets of the Sellers, and all of its terms, conditions, schedules, exhibits and related and ancillary agreements (collectively, the "**Transaction**"), and the Report dated September 23, 2010 (the "**Report**") of Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as the monitor (the "**Monitor**") of the Debtors and the Mises en Cause;

CONSIDERING the representations made by counsel; and

GIVEN the provisions of the CCAA and, in particular, Section 36 thereof;

WHEREFORE, THE COURT:

1 **GRANTS** the Motion;

2 **DECLARES** sufficient the service and notice of the Motion and hereby dispenses with further service thereof;

3 **ORDERS** that capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given to them in the Sale Agreement;

4 **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Sale Agreement and all of its terms and conditions (including all schedules and exhibits thereto and related and ancillary agreements and all schedules and exhibits thereto) and the Transaction are hereby fully and finally approved. The execution, delivery and performance of the Sale Agreement and the Transaction (with any such amendments as the parties thereto may agree to in accordance with the terms thereof) by the Debtors and the Mises en Cause party thereto is hereby authorized and approved, and the Debtors and the Mises en Cause and the Monitor are hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transaction and for the conveyance of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets to the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser;

5 **ORDERS** that the Debtors and the Mises en Cause are authorized and directed to perform their obligations under the Sale Agreement and in respect of the Transaction;

6 **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, subject to paragraph 16 of this Order, upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate to the Purchaser substantially in the form attached as Schedule "A" hereto (the "**Monitor's Certificate**"), all of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title, benefit and interest in and to the Assets shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all right, title, interest, security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs (legal or contractual), prior claims, mortgages, pledges, deeds of trust, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens (statutory or otherwise), executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, options, rights of first offer or first

refusal, real property licenses, encumbrances, conditional sale arrangements, leasing agreements or other similar restrictions of any kind, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured, legal, possessory or otherwise (collectively, the "**Claims**"), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order of the Honourable Robert Mongeon, J.S.C. dated February 24, 2010 or any other Order of this Honourable Court in these proceedings; (ii) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the Registre des droits personnels et réels mobiliers (Québec), the Personal Property Security Act (Nova Scotia), the *Bank Act* (Canada) or any other personal property registry system, or recorded with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office pursuant to the Trade-marks Act (Canada); and (iii) all Excluded Liabilities (all of which are collectively referred to as the "**Encumbrances**", but excluding Permitted Encumbrances (other than those Permitted Encumbrances specified in clause (I) of the definition of Permitted Encumbrances in the Sale Agreement and any other Permitted Encumbrances specifically contemplated to be discharged by this Order)). For greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Assets shall, upon delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, be and are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Assets. Counsel for the Purchaser and any agents appointed by such counsel may, immediately following the Closing of the Transaction, proceed with the discharge of such Claims and Encumbrances including, without limitation, the electronic discharge of any financing statements, UCC registrations, mortgages or other registrations in respect thereof;

7 **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims and Encumbrances, the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets (other than the Wind-Down Amount and the Reserve Payment Amount) shall stand in the place and stead of the Assets, and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, all Claims and Encumbrances (other than the D & O Charge and the Administrative Charge) shall attach to the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets (other than the Wind-Down Amount and the Reserve Payment Amount) with the same priority as they had with respect to the Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale;

8 **ORDERS** that the Monitor shall administer the Wind-Down Amount in accordance with the provisions of the Sale Agreement including, without limitation, Section 5.18 thereof;

9 **ORDERS** that: (i) all right, title and interest in and to any portion of the Wind-Down Amount that is not used to pay costs associated with winding- down the Sellers' estate in accordance with Section 5.18 of the Sale Agreement shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser as at the Closing Date and shall promptly be distributed to the Purchaser; and (ii) the Wind-Down Amount shall not be considered to be proceeds of sale of the Assets and the Claims and Encumbrances shall not attach to the Wind-Down Amount;

10 **ORDERS** that upon the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Purchaser: (i) the Administration Charge provided for in the Initial Order be and is hereby released, expunged and discharged; and (ii) the D&O Charge provided for in the Initial Order be and is hereby released, expunged and discharged;

11 **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Témiscouata, upon presentation of the Monitor's Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "A" hereto, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) as the absolute owner in regards to the immovable listed in Schedule "B" hereto which are located in Rivière-du-Loup, in the Province of Québec (being hereinafter described as the "**Rivière-du-Loup Property**"); and (ii) proceed with the reduction and cancellation of any and all Encumbrances but

only insofar as concerns the Rivière-du-Loup Property as described in Schedule "B", including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Témiscouata:

(i) a hypothec charging buildings only granted in favour of White Birch Paper Company by F.F. Soucy General Partner Inc./Commandité F.F. Soucy Inc. for an amount of $250,000,000 and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 7, 2005 under number 12195029;

(ii) a hypothec granted for an amount of $250,000,000 in favour of White Birch Paper Company by F.F. Soucy, Inc. & Partners, Limited Partnership/F.F. Soucy inc. & associés, Société en commandite and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 030;

(iii) a first hypothec granted for an amount of $550,000,000 and a second hypothec granted pursuant to the same deed for an amount of $250,000,000 granted in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston, Toronto Branch, by White Birch Paper Company and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 7, 2005 under number 12195031;

(iv) a legal hypothec (construction) granted for an amount of $2,692,455.81 registered by Service d'impartition Industriel Inc. against F.F. Soucy S.E.C., as owner, and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on November 18, 2009 under number 16 731 954;

(v) a legal hypothec (construction) granted for an amount of $2,692,455.81 registered by Service d'impartition Industriel Inc. against F.F. Soucy S.E.C., as owner, and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on November 27, 2009 under number 16 758 360;

(vi) a hypothec on a universality of immovables granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch, by White Birch Paper Company registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on March 4, 2010 under number 16 979 262;

(vii) a hypothec on the universality of immovables granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch, by FE. Soucy L.P./F.F. Soucy S.E.C. and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on March 4, 2010 under number 16 979 263; and

(viii) a prior notice of the exercise of a sale under judicial authority registered by Service d'impartition Industriel Inc. against F.F. Soucy S.E.C., as owner, registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 21, 2010 under number 17 095 095 and on June 15, 2010 under number 17 281 485, which registrations refer to the legal hypothecs registered under numbers 16 731 954 and 16 758 360 referred to above;

12 ORDERS the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Québec, upon presentation of the Monitor's Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "A" hereto, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) as the absolute owner in regards to the immovables listed in Schedule "C" hereto which are located in Québec City, in the Province of Québec (being hereinafter described as the "**Quebec City Properties**"); and (ii)

proceed with the reduction and cancellation of any and all Encumbrances but only insofar as concerns the Québec City Properties as described in Schedule "C", including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Quebec:

(i) a hypothec on a universality of immovables granted for an amount of $550,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch by Stadacona L.P./Stadacona S.E.C. and Stadacona General Partner Inc./Commandité Stadacona Inc. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 317;

(ii) a hypothec on a universality of immovables granted for an amount of $250,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch by Stadacona L.P./Stadacona S.E.C. and Stadacona General Partner Inc./Commandité Stadacona Inc. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 318;

(iii) a legal hypothec (construction) for an amount of $2,067,704.24 in favour of KSH Solutions Inc. against Stadacona S.E.C. and Commandité Stadacona Inc. and registered at the office of the Registration Division on May 19, 2006 under number 13 298 021;

(iv) a prior notice of the exercise of a sale by judicial authority in favour of OSLO Construction Inc. against Stadacona S.E.C., owner, and Commandité Stadacona Inc., owner, registered on August 2, 2006 under number 13 534 837, this prior notice being in reference to a legal hypothec that was registered at the office of the Registration Division under number 13 126 592 which has been totally discharged;

(v) a prior notice of the exercise of a sale by judicial authority in favour of KSH Solutions Inc. against Stadacona S.E.C. and Commandité Stadacona Inc. registered at the office of the Registration Division on October 20, 2006 under number 13 742 043, this prior notice being in reference of the legal hypothec registered under number 13298 021 referred to in Section (iii) above;

(vi) a hypothec on a universality of property granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch by Stadacona General Partner inc./Commandité Stadacona inc. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on March 4, 2010 under number 16 977 835; and

(vii) a hypothec on a universality of property granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch by Stadacona L.P./Stadacona S.E.C. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on March 4, 2010 under number 16 977 836;

13 ORDERS the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Papineau, upon presentation of the Monitor's Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "A" hereto, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) as the absolute owner in regards to the immovables listed in Schedule "D" hereto which are located in Gatineau, in the Province of Québec (being hereinafter described as the "*Gatineau Property*"); and (ii) proceed with the reduction and cancellation of any and all Encumbrances but only insofar as concerns the Gatineau Property as described in Schedule "D", including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of

Papineau:

(i) a hypothec in the amount of $550,000,000 by Papier Masson Ltée in favour of Credit Suisse, Toronto Branch, in its quality of "*fondé de pouvoir*", registered on January 25, 2006 under number 13 011 629;

(ii) a hypothec in the amount of $250,000,000 by Papier Masson Ltée in favour of Credit Suisse, Toronto Branch, in its quality of "*fondé de pouvoir*", registered on January 25, 2006 under number 13 011 630;

(iii) a legal hypothec in the amount of $1,808,000 in favour of Hydro-Québec, registered on September 2, 2009 under number 16 512 303 against the part of the Property known as lot 2 469 374 and located at the civic address 2 Montreal Road West, City of Gatineau;

(iv) a legal hypothec in the amount of $3,205,539.79 in favour of Hydro-Québec, registered on November 20, 2009 under number 16 737 683 against the part of the Property known as lot 2 469 374 and located at the civic address 2 Montreal Road West, City of Gatineau; and

(v) a hypothec in the amount of $200,000,000 by Papier Masson Ltée in favour of Credit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch, registered on March 4,2010 under number 16977911;

14 ORDERS the Québec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a certified copy of this Order and the Monitor's Certificate, to reduce the scope of the hypothecs listed in Schedule "E" hereto in connection with the Assets and to cancel, release and discharge all of the Encumbrances from the Assets in order to allow the transfer to the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) of the Assets free and clear of any and all Encumbrances created by those hypothecs;

15 ORDERS the officer responsible for the register of timber supply and forest management agreements according to article 38 of the Forest Act (Quebec), upon presentation of a true copy of this vesting order, to proceed with the cancellation and discharge of all the Encumbrances from the timber supply and forest management agreements of the Sellers, including, without limitation, the following registrations:

(i) a hypothec on the CAAF #00205081602 granted by Stadacona S.E.C. in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch dated 2005-04-06 and registered on November 18, 2005 under number 00205111801;

(ii) a hypothec on the CAAF #00205081602 granted by Stadacona S.E.C. in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch dated 2005-04-06 and registered on November 18, 2005 under number 00205111802.

16 ORDERS that, pursuant to section 11.3 of the CCAA, and subject to paragraph 17 of this Order, the Debtors and the Mises en Cause are authorized and directed to assign the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's respective rights and obligations under the contracts, leases and agreements and other arrangements of which the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser takes an assignment on Closing pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the Sale Agreement (the "**Designated Seller Contracts**", as defined in and pursuant to the terms of the Sale Agreement) and that such assignments are hereby approved and are valid and binding upon the counterparties to the Designated Seller Contracts (the "**Counterparties**") notwithstanding any restriction or prohibition on assignment contained in any such Designated Seller Contract; provided, however, that, the effectiveness of the assignment of any such Designated Seller Contract pursuant to this Order and the Sale Agreement shall be conditioned upon payment in full of the Cure Cost, if any, payable in respect of any such Designated Seller Contract (as determined by agreement among the parties or order of this Court);

17 ORDERS that the Cure Cost payable in respect of any Designated Seller Contract shall be as agreed between the Purchaser and the Counterparty, failing which the Purchaser or the Counterparty shall be entitled to apply to this Court for an order determining the amount of such Cure Cost and, if such application is made, the assignment of such Designated Seller Contract shall not become effective until (i) such Cure Cost shall have been determined by a final, non-appealable order of this Court and (ii) such Cure Cost shall have been paid in full to the Counterparty; provided, however, that, nothing in this Order shall affect or limit the Purchaser's right under the Sale Agreement to elect in its sole discretion, at any time at least five (5) business days prior to Closing, to exclude any contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement from being a Designated Seller Contract under the terms of the Sale Agreement;

18 ORDERS that, from and after the Closing Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived all defaults then existing or previously committed by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause under, or caused by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause under, and the non-compliance of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause with, any of the Designated Seller Contracts arising solely by reason of the insolvency of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause or as a result of any actions taken by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause pursuant to the Sale Agreement or in these proceedings, and all notices of default and demands given in connection with any such defaults under, or noncompliance with, any of the Designated Seller Contracts shall be deemed to have been rescinded and shall be of no further force or effect;

19 ORDERS AND DIRECTS the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof;

20 ORDERS that neither the Purchaser nor any Designated Purchaser nor any affiliate thereof shall assume or be deemed to assume any liabilities or obligations whatsoever of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause (other than as expressly assumed in relation to any Designated Seller Contracts assigned pursuant to this Order and under the terms of the Sale Agreement), including without limitation, any liabilities or obligations in respect of, in connection with or in relation to: (i) any Seller Employee Plans (other than a Transferred Employee Plan); (ii) any and all termination, severance or related amounts which any current or former employee of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause (other than the Transferred Employees who become employees of the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser on Closing as provided for in the Sale Agreement) could at any time assert against any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause; or (iii) any and all former, current or future employees of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause (other than the Transferred Employees who become employees of the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser on Closing as provided for in the Sale Agreement);

21 ORDERS that the Purchaser and any Designated Purchasers, and their respective affiliates and officers, directors, employees, delegates, agents and representatives shall, effective immediately upon Closing of the Transaction, be and be deemed to be irrevocably and unconditionally fully and finally released of and from any and all claims, obligations or liabilities whatsoever arising from any event, fact, matter or circumstance occurring or existing on or before the Closing Date in relation to or in connection with the Debtors or the Mises en Cause or their respective present or past businesses, properties or assets, including, without limitation, any and all claims, obligations or liabilities whatsoever, whether known, anticipated or unknown, in relation to or in connection with the Seller Employee Plans (other than any Transferred Employee Plans) and the former, current or future employees of the Debtors and the Mises en Cause (other than any Transferred Employees who become employees of the Purchaser or a Designated Purchasers on Closing in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Sale Agreement) and provided that the foregoing shall not operate to release the Purchaser or any Designated Purchaser from any liabilities or obligations expressly assumed under the terms of the Sale Agreement;

22 ORDERS that, notwithstanding:

(i) the pendency of these proceedings;
(ii) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) in respect of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and
(iii) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause; the provisions of the Sale Agreement and the Transaction, and the vesting of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets in the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser pursuant to this Order and all other transactions contemplated thereby shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause, nor shall they constitute nor be deemed to be a settlement, fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other challengeable, voidable or reviewable transaction under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall they constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation;

23 **ORDERS** that the Sale Agreement and any related or ancillary agreements shall not be repudiated, disclaimed or otherwise compromised in these proceedings;

24 **ORDERS** that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Canada) and any substantially similar legislation, the Debtors and the Mises en Cause are authorized and permitted to disclose and transfer to the Purchaser or any Designated Purchaser all Employee Records. The Purchaser or any Designated Purchaser shall maintain and protect the privacy of any personal information contained in the Employee Records and shall be entitled to collect and use the personal information provided to it for the same purpose(s) as such information was used by the Debtors and the Mises en Cause;

25 **ORDERS** that forthwith upon receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets, and prior to payment or repayment of any other claims, interests or obligations of or against the Debtors or the Mises en Cause, all outstanding Obligations (as defined in the Interim Financing Credit Agreement (as defined in the Initial Order of this Court dated February 24, 2010)) owed by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause under the Interim Financing Credit Agreement will be repaid in full and in cash from the proceeds of the sale of the Assets (other than the Wind-Down Amount and the Reserve Payment Amount) pursuant to the Sale Agreement;

26 **ORDERS** that all Persons shall co-operate fully with the Debtors and the Mises en Cause, the Purchaser, any Designated Purchaser, their respective Affiliates and the Monitor and do all such things that are necessary or desirable for purposes of giving effect to and in furtherance of this Order, the Sale Agreement and the Transaction;

27 **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, the United States or elsewhere, including the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Debtors, the Mises en Cause and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Debtors, the Mises en Cause and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Debtors, the Mises en Cause and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order;

28 ORDERS that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada;

ROBERT MONGEON, J.S.C.

cp/s/qlspt

TAB 10

CANADA

SUPERIOR COURT
(Commercial Division)
The *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*

PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC
DISTRICT OF MONTRÉAL
No.: 500-11-038474-108

MONTRÉAL, this 28th day of SEPTEMBER, 2010

IN THE PRESENCE OF:
THE HONOURABLE ROBERT MONGEON, J.S.C.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT AND COMPROMISE OF:

WHITE BIRCH PAPER HOLDING COMPANY

-and-

WHITE BIRCH PAPER COMPANY

-and-

STADACONA GENERAL PARTNER INC.

-and-

BLACK SPRUCE PAPER INC.

-and-

F.F. SOUCY GENERAL PARTNER INC.

-and-

3120772 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY

-and-

ARRIMAGE DE GROS CACOUNA INC.

-and-

PAPIER MASSON LTÉE

Debtors

-and-

ERNST & YOUNG INC.

Monitor

-and-

STADACONA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

-and-

F.F. SOUCY LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

-and-

F.F. SOUCY, INC. & PARTNERS, LIMITED PARTNERSHIP

Mises en Cause

APPROVAL AND VESTING ORDER

CONSIDERING the Debtors' "*Motion to Approve the Sale of Substantially All the WB Group's Assets*" (the "**Motion**") in respect of a sale transaction contemplated by an asset sale agreement (the "**Sale Agreement**") dated August 10, 2010 and amended on August 23, August 31, 2010 and September 23, 2010, amongst White Birch Paper Company and the other entities identified therein as sellers (collectively, the "**Sellers**"), as sellers, and BD White Birch Investment LLC (the

"Purchaser") and such other Person(s) as it may designate (each, a **"Designated Purchaser"**), as purchaser, for the sale of substantially all of the Assets of the Sellers, and all of its terms, conditions, schedules, exhibits and related and ancillary agreements (collectively, the **"Transaction"**), and the Report dated September 23, 2010 (the **"Report"**) of Ernst & Young Inc. in its capacity as the monitor (the **"Monitor"**) of the Debtors and the Mises en Cause;

CONSIDERING the representations made by counsel; and

GIVEN the provisions of the CCAA and, in particular, Section 36 thereof;

WHEREFORE, THE COURT:

[1] **GRANTS** the Motion;

[2] **DECLARES** sufficient the service and notice of the Motion and hereby dispenses with further service thereof;

[3] **ORDERS** that capitalized terms used herein and not otherwise defined shall have the meaning given to them in the Sale Agreement;

[4] **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Sale Agreement and all of its terms and conditions (including all schedules and exhibits thereto and related and ancillary agreements and all schedules and exhibits thereto) and the Transaction are hereby fully and finally approved. The execution, delivery and performance of the Sale Agreement and the Transaction (with any such amendments as the parties thereto may agree to in accordance with the terms thereof) by the Debtors and the Mises en Cause party thereto is hereby authorized and approved, and the Debtors and the Mises en Cause and the Monitor are hereby authorized and directed to take such additional steps and execute such additional documents as may be necessary or desirable for the completion of the Transaction and for the

conveyance of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets to the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser;

[5] **ORDERS** that the Debtors and the Mises en Cause are authorized and directed to perform their obligations under the Sale Agreement and in respect of the Transaction;

[6] **ORDERS AND DECLARES** that, subject to paragraph 16 of this Order, upon the delivery of a Monitor's certificate to the Purchaser substantially in the form attached as Schedule "A" hereto (the "**Monitor's Certificate**"), all of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title, benefit and interest in and to the Assets shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser, free and clear of and from any and all right, title, interest, security interests (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), hypothecs (legal or contractual), prior claims, mortgages, pledges, deeds of trust, trusts or deemed trusts (whether contractual, statutory, or otherwise), liens (statutory or otherwise), executions, levies, charges, or other financial or monetary claims, options, rights of first offer or first refusal, real property licenses, encumbrances, conditional sale arrangements, leasing agreements or other similar restrictions of any kind, whether or not they have attached or been perfected, registered or filed and whether secured, unsecured, legal, possessory or otherwise (collectively, the "**Claims**"), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing: (i) any encumbrances or charges created by the Order of the Honourable Robert Mongeon, J.S.C. dated February 24, 2010 or any other Order of this Honourable Court in these proceedings; (ii) all charges, security interests or claims evidenced by registrations pursuant to the Registre des droits personnels et réels mobiliers (Québec), the Personal Property Security Act (Nova Scotia), the *Bank Act (Canada)* or any other personal property registry system, or recorded with the Canadian Intellectual Property Office

pursuant to the Trade-marks Act (Canada); and (iii) all Excluded Liabilities (all of which are collectively referred to as the "**Encumbrances**", but excluding Permitted Encumbrances (other than those Permitted Encumbrances specified in clause (i) of the definition of Permitted Encumbrances in the Sale Agreement and any other Permitted Encumbrances specifically contemplated to be discharged by this Order)). For greater certainty, this Court orders that all of the Encumbrances affecting or relating to the Assets shall, upon delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, be and are hereby expunged and discharged as against the Assets. Counsel for the Purchaser and any agents appointed by such counsel may, immediately following the Closing of the Transaction, proceed with the discharge of such Claims and Encumbrances including, without limitation, the electronic discharge of any financing statements, UCC registrations, mortgages or other registrations in respect thereof;

[7] **ORDERS** that for the purposes of determining the nature and priority of Claims and Encumbrances, the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets (other than the Wind-Down Amount and the Reserve Payment Amount) shall stand in the place and stead of the Assets, and that from and after the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate, all Claims and Encumbrances (other than the D & O Charge and the Administrative Charge) shall attach to the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets (other than the Wind-Down Amount and the Reserve Payment Amount) with the same priority as they had with respect to the Assets immediately prior to the sale, as if the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets had not been sold and remained in the possession or control of the person having that possession or control immediately prior to the sale;

[8] **ORDERS** that the Monitor shall administer the Wind-Down Amount in accordance with the provisions of the Sale Agreement including, without limitation, Section 5.18 thereof;

[9] **ORDERS** that: (i) all right, title and interest in and to any portion of the Wind-Down Amount that is not used to pay costs associated with winding-down the Sellers' estate in accordance with Section 5.18 of the Sale Agreement shall vest absolutely in the Purchaser as at the Closing Date and shall promptly be distributed to the Purchaser; and (ii) the Wind-Down Amount shall not be considered to be proceeds of sale of the Assets and the Claims and Encumbrances shall not attach to the Wind-Down Amount;

[10] **ORDERS** that upon the delivery of the Monitor's Certificate to the Purchaser: (i) the Administration Charge provided for in the Initial Order be and is hereby released, expunged and discharged; and (ii) the D&O Charge provided for in the Initial Order be and is hereby released, expunged and discharged;

[11] **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Témiscouata, upon presentation of the Monitor's Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "A" hereto, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) as the absolute owner in regards to the immovable listed in Schedule "B" hereto which are located in Rivière-du-Loup, in the Province of Québec (being hereinafter described as the **"Rivière-du-Loup Property"**); and (ii) proceed with the reduction and cancellation of any and all Encumbrances but only insofar as concerns the Rivière-du-Loup Property as described in Schedule "B",

including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Témiscouata:

(i) a hypothec charging buildings only granted in favour of White Birch Paper Company by F.F. Soucy General Partner Inc./Commandité F.F. Soucy Inc. for an amount of $250,000,000 and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 029;

(ii) a hypothec granted for an amount of $250,000,000 in favour of White Birch Paper Company by F.F. Soucy, Inc. & Partners, Limited Partnership/F.F. Soucy, inc. & associés, Société en commandite and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 030;

(iii) a first hypothec granted for an amount of $550,000,000 and a second hypothec granted pursuant to the same deed for an amount of $250,000,000 granted in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston, Toronto Branch, by White Birch Paper Company and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 031;

(iv) a legal hypothec (construction) granted for an amount of $2,692,455.81 registered by Service d'impartition Industriel Inc. against F.F. Soucy S.E.C., as owner, and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on November 18, 2009 under number 16 731 954;

(v) a legal hypothec (construction) granted for an amount of $2,692,455.81 registered by Service d'Impartition Industriel Inc. against F.F. Soucy S.E.C., as owner, and registered at the office of

the Registration Division of Témiscouata on November 27, 2009 under number 16 758 360;

(vi) a hypothec on a universality of immovables granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Crédit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch, by White Birch Paper Company registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on March 4, 2010 under number 16 979 262;

(vii) a hypothec on the universality of immovables granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Crédit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch, by F.F. Soucy L.P./F.F. Soucy S.E.C. and registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on March 4, 2010 under number 16 979 263; and

(viii) a prior notice of the exercise of a sale under judicial authority registered by Service d'impartition Industriel Inc. against F.F. Soucy S.E.C., as owner, registered at the office of the Registration Division of Témiscouata on April 21, 2010 under number 17 095 095 and on June 15, 2010 under number 17 281 485, which registrations refer to the legal hypothecs registered under numbers 16 731 954 and 16 758 360 referred to above;

[12] **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Québec, upon presentation of the Monitor's Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "A" hereto; and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) as the absolute owner in regards to the immovables listed in Schedule "C" hereto which are located

in Québec City, in the Province of Québec (being hereinafter described as the **"Quebec City Properties"**); and (ii) proceed with the reduction and cancellation of any and all Encumbrances but only insofar as concerns the Québec City Properties as described in Schedule "C", including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Quebec:

(i) a hypothec on a universality of immovables granted for an amount of $550,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch by Stadacona L.P./Stadacona S.E.C. and Stadacona General Partner Inc./Commandité Stadacona Inc. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 317;

(ii) a hypothec on a universality of immovables granted for an amount of $250,000,000 in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch by Stadacona L.P./Stadacona S.E.C. and Stadacona General Partner Inc./Commandité Stadacona Inc. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on April 7, 2005 under number 12 195 318;

(iii) a legal hypothec (construction) for an amount of $2,067,704.24 in favour of KSH Solutions Inc. against Stadacona S.E.C. and Commandité Stadacona Inc. and registered at the office of the Registration Division on May 19, 2006 under number 13 298 021;

(iv) a prior notice of the exercise of a sale by judicial authority in favour of OSLO Construction Inc. against Stadacona S.E.C., owner, and Commandité Stadacona Inc., owner, registered on August 2, 2006 under number 13 534 837, this prior notice being in reference to a legal hypothec that was registered at the office of the Registration

Division under number 13 126 592 which has been totally discharged;

(v) a prior notice of the exercise of a sale by judicial authority in favour of KSH Solutions Inc. against Stadacona S.E.C. and Commandité Stadacona Inc. registered at the office of the Registration Division on October 20, 2006 under number 13 742 043, this prior notice being in reference of the legal hypothec registered under number 13 298 021 referred to in Section (iii) above;

(vi) a hypothec on a universality of property granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Crédit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch by Stadacona General Partner Inc./Commandité Stadacona inc. [redacted] Division on March 4, 2010 under number 16 977 835; and

(vii) a hypothec on a universality of property granted for an amount of $200,000,000 in favour of Crédit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch by Stadacona L.P./Stadacona S.E.C. pursuant to a deed registered at the office of the Registration Division on March 4, 2010 under number 16 977 836;

[13] **ORDERS** the Land Registrar of the Land Registry Office for the Registry Division of Papineau, upon presentation of the Monitor's Certificate, in the form appended as Schedule "A" hereto, and a certified copy of this Order accompanied by the required application for registration and upon payment of the prescribed fees, to publish this Order and (i) to proceed with an entry on the index of immovables showing the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) as the absolute owner in regards to the immovables listed in Schedule "D" hereto which are located in Gatineau, in the Province of Québec (being hereinafter described as

the **"Gatineau Property"**); and (ii) proceed with the reduction and cancellation of any and all Encumbrances but only insofar as concerns the Gatineau Property as described in Schedule "D", including, without limitation, the following registrations published at the said Land Registry Office for the Registration Division of Papineau:

(i) a hypothec in the amount of $550,000,000 by Papier Masson Ltée in favour of Crédit Suisse, Toronto Branch, in its quality of *"fondé de pouvoir"*, registered on January 25, 2006 under number 13 011 629;

(ii) a hypothec in the amount of $250,000,000 by Papier Masson Ltée in favour of Crédit Suisse, Toronto Branch, in its quality of *"fondé de pouvoir"*, registered on January 25, 2006 under number 13 011 630;

(iii) a legal hypothec in the amount of $1,808,000 in favour of Hydro-Québec, registered on September 2, 2009 under number 16 512 303 against the part of the Property known as lot 2 469 374 and located at the civic address 2 Montreal Road West, City of Gatineau;

(iv) a legal hypothec in the amount of $3,205,539.79 in favour of Hydro-Québec, registered on November 20, 2009 under number 16 737 683 against the part of the Property known as lot 2 469 374 and located at the civic address 2 Montreal Road West, City of Gatineau; and

(v) a hypothec in the amount of $200,000,000 by Papier Masson Ltée in favour of Crédit Suisse AG, Toronto Branch, registered on March 4, 2010 under number 16 977 911;

[14] **ORDERS** the Québec Personal and Movable Real Rights Registrar, upon presentation of the required form with a certified copy of this Order and the Monitor's Certificate, to reduce the scope of the hypothecs listed in Schedule "E" hereto in connection with the Assets and to cancel, release and discharge all of the Encumbrances from the Assets in order to allow the transfer to the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser (as the case may be) of the Assets free and clear of any and all Encumbrances created by those hypothecs;

[15] **ORDERS** the officer responsible for the register of timber supply and forest management agreements according to article 38 of the Forest Act (Quebec), upon presentation of a true copy of this vesting order, to proceed with the cancellation and discharge of all the Encumbrances from the timber supply and forest management agreements of the Sellers, including, without limitation, the following registrations:

(i) a hypothec on the CAAF #00205081602 granted by Stadacona S.E.C. in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch dated 2005-04-06 and registered on November 18, 2005 under number 002 05 11 18 01;

(ii) a hypothec on the CAAF #00205081602 granted by Stadacona S.E.C. in favour of Credit Suisse First Boston Toronto Branch dated 2005-04-06 and registered on November 18, 2005 under number 002 05 11 18 02.

[16] **ORDERS** that, pursuant to section 11.3 of the CCAA, and subject to paragraph 17 of this Order, the Debtors and the Mises en Cause are authorized and directed to assign the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's respective rights and obligations under the contracts, leases and agreements and other arrangements of which the Purchaser, or a

Designated Purchaser takes an assignment on Closing pursuant to and in accordance with the terms of the Sale Agreement (the "**Designated Seller Contracts**", as defined in and pursuant to the terms of the Sale Agreement) and that such assignments are hereby approved and are valid and binding upon the counterparties to the Designated Seller Contracts (the "**Counterparties**") notwithstanding any restriction or prohibition on assignment contained in any such Designated Seller Contract; provided, however, that, the effectiveness of the assignment of any such Designated Seller Contract pursuant to this Order and the Sale Agreement shall be conditioned upon payment in full of the Cure Cost, if any, payable in respect of any such Designated Seller Contract (as determined by agreement among the parties or order of this Court);

[17] **ORDERS** that the Cure Cost payable in respect of any Designated Seller Contract shall be as agreed between the Purchaser and the Counterparty, failing which the Purchaser or the Counterparty shall be entitled to apply to this Court for an order determining the amount of such Cure Cost and, if such application is made, the assignment of such Designated Seller Contract shall not become effective until (i) such Cure Cost shall have been determined by a final, non-appealable order of this Court and (ii) such Cure Cost shall have been paid in full to the Counterparty; provided, however, that, nothing in this Order shall affect or limit the Purchaser's right under the Sale Agreement to elect in its sole discretion, at any time at least five (5) business days prior to Closing, to exclude any contract, lease, agreement or other arrangement from being a Designated Seller Contract under the terms of the Sale Agreement;

[18] **ORDERS** that, from and after the Closing Date, all Persons shall be deemed to have waived all defaults then existing or previously committed by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause under, or caused by the Debtors or

the Mises en Cause under, and the non-compliance of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause with, any of the Designated Seller Contracts arising solely by reason of the insolvency of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause or as a result of any actions taken by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause pursuant to the Sale Agreement or in these proceedings, and all notices of default and demands given in connection with any such defaults under, or non-compliance with, any of the Designated Seller Contracts shall be deemed to have been rescinded and shall be of no further force or effect;

[19] **ORDERS AND DIRECTS** the Monitor to file with the Court a copy of the Monitor's Certificate, forthwith after delivery thereof;

[20] **ORDERS** that neither the Purchaser nor any Designated Purchaser nor any affiliate thereof shall assume or be deemed to assume any liabilities or obligations whatsoever of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause (other than as expressly assumed in relation to any Designated Seller Contracts assigned pursuant to this Order and under the terms of the Sale Agreement), including without limitation, any liabilities or obligations in respect of, in connection with or in relation to: (i) any Seller Employee Plans (other than a Transferred Employee Plan); (ii) any and all termination, severance or related amounts which any current or former employee of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause (other than the Transferred Employees who become employees of the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser on Closing as provided for in the Sale Agreement) could at any time assert against any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause; or (iii) any and all former, current or future employees of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause (other than the Transferred Employees who become employees of the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser on Closing as provided for in the Sale Agreement);

[21] **ORDERS** that the Purchaser and any Designated Purchasers, and their respective affiliates and officers, directors, employees, delegates, agents and representatives shall, effective immediately upon Closing of the Transaction, be and be deemed to be irrevocably and unconditionally fully and finally released of and from any and all claims, obligations or liabilities whatsoever arising from any event, fact, matter or circumstance occurring or existing on or before the Closing Date in relation to or in connection with the Debtors or the Mises en Cause or their respective present or past businesses, properties or assets, including, without limitation, any and all claims, obligations or liabilities whatsoever, whether known, anticipated or unknown, in relation to or in connection with the Seller Employee Plans (other than any Transferred Employee Plans) and the former, current or future employees of the Debtors and the Mises en Cause (other than any Transferred Employees who become employees of the Purchaser or a Designated Purchasers on Closing in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Sale Agreement) and provided that the foregoing shall not operate to release the Purchaser or any Designated Purchaser from any liabilities or obligations expressly assumed under the terms of the Sale Agreement;

[22] **ORDERS** that, notwithstanding:

(i) the pendency of these proceedings;

(ii) any applications for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) in respect of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such applications; and

(iii) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause;

the provisions of the Sale Agreement and the Transaction, and the vesting of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets in the Purchaser or a Designated Purchaser pursuant to this Order and all other transactions contemplated thereby shall be binding on any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of any of the Debtors or the Mises en Cause, nor shall they constitute nor be deemed to be a settlement, fraudulent preference, assignment, fraudulent conveyance, transfer at undervalue or other challengeable, voidable or reviewable transaction under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor shall they constitute oppressive or unfairly prejudicial conduct pursuant to any applicable federal or provincial legislation;

[23] **ORDERS** that the Sale Agreement and any related or ancillary agreements shall not be repudiated, disclaimed or otherwise compromised in these proceedings;

[24] **ORDERS** that, pursuant to clause 7(3)(c) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Canada) and any substantially similar legislation, the Debtors and the Mises en Cause are authorized and permitted to disclose and transfer to the Purchaser or any Designated Purchaser all Employee Records. The Purchaser or any Designated Purchaser shall maintain and protect the privacy of any personal information contained in the Employee Records and shall be entitled to collect and use the personal information provided to it for the same purpose(s) as such information was used by the Debtors and the Mises en Cause;

[25] **ORDERS** that forthwith upon receipt of the proceeds from the sale of the Debtors' and the Mises en Cause's right, title and interest in and to the Assets, and prior to payment or repayment of any other claims, interests or obligations of or against the Debtors or the Mises en Cause, all outstanding Obligations (as defined in the Interim Financing Credit Agreement (as defined in the Initial Order of this Court dated February 24, 2010)) owed by the Debtors or the Mises en Cause under the Interim Financing Credit Agreement will be repaid in full and in cash from the proceeds of the sale of the Assets (other than the Wind-Down Amount and the Reserve Payment Amount) pursuant to the Sale Agreement;

[26] **ORDERS** that all Persons shall co-operate fully with the Debtors and the Mises en Cause, the Purchaser, any Designated Purchaser, their respective Affiliates and the Monitor and do all such things that are necessary or desirable for purposes of giving effect to and in furtherance of this Order, the Sale Agreement and the Transaction;

[27] **THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS** the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, the United States or elsewhere, including the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Debtors, the Mises en Cause and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Debtors, the Mises en Cause and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Debtors, the Mises en Cause and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order;

[28] **ORDERS** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all provinces and territories in Canada;

THE WHOLE without **COSTS.**

MONTRÉAL, this 28th day of SEPTEMBER, 2010

THE HONOURABLE ROBERT MONGEON, J.S.C.

J.S.C.

COPIE CONFORME

Greffier adjoint

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Court File No. CV-11-9159CL

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OR COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF PRISZM INCOME FUND, PRISZM CANADIAN OPERATING TRUST, PRISZM INC., AND KIT FINANCE INC, APPLICANTS

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
(COMMERCIAL LIST)

Proceeding Commenced at Toronto

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES
(11.3 CCAA Assignment Motion Returnable May 30, 2011)

BENNETT JONES LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
Suite 3400, P.O. Box 130
One First Canadian Place
Toronto, Ontario
M5X 1A4

Gavin H. Finlayson (LSUC# 44126D)
Tel: (416) 777-5762
Fax: (416) 863-1716
Email: finlaysong@bennettjones.com

Lee J. Cassey (LSUC# 53654I)
Tel: (416) 777-6448
Fax: (416) 863-1716
Email: casseyl@bennettjones.com

TAB 11

2001 CarswellOnt 3893, 18 B.L.R. (3d) 298, 31 C.B.R. (4th) 302

Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Playdium Entertainment Corporation et al.

Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Spence J.

Heard: October 29 and 30, 2001
Judgment: November 2, 2001[FN*]
Docket: 01-CL-4037

Proceedings: additional reasons at [2001] CarswellOnt 4109 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: *Paul G. Macdonald, Alexander L. MacFarlane*, for Covington Fund I Inc.

Gary C. Grierson, J. Anthony Caldwell, for Famous Players Inc.

Craig J. Hill, for Pricewaterhouse Coopers Inc.

Roger Jaipargas, for Monitor

Gavin J. Tighe, for Toronto-Dominion Bank

Michael B. Rosztain, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

Geoff R. Hall, for Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement Board

David B. Bish, for Playdium Entertainment Corporation

Julian Binavince, for Cambridge Shopping Centres Limited

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Miscellaneous issues

Group of corporations which operated chain of cinemas attempted restructuring under Companies' Creditors Ar-

rangement Act, but no viable plan was arrived at — Corporations proposed that all their assets be transferred to new corporation, to be indirectly controlled by corporations' two primary secured creditors — Transaction would involve assignment of all material contracts of business, including agreement with film distribution company — Corporations were not in compliance with agreement, but propnsed that new corporation would take steps to achieve compliance — Corporations brought application for court approval of proposed transfer — Application granted — Interim receiver appointed — Corporations did not have right to make assignment pursuant to s. 35 of agreement, because transfer was not to "affiliate" and film distribution company's consent to transfer was not unreasonably withheld — Film distribution company was entitled to look for better deal elsewhere in view of corporations' ongoing non-compliance with agreement — Court had jurisdiction to approve transfer, however, by reason of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Appropriate to approve transfer in circumstances — Corporations had made sufficient effort to obtain best price and had not acted improvidently — Proposal took into account interests of trade creditors, employees and members of public — There had been no unfairness in process by which offer was obtained — Right of film production company to seek relief for default under agreement adequately addressed risk of new corporation's continuing non-compliance — Fact that film production company could obtain better deal with another entity did not furnish reason to refuse tn approve transfer, especially since propriety of alternate transaction was in dispute — If transfer were not approved, likely that corporations would go into bankruptcy.

Cases considered by *Spence J.*:

Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development) v. Curragh Inc. (1994), 27 C.B.R. (3d) 148, 114 D.L.R. (4th) 176 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — followed

Dominion Stores Ltd. v. Bramalea Ltd. (1985), 38 R.P.R. 12 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) — considered

GATX Corp. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc. (1996), 1 O.T.C. 322, 27 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

T. Eaton Co., Re (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

APPLICATION by corporations for approval of proposed transfer of assets.

Spence J.:

1 These reasons are provided in brief form to accommodate the exigencies of this matter.

2 The Playdium corporations and entities (the "Playdium Group") have been engaged in restructuring efforts under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement* Act (the "*CCAA*"). These efforts have been unsuccessful. It is now proposed that substantially all the Playdium assets will be transferred to a new corporation ("New Playdium") which will be indirectly controlled by Covington Fund I Inc. and Toronto-Dominion Bank. This transfer would be made in satisfaction of the claims of those two creditors and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, the primary secured creditors and the only creditors with an economic interest in the Playdium Group.

3 The primary secured creditors intend that the Playdium Group's business will continue to be operated as a going concern. If successful, this would potentially save 300 jobs as well as various existing trade contracts and leases.

4 This transaction is considered to be the only viable alternative to a liquidation of Playdium Group and the adverse consequences that would flow from a liquidation. Interests of members of the public also stand to be affected, in respect of prepaid game cards and discount coupons, which are to be honoured by the new entity.

5 The proposed transaction would involve assignment to the new entity of the material contracts of the business, including the Techtown Agreement with Famous Players.

6 Playdium Group is not currently in compliance with the equipment supply provisions of s.9(e) of the Techtown Agreement. The new entity is to take steps, as soon as reasonably practicable, that are intended to achieve compliance with s.9(e). Famous Players disputes that the proposed steps will have that effect and opposes approval of the proposed assignment of the Techtown Agreement to the new entity.

7 Covington says that the assignment of the Techtown Agreement is a critical condition of the proposed transaction: without the assignment, the transaction cannot proceed.

8 Covington says that the structure of the proposed transaction is such that it does not require the consent of Famous Players. This is disputed by Famous Players, based on s.35 of the Agreement and the fact that the assignee is to be controlled by Covington and TD Bank.

9 Covington submits that it is in the best interests of all the shareholders that the proposed transaction, including the assignment of the Techtown Agreement, be implemented. Covington and TD Bank seek an order authorising the assignment and precluding termination of the Techtown Agreement by reason only of the assignment or certain defaults. Famous Players has not given any notice of default to date. The prohibition against termination for default is not to apply to a continuing default under para.9(e) of the Agreement.

10 The primary secured creditors also seek an extension of the existing stay until November 29, 2001 to finalize these transactions. To facilitate the transactions, Covington and TD Bank seek the appointment of Pricewaterhouse Coopers as Interim Receiver.

11 Based on the cases cited, including *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), and *T. Eaton Co., Re* (1999), 14 C.B.R. (4th) 298 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), and the statutory provisions and text commentary cited, the court has the jurisdiction to grant the orders that are sought, and may do so over the objections of creditors or other affected parties. Also, the decision in *Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development) v. Curragh Inc.* (1994), 114 D.L.R. (4th) 176 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), supports the appointment of an interim receiver to do what

"justice dictates" and "practicality demands".

12 Famous Players says that no reason has been shown to expect the proposed course of action will bring the Techtown Agreement into compliance and make it properly operational; Covington has not shown it has expertise to bring to the business operations; the operations are grossly in default at present, and the indicated plans are inadequate to cure the default, which has serious adverse consequences to Famous Players.

The Relief Sought

13 The applicants revised the form of order that they seek, to provide (in paragraph 15) that a counterparty to a Material Agreement is not to be prevented from exercising a contractual right to terminate such an agreement as a result of a default that arises or continues to arise after the filing of the Interim Receiver's transfer certificate following completion of the contemplated transactions.

14 Famous Players moved for certain relief that was apparently formulated before the applicants' revisions to their draft order. From the submissions made at the hearing, I understand the position of Famous Players to be that it opposes the order sought by the applicants, at least insofar as it would approve the assignment of the Techtown Agreement, but the submissions of Famous Players did not address specifically the relief sought in their notice of motion, presumably because of the revision to the applicants' draft order as regards continuing defaults.

Section 35 of the Techtown Agreement

15 Section 35 permits an assignment to a Playdium affiliate. The proposed assignee is to be a new company, "New Playdium", to be incorporated on behalf of the Playdium Group, and to be owned by it at the precise time when the assignment occurs. The assignment will occur, it may be presumed, if and only if the contemplated transactions of transfer are completed. On completion of the contemplated transactions, New Playdium will be owned by a corporation controlled by Covington and TD Bank. That outcome reflects the purpose of the assignment, which is to transfer the benefit of the Techtown Agreement to the new owners. Accordingly the assignment, viewed in terms of its substance and not simply its momentary constituent formalities, is not a transfer to a Playdium affiliate. This view is in keeping with the decision in *GATX Corp. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada Inc.* (1996), 27 B.L.R. (2d) 251 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

16 Under s.35, the Agreement therefore may not be assigned without the consent of Famous Players, which consent may not be unreasonably withheld. Famous Players says that it has not been properly requested to consent and it has not received adequate financial information and assurances as to the provision of satisfactory management expertise and as to how the Agreement is to be brought into good standing.

17 The submission to the contrary is that the Agreement is really in the nature of a lease, not a joint venture involving the requirement for the provision to the venture of management services. This submission has some merit. Playdium seems principally to be required to supply game equipment. Section 26 of the Agreement disclaims any partnership or joint venture. If the business is to be sold to the new owners as a going concern, it would be likely to have the same competence as before, unless the contrary is shown, which is not so. Covington says that financial information was offered and not accepted and (although this is either disputed or not accepted) that no further request was made for it.

18 Reference was made to the decision in *Dominion Stores Ltd. v. Bramalea Ltd.* (1985), 38 R.P.R. 12 (Ont.

Dist. Ct.) that an assignment clause of this kind is to be construed strictly, as a restraint upon alienation, and its purpose is to protect the landlord as to the type of business carried on. The case also says that a refusal for a collateral purpose or unconnected with the lease is unreasonable.

19 On the material filed, Famous Players has the prospect of a better deal with Starburst and this must be considered a factor in their withholding of consent. It is also relevant that Playdium is not in compliance with the Agreement and it is not clear how soon compliance is intended to be achieved under the Covington proposal. It is not clearly unreasonable for a party in the position of Famous Players to look for a better deal when the counterparty is in a condition of continuing non-compliance.

20 The propriety of the proposed Starburst deal is disputed on the basis of a possible breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement between Starburst and Playdium. The relevance of this dispute is considered below.

Whether Court should approve the Assignment of the Techtown Agreement

21 This is the pivotal issue in respect of the motion.

22 Famous Players objects to the assignment. Famous Players refuses its consent. With regard to s.35 of the Agreement, and without reference to considerations relating to *CCAA* (which are dealt with below), I cannot conclude that the withholding of consent is unreasonable. So s.35 does not provide any right of assignment.

23 If there were no *CCAA* order in place and Playdium wished to assign to the proposed assignees, it would not be able to do so, in view of Famous Players' withholding of its consent. The *CCAA* order affords a context in which the court has the jurisdiction to make the order. For the order to be appropriate, it must be in keeping with the purposes and spirit of the regime created by *CCAA*: see the *Red Cross* decision.

The factors to be considered

24 The applicants submit that it is clear from the Monitor's reports that a viable plan cannot be developed under *CCAA* and the present proposal is the only viable alternative to a liquidation in bankruptcy. The applicants say that the present proposal has the potential to save jobs and to benefit the interests of other stakeholders.

25 Famous Players submits that, on the basis of the *Red Cross* decision, the court should approve the appointment of an interim receiver with power to vest assets, in a *CCAA* situation, where there is no plan, only where certain appropriate circumstances exist as set out in *Red Cross*, and those circumstances do not exist here.

26 In this regard, the first factor mentioned in *Red Cross* is whether the debtor has made a sufficient effort to obtain the best price and has not acted unprovidently. Famous Players says that there has been no substantial effort to develop a plan to sell the business components (such as the LBE's) as going concerns, no tender process, no marketing effort and no expert analysis. From the reports of the monitor it appears efforts were made to find prospects to purchase debt or equity or assets and there was no indication of viable deals. Whether or not the best price has been obtained, on the material it appears the value of the assets would not satisfy the claims of the principal secured creditors. There is nothing to suggest that a better deal could be done without including the Techtown Agreement; according to the monitor it would have been a key part of any viable plan. Famous Players is not in the position of a creditor looking to be paid out, so its submissions as to the need to get the best price do not seem to be well addressed to its proper interest in this case, and the others who have appeared who are creditors are not objecting to the process and the result.

27 The second factor mentioned in the *Red Cross* decision is that the proposal should take into consideration the interests of the parties. The proposal has potential benefits for trade creditors, employees and members of the public which would flow from continuing the business operations as proposed.

28 The other two criteria in *Red Cross* are that the court is to consider the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offers were obtained and whether there has been unfairness in the working out of the process. Famous Players says that, as regards its interests, there has been no participation afforded to it in designing the proposal, although the Techtown Agreement is said to be critical to the proposal, and nothing to show how or when the s.9(e) requirements will be brought into compliance. There were discussions between the parties in August but they did not lead to any productive result. It is true that it is not clear how or when compliance will be brought about. This point is considered below.

The effect on Famous Players

29 Famous Players says that if the applicants are given the relief they seek, the proposed transactions will close and the *CCAA* stay will be lifted — which would happen at the end of November, on the present proposal — and the prospect would be that Famous Players would then issue notices of default in respect of s.9(e), notice of termination would follow and the entire matter would end up in litigation within two months. That is possible. It is also possible that the parties would work out a deal. Covington is to invest about $3 million in the new entity so there will be an incentive for it to find ways to make the new business work.

30 If the parties cannot resolve their differences, then litigation might well result. Famous Players would be saved that prospect if the assignment were not to be approved and the companies instead were liquidated in bankruptcy. The delay occasioned by a further stay and subsequent litigation would also presumably result in increased losses of revenue to Famous Players compared to a full compliance situation or an immediate termination. There is nothing before the court to suggest that, if Famous Players has to resort to litigation and succeeds, it would not be able to recover from the new company. On this basis, the right of Famous Players to seek relief for a default seems to address adequately the risk of continuing non-compliance with s.9(e). Accordingly, the provision preserving that right is a key consideration in favour of the motion.

31 The other reason Famous Players evidently has for opposing the applicants' motion is that it could do a better deal with Starburst. If that were the only reason it had for withholding consent to an assignment of the Agreement, it would not be a reasonable basis for withholding consent under s.35 of the Agreement. It can be inferred from that consideration that it should also not be regarded as, by itself, a proper reason to allow the objection to stand in the way of the proposed assignment as part of the proposal to enable the business to continue.

32 Moreover, as noted above, the propriety of the Starburst transaction is disputed, on the basis of a possible breach of the Non-Disclosure Agreement between Starburst and Playdium. Based on the submissions before the court, the dispute could not be said to be without substance. If the proposed transactions are allowed to proceed and litigation ensues between Famous Players and New Playdium, there would presumably also be an opportunity for the dispute about the possible breach, and its implications for the propriety of the proposed deal between Starburst and Famous Players, to be pursued in litigation.

33 If instead the proposed transactions are precluded by a denial of the requested order, Playdium would go into bankruptcy and it would lose any opportunity to obtain the benefit of any rights it would otherwise have to oppose the proposed deal between Starburst and Famous Players. Allowing the Playdium transactions to proceed would effectively preserve those rights.

Conclusion

34 For the above reasons the motion of the applicants is granted. The initial order of this court made February 22, 2001 shall be continued to November 29, 2001, and the stay period provided for therein shall be extended to November 29, 2001. The parties may consult me about the other terms of the order, and costs.

Application granted.

FN* Additional reasons at 2001 CarswellOnt 4109, 31 C.B.R. (4th) 309 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 12

2009 CarswellOnt 8071, 62 C.B.R. (5th) 248

Nexient Learning Inc., Re

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended, And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Nexient Learning Inc. and Nexient Learning Canada Inc.

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

H.J Wilton-Siegel J.

Heard: November 30, 2009
Judgment: December 23, 2009
Docket: CV-09-8257-00CL

Counsel: George Benchetrit for Nexient Learning Inc., Nexient Learning Canada Inc.

Margaret Sims, Arthi Sambasivan for Global Knowledge Network (Canada) Inc.

Catherine Francis, David T. Ullman, Melissa McCready for ESI International Inc.

Lynne O'Brien for Monitor

Subject: Insolvency

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Initial application — Proceedings subject to stay — Contractual rights

Debtor obtained certain materials from licensor pursuant to license agreement — License agreement granted debtor exclusive and perpetual use of materials on royalty-free basis subject to certain conditions — Agreement was not assignable on stand-alone basis but could be assigned in context of major changes in ownership — Licensor was entitled to terminate agreement on basis of insolvency of debtor — Debtor successfully applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — Licensor unsuccessfully tried to terminate license agreement — All of debtor's assets were sold to proposed assignee — License agreement was not listed among debtor's assets but assignee wished to assume it — Debtor brought motion for order permanently staying licensor's right of termination and authorizing assignment of license agreement to proposed assignee — Motion dismissed — Court had authority to grant requested relief but only when doing so was important to reorganization process — Such relief had only been granted when sale of debtor's assets could not otherwise proceed — Underlying considerations included purpose and spirit of CCAA proceedings and effect on parties' contractual rights — In this case, asset sale had proceeded without regard to whether agreement would be assigned or not

and without notice to licensor — Requested relief would currently have no impact on CCAA proceedings — Another factor was proposed assignee's decision not to assume companion agreement that debtor had with licensor — Granting requested relief at this point would amount to unfair interference with licensor's contractual rights.

Cases considered by *H.J Wilton-Siegel J.*:

Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re (2001), [2001] O.T.C. 828, 2001 CarswellOnt 4109, 31 C.B.R. (4th) 309 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Woodward's Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236, 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257, 1993 CarswellBC 530 (B.C. S.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — considered

s. 11(4) — referred to

s. 11(4)(c) — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194

R. 57.01(6) — referred to

MOTION by debtor for order permanently staying licensor's right to terminate license agreement and authorizing assignment of license agreement to proposed assignee.

***H.J Wilton-Siegel J.*:**

1 On this motion, the applicants, Nexient Learning Inc. and Nexient Learning Canada Inc. (collectively, "Nexient") and Global Knowledge Network (Canada) Inc. ("Global Knowledge"), seek an order authorizing the assignment of a contract from Nexient to Global Knowledge on terms that would permanently stay the right of the other party to the contract, ESI International Inc. ("ESI"), to exercise rights of termination that arose as a result of the insolvency of Nexient. ESI is the respondent on the motion, which is brought under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "CCAA") as a result of Nexient's earlier filing for protection under that statutue.

Background

The Parties

2 Nexient Learning Inc. and Nexient Learning Canada Inc. are corporations incorporated under the laws of Canada.

3 Global Knowledge is a corporation incorporated under the laws of Ontario carrying on business across

Canada.

4 ESI is a United States corporation having its head office in Arlington, Virginia.

5 Nexient was the largest provider of corporate training and consulting in Canada. It had three business lines, which had roughly equal revenue in 2008: (1) information technology ("IT"); (2) business process improvements ("BPI"); and (3) leadership business solutions. The BPI line of business was principally comprised of three subdivisions — business analysis ("BA"), project management ("PM") and IT Infrastructure Library Training.

6 The curriculum and course materials offered by Nexient in respect of its PM programmes were licenced to Nexient by ESI pursuant to an agreement dated March 29, 2004, as extended by a first amendment dated January 16, 2006 (collectively, the "PM Agreement"). The PM Agreement granted Nexient an exclusive licence to offer the ESI PM course materials in Canada in return for royalty payments. The PM Agreement expires on December 31, 2009.

7 Similarly, the curriculum and course materials offered by Nexient in respect of its BA programmes were licenced to Nexient by ESI pursuant to an agreement dated January 16, 2006 ("BA Agreement"). The BA Agreement was executed in connection with a transaction pursuant to which ESI received the rights to BA materials from a predecessor of Nexient in return for payment of $2.5 million and delivery of the BA Agreement to the Nexient predecessor. The BA Agreement provided for a perpetual, exclusive royalty-free licence to use such BA materials in Canada.

8 ESI is a significant participant in the market for project management, business analysis, sourcing management training and business skills training. It offers classroom, on-site, e-training and professional services. To deliver its services, ESI typically enters into distributorship arrangements with distributors in countries around the world, which it describes as "strategic partnering arrangements". In Canada, ESI considers Nexient to be its "strategic partner". That arrangement is defined by the PM Agreement, the BA Agreement and, according to ESI, oral understandings and a course of dealings between ESI and Nexient that collectively constitute an "umbrella" agreement.

9 Global Knowledge Training LLC, a United States corporation ("Global Knowledge U.S."), is the parent corporation of Global Knowledge. Together with its affiliates, Global Knowledge U.S. is one of ESI's largest competitors.

Relevant Provisions Of The BA Agreement

10 Despite the grant of a perpetual licence in section 2.1, the BA Agreement provides for three "trigger" events giving rise to a right to terminate the contract. Of the three termination events, the following two are relevant:

> 6. Term and Termination
>
> 6.2 Upon written notice to [Nexient], ESI will have the right to terminate this Agreement in the event of any of the following:
>
> . . . . .

> 6.2.2 [Nexient] commits a material breach of any provision of this Agreement and such material breach remains uncured for thirty (30) days after receipt of written notification of such material breach, such written notice to include full particulars of the material breach.
>
> 6.2.3 [Nexient] (i) becomes insolvent, (ii) makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors, (iii) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, (iv) an involuntary petition in bankruptcy filed against it is not dismissed within ninety (90) days of filing, or (v) if a receiver is appointed for a substantial portion of its assets.

11 Pursuant to section 8.5, the BA Agreement is not assignable by either party except in the event of a merger, acquisition, reorganization, change of control, or sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a party's business.

12 Section 8.7 of the BA Agreement provides that the agreement is governed by the laws of Virginia in the United States. Section 8.8 provides that the federal and state courts within Virginia have the exclusive jurisdiction over any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in connection with the BA Agreement or any breach thereof.

Proceedings under the CCAA

13 On June 29, 2009, Nexient was granted protection under the CCAA by this Court. The initial order made on that day was subsequently amended and restated on two occasions, the latest being August 19, 2009 (as so amended and restated, the "Initial Order").

14 On July 8, 2009, the Court approved a stalking horse sales process involving a third party offeror. The sales process was conducted by the monitor RSM Richter Inc. (the "Monitor"). Both ESI and Global Knowledge participated in that process. In this connection, ESI signed a non-disclosure agreement on July 13, 2009 (the "NDA").

15 By letter dated July 24, 2009 (the "Termination Notice"), ESI purported to terminate the BA Agreement effective immediately on the grounds of breaches of sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 of the Agreement (the "Insolvency Defaults"). In respect of section 6.2.2, ESI alleged that the disclosure to potential purchasers of Nexient's assets of the BA Agreement, and of information relating to the BA materials offered by Nexient thereunder, constituted a breach of the confidentiality provisions of the BA Agreement. By the same letter, ESI purported to grant Nexient a temporary licence to continue acting as ESI's distributor in Canada for the BA materials solely to fulfill Nexient's existing obligations. Such licence was expressed to terminate on August 21, 2009.

16 No similar termination notice was sent in respect of the PM Agreement. As noted, the PM Agreement expires on December 31, 2009.

17 It is undisputed that Nexient owes ESI approximately $733,000 on account of royalties for the use of ESI's corporate training materials. ESI says that this amount includes royalties in respect of two BA courses that are not covered by the BA Agreement and are therefore payable in accordance with the "umbrella" agreement that governs the strategic partnership between ESI and Nexient.

18 By letter dated July 28, 2009, counsel for Nexient informed ESI of its client's view that, given the stay of

proceedings in the Initial Order, the Termination Notice was of no force or effect.

19 The existence and content of the Termination Notice and the letter of Nexient's legal counsel dated July 28, 2009 were communicated orally to Brian Branson ("Branson"), the chief executive officer of Global Knowledge U.S., by Donna De Winter ("De Winter"), the president of Nexient, some time between July 28 and July 31, 2009. Both documents were sent to Global Knowledge on or about August 25, 2009.

The Sale Transaction

20 Global Knowledge was the successful bidder in the sales process. In connection with the sale transaction, Nexient and Global Knowledge entered into an asset purchase agreement dated August 5, 2009 (the "APA") and a transition and occupation services agreement dated August 17, 2009 (the "Transition Agreement").

21 Under the APA, Global Knowledge agreed to acquire all of Nexient's assets as a going concern pursuant to the terms of the APA (the "Sale Transaction"). As Global Knowledge had not completed its due diligence of Nexient's contracts, the APA provided for a ninety-day period after the closing date (the "Transaction Period") during which, among other things, Global Knowledge could review the contracts to which Nexient was a party and determine whether it wished to take an assignment of any or all of such contracts. The APA also provided that, prior to the closing date, Global Knowledge had the right to designate any or all of the contracts as "Excluded Assets" which would not be assigned at the closing but would instead be dealt with pursuant to the Transition Agreement. At the Closing, Global Knowledge elected to treat all contracts of Nexient (the "Contracts") as "Excluded Assets".

22 Significantly, section 2.7 of APA provided that the purchase price would not be affected by designation of any assets, including any Contracts, as "Excluded Assets":

> **2.7 Purchaser's Rights to Exclude**
>
> Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, the Purchaser may, at its option, exclude any of the Assets, including any Contracts, from the Transaction at any time prior to Closing upon written notice to the Vendors, whereupon such Assets shall be Excluded Assets, provided, however, that there shall be no reduction in the Purchase Price as a result of such exclusion. For greater certainty, the Purchaser may, at its option, submit further and/or revised lists of Excluded Assets at any time prior to Closing.

Accordingly, there was no reduction in the purchase price under the Sale Transaction as a result of the exclusion of the BA Agreement from the assets that were sold and assigned to Global Knowledge at the Closing (as defined below).

23 It was a condition of completion of the Sale Transaction in favour of both parties that a vesting order, in form and substance acceptable to Nexient and Global Knowledge acting reasonably, be obtained vesting in Global Knowledge all of Nexient's right, title and interest in the Nexient assets, including the Contracts to be assumed, free and clear of all "Claims" (as defined below). As described below, the Sale Order (defined below) addressed the vesting of all Contracts that Nexient might decide to assume at the end of the Transition Period. It did not, however, include a provision that permanently stayed ESI's rights of termination based on the Insolvency Defaults.

24 Under section 4 of the Transition Agreement, Global Knowledge had the right to review the Contracts

and was obligated to notify Nexient of the Contracts it wished to assume not less than seven days prior to the end of the Transition Period. Under section 14(ii), Nexient was obligated to assign to Global Knowledge all of Nexient's right, benefit and interest in such Contracts provided all required consents or waivers in respect of the Contracts to be assigned had been obtained. Upon such assignment, section 6 provided that Global Knowledge would assume all obligations and liabilities of Nexient under such Contracts, whether arising prior to or after Closing. The Transition Agreement further provided that, during the Transition Period, Global Knowledge would perform the Contracts on behalf of Nexient.

25 On or about August 17, 2009, subsequent to submitting Global Knowledge's bid and prior to the hearing of this Court to approve the Sale Transaction, Branson spoke to John Elsey ("Elsey"), the president and chief executive officer of ESI, regarding ESI's right to terminate the BA Agreement. ESI continued to assert that it was entitled to terminate the BA Agreement on the grounds of the Insolvency Defaults. Branson advised Elsey that Global Knowledge had a different interpretation of ESI's right to terminate the BA Agreement. As discussed below, it is unclear whether the parties were addressing the same issue in this and other conversations described below regarding the right of ESI to terminate the Agreement. However, nothing turns on this issue. During that conversation, Branson advised Elsey of the proposed closing date of August 21, 2009 for the Sale Transaction.

26 Branson also spoke to De Winter and Scott Williams of Nexient regarding the enforceability of the Termination Notice (in respect of De Winter, it is unclear whether this is a reference to the telephone conversation referred to above or another conversation). Branson says he was also advised by Nexient's counsel that ESI could not terminate the BA Agreement under Canadian bankruptcy law. In addition, Branson says he also spoke to a representative of the Monitor and its legal counsel. He says their view on the enforceability of the Termination Notice was consistent with the view expressed by De Winter.

27 Following this conversation, Elsey wrote a letter to Branson in which he reiterated that the parties did not agree on the legal effect of the Termination Notice. Elsey went on in that letter to extend the purported interim licence of the BA materials granted in the Termination Notice to September 30, 2009 in view of future discussions concerning possible future collaboration between ESI and Global Knowledge scheduled for the week of September 7, 2009.

Court Approval Of The Sale Transaction

28 The Sale Transaction, together with the APA and the Transition Agreement, was approved by the Court on August 19, 2009 pursuant to the sale approval and vesting order of that date (the "Sale Order"). ESI did not file an appearance in the CCAA proceedings of Nexient. Nexient did not give notice of the Court hearing to ESI. Therefore, ESI did not receive notice of the Court hearing on August 19, 2009 nor did it receive copies of the APA or the Transition Agreement at that time. It did not attend the hearing to approve the Sale Transaction and therefore did not oppose the Order.

29 The Sale Order provided that, upon delivery of the "First Monitor's Certificate" at the time of Closing, the Nexient assets other than the Contracts would vest in Global Knowledge free and clear of any "Claims". Similarly, the Sale Order provided that, upon delivery of the "Second Monitor's Certificate" at the end of the Transition Period, the Contracts to be assigned to Global Knowledge would vest free and clear of any "Claims".

30 "Claims" is defined in the Sale Order to be all security interests, charges or other financial or monetary claims of every nature or kind. "Claims" do not, however, include any rights of termination of the BA Agreement in favour of ESI based on the Insolvency Defaults. Global Knowledge does not dispute this interpretation.

Accordingly, it has brought this proceeding to seek an order directed against ESI permanently staying ESI's rights to terminate the BA Agreement on such basis after the proposed assignment to Global Knowledge.

31 The Sale Transaction closed on August 21, 2009 (the "Closing"). Global Knowledge paid the full purchase price for the Nexient assets at that time. At the same time, the Monitor delivered the First Monitor's Certificate thereby transferring the assets to Global Knowledge free of all Claims.

32 At the time of the Sale Order, the stay under the Initial Order was also extended until the end of the Transition Period. The stay and the Transaction Period were further extended until the hearing of this motion and, at such hearing, were further extended until two days after the release of this Endorsement.

33 Nexient does not intend to file a plan of arrangement under the CCAA. As a result of the completion of the Sale Transaction, it no longer has any operations and all employees as of November 1, 2009 were assumed by Global Knowledge on that date. Upon the lifting of the stay at the end of the Transition Period, it is understood that Nexient intends to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

Events Subsequent To The Closing

34 At the time that Global Knowledge and Nexient entered into the APA, Global Knowledge marketed a few BA courses in Canada, although it says its courses approached the subject-matter in a different manner from ESI's BA courses. Global Knowledge did not offer PM courses in Canada. However, it had access to PM materials from Global Knowledge U.S. that it believed it could readily adapt for the Canadian market.

35 According to De Winter, Nexient did not regard Global Knowledge as a competitor in Canada in the BA and PM product lines at that time. By acquiring the Nexient assets including the BA Agreement, however, Global Knowledge became, in effect, a new competitor in the Canadian market for BA and PM products. At the same time, as described below, ESI, which had previously marketed its products through its strategic arrangement with Nexient, also decided to enter the Canadian market in its own right.

36 Although it had not yet determined to reject the PM Agreement, on or about September 4, 2009, Global Knowledge also commenced discussions with McMaster University regarding recognition of its training facilities and eventual accreditation of its proposed PM courses. The BA and PM courses of ESI offered by Nexient were already accredited by McMaster University.

37 Subsequent to August 21, 2009, ESI and Global Knowledge had discussions regarding their possible future relationship. In a telephone conference on September 11, 2009, attended by representatives of ESI, Global Knowledge and Nexient, Global Knowledge indicated that it did not intend to acquire the PM Agreement.

38 As a result, given the anticipated competition with Global Knowledge, ESI concluded that it would need to find a new strategic partner in Canada or begin delivering its products directly in Canada. It chose to pursue the latter option. In response to ESI commencing direct operations in Canada, Global Knowledge and Nexient commenced the motions described below seeking various orders pertaining to the BA Agreement and the NDA including injunctive relief relating to alleged breaches of these agreements.

39 In early November 2009 Global Knowledge formally advised Nexient pursuant to the Transition Agreement that it proposed to take an assignment of the BA Agreement and the NDA but did not propose to take an assignment of the PM Agreement. Its notice was unconditional — that is, it did not make such assignment con-

ditional on receiving the requested relief in this proceeding.

40 ESI opposes the assignment of the BA Agreement to Global Knowledge on the basis sought by Global Knowledge, which would permanently stay the exercise of any termination rights of ESI based on the Insolvency Defaults.

Procedural Matters

Motions Brought By The Parties

41 Nexient commenced this motion on October 30, 2009. The notice of motion seeks a declaration that the BA Agreement and the PM Agreement remain in force and are both assignable to Global Knowledge, and an order restraining ESI from interfering with Nexient's rights under the BA Agreement and PM Agreement and from carrying on BA and PM training programmes in Canada.

42 On November 3, 2009, Global Knowledge served its own notice of motion seeking the same relief. In addition, Global Knowledge seeks a declaration that the NDA is assignable to it, an order restraining ESI from breaching certain covenants in the NDA that Global Knowledge alleges have been breached relating to ESI's commencement of direct operations in Canada since September 21, 2009, and ancillary relief related to such order.

43 ESI responded by a notice of cross-motion dated November 17, 2009 seeking an order staying or dismissing the Nexient and Global Knowledge motions to the extent the relief sought (1) relates to contracts that have not been assigned to Global Knowledge; (2) does not benefit the Nexient estate; and (3) relates to contracts subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of Virginia in the United States. ESI takes the position that the BA Agreement is not assignable to Global Knowledge, that the relief sought by Nexient and Global Knowledge benefits only Global Knowledge, and that all matters pertaining to the BA Agreement are within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts in Virginia pursuant to the exclusive jurisdiction clause in that agreement. It therefore also seeks an order staying the motions of Nexient and Global Knowledge insofar as they involve the BA Agreement pending a determination by the appropriate court in Virginia of the disputes, controversies or claims pertaining to the BA Agreement asserted by the parties in their respective motions.

Narrowing Of The Issues For The Court On This Hearing

44 As a result of the following three developments before and at the hearing of this motion, the issues for the Court on this motion have been narrowed considerably.

45 First, as mentioned, Global Knowledge has advised Nexient that it does not intend to assume the PM Agreement. Accordingly, neither Nexient nor Global Knowledge now seeks any relief in respect of the PM Agreement.

46 Second, the parties agreed at the hearing that, on the filing of the Second Monitor's Certificate, the NDA would be assigned to Global Knowledge.

47 Third, the motion of Global Knowledge for injunctive relief in respect of alleged interference with Global Knowledge's rights under the BA Agreement, and in respect of alleged breaches of the NDA, was adjourned to December 21, 2009, by which date it is intended that Global Knowledge shall have commenced a separate application for the relief it seeks against ESI apart from the declaration sought on the present motion.

48 I think it is inappropriate for the Global Knowledge motion respecting injunctive relief to be adjudicated in the Nexient CCAA proceedings. Global Knowledge's claim flows from its rights against ESI under the BA Agreement and the NDA. This claim is entirely a matter between ESI and Global Knowledge. It therefore falls outside the Nexient CCAA proceedings, which will effectively terminate upon the lifting of the stay under the Initial Order at the end of the Transition Period. While Global Knowledge will not formally take an assignment of the BA Agreement and the NDA until such time, I accept that Global Knowledge may have a sufficient interest in these agreements at the present time to obtain injunctive relief, in view of Nexient's obligation under the Sale Agreement to assign them to Global Knowledge. However, to obtain such relief, Global Knowledge must first commence its own proceeding against ESI and move for such interim injunctive relief in that proceeding.

49 Similarly, ESI's request for a stay of the Global Knowledge motion is adjourned to the hearing of the motion on December 21, 2009. At that time, ESI is at liberty to bring any motion in the proceeding to be commenced by Global Knowledge it may choose addressing the jurisdictional issues raised in its cross-motion in the present proceeding.

Issues On This Motion

50 Accordingly, the issues that are addressed on this motion are:

1. Is the BA Agreement assignable to Global Knowledge, on its terms or by order of this Court?

2. If it is, is Global Knowledge entitled to an order in connection with such assignment that permanently stays the exercise of any rights that ESI may have to terminate the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults?

51 The issue of the assignability of the BA Agreement has two elements — the assignability of the agreement as a matter of interpretation of the contract which, as noted, is governed by the laws of the Virginia, and the authority of the Court to authorize an assignment to Global Knowledge if the contract is not assignable on its terms. In view of the determination below regarding the authority of the Court to authorize an assignment, it is unnecessary to consider the assignabilty of the BA Agreement as a matter of contractual interpretation and I therefore decline to do so.

52 I would note, however, that if I had concluded that Global Knowledge was entitled to the requested relief effectively deleting the Insolvency Defaults, I would also have concluded, for the same reasons, that Global Knowledge was entitled to an order authorizing the assignment of the BA Agreement to the extent it was not otherwise assignable under the laws of Virginia.

Applicable Law

Authority Of The Court To Grant The Requested Relief

53 The Court has authority to authorize an assignment of an agreement to which a debtor under CCAA protection is a party and to permanently stay termination of the agreement by the other party to the contract by reason of either the assignment or any insolvency defaults that arose in the context of the CCAA proceedings: see *Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re*, [2001] O.J. No. 4459 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).

54 In *Playdium*, Spence J. grounds that authority in the provisions of section 11(4)(c) of the CCAA and, al-

ternatively, in the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The reasoning, which I adopt, is set out in paragraphs 32 and 42:

> So it is necessary for the order to have such positive effect if the jurisdiction of the court to grant the order under s. 11(4)(c) is to be exercised in a manner that is both effective and fair. To the extent that the jurisdiction to make the order is not expressed in the CCAA, the approval of the assignment may be said to be an exercise by the court of its inherent jurisdiction. But the inherent jurisdiction being exercised is simply the jurisdiction to grant an order that is necessary for the fair and effective exercise of the jurisdiction given to the court by statute....
>
> Having regard to the overall purpose of the Act to facilitate the compromise of creditors' claims, and thereby allow businesses to continue, and the necessary inference that the s. 11(4) powers are intended to be used to further that purpose, and giving to the Act the liberal interpretation the courts have said that the Act, as remedial legislation should receive for that purpose, the approval of the proposed assignment of the Terrytown Agreement can properly be considered to be within the jurisdiction of the court and a proper exercise of that jurisdiction.

Consideration Of The Applicable Standard In Previous Decisions

55 However, the test that must be satisfied in order to obtain an order authorizing assignment remains unclear after *Playdium*. In that decision, it was clear that the sale of the debtor's assets could not proceed without the requested order. This would seem to suggest that demonstration of that fact was the applicable test.

56 On the other hand, in para. 39, Spence J. quotes with approval a statement of Tysoe J. in *Woodward's Ltd., Re*, [1993] B.C.J. No. 42 (B.C. S.C.) that suggests that it may not be a requirement that the insolvent company would be unable to complete a proposed reorganization without the exercise of the Court's discretion. Tysoe J. framed the test as requiring a demonstration that the exercise of the Court's discretion be "important to the reorganization process". In my opinion, this is the governing test.

57 In addition, in para. 43 of *Playdium*, Spence J. appears to grant the requested relief after determining that the relief did not subject the third party to an inappropriate imposition or an inappropriate loss of claims having regard to the overall purpose of the CCAA of allowing businesses to continue.

58 Moreover, Spence J. also considered a number of factors in assessing whether the relief was consistent with the purpose and spirit of the CCAA: whether sufficient efforts had been made to obtain the best price such that the debtor was not acting improvidently; whether the proposal takes into consideration the interests of the parties; the efficacy and integrity of the process by which the offers were obtained; and whether there had been unfaimess in the working out of the process.

Standard Applied On This Motion

59 It is clear from *Playdium* and *Woodwards* that the authority of the Court to interfere with contractual rights in the context of CCAA proceedings, whether it is founded in section 11(4) of the CCAA or the Court's inherent jurisdiction, must be exercised sparingly. Before exercising the Court's jurisdiction in this manner, the Court should be satisfied that the purpose and spirit of the CCAA proceedings will be furthered by the proposed assignment by analyzing the factors identified by Spence J. and any other factors that address the equity of the proposed assignment. The Court must also be satisfied that the requested relief does not adversely affect the

third party's contractual rights beyond what is absolutely required to further the reorganization process and that such interference does not entail an inappropriate imposition upon the third party or an inappropriate loss of claims of the third party.

The Specific Legal Issue Presented On This Motion

60 This motion raises an important issue concerning the extent of the authority of the Court to authorize the assignment of a contract in the face of an objection from the other party to the contract. ESI argues that a Court should not permit a purchaser under a "liquidating CCAA" to "cherry pick" the contracts it wishes to assume.

61 Insofar as the result would be to prevent a debtor subject to CCAA proceedings from selling only profitable business divisions or would prevent a purchaser from deciding which business divisions it wishes to purchase, I do not think ESI's proposition is either correct or practical. The purpose of the CCAA is to further the continuity of the business of the debtor to the extent feasible. It does not, however, mandate the continuity of unprofitable businesses.

62 However, the situation in which a purchaser seeks to assume less than all of the contracts between a debtor and a particular third party with whom the debtor has a continuing or multifaceted arrangement is more problematic. In many instances in which a purchaser wishes to discriminate among contracts with the same third party, the Court will not exercise its authority under the CCAA, or its inherent jurisdiction, to authorize an assignment and/or permanently stay termination rights based on insolvency defaults. In such circumstances, the purchaser must assume all contracts with the third party or none at all.

63 There can be many reasons why it would be inappropriate or unfair to authorize the assignment of less than all of a debtor's contracts with a third party. In many instances, there is an interconnection between such contracts created by express terms of the contracts. Similarly, there may be an operational relationship between the subject-matter of such contracts even if there is no express contractual relationship. Courts are also reluctant to authorize an assignment that would prevent a counterparty from exercising set-off rights in contracts that are not to be assigned. In respect of financial contracts between the same parties, for example, it would be highly inequitable to permit a purchaser to take only "in the money" contracts leaving the counterparty with all of the "out of the money" contracts and only an unsecured claim against the debtor for its gross loss. It would also be inappropriate in many circumstances to permit a selective assignment of a debtor's contracts if the competitive position of the third party relative to the assignee would be materially and adversely affected, at least to the extent the third party is unable to protect itself against such result.

Analysis and Conclusions

Preliminary Observations

64 Before addressing the issues on this motion, I propose to set out the following observations which inform the conclusions reached below.

65 First, being a perpetual, royalty-free licence, the BA Agreement represents a valuable contract to Nexient except to the extent that ESI is entitled to terminate it. It represents part of the sales proceeds received in an earlier transaction by Nexient for the BA materials developed by a predecessor of Nexient. While there is an issue as to whether the current BA materials are still subject to the BA Agreement, that issue requires a determination of facts that cannot be made in the present proceeding. It must be addressed, if necessary, in another pro-

ceeding. For the purposes of this motion, I assume that such materials could be subject to the BA Agreement, which would therefore have significant value in Nexient's hands.

66 Second, Global Knowledge was well aware that ESI's position was that it had the right to terminate the BA Agreement. As a consequence, Global Knowledge was also well aware that ESI would use any means available to it to terminate the BA Agreement after it had been assigned to Global Knowledge if ESI and Global Knowledge were unable to establish a satisfactory working relationship. Global Knowledge did not, however, seek any protections against such action by ESI in either the APA or the Sale Order.

67 In particular, as mentioned, section 4.3 of the Sale Agreement provided that the obligation of the parties to close the Sale Transaction was subject to receipt of a vesting order of this Court satisfactory in form to both parties. However, the Sale Order that was actually sought by Nexient and Global Knowledge, and was granted by the Court, did not address deletion of any of ESI's termination rights based on the Insolvency Defaults.

68 There is no explanation in the record for the failure of the Sale Order to address this matter notwithstanding the fact that, as a matter of law as set out above, there could have been no misunderstanding as to the legal requirement for terms in the Sale Order imposing a permanent stay if, at the time of the sale approval hearing, Global Knowledge in fact intended to receive a transfer of the BA Agreement on such terms. As both parties were represented by experienced legal counsel, I assume the form of the Sale Order reflected a conscious decision on the part of Global Knowledge not to address this issue explicitly at the time of the hearing.

69 Third, while Nexient and Global Knowledge allege that their intention at the time of the hearing was that the BA Agreement was to be assigned on the basis that ESI's rights to terminate it on the basis of the Insolvency Defaults would be permanently stayed, there is no evidence of such intention in the record apart from Branson's bald statements to this effect in his affidavit, which is insufficient.

70 Moreover, the evidence of Branson exhibits a lack of precision regarding his understanding of the applicable law and Global Knowledge's intentions. In both his affidavit and the transcript of his cross-examination, Branson refers to his understanding that the stay in the Initial Order prevented ESI from terminating its contractual relationship with Nexient without an order of the Court. In his affidavit, he added that he understood that, as a consequence, to the extent that contracts did not contain restrictions on assignment, they could be assigned to the successful bidder and would remain in force and effect after the assignment. This implies that he thought the Initial Order would also prevent ESI from terminating its contractual relationship with Global Knowledge, as the assignee of the Nexient contracts, without a further order of the Court.

71 As *Playdium* demonstrates, there are two different issues involved here. The stay in the Initial Order did prevent ESI from terminating the BA Agreement under Ontario Law as long as the CCAA proceedings are continuing. Indeed, because delivery of the Termination Notice contravened the Initial Order, I think the Termination Notice must be regarded as totally ineffective under Ontario Law with the result that ESI could not rely on it subsequently if ESI became entitled to terminate the BA Agreement after the assignment to Global Knowledge or otherwise.

72 The stay did not, however, by itself have the consequence of staying enforcement of any right of ESI to terminate the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults after it had been assigned to Global Knowledge. That is, of course, the reason for the present motion. Any such order would constitute, in effect, a re-writing of the BA Agreement to remove ESI's rights. As *Playdium*illustrates, a further order of the Court would be required to permanently stay ESI's rights to terminate the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults. Not only did

Global Knowledge not seek such an order as mentioned above, it also did not require Nexient to give ESI formal notice of the Court hearing to approve the Sale Transaction.

73 In the absence of such notice, I do not think any order of this Court to permanently stay ESI's rights to terminate the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults would have been binding on ESI, even though ESI had not filed an appearance in the CCAA Proceedings and had been orally advised as to the date of the hearing. Nexient and Global Knowledge therefore cannot argue that ESI's failure to oppose the Sale Order at the hearing constituted "lying in the weeds," which disentitles ESI to sympathetic consideration on this motion. Moreover, in addition to the fact that it is not established on the record that either Nexient or Global Knowledge specifically advised ESI of an intention to seek an order permanently staying ESI's termination rights based on the Insolvency Defaults, the Sale Order does not have that effect in any event, as mentioned above. There was, therefore, nothing for ESI to oppose on this issue even if it had appeared at the approval hearing.

74 Fourth, given the structure of the Sale Transaction, there is no impact on the Sale Transaction of an exclusion of the BA Agreement from the Contracts assigned to Global Knowledge. Global Knowledge has already paid the purchase price under the Sale Agreement. The effect of section 2.7 of the APA is that there will no adjustment to the purchase price if, as transpired, Global Knowledge was unable to reach agreement with ESI on acceptable terms for the assignment of the BA Agreement. There is similarly no material impact on Nexient's customers - the BA product will be delivered in Canada by either Global Knowledge or ESI depending upon the outcome of this litigation. As such, at the present time, the requested relief will have no impact on the CCAA proceedings, or on the distributions realized by Nexient's creditors under these proceedings.

75 Fifth, although there is no contractual connection between the subject matter of the PM Agreement and the BA Agreement, there is a significant operational relationship between the PM and BA product lines. They comprise two of the three product lines of Nexient's BPI division. Both products are licenced by Nexient from ESI. In many instances, both products are marketed to the same customers. In addition, Nexient's facilitators provide educational services in respect of both products. There may also be certain economies of scale associated with offering both products. In her cross-examination, De Winter summarized the situation succinctly in stating that "one product line can't operate without the other".

76 There is also a significant business relationship between ESI and Nexient. Nexient was the Canadian distributor through which ESI marketed and sold its BA and PM products. At the present time, Nexient owes ESI in excess of $733,000 in respect of royalties payable under the PM Agreement. ESI says that this amount also includes royalties for two BA courses that are not governed by the BA Agreement. It also asserts that the BA materials described in the BA Agreement no longer are included in the current BA materials as a result of subsequent revisions. There are, therefore, several issues relating to the provision of the BA materials currently distributed by Nexient that would remain to be resolved if the BA Agreement were transferred to Global Knowledge.

77 Sixth, in his affidavit, Branson gave three reasons for Global Knowledge's decision not to assume the PM Agreement: (1) the PM Agreement terminates on December 31, 2009; (2) Global Knowledge would have to assume the amounts outstanding under the PM Agreement; and (3) Global Knowledge has access to similar course materials for which it would pay lower or no royalties. Although Branson says that the outstanding liability under the PM Agreement was not the principal factor in Global Knowledge's decision, it would appear that it was an important consideration.

78 There is no suggestion that Global Knowledge was unaware of the amount outstanding under the PM Agreement at a time of signing the APA or at the time of Closing. Although Global Knowledge did not decide against taking an assignment of the PM Agreement until later, it appears that, from the time of signing the APA if not earlier, Global Knowledge proceeded on the basis that it was not prepared to assume the PM Agreement unless ESI agreed to significantly different terms, including a reduction in the amount owing under the agreement and a reduction in the royalties payable for the PM materials. If it had intended instead to assume the PM Agreement with its outstanding liability, or to keep open that possibility, Global Knowledge could simply have provided for a reduction in the purchase price in such amount in the event it assumed the PM Agreement.

79 This is significant because, as discussed below, the issue before the Court would have been considerably different, and simpler, if Nexient had proposed to assign, and Global Knowledge had proposed to assume, both the PM Agreement and the BA Agreement as they stand. In such event, the question of whether a purchaser could "cherry pick" contracts of a debtor with the same third party on a sale of the debtor's assets would not have arisen. Moreover, given the expiry date of the PM Agreement and Global Knowledge's need to adapt the PM courses to which it had access, it would have been able to implement essentially the same business plan as it is currently proposing to implement without the need for any Court order provided its interpretation of the conflict provisions in the BA Agreement is correct. In such circumstances, the principal effect of assuming the PM Agreement would have been the assumption of the liability of approximately $733,000 owed to ESI, which Global Knowledge alleges was not the principal factor in its decision to reject the PM Agreement.

80 Seventh, Global Knowledge seeks relief that is related solely to the BA Agreement. It treats the BA Agreement and the PM Agreement as completely unrelated to each other. This treatment is not entirely unjustified in view of the wording of these agreements. Section 6.6.1 of the BA Agreement does not expressly refer to the provision of services or products that compete with PM products delivered under the PM Agreement. Whether this interpretation is affected by the course of dealing or the alleged "umbrella" agreement between the parties is not an issue that can be addressed on this motion.

81 However, given that, on this motion, Global Knowledge and Nexient seek relief that requires the exercise of the Court's discretion under section 11(4) of the CCAA or pursuant to its inherent jurisdiction, I think the contractual arrangements between the parties, while important, are not the only factors to be considered by the Court. Instead, the Court should look to the entirety of the arrangement between ESI and Nexient and assess (1) the extent of the adverse impact on ESI of the order sought by Nexient and Global Knowledge and (2) whether there are any alternatives to the proposed relief that achieve the same result with less encroachment on ESI's rights.

Analysis and Conclusions

82 The applicants' request for relief is denied for the following three reasons.

83 First, because of the structure of the Sale Transaction, the requested relief will not further the CCAA proceedings and will have no impact on Nexient or its stakeholders. The Sale Transaction has been completed and cannot be unwound. At the present time, the only impact of the proposed relief is to adversely affect ESI's rights to terminate the BA Agreement after the proposed assignment to Global Knowledge.

84 The evidence is, therefore, insufficient to satisfy the test noted by Spence J., and adopted above, that the requested order be important to the reorganization process. The time to request such relief was either at the time of negotiation of the Sale Agreement or at the time of the Sale Order. Given the terms of the Sale Transaction -

in particular, the fact that the purchase price has been paid and is not subject to adjustment in respect of any exclusion of assets - it is impossible to demonstrate that the requested order is important to the reorganization after closing of the Sale Transaction. The proposed relief also cannot satisfy the requirement that it adversely affect ESI's contractual rights only to the extent necessary to further the reorganization process. Accordingly, it also cannot be said that such interference with ESI's contractual rights does not entail an inappropriate imposition upon ESI.

85 Second, there is no evidence that Nexient and Global Knowledge intended at the time of entering into the Sale Transaction, or at the time of the approval hearing, to assign the BA Agreement to Global Knowledge on the basis of a permanent stay preventing ESI from terminating the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults. There is, therefore, no basis for an order rectifying the Sale Order to include such provisions at the present time. In reaching this conclusion, the following considerations are relevant.

86 The structure of the Sale Transaction contradicts the existence of the alleged intention. At Closing, Global Knowledge elected to treat all Contracts as "Excluded Assets". Consequently, given the structure of the Sale Transaction, Global Knowledge assumed the risk that it might be unable to reach an acceptable accommodation with ESI with whatever consequences that entailed. The evidence before the Court does not explain the thinking behind Global Knowledge's decision to take this calculated risk but the actual reason is irrelevant to the determination of this motion. It is impossible to conclude that the parties intended at the time of Closing to transfer the BA Agreement on the basis of a permanent stay given that Global Knowledge had not yet reached a conclusion as to whether it even wished to take the BA Agreement. The most that can be said is that the parties may have had an intention to transfer the BA Agreement on the basis of a permanent stay *if* Global Knowledge decided later to take an assignment. This does not constitute an intention at the time of the Court approval hearing. It also begs the question of why, even on such a conditional intention, the parties did not seek appropriate conditional relief at the time of the hearing on the Sale Order.

87 More generally, the evidence suggests that, at the time of Closing, Global Knowledge had not decided between two options — to attempt to renegotiate the BA Agreement and the PM Agreement on favorable terms, including the financial arrangements, or to assume the BA Agreement only and seek a Court order permanently staying ESI's rights of termination based on the Insolvency Defaults. Global Knowledge pursued the first option until the September 11, 2009 telephone conference, after which it appears to have decided to pursue the second. On this scenario, Global Knowledge cannot say that, at the time of Closing or of the Court approval hearing, it intended to take an assignment of the BA Agreement on the basis of a permanent stay.

88 In any event, to obtain rectification, Nexient and Global Knowledge must demonstrate that ESI shared the alleged intention, or alleged understanding, or that ESI acquiesced in the alleged intention or understanding. They cannot do so on the evidence before the Court.

89 It is impossible to infer from the relative significance of the BA Agreement to Nexient that all the parties must have understood that Global Knowledge would be receiving an assignment of the BA Agreement free of any risk of termination by ESI. The BA product line represented less than one-third of the total revenues of Nexient. There is no evidence in the record of its relative contribution to profit. The only evidence are unsupported statements in Branson's affidavit to the effect that the BA Agreement was a "highly material contract" in Global Knowledge's consideration of its bid for the Nexient assets. There is nothing in the description of the conversation between Elsey and Branson on or about August 17, 2009 or otherwise in the record to support Branson's statement.

90 Global Knowledge submits that this intention should be inferred from the fact that the Sale Transaction was on a "going-concern" basis. Such an inference might be reasonable if Global Knowledge was, in fact, purchasing all of the Nexient assets on a "going-concern" basis. Its failure to take all of the Contracts, including the PM Agreement, however, excludes such an inference in the present circumstances.

91 Third, Global Knowledge has failed to demonstrate circumstances that would justify the exercise of the Court's discretion to order a permanent stay against ESI in respect of its rights of termination based on the Insolvency Defaults in the BA Agreement given Global Knowledge's decision not to take an assignment of the PM Agreement. In reaching this conclusion, I have taken the following factors into consideration.

92 I acknowledge that there are factors weighing in favour of authorizing an assignment of the BA Agreement on the requested terms of a permanent stay against ESI. As mentioned, the BA Agreement appears to constitute a valuable asset of Nexient. It is in the interests of Nexient's creditors that value be received for such asset by way of an assignment. In addition, the sale price for the Nexient assets, including the BA Agreement, was arrived at in a sales process previously approved by this Court. There is no suggestion that the process lacked integrity, that the price for the assets did not represent fair market value or that it was an improvident sale.

93 However, by taking an assignment of the BA Agreement but not the PM Agreement, ESI is adversely affected in two respects.

94 First, in any negotiations between Global Knowledge and ESI relating to issues under the BA Agreement, including the two issues relating to the BA materials described above and the extent to which, if at all, the conflict provisions of section 6.2.1 of the BA Agreement prevent the marketing of Global Knowledge's PM products, ESI's bargaining position has been weakened by the exclusion of its claim for royalties owing under the PM Agreement.

95 Second, and more generally, ESI will be competitively disadvantaged in the Canadian marketplace if it is unable to deliver both its PM products and its BA products either directly or through a new "strategic partner". As discussed above, the evidence in the record indicates that there is a significant benefit to having a common entity market both BA products and PM products. This was reflected in Nexient's BPI business line and in Global Knowledge's own business plan, both of which involved marketing both product lines together.

96 This raises the issue of whether the Court should refuse to exercise its discretion to order a permanent stay of ESI's rights to terminate the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults in the circumstances in which Global Knowledge does not intend to take an assignment of the PM Agreement. In my view, such order should not be granted for three reasons.

97 First, as mentioned, in the present circumstances, the purposes of the CCAA will not be furthered by the proposed relief. Given the structure of the Sale Transaction, it is unnecessary to grant the requested relief to complete the Sale Transaction at the agreed sale price. Moreover, the effect of such an order would be to destroy the overall relationship between ESI and Nexient. rather than to continue the BPI business line of Nexient in its form prior to the CCAA proceedings.

98 Second, as mentioned, whether intentional or not, Global Knowledge is seeking to use the CCAA proceedings as a means of competitively disadvantaging ESI in Canada. ESI and Global Knowledge are already competitors in the United States. ESI will be competitively disadvantaged in Canada if it can offer only its PM products and not its BA products and Global Knowledge will be correspondingly advantaged. The Court's dis-

cretion should not be invoked to competitively disadvantage a licensor to the debtor in favour of a purchaser of the debtor's assets where the licensor has bargained for protection against such event in its contract with the debtor.

99 ESI bargained for the right to ensure that its BA courses and PM courses were marketed by an entity of its own choosing after an insolvency of Nexient through the inclusion of the insolvency termination provisions in the BA Agreement and PM Agreement. I do not think that the Court's authority should be invoked to remove that right as a result of Nexient's CCAA proceedings in the present circumstances where the PM Agreement is not to be assumed by Global Knowledge. ESI cannot expect to improve its competitive position as a result of the CCAA proceedings. Conversely, the Court's discretion should not be invoked in CCAA proceedings to weaken the competitive position of ESI in favour of a competitor.

100 Third, the discretion of the Court should not be invoked after failed negotiations between the purchaser and the third party respecting the feasibility of an on-going relationship. As mentioned above, Global Knowledge excluded the BA Agreement and the PM Agreement at Closing pending not only a review of the agreements themselves but, more importantly, pending the outcome of negotiations between Global Knowledge and ESI regarding the possibility of a workable relationship. Among other things, such a relationship required a renegotiation of the financial terms of the PM Agreement to the benefit of Global Knowledge that ESI was not prepared to accept. Those negotiations were conducted on the basis that the Sale Order did not include any terms providing for a permanent stay of ESI's termination rights in respect of the BA Agreement. In entering into the APA and closing on an unconditional basis, Global Knowledge accepted the risk that such negotiations would prove unsuccessful. It is not appropriate for the Court to exercise its discretion at this stage to re-write the terms of the BA Agreement to the detriment of ESI in order to adjust the financial benefits of the Sale Transition in favour of Global Knowledge. To do so would be to change the relative bargaining positions of the parties after their negotiations had terminated.

Conclusion

101 Based on the foregoing, I conclude that, while the Court has authority to authorize an assignment of the BA Agreement to Global Knowledge notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in that agreement, it should not exercise its discretion to authorize the proposed assignment on the basis requested by Global Knowledge, which involves the issue of a permanent stay against the exercise of any rights of ESI to terminate the BA Agreement based on the Insolvency Defaults.

Costs

102 The parties shall have 30 days from the date of these reasons to make written submissions with respect to the disposition of costs in this matter, and a further 15 days from the date of receipt of the other party's submission to provide the Court with any reply submission they may choose to make. Submissions seeking costs shall include the costs outline required by Rule 57.01(6) of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended. To the extent not reflected in the costs outline, such submissions shall also identify all lawyers on the matter, their respective years of call, and rates actually charged to the client, with supporting documentation as to both time and disbursements.

Motion dismissed.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 13

2009 CarswellBC 2286, 2009 BCSC 1169, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 7082, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 7080, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 7252, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 52

C

2009 CarswellBC 2286, 2009 BCSC 1169, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 7082, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 7080, [2009] B.C.W.L.D. 7252, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 52

Hayes Forest Services Ltd., Re

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-3 And In the Matter of the Business Corporations Act, S.B.C. 2002, c. 57 And In the Matter of Hayes Forest Services Limited, Hayes Holding Services Limited and Hayes Helicopter Services Ltd.

British Columbia Supreme Court

Burnyeat J.

Heard: July 8, 10, 24, 2009; August 14, 2009
Judgment: August 27, 2009
Docket: Vancouver S085453

Counsel: S.C. Fitzpatrick for Teal Cedar Products Ltd.

J.I. McLean for Hayes Forest Services Limited, Hayes Holding Services Limited, Hayes Helicopter Services Ltd.

E.J. Milton, Q.C. for Western Forest Products Inc.

J. Cytrynbaum for G.E. Canada Corporation

J. Mistry for Steelworkers Locals 1-80, 1-85

F.R. Dearlove for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

Subject: Natural Resources; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial; Public; Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Natural resources — Timber — Timber licences — Miscellaneous

H Ltd. filed for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — H Ltd. logged timber for T Ltd. under contract in respect of tree farm licence — In accordance with regulation, contract provided that H Ltd. could assign its rights or interest under agreement provided H Ltd. obtained T Ltd.'s consent which would not be unreasonably withheld — Contract provided for disputes to be referred to arbitration — H Ltd. requested consent of T Ltd. to assignment of contract to N Ltd. — T Ltd. advised that it was withholding consent because

N Ltd. was not suitable assignee — T Ltd. brought application to lift stay of proceedings so that it could commence arbitration proceedings in respect of issue of whether it was reasonable to withhold its consent to assignment of contract — H Ltd. brought application for approval of sale of contract to N Ltd. — Application to lift stay of proceedings dismissed; application for approval of sale granted — Issue should be dealt with in CCAA proceedings — Language of s. 11(4) of CCAA was broad enough to allow decision in CCAA proceedings to be substituted for arbitration process contemplated under contract — H Ltd. met burden of showing that reasonable person would not have withheld consent — T Ltd. should have had no hesitation in concluding that equipment, crew and expertise to undertake work required under contract would be available to N Ltd. — If N Ltd. failed to perform under contract, H Ltd. would be in position to take back contract and perform required logging — Concerns regarding financial capability of N Ltd. and lack of business plan were answered — Part of T Ltd.'s refusal to provide consent was designed to achieve collateral purpose of having contract revert to T Ltd. — T Ltd. did not meet burden of showing that it was reasonable to approve offer of another company, 858 Ltd., since no information was provided regarding financial capability of 858 Ltd. and offer contained conditions precedent that were not met.

Alternative dispute resolution — Relation of arbitration to court proceedings — Where jurisdiction of court ousted by statute

H Ltd. filed for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — H Ltd. logged timber for T Ltd. under contract in respect of tree farm licence — In accordance with regulation, contract provided that H Ltd. could assign its rights or interest under agreement provided H Ltd. obtained T Ltd.'s consent which would not be unreasonably withheld — Contract provided for disputes to be referred to arbitration — H Ltd. requested consent of T Ltd. to assignment of contract to N Ltd. — T Ltd. advised that it was withholding consent because N Ltd. was not suitable assignee — T Ltd. brought application to lift stay of proceedings so that it could commence arbitration proceedings in respect of issue of whether it was reasonable to withhold its consent — H Ltd. brought application for approval of sale of contract to N Ltd. — Application to lift stay of proceedings dismissed; application for approval of sale granted — Issue should be dealt with in CCAA proceedings — But for filing under CCAA, disputes under contract would have been governed by dispute resolution provisions under contract, Forest Act and related regulations — Language of s. 11(4) of CCAA was broad enough to allow decision in CCAA proceedings to be substituted for arbitration process — Determination of issue was less expeditious and more expensive under arbitration provisions — Time constraints imposed by N Ltd. could not be met by arbitration proceedings — Issue was commonly dealt with by court and required no forestry related experience — Assignment could be approved even if conclusion was reached that it was not unreasonable for T Ltd. to withhold its consent.

Bankruptcy and insolvency — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — General principles — Jurisdiction — Court

H Ltd. filed for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") — H Ltd. logged timber for T Ltd. under contract in respect of tree farm licence — In accordance with regulation, contract provided that H Ltd. could assign its rights or interest under agreement provided H Ltd. obtained T Ltd.'s consent which would not be unreasonably withheld — Contract provided for disputes to be referred to arbitration — H Ltd. requested consent of T Ltd. to assignment of contract to N Ltd. — T Ltd. advised that it was withholding consent because N Ltd. was not suitable assignee — T Ltd. brought application to lift stay of proceedings so that it could commence arbitration proceedings in respect of issue of whether it was reasonable to withhold its consent — H Ltd. brought application for approval of sale of contract to N Ltd. — Application to lift stay of proceedings dis-

missed; application for approval of sale granted — Issue should be dealt with in CCAA proceedings — But for filing under CCAA, disputes under contract would have been governed by dispute resolution provisions under contract, Forest Act and related regulations — Language of s. 11(4) of CCAA was broad enough to allow decision in CCAA proceedings to be substituted for arbitration process — Determination of issue was less expeditious and more expensive under arbitration provisions — Time constraints imposed by N Ltd. could not be met by arbitration proceedings — Issue was commonly dealt with by court and required no forestry related experience — Assignment could be approved even if conclusion was reached that it was not unreasonable for T Ltd. to withhold its consent — H Ltd. met burden of showing that reasonable person would not have withheld consent.

Cases considered by *Burnyeat J.*:

Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re (1993), 1993 CarswellOnt 241, 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.) — referred to

Doman Industries Ltd., Re (2003), 2003 BCSC 376, 2003 CarswellBC 538, 14 B.C.L.R. (4th) 153, 41 C.B.R. (4th) 29 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Dylex Ltd., Re (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106, 1995 CarswellOnt 54 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Exxonmobil Canada Energy v. Novagas Canada Ltd. (2002), 2002 CarswellAlta 739, 30 B.L.R. (3d) 262, [2003] 3 W.W.R. 657, 318 A.R. 99, 10 Alta. L.R. (4th) 80, 2002 ABQB 455 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re (2003), 2003 ABQB 718, 2003 CarswellAlta 1209, 45 C.B.R. (4th) 47, [2004] 4 W.W.R. 373, 336 A.R. 302, 36 B.L.R. (3d) 250, 20 Alta. L.R. (4th) 314, 5 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 236 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Teal Cedar Products Ltd. (2008), [2008] 11 W.W.R. 612, 257 B.C.A.C. 105, 432 W.A.C. 105, 2008 CarswellBC 1325, 2008 BCCA 283, 82 B.C.L.R. (4th) 110 (B.C. C.A.) — referred to

Landawn Shopping Centres Ltd. v. Harzena Holdings Ltd. (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 4328, 44 O.T.C. 288 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Lehndorff Canadian Pension Properties Ltd. v. Davis Management Ltd. (1987), 46 R.P.R. 34, 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) 367, 1987 CarswellBC 128 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re (1991), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 1, [1992] 1 W.W.R. 651, 60 B.C.L.R. (2d) 311, 1991 CarswellBC 502 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 3893, 18 B.L.R. (3d) 298, 31 C.B.R. (4th) 302 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 4109, 31 C.B.R. (4th) 309 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re (2003), 2003 CarswellBC 1399, 2003 BCCA 344, 184 B.C.A.C. 54, 302 W.A.C. 54, 43 C.B.R. (4th) 187, 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.) — considered

Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re (1999), 12 C.B.R. (4th) 94, 1999 ABCA 179, 71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 1, 175 D.L.R.

(4th) 703, 237 A.R. 326, 197 W.A.C. 326, [1999] 11 W.W.R. 734, 1999 CarswellAlta 491 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 5954 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 1997 CarswellOnt 1914, 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

1455202 Ontario Inc. v. Welbow Holdings Ltd. (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 1761, 33 B.L.R. (3d) 163, 9 R.P.R. (4th) 103 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — referred to

Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157

Generally — referred to

s. 160 — referred to

s. 162 — referred to

Rules considered:

Rules of Court, 1990, B.C. Reg. 221/90

R. 3(3.1) [en. B.C. Reg. 191/2000] — pursuant to

R. 10 — pursuant to

R. 12 — pursuant to

R. 13(1) — pursuant to

R. 13(6) — pursuant to

R. 14 — pursuant to

R. 44 — pursuant to

Regulations considered:

Forest Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157

Timber Harvesting Contract and Subcontract Regulation, B.C. Reg. 22/96

Generally — referred to

s. 4(1) — referred to

s. 5 — referred to

ss. 48-51 — referred to

APPLICATION by company under *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for approval of sale of logging contract; APPLICATION to lift stay of proceedings.

Burnyeat J.:

1 Hayes Forest Services Limited, Hayes Holding Services Limited and Hayes Helicopter Services Ltd. ("Hayes") apply pursuant to the *Companies Creditors' Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("*CCAA*"), the *Forest Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 157 and its Regulations, Rules 3(3.1), 10, 12, 13(1), 13(6), 14 and 44 of the *Rules of Court* and the inherent jurisdiction of the Court for Orders approving the sale of that "certain replaceable stump to dump logging contract" ("Contract") between Hayes Forest Services Limited and Teal Cedar Products Ltd. ("Teal") to North View Timber Ltd. ("North View") relating to Timber Forest Licence 46 ("TRL46"). A $50,000.00 deposit has been paid by North View, and a further $277,000.00 would be paid at the time of the closing contemplated by the purchase. The balance of the purchase price of $1,614,266.00 is to be paid at the rate of $3.00 per cubic metre of the timber harvested under the Contract.

2 In opposing that application, Teal applies to lift the stay of proceedings granted under the July 31, 2008 Order so that Teal may commence arbitration proceedings in respect of the issue of whether it is reasonable to withhold its consent to the assignment of the Contract to North View and adjourning the application of Hayes pending the completion of the arbitration proceedings. In the alternative, Teal requests an order adjourning the application pending the production of certain documentation and information concerning the proposed sale to North View. In the further alternative, Teal seeks an order that a sale of the Contract be approved to 0858434 B.C. Ltd. ("858") for a purchase price of $1,400,000.00, with a down payment of $400,000.00, and with the balance of the purchase price to be paid at the rate of $2.00 per cubic metre of timber harvested under the Contract.

3 As part of a July 31, 2008 Order, a Monitor was appointed to report to the Court and the creditors from time to time. In a June 25, 2009 letter to counsel for Hayes, the Monitor states in part regarding the proposed sale to North View:

> In our opinion, the offer represents a reasonable price for this asset in today's market and we believe that the Company has diligently attempted to market this asset over an extended period of time.
>
> The purchase price is payable based on Northview logging activity under the contract. We believe that this is the only realistic mechanism to conclude a sale at this value. In order to protect its position and ensure future payments are made, the Company will receive a deposit of $327,000 on completion of the sale, and take security over the contract such that in the event Northview defaults on its future obligations the Company will be in a position to enforce that security and retake ownership of the contract.

Background

4 A "replaceable stump to dump" logging contract in respect of Tree Farm Licence 46 dated January 9, 1990 was entered into by Fletcher Challenge Canada Ltd. as the holder of the contract and Pat Carson Bulldozing Ltd. as the contractor. The interests of the original parties have both been acquired by other parties. The interest of Pat Carson Bulldozing Ltd. was acquired by Hayes Forest Services Limited. The interest of Fletcher Challenge Canada Ltd. was acquired by Teal pursuant to a January 19, 2004 Asset Purchase Agreement and a May 6, 2004 Assignment of Agreement. From January 1, 2008 through August 2, 2008, Hayes logged approximately 43,000 cubic meters of timber for Teal under the Contract.

5 These proceedings under the *CCAA* were commenced on July 31, 2008. At the time of the July 31, 2008 "initial Order", there were four ongoing disputes regarding key operating and financial terms of the Contract. In each dispute, the dispute resolution mechanism under the provisions under the *Forest Act* and its Regulations and under the Contract required mediation, arbitration and court proceedings. The applicable "Dispute Resolution" mechanism under the Contract was set out in paragraph 22.01:

> The Company and the Contractor mutually agree that where a dispute arises between them regarding a term, condition or obligation under this Agreement, and the Work under this Agreement is carried out on lands managed by the Company under a Tree Farm Licence or Forest Licence, then either party may require the dispute to be resolved in accordance with the Dispute Resolution Clause attached as Schedule "D" to this Agreement.

6 Portions of the Schedule "D" referred to in Paragraph 22.01 of the Contract are attached as Appendix "A" to these Reasons for Judgment.

7 In a September 30, 2008 letter, Hayes notified Teal that Hayes was in the process of seeking expressions of interest with respect to the purchase of the Contract as part of the restructuring contemplated under the *CCAA* filing. In an October 10, 2008 response, counsel for Teal advised counsel for Hayes that:

> Teal is certainly prepared to consider any potential assignee of the contract, and will expect the usual information, including financial information, that would normally be produced in that process.

8 The relationship between Hayes and Teal was such that a number of positions were taken by Teal which resulted in applications by Hayes in the *CCAA* proceedings. Hayes took the position that monies were owing by Teal under the Contract. Against what was owing, Teal attempted to set-off "unliquidated claims" it alleged it had under rate disputes arising out of the Contract. An Order was made on August 15, 2008 prohibiting such a set-off.

9 An attempt was made by Teal along with Western Forest Products Ltd. ("Western") to set aside the *CCAA* proceedings on September 4, 2008. That application was unsuccessful.

10 In October, 2008, Teal reduced the contract rate payable to Hayes for work done under the Contract. An order was made compelling payment on the existing contractual rates.

11 Teal sought to lift the stay of proceedings imposed under the July 31, 2008 Order to permit it to proceed with the various ongoing rate disputes under which it claimed Hayes owed it in excess of $2,500,000. Hayes consented to the lifting of the stay of proceedings to permit those claims to proceed. By November, 2008, Teal had not taken any steps to prosecute the arbitrations contemplated under the Contract. Hayes obtained an order establishing a "bar date" by which time Teal was required to have those claims arbitrated. Before the bar date

was reached, Teal and Hayes settled all rate disputes between them on the basis that Hayes was not indebted to Teal. That settlement agreement was approved by the Court in February, 2009.

12 In November 2008, Teal made an offer to Hayes to purchase the Contract for $764,112 with $191,028 on closing and the remainder at the rate of $2.00 per cubic meter of timber harvested under the Contract paid quarterly with the first payment to be made on April 1, 2009. The offer had a December 15, 2009 completion date. The offer provided that Teal would be the successor employer for those employees of Hayes engaged under the Contract who were not eligible for compensation under the B.C. Forestry Revitalization Trust. The offer was open for acceptance until December 1, 2008. The offer was not accepted by Hayes.

13 Under the Contract, Teal was to provide a 2009 logging plan to Hayes. The 2009 logging plan was provided to Hayes on December 9, 2008. On January 12, 2009, a representative of Teal advised a representative of Hayes that Teal was "... suspending operations indefinitely with respect to the work allocated to Hayes ..." Since December, 2008, Teal has not assigned work under the Contract to Hayes. Under the Contract, Hayes is entitled to 34.6% of the stump to dump logging work available relating to TFL46.

Possible Transfer of the Contract to North View

14 The *Timber Harvesting Contract and Subcontract Regulation*, B.C. Reg. 22/93, and paragraph 18 of the Contract governs the question of whether the Contract can be assigned. Section 4(1) of the Regulation provides: "Every replaceable contract must provide that the interests of the contractor are assignable, subject to the consent of the licence holder, and that consent must not be withheld unreasonably." In accordance with that section, paragraph 18 of the Contract provides:

> 18.01 The Contractor may assign any of its rights or interests under this Agreement, provided the Contractor first obtains the consent of the Company. The Company will not unreasonably withhold its consent to any assignment proposed by the Contractor.
>
> 18.02 Any assignment or transfer by the Contractor of this Agreement or of any interest therein ... without the written consent of the Company will be void....

15 In a May 8, 2009 letter to Teal, Hayes requested the consent of Teal to the assignment of the Contract to North View and advised that they contemplated completing the transfer prior to June 15, 2009. The letter also stated:

16 The outstanding payments under the Purchase Agreement will be secured by a security interest granted by the Purchaser (North View) to Hayes in all of the Purchaser's rights, title and interest in and to the Logging Contract and all proceeds thereof or therefrom.

17 In a May 14, 2009 letter, Hayes provided further information to Teal with respect to North View. In a May 15, 2009 letter, Teal sought information concerning North View and forwarded a questionnaire for completion and return. In a May 22, 2009 letter, Hayes provided the questionnaire to Teal. At that stage, it is clear that not all of the questions set out in the questionnaire had been answered in full. In any event, the questionnaire was not answered to the satisfaction of Teal. Despite the fact that all of the questions it had set out had not been answered, Teal wrote to Hayes on May 29, 2009 advising that it would be withholding their consent to the assignment of the Contract because Teal was of the view that the information provided did not justify providing their consent.

18 The matters which remained of concern to Teal were set out in that letter, being that North View:

1. is not a going concern;

2. when it last operated, was a minor business with revenues of about 1 to 2% of what the Contract currently delivers to the contractor and financial statements that suggest it is financially not viable or capable of performing the Contract;

3. has no experience performing a Coastal stump to dump contract;

4. has no equipment or crew or substantive projections of the equipment or crew it needs to perform its obligations under the Contract;

5. despite the difficult circumstances in the Coastal forest industry, has no business plan demonstrating that it can viably perform the obligations under the Contract, and no apparent financial resources to fund acquisition of equipment or ongoing expenses of operations; and

6. has no executed assignment of the Contract conditional on our consent being provided.

19 The letter then detailed the nature of the concerns of Teal. Despite the position having been taken, Hayes continued to provide information and Teal continued to request further information. On June 5, 2009, Hayes provided further information regarding North View and on June 8, 2009, Teal requested further information. In a June 12, 2009 letter, Teal advised that it was continuing to withhold its consent setting out detailed reasons regarding why they were continuing to take that position. The following "summary" was provided by Teal regarding the proposed assignment to North View:

> In summary, the evidence continues to indicate North View is not a suitable assignee. It is a small and virtually inactive company, particularly in the context of the operation required under the Contract. It has no experience performing a Coastal stump to dump operation, let alone a significant one; no experience with a union operation; few financial resources; no commitments from financial institutions or others to provide the necessary working capital to begin operations; and no equipment or crew. Moreover, it has no firm plans to address these issues in the context of the five-year replaceable contract it seeks to obtain.
>
> In our view, these and the other concerns we have raised comprise, at any time, reasonable grounds for us to withhold consent.
>
> However, beyond this, you are proposing to assign this important Contract to a company with these shortcomings at a time when the Coast forest industry is, as you acknowledge, in a severe downturn. In these conditions, few licensees, Teal included, can afford to expend scarce resources dealing with weak or failing contractors. Teal has already incurred significant time and expenses addressing the financial difficulties experienced by you as the current contractor. You incurred these difficulties despite your significant resources and experience in Coastal, unionized, stump to dump operations. If a contractor with significant resources and experience has had difficulties, it is most probable an under-resourced and inexperienced contractor such as North View will also face significant difficulties. Teal is no position to bear the costs in time, money and process of another failure of the contractor holding this Contract. It is unreasonable to expect Teal to put itself in that position by consenting to an assignment to a contractor with North View's shortcomings.

Should the Dispute Go to Arbitration?

20 The "Dispute Resolution Clause" set out in the Contract provides for a period of 30 days for the parties to attempt to resolve any dispute arising, the ability of either party to then refer the matter to arbitration, the ability of each party to have two days to complete their submissions and the requirement that the arbitrator shall hand down the arbitral award within seven days of the completion of the submissions. However, each party is entitled to an "examination for discovery" as that term is defined in the Rules of Court, including discovery of documents and discovery of one officer representative of the other party, to a maximum of three days. Once the award of the arbitrator has been received, a party would be at liberty to apply to this Court to have the award set aside. Any party not satisfied with the decision of a Judge of this Court could then apply to the Court of Appeal to overturn the decision reached by a Judge of this Court. These parties have had a history of a number of their disputes going to the Court of Appeal.

21 Teal contacted Mr. Daniel B. Johnston regarding his availability to act as an arbitrator. Although Mr. Johnston is Counsel for the law firm representing Hayes, Mr. Johnston has served as an mediator and arbitrator in disputes between Hayes and Teal pertaining to the Contract in the past and has advised Teal that it is "highly likely" that he would be available for "a few days over the next six weeks to act as the arbitrator...."

22 But for the filing under the *CCAA*, disputes under the Contract would be governed by the Dispute Resolution provisions under the Contract and under ss. 162 and 160 of the *Forest Act* and ss. 5 and 48 - 51 of the Regulation under that *Act*: *Hayes Forest Services Ltd. v. Teal Cedar Products Ltd.* (2008), 82 B.C.L.R. (4th) 110 (B.C. C.A.). However, the Court under the *CCAA* has the jurisdiction to decide a dispute which arises under the Contract between Hayes and Teal despite the provincial statutory authority and the terms of the Contract: *Smoky River Coal Ltd., Re* (1999), 175 D.L.R. (4th) 703 (Alta. C.A.).

23 In *Luscar*, *supra*, the Court dealt with the issue of whether a judge had the discretion under the *CCAA* to establish a procedure for resolving a dispute between the parties who had previously agreed under a contract to arbitrate their disputes. The question before the Court was whether the dispute should be resolved as part of the "supervisory role of the reorganization" of the company under the *CCAA* or whether the Court should stay the proceedings while the dispute was resolved by an arbitrator. The decision of the Learned Chambers Judge was that the dispute should be resolved as expeditiously as possible by the Court of Queen's Bench under the *CCAA* proceedings.

24 In upholding the ruling of the Learned Chambers Judge, and concluding that the discretion of the Learned Chambers Judge had been exercised properly, Hunt J.A., on behalf of the Court stated:

> The above jurisprudence persuades me that "proceedings" in s. 11 includes the proposed arbitration under the B.C. Arbitration Act. The Appellants assert that arbitration is expeditious. That is often, but not always, the case. Arbitration awards can be appealed. Indeed, this is contemplated bys. 15(5) of the Rules. Arbitration awards, moreover, can be subject to judicial review, further lengthening and complicating the decision-making process. Thus, the efficacy of CCAA proceedings (many of which are time-sensitive) could be seriously undermined if a debtor company was forced to participate in an extra-CCAA arbitration. For these reasons, having taken into account the nature and purpose of the CCAA, I conclude that, in appropriate cases, arbitration is a "proceeding" that can be stayed under s. 11 of the CCAA.
>
> (at para. 33)

> The language of s. 11(4) is very broad. It allows the court to make an order "on such terms as it may impose". Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) empower the court order to stay "all proceedings taken or that might be taken" against the debtor company; restrain further proceedings "in any action, suit or proceeding" against the debtor company; and prohibit "the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding" (emphasis added). These words are sufficiently expansive to support the kind of discretion exercised by the chambers judge.
>
> (at para. 50)

25 I agree that the language of s. 11(4) of the *CCAA* is broad enough to allow this Court to substitute a decision in these proceedings for the arbitration process contemplated under the Contract. In this regard, see also the decision in *Landawn Shopping Centres Ltd. v. Harzena Holdings Ltd.* (1997), 44 O.T.C. 288 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) where the Court allowed the arbitration stipulated under a contract to be replaced by a claim of the landlord being dealt with by the Court under the terms of a plan of arrangement.

26 Of similar effect are other decisions where the contracts between landlords and tenants were affected by the power contained under s. 11 of the *CCAA*: *T. Eaton Co., Re* (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Dylex Ltd., Re* (1995), 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1991), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (B.C. S.C.); *Playdium Entertainment Corp., Re* (2001), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 302 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) with additional reasons at (2001), 31 C.B.R. (4th) 309 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Armbro Enterprises Inc., Re* (1993), 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Bktcy.); and *Skeena Cellulose Inc., Re* (2003), 13 B.C.L.R. (4th) 236 (B.C. C.A.).

27 *Skeena, supra*, dealt with the interaction between logging contracts established under the *Forest Act* and the scheme of judicial stays and creditors' compromises available under the *CCAA*. The Court authorized the termination of contracts similar to the Contract here despite the provisions in the contracts themselves. In this regard, Newbury J.A. on behalf of the Court stated at paragraph 37:

> In the exercise of their 'broad discretion' under the CCAA, it has now become common for courts to sanction the indefinite, or even permanent, affecting of contractual rights. Most notably, in *Re Dylex Ltd.* (1995) 31 C.B.R. (3d) 106 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), Farley J. followed several other cases in holding that in "filling in the gaps" of the CCAA, a court may sanction a plan of arrangement that includes the termination of leases to which the debtor is a party. (See also the cases cited in *Dylex*, at para. 8; *Re T. Eaton Co.* (1999) 14 C.B.R. (4th) 288 (Ont. S.C.), at 293-4; *Smoky River Coal; supra*, and *ReArmbro Enterprises Inc.* (1993) 22 C.B.R. (3d) 80 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at para. 13.) In the latter case, R.A. Blair J. said he saw nothing in principle that precluded a court from "interfering with the rights of a landlord under a lease, in the CCAA context, any more than from interfering with the rights of a secured creditor under a security document. Both may be sanctioned when the exigencies of the particular re-organization justify such balancing of the prejudices." In its recent judgment in *Syndicat national de l'amianted'Asbestos inc. v. Jeffrey Mines Ltd*, [2003] Q.J. No. 264, the Quebec Court of Appeal observed that "A review of the jurisprudence shows that the debtor's right to cancel contracts prejudicial to it can be provided for in an order to stay proceedings under s. 11." (para. 74.)

28 In May 31, 2008 Oral Reasons for Judgment (Supreme Court of British Columbia Action No. S080752). In *Backbay Retailing Corporation, and Gray's Apparel Company Ltd.*, the Court approved an assignment of the interests of the Petitioner's interests in leases in certain retail outlets to a third party despite the objection of the

landlords and despite the fact that leases provided that the approval or consent of the landlords was required prior to the transfer, assignment or assumption of the leases. The new tenants were not prepared to agree to be liable for past defaults under the leases and required that all of the rights under the leases including those that were expressed to be personal to Petitioners be assigned to them. The petitioners had asserted no common law entitlement to the orders that they sought but, rather, had submitted that the Court has a statutory discretion under the *CCAA* to make the orders sought so long as that is consistent with the objectives of the *CCAA* to facilitate a restructuring. Citing with approval the decision in *Playdium*, *supra*, Hinkson J. concluded that the proposed purchase and sale agreement was in the best interests of the Petitioners, would afford significant benefits to their landlords, and that the refusal of the proposed tenants to assume the liabilities of the immediate predecessors was not a reasonable basis upon which to withhold consent.

29 Hinkson J. also cited with approval the decision of Kent J. in *Gauntlet Energy Corp., Re* (2003), 336 A.R. 302 (Alta. Q.B.): "Interference with contractual rights of creditors and non-creditors is consistent with the objective of the CCAA to allow struggling companies an opportunity to survive whenever reasonably possible." (at para. 58). Hinkson J. also relied on the decision in *Doman Industries Ltd., Re* (2003), 14 B.C.L.R. (4th) 153 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) and *T. Eaton Co., Re*, [1997] O.J. No. 6388 (Ont. Gen. Div.). In July 11, 2008 Oral Reasons for Judgment, Levine J.A. denied leave to appeal the Order of Hinkson J.

30 I have concluded that I should override the arbitration provisions in this Contract to allow a Court determination of the issue of whether Teal is or is not unreasonably withholding its approval for the transfer of the Contract to North View. First, I am satisfied that the determination of this issue is less expeditious and more expensive under the arbitration provisions. The past history between these parties is that the arbitration proceedings have been both lengthy and incredibly costly. In the context of a previous application, counsel for Teal indicated that the cost of an arbitration might approach $250,000.00. Second, an arbitration award is subject to judicial review, further lengthening and complicating the decision-making process. Third, there are time constraints imposed by North View regarding the purchase of this Contract. Those deadlines cannot be met by the arbitration proceedings contemplated under the Contract. Fourth, there is no reason why the question whether the consent has been unreasonable withheld or not cannot be determined by the Court. Although a number of arbitrators are experienced in dealing with the type of issues that would arise in the arbitration of other issues which have arisen between Hayes and Teal, the question of whether consent has been unreasonably or reasonably withheld is an issue which is commonly dealt with by the Court and requires no forestry related expertise. Taking into account all of those factors, I am satisfied that the issue raised by the dispute between the parties should be dealt with by this Court in the *CCAA* proceedings. The application of Teal to lift the stay of proceedings granted on July 31, 2008 is dismissed.

Can the Court Approve the Assignment of the Contract, Even Though It Is Not Unreasonable for Teal to Withhold Its Consent?

31 I am satisfied that the *CCAA* Court can approve an assignment even if I reach the conclusion that it is not unreasonable for Teal to withhold its consent. In *Playdium*, *supra*, Spence J. dealt with a proposal to transfer all of the assets of Playdium to a new corporation as the only viable alternative to a liquidation of the assets of the company. Under that tenancy, an agreement could not be assigned without the consent of Famous Players, which consent could not be unreasonably withheld. Famous Players had argued that it had not been properly requested to consent and it had not received adequate financial information and assurances regarding management expertise and how their agreement might be brought into good standing. Save for the *CCAA* Order in place, Spence J. concluded that there could be no assignment but that the *CCAA* Order affords "... a context in which the court

has the jurisdiction to make the order." Spence J. concluded that he had jurisdiction to compel the assignment of leases over the objections of other parties and held that he had the jurisdiction to approve the assignment of leases even though it would not have been unreasonable for Famous Players to withhold its consent to the assignment. I am prepared to adopt the path taken by Spence J. in *Playdium, supra*, if I conclude that it is reasonable for the consent of Teal to be withheld.

Has the Consent of Teal Been Unreasonably Withheld?

32 The determination of the reasonableness of withholding consent is a question of whether a reasonable person would have withheld consent in the circumstances. The determination will be dependent on such factors as the commercial realities of the marketplace, the economic impact of the assignment, and the financial position of the proposed assignee. *Exxonmobil Canada Energy v. Novagas Canada Ltd.*, [2003] 3 W.W.R. 657 (Alta. Q.B.), dealt with the assignment of the management of the interest of Exxonmobil Canada Energy in a gas processing plant. Regarding the argument that the assignment had been unreasonably withheld, Park J. concluded that it was reasonable to have refused the consent to the assignment and, in these regards, made the following statements:

> The reasons for including a consent requirement in the assignment was to allow each party the opportunity of reasonably assessing any future contractual partners. If a proposed assignee did not meet the criteria reasonably required by the other party, the assignment should not proceed. (at para. 54)
>
> On an objective basis it is entirely reasonable to enquire into the financial capability of a proposed business partner in determining whether to accept that party as a business partner. There must be adequate information provided to EMC regarding the strength of the Solex financial covenant. Further, if NCLP and Solex wish to argue (as they did) that EMC would be in a better position with the financial covenant of each of Solex and NCLP, in the absence of Solex being novated into the Agreement, then it would be reasonable for Solex and NCLP to provide adequate information on the strengths of those financial covenants rather than leaving EMC to surmise.
>
> However, it is not the final strength or weakness of Solex's financial covenant which prevents consent. Rather it is the failure of Solex to provide relevant and material financial information which will enable EMC to assess the financial strength of Solex on a go forward basis. The absence of financial information provided by Solex means that EMC has reasonably withheld its consent. EMC in the circumstances cannot satisfy itself as to the financial ability of Solex to meet its prospective obligations as the proposed assignee under the Agreement.
>
> Finally, I note that EMC has not withheld its consent for improper reasons. As I noted previously, the desire of EMC to resolve outstanding issues between itself and NCLP is a separate issue, and is not tied to EMC's desire to receive proper and adequate financial information from Solex as a separate entity. EMC did not withhold its consent in order to secure additional benefits as argued by Solex and NCLP.
>
> (at paras. 58-60)

33 The reasonableness of withholding consent has often been considered in the context of leases. In *1455202 Ontario Inc. v. Welbow Holdings Ltd.* (2003), 9 R.P.R. (4th) 103 (Ont. S.C.J.), Cullity J. concluded that the landlord was justified in its decision based on the lack of information concerning the business experience of the proposed assignee stating:

In determining whether the Landlord has unreasonably withheld consent, I believe the following propositions are supported by the authorities cited by counsel and are of assistance:

1. The burden is on the Tenant to satisfy the court that the refusal to consent was unreasonable: *Shields v. Dickler*, [1948] O.W.N. 145 (C.A.),at pages 149-50; *Sundance Investment Corporation Ltd. v. RichfieldProperties Limited et al*, [1983] 2 W.W.R. 493 (Alta. C.A.), at page 500;cf. *Welch Foods Inc. v. Cadbury Beverages Canada Inc.* (2001), 140 O.A.C. 321 (C.A.), at page 331. In deciding whether the burden has been discharged, the question is not whether the court would have reached the same conclusion as the Landlord or even whether a reasonable person might have given consent; it is whether a reasonable person could have withheld consent: *Whiteminster Estates v. HedgesMenswear Ltd.* (1972), 232 Estates Gazette 715 (Ch. D.), at pages715-6; *Zellers Inc. v. Brad-Jay Investments Ltd.*, [2002] O.J. No. 4100 (S.C.J.), at para. 35.

2. In determining the reasonableness of a refusal to consent, it is the information available to - and the reasons given by - the Landlord at the time of the refusal - and not any additional, or different, facts or reasons provided subsequently to the court - that is material: *Bromley ParkGarden Estates Ltd. v. Moss*, [1982] 2 All E.R. 890 (C.A.), at page 901-2 per Slade L.J. Further, it is not necessary for the Landlord to prove that the conclusions which led it to refuse consent were justified, if they were conclusions that might have been reached by a reasonable person in the circumstances: *Pimms, Ltd. v. Tallow Chandlers in the City of London*, [1964] 2 All E.R. 145 (C.A.), at page 151.

3. The question must be considered in the light of the existing provisions of the lease that define and delimit the subject matter of the assignment as well as the right of the Tenant to assign and that of the Landlord to withhold consent. The Landlord is not entitled to require amendments to the terms of lease that will provide it with more advantageous terms: *Jo-EmmaRestaurants Ltd. v. A. Merkur & Sons Ltd.* (1989), 7 R.P.R. (2d) 298 (Ont. Div. Ct.); *Re Town Investments Ltd.*, [1954] Ch. 301 (Ch. D.) -but, as a general rule, it may reasonably withhold consent if the assignment will diminish the value of its rights under it, or of its reversion: *Federal Business Development Bank v. Starr* (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 65 (H.C.) , at page 72. A refusal will, however, be unreasonable if it was designed to achieve a collateral purpose, or benefit to the Landlord, that was wholly unconnected with the bargain between the Landlord and the Tenant reflected in the terms of the lease: *Bromley Park Garden EstatesLtd. v. Moss*, above, at page 901 per Dunn L.J.)

4. A probability that the proposed assignee will default in its obligations under the lease may, depending upon the circumstances, be a reasonable ground for withholding consent. A refusal to consent will not necessarily be unreasonable simply because the Landlord will have the same legal rights in the event of default by the assignee as it has against the assignor: *Ashworth Frazer Ltd., v. Gloucester City Council*, [2001] H.L.J. 57.

5. The financial position of the assignee may be a relevant consideration. This was encompassed by the references to the "personality" of an assignee in the older cases see, for example, *Shanley v. Ward* (1913), 29 T.L.R. 714 (C.A.); *Dominion Stores Ltd. v. Bramalea Ltd.*, [1985] O.J.No. 1874 (Dist. Ct.)

6. The question of reasonableness is essentially one of fact that must be determined on the circumstances of the particular case, including the commercial realities of the market place and the economic impact of an assignment on the Landlord. Decisions in other cases that consent was reasonably, or un-

> reasonably, withheld are not precedents that will dictate the result in the case before the court: *Bickel et al. v. Duke ofWestminster et al.*, [1976] 3 All E.R. 801 (C.A.), at pages 804-5;*Ashworth Frazer Ltd. v. Gloucester City Council*, above, at para. 67;*Dominion Stores Ltd. v. Bramalea Ltd.*, above, at para. 25.
>
> (at para. 9)

34 Of the six general areas of concern raised by Teal, the objection that there was no executed Assignment of Contract is no longer an issue as an executed assignment conditional on the consent of Teal has now been provided.

35 Regarding the concern regarding the lack of equipment or crew, I am satisfied that this should not be an impediment to the assumption of the contractual obligations by North View. Some of the crew that will be required has already been contracted through Horsman Trucking Ltd. ("Horsman"), who has entered into a services subcontract with North View. In general, I accept the evidence of Donald P. Hayes who makes this statement in his July 2, 2009 Affidavit:

> At present there is no work available under the Teal Bill 13 Contract and no equipment is currently required. When logging recommences under the Contract, the Purchaser will be able to acquire equipment either directly or be able to subcontract out portions of the work (as is currently done by Hayes) and service the Contract without difficulty.
>
> There is currently a surplus of logging equipment on Vancouver Island. The most recent auction of equipment was held in June, 2009 by Ritchie Bros. in Duncan, BC. The sale prices at that recent Ritchie Bros.' auction were extremely low and any contractor on the Island will have no difficulty acquiring the necessary equipment at some of the lowest historic prices for that equipment.
>
> There is current an abundance of logging equipment from Coastal BC operations that has been returned to various leasing companies. I am aware of certain lessors that are now re-leasing this equipment without the requirement of a down payment by the new lessee. Essentially the new lessee simply makes payments based on the returned value of the equipment. This will make it very easy for any contractor or subcontractor to acquire any equipment needed to service a contract for logging or road building.

36 I am also satisfied that North View sets out a satisfactory explanation regarding equipment in its July 16, 2009 letter to Teal:

> I have made inquiries in the market as to the availability of equipment. Hayes has all of the equipment for sale that I would require to start the operations. I confirm that in the event of short notice from Teal that Hayes would rent or rent to purchase suitable equipment as required including a grapple yarder, log loaders, back spar, cat etc.
>
> Finning also has new and used inventory in stock. I am also aware of several contractors who are shut down and will likely have equipment for short term rent or rental purchase.
>
> Pick up trucks are readily available for purchase or lease in the market and Hayes will sell me the industrial box liners required.
>
> Until there is a logging plan and a start date, I have not tried to firm up equipment arrangements. Without the logging plan and a start date, I cannot be sure of the equipment actually required or the timing of that re-

quirement.

37 Regarding the concern that North View is not a going concern, while it is clear that North View is an entity which is not presently operating, my review of the experience of the principals of North View allows me to conclude that the principals have sufficient experience to allow North View to be successful in performing the work that is provided by Teal under the Contract. The principal of North View has over 35 years of logging experience and worked as a subcontractor for Hayes between 2005 and 2008 on the work required under the Contract. As well, North View will have the assistance of the principals of Hayes, and has contracted with an experienced hauler to subcontract the hauling of timber to the dump operations.

38 I also accept the following evidence regarding the proposed operations of North View under the Contract which is set out in the July 24, 2009 Affidavit of Donald P. Hayes:

> The contract will be operated as follows:
>
> (a) Falling. The falling work under the contract is currently done by a sub contractor, Gemini, they had done the falling work for years, and will continue to do so for North View Timber Ltd. ("North View");
>
> (b) Yarding. Mr. Horsman is one of the most experienced yarders on the coast and has done this work on this contract for Hayes. He will do this work;
>
> (c) Loading. This work will be contracted out to an experienced loader. The loading takes place in close proximity to the yarding and can be supervised by the yarder, in this case Mr. Horsman;
>
> (d) Hauling. The hauling will be subcontracted to Horsman Trucking Ltd, a well know and experienced hauler on the Island. I have know them for years and they have a good reputation.

39 I am satisfied that Teal should have no hesitation in concluding that the equipment, crew and expertise to undertake the work required under the Contract will be available to North View. In this regard, I am also mindful of the fact that, if North View fails to perform under the Contract, Hayes will be in a position to take back the Contract and then perform the logging required under the Contract. In the past, Teal was satisfied with the performance of Hayes under the Contract, and should have some solace that Hayes will be in a position to perform under the Contract if North View does not.

40 Regarding the concern of Teal that North View is not financially capable, I note that a $50,000.00 deposit has already been paid, that an agreement has been reached with Horsman to sell to Horsman the hauling subcontract for $400,000.00 so that the further $277,000.00 required at the date of closing will be available, that $100,000.00 will be set aside to meet capital requirements, and that preliminary discussions are underway with B.D.C. and Caterpillar Finance regarding financing once any logging plan proposed by Teal is known. In this regard, I am satisfied that the payments under the Contract must be made by Teal every two weeks, and I take into account the advice received from North View that its expenses need to be paid monthly so that the working capital that would otherwise be required to service this Contract is reduced.

41 Finally, Teal is concerned that North View has no "business plan". I am satisfied that this concern is answered in the July 16, 2009 letter from North View to Teal:

> I have not regularly prepared business plans. My practice is to study the logging plan, when I receive it and then determine the equipment and people that I need. I then closely supervise the production and all pur-

chases to control the cash flow.

I have had Mr. Donald P. Hayes assist me with the preparation of the

Business Plan. Mr. Hayes is a Chartered Accountant and the President of Hayes Forest Services Limited, the current operator of the contract. This is a much more detailed plan than I could produce myself. I have reviewed it with Mr. Hayes and based on my knowledge I confirm that in my opinion the Business Plan reflects the economic conditions in the industry and uses reasonable assumptions concerning rates, costs, financing and working capital needs including the payment of the $3.00 per cubic meter promissory note to Hayes. I further confirm that I believe that the contract is viable at market rates.

This Business Plan has not been independently reviewed but was developed in conjunction with Mr. Hayes who has operated this contract for over 20 years and is extremely knowledgeable in respect of this contract. Once the actual logging plan is provided, it will likely require material changes to the Business Plan.

42 As well, it should be obvious to Teal that it is difficult to put forward a "business plan" when the 2009 and 2010 work allocated under the Contract is not known. While it is clear that North View does not have the present capacity or business plan in place to handle a cut of 125,000 cubic metres, it is also clear that there is no current work under the Contract and this yearly volume has not been required of Hayes for over three years.

43 In the context of leases, the Court must look at all of the circumstances to determine if consent has been reasonably withheld: *Lehndorff Canadian Pension Properties Ltd. v. Davis Management Ltd.* (1987), 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) 367 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 51. The *Forest Act* and the *Timber Harvesting Regulations* require similar contracts to be assignable and puts the onus on licence holders such as Teal to justify their refusal to consent to any assignment. Taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding this question, I am satisfied that Teal has not shown that it is reasonable to withhold its consent. At the same time, I am satisfied that Hayes has met the burden of showing that a reasonable person would not have withheld consent.

44 In this regard, I have concluded that at least part of the refusal to provide consent was designed by Teal to achieve a collateral purpose that is wholly unconnected with the bargain between Teal and Hayes. In November 2008, Teal made an offer to purchase the Contract for $764,112.00. From this, I can conclude that Teal believes that there is significant value to it if the Contract cannot be performed by Hayes or if Teal can otherwise obtain the benefits of the Contract in order that they can be transferred to another operator. Teal has also provided an offer through 858 to purchase the Contract for $1,400,000.00. This is further evidence of the value to Teal of stopping a transfer of the Contract to North View in the hope that the Contract will revert to it by virtue of the inability or unwillingness of Hayes to perform under the Contract.

What Should Be Made of the Offer of 858?

45 The offer of 858 was open for acceptance until August 11, 2009 and was directed to the attention of Hayes Forest Services Ltd. ("Offer"). It was a condition of the Offer that Horsman enter into a replaceable services sub-contract with 858 in the same form as the Horsman contract with North View. As at August 14, 2009, no confirmation had been received from Horsman that they were prepared to accept that stipulation. The purchase price under the Offer is $1,400,000, with $400,000 at the time of closing (being the amount that would be available to 858 under the Horsman contract) and with balance of the purchase price by a promissory note for $1,000,000.

46 In response to the concern raised by Hayes that Teal would be in a position to control the amount of work that would be available to 858 so that 858 would not be in a position to pay the balance due and owing under the Promissory Note quickly or at all, the following provision was inserted after the first draft of the Offer was forwarded to Hayes:

> 2.11 **Amount of Work Dispute.** Teal and the Purchaser agree that if, at any time before the Purchaser pays the Contract Purchase Price in full, the Vendor reasonably believes that Teal has failed to meet its obligation under Paragraph 2.05 of the Teal Contract, the Vendor may give notice (the "**Dispute Notice**") to Teal and the Purchaser specifying in reasonable detail the particulars of the default, in which case a dispute is deemed to exist between the Vendor and Teal under this Agreement, which dispute, despite the reference in Paragraph 2.05 of the Teal Contract to resolving amount of work disputes in accordance with the Contract Regulation (as defined in the Teal Contract), will be resolved as follows:
>
> (a) as soon as reasonably practicable after the notice is given, the Vendor and Teal will:
>
> (i) cause their respective appropriate personnel with decision making authority to meet in an attempt to resolve the dispute through amicable negotiations; and
>
> (ii) provide frank, candid and timely disclosure of all relevant facts, information and documents to facilitate those negotiations;
>
> (b) if the dispute is not resolved by such negotiations within 15 days of the Vendor having given the Dispute Notice, either the Vendor or Teal may, within 30 days after the Dispute Notice was given, deliver a Notice (a "Mediation Notice") to the other party requiring the dispute to go to mediation, in which case the Vendor and Teal will attempt to resolve the dispute by structured negotiation with a mediator administered under the Commercial Mediation Rules of the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre before a mediator agreed upon by the Vendor and Teal or, failing agreement, appointed by the Centre;
>
> (c) if:
>
> (i) the dispute is not resolved within 14 days after the mediator has been agreed upon or appointed under Section 2.11(b); or
>
> (ii) the mediation is terminated earlier as a result of a written notice by the mediator to the Vendor and Teal that the dispute is not likely to be resolved through mediation, either the Vendor or Teal may, not more than 14 days after the conclusion of the period referred to in Section 2.1 1(c)(i) or the receipt of the notice referred to in Section 2.11(c)(ii), as the case may be, commence arbitration proceedings by giving a notice of arbitration to the other party, in which case the dispute will be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration administered under the British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration Centre's Shorter Rules for Domestic Commercial Arbitration before an arbitrator agreed upon by the Vendor and Teal or, failing agreement, appointed by the Centre, and the decision of the arbitrator will be final and binding on the Vendor, the Purchaser and Teal, but will not be a precedent in any subsequent arbitration under this Section;
>
> (d) pending resolution or other determination of the dispute under this Section, the Purchaser will continue to perform its obligations under the Teal Contract; and

(e) if, as a result of the resolution or other determination of the dispute under this Section, Teal allocates an additional amount of work to the Purchaser, the Purchaser will perform that additional amount of work in accordance with the terms of the Teal Contract.

47 Some of the objections to the Offer are summarized in the August 10, 2009 letter from counsel for Hayes to counsel for Teal:

As you are aware our client has entered into a contract with North View Logging Ltd. to sell that contract to North View. Having done so Hayes is not in a position to enter into a second contract to sell the same contract.

Apart from that problem, there are a number of other issues that make this offer problematic from Hayes' perspective, these include:

1. The proposed purchase price is substantially less than the North View offer, some $250,000. In addition, to obtain an extension of the closing of the transaction to North View, Hayes has had to agree to a break fee of $50,000 payable to North View if Hayes sells the contract to Teal. A copy of that agreement is enclosed;

2. The rate of payment on the Promissory Note is only $2 per M3 as opposed to the $3 per M3 to be paid by North View;

3. The Purchaser is a shell company incorporated on August 6, 2009 that appears to have no assets. It is proposed that the sale proceeds derived from the Horsman Trucking subcontract be used to fund the cash component of the transaction, with the balance to be paid by the $2 per M3 payable under the Promissory Note. The Purchaser will not have any of its assets invested in this contract and is not at any financial risk. There is no consequence to the Purchaser simply walking away from its obligations and allowing Teal to cancel the underlying Bill 13 contract for non performance;

4. The only security proposed is from what appears to be a shell company and even that is limited to the underlying Bill 13 contract itself. If the Purchaser, a Teal nominee, defaults in performance, Teal will cancel the Bill 13 contract, and the "security" held by Hayes would vanish;

5. Payment under the promissory note is wholly dependent upon Teal allocating the amount of work that the holder of the Bill 13 contract is entitled to. An arm's length purchaser, such as North View, has a strong economic interest in enforcing its rights as against Teal to ensure that it receives the volume of work it is entitled to. The Purchaser proposed by Teal is a Teal nominee and will have no such economic interest. Teal has taken every step it can in the course of the CCAA proceedings to terminate the Bill 13 contract. We see no reason to expect that this attitude will change once both sides of the Bill 13 contract are in the control of Teal;

6. Teal can arbitrarily reduce and or delay the amount payable under the Promissory Note by allocating work that could or should be done by Hayes to other contractors working for Teal on TFL 46. It is doing so now;

7. There is no evidence of the ability of the Purchaser to do the work required under the contract, its finances, equipment or personnel.

48 Many of the objections raised by Hayes regarding the Offer parallel many of the objections raised by Teal regarding the North View offer. While Teal and 858 have common shareholders, none of the information that Teal required of North View is available to Hayes or the Court regarding the Offer of 858. If it is the position of Teal that the Court should approve the offer of 858 because it is reasonable to do so and is in the best interests of the creditors of Hayes to do so, then I conclude that Teal has not met the burden of showing that it is. In the context of whether withholding consent has been reasonable or not, a number of factors apply. If those factors are applied to the application of Teal, it is clear that a reasonable person would withhold consent and it is clear that approval of the offer of 858 would not be ordered. It is difficult for Teal to argue on one hand that a reasonable person would withhold consent for the proposed assignment to North View but, at the same time, the Court should approve the proposed transfer to 858, even though there is even less information available to allow the Court to reasonably assess the future contractual partner recommended by Teal. There is no information regarding the financial capability of 858. There is nothing which would allow the Court to satisfy itself as to the financial ability of 858 to meet its prospective obligations. As well, the Court is not in a position to approve offers where the offer continues to contain conditions precedent that have not been met. In this regard, the approval of Horsman to "transfer" its contract with Hayes to 858 so that 858 receives $400,000.00 remains an unfulfilled condition.

49 There are also significant economic advantages to the creditors of Hayes to accept the North View offer and for the Court to make a finding that the consent of Teal has been unreasonably withheld so that the assignment of the Contract to North View should be approved. First, the offer of North View is $214,266.00 better. Second, the balance of the purchase price is paid off more quickly as the payment will be based on $3.00 per cubic metre, whereas the payment of the balance of the purchase price contemplated by 858 will be based on a payment of $2.00 per cubic metre. Third, if there is default, it is clear that the creditors of Hayes will benefit if there is a reversion of the Contract to Hayes. I cannot conclude that is the case with the Offer. Fourth, it may well be that Hayes will have to pay a $50,000.00 cancellation fee to Horsman if the Offer is approved by the Court.

50 It also should be noted that 858 is bringing none of its own money "to the table". Rather, all of the $400,000.00 that will be due on closing comes from the funds that would be available from Horsman if Horsman is prepared to enter into a similar subcontract with 858. As well, all payments of the $2.00 per cubic metre contemplated under the Offer are wholly dependent upon Teal allocating the amount of work that is contemplated under the Contract. North View has a stronger economic interest to enforce its rights against Teal to ensure that it receives the volume of work it is entitled to under the Contract whereas 858 has no such economic interest. As well, what is proposed under the Offer provides ample opportunity for the arbitration process and appeals therefrom to delay the question of the allocation of work to 858.

51 I am satisfied that Teal has unreasonably withheld its consent for the assignment of the Contract from Hayes to North View. Even if I had not reached that conclusion, I am satisfied that the advantages to the creditors of Hayes far outweigh any disadvantages so that I should exercise the discretion available to me under the *CCAA* to approve the assignment of the Contract despite the consent of Teal being reasonably withheld. The sale to North View Timber Ltd. of the replaceable stump to dump logging contract between Hayes Forest Services Limited and Teal Cedar Products Ltd. is approved. The application by Teal Cedar Products Ltd. to approve a sale of that contract to 858434 BC Ltd. is dismissed.

52 The parties will be at liberty to speak to the question of costs.

Application for approval of sale granted; application to lift stay of proceedings dismissed.

Appendix "A"

Schedule "D"

Dispute Resolution Cause Timber Harvesting Contracts

Dispute Resolution

Where the Work performed by the Contractor under an agreement with the Company is carried out on lands managed by the Company under a Tree Farm Licence or Forest Licence, and where a dispute arises over a term, condition or obligation under the agreement which cannot be resolved amicably between the parties within 30 days of the dispute arising, the Company and the Contractor mutually agree that either party may invoke the following dispute resolution provisions:

(a) The parties may by agreement first attempt to resolve their dispute with the assistance of a single professionally qualified mediator. The mediator shall be chosen by agreement between the parties. In the event that the parties fail to agree on the choice of a mediator, then a mediator shall be chosen by a mutually agreed upon third party unrelated to the parties to this agreement.

(b) In the event that the mediator is unsuccessful in assisting the parties to resolve their dispute within 5 days of the commencement of the mediation, or either party wishes the dispute to proceed directly to arbitration, then either party may require by notice in writing that the. matter be referred to arbitration as provided for by the provisions of the Dispute Resolution Clause.

Where either party to the agreement has commenced an action in a court of competent jurisdiction regarding a term, condition or obligation under the agreement, and the action is in good standing, then the parties to the agreement shall not invoke or continue with the dispute resolution provisions of the agreement until such time as the court action has been finally concluded. Where a court issues a judgement in an action regarding a term, condition or obligation under the agreement and the judgement becomes final, then that judgement shall constitute the final resolution of the dispute between the parties.

Arbitration

The Company and the Contractor mutually agree that where a dispute is to be resolved by arbitration (the "Arbitration Proceeding"), it shall be so resolved by a single arbitrator to be agreed on by the parties. If the parties are unable to agree on the choice of arbitrator then a single arbitrator shall be selected pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Act, S.B.C. 1996, c. 3 as amended.

The Arbitration Proceeding shall be conducted in Vancouver British Columbia or such other place as the parties may agree in writing. The rules of procedure for the Arbitration Proceeding shall be those provided for in the Commercial Arbitration Act for domestic commercial arbitrations. as amended by the provisions of the Dispute Resolution Clause.

Each party shall only be entitled to two days to complete their submissions to the arbitrator. Each party shall have the right of reply to the submission of the other for one hour only. ....

The arbitrator shall hand down the arbitral award within 7 days of the completion of the submissions and reply of the parties.

Discovery

Each party shall be entitled to the following pre-arbitration "examination for discovery" rights, as that term is defined in the Rules of Court of the Supreme Court of British Columbia:

(a) discovery of all relevant documents pertaining directly to the issue or issues in dispute between the parties;

(b) discovery of one officer or representative of the other party;

(c) each party shall be allowed to discover the officer or representative of the other for no more than one day for each $50,000.00 in dispute to a maximum of three days, and where no amount has been specified, then each party shall only be allowed a maximum of two days of discovery of the officer or representative of the other.

Costs of the Dispute Resolution

Where a provision in the agreement has been referred to mediation or arbitration by the Company or the Contractor, then any funds actually in dispute shall be deposited in an interest bearing trust account. Upon the resolution of the dispute, the funds and interest thereon shall be paid to the Company and the Contractor proportionately as agreed between the parties, or as directed by the arbitration award.

The Company and the Contractor shall pay all costs associated with the provision of mediation or arbitration services forthwith upon an invoice for these services being rendered, equally, except as provided for below.

The Company and the Contractor shall each bear their own costs in resolving the dispute between them, with the following exceptions:

(a) Where one party is found, on a balance of probabilities

(i) not to have pursued its various rights and responsibilities under this agreement in good faith,

(ii) not to have used all reasonable effort to resolve its dispute with the other through mediation with a minimum of delay and expense, or

(iii) not to have used all reasonable effort to resolve its dispute with the other by the Arbitration Proceeding with a minimum of delay and expense,

then the offending party shall pay the disbursements and one half of all other direct expense incurred by the other;

(b) Where both parties are found, on a balance of probabilities, to have acted in bad faith or made less than all reasonable effort to resolve their dispute, then each party shall bear its own direct costs and disbursements and shall share equally all costs associated with the conduct of the mediation and/or the Arbitration Proceeding; and

(c) For the purposes of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, the costs associated with the provision of mediation and arbitration services and the Conduct of the Arbitration Proceeding shall be considered a disbursement.

Any award or division of costs referred to herein shall constitute a liquidated debt immediately due and payable by the one party to the other, and shall be satisfied to the extent possible by the indebted party to the other from the funds held in trust and referred to above.

Failure of Arbitration

Where the Contractor and the Company agree in writing, or where the arbitrator is unable to resolve the dispute, then the dispute shall be resubmitted for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Dispute Resolution Clause of the agreement.

Where the inability of the arbitrator to resolve the dispute arises out of the misconduct of one of the parties in the dispute or a party affiliated with one of the parties in the dispute, then the dispute shall be deemed to be settled in favour of the other party with that other party entitled to their full costs arising out of the dispute as a liquidated debt.

END OF DOCUMENT

TAB 14

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY LAW OF CANADA

FOURTH EDITION

REVISED

VOLUME 4

by

The Honourable

L. W. HOULDEN, B.A., LL.B.,

formerly a Judge of The Court of Appeal for Ontario

and

The Honourable

G. B. MORAWETZ, B.A., LL.B.

of the Superior Court of Justice

and

JANIS SARRA, B.A., M.A., LL.B., LL.M., S.J.D.

of UBC Faculty of Law and the Ontario Bar

CARSWELL®

A cataloguing record for this publication is available from Library and Archives Canada.

Houlden, L. W., 1922-
Bankruptcy law of Canada

4th ed.
Tables of cases.
Includes the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, 1985.
ISBN 978-0-7798-2158-7

1. Canada. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. 2. Bankruptcy – Canada.
I. Morawetz, Carl H., 1917- . II. Canada.
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act. III. Title.

KE1494.55.H68 1989 346.71'078 C89-093461-4
KF1536.ZA2H68 1989

Composition: Computer Composition of Canada Inc.

THOMSON REUTERS

CARSWELL, A DIVISION OF THOMSON REUTERS CANADA LIMITED

One Corporate Plaza
2075 Kennedy Road
Toronto, Ontario
M1T 3V4

Customer Relations
Toronto 1-416-609-3800
Elsewhere in Canada/U.S. 1-800-387-5164
Fax: 1-416-298-5082
www.carswell.com
Online www.carswell.com/email

defaults in relation to the agreement, other than those arising by reason only of the insolvency, will be remedied by a date fixed by the court (2007, c. 36 proclaimed in force as of September 18, 2009). The applicant is to send a copy of the order to every party to the agreement: s. 11.3(4) (2007, c. 36 proclaimed in force as of September 18, 2009). Section 11.3(2) refers to specific agreements that may not be assigned, see N§98 "Exceptions to Court's Ability to Assign".

The court held that while it has authority to authorize the assignment of a license agreement, notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in that agreement, it should only exercise its authority where doing so is important to the reorganization process. Underlying considerations include the purpose of the *CCAA* and the effect on parties' contractual rights. Here, the requested relief would have no impact on the *CCAA* proceedings and would amount to unfair interference with the licensor's contractual rights: *Re Nexient Learning Inc.* (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 8071, 62 C.B.R. (5th) 248 (Ont. S.C.J.).

N§97 Criteria to Apply in Considering Proposed Assignment

Section 11.3(3) specifies that the court is to consider three factors: whether the monitor approved the proposed assignment; whether the person to whom the rights and obligations are to be assigned would be able to perform the obligations; and whether it would be appropriate to assign the rights and obligations to that person (2007, c. 36 proclaimed in force as of September 18, 2009).

The court granted approval to the debtor for sale of a contract to a third party and refused to lift the stay for the affected creditor that sought to commence arbitration proceedings to determine whether it was reasonable to withhold its consent to assignment of the contract. The court found that the *CCAA* is broad enough to allow the court to substitute a decision in *CCAA* proceedings for the arbitration process contemplated in the contract. It held that the issue should be dealt with in the *CCAA* proceedings as it would be more expeditious and less costly, and would better advance the objectives of the statute. The determination of the reasonableness of withholding consent to assignment is a question of whether a reasonable person would have withheld consent in the circumstances, taking account of the commercial realities of the marketplace, the economic impact of the assignment, and the financial position of the proposed assignee. In approving the assignment, the court held that the advantage to the creditors of the debtor company far outweighed any disadvantage to the creditor, despite the consent of the creditor being reasonably withheld: *Re Hayes Forest Services Ltd.* (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 2286, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 52 (B.C.S.C.).

TAB 15

Case Name:

AbitibiBowater inc. (Arrangement relatif à)

IN THE MATTER OF THE PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF:
ABITIBIBOWATER INC.
and
ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC., BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC., The other Petitioners listed on Schedules "A", "B" and "C",
Petitioners
and
ERNST & YOUNG INC., Monitor

[2009] Q.J. No. 19125

2009 QCCS 6461

No.: 500-11-036133-094

Quebec Superior Court
District of Montreal

The Honourable Clément Gascon, J.S.C.

Heard: November 9, 2009.
Judgment: November 16, 2009.

(109 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Compromises and arrangements -- Sanction by court -- Motion for the approval of a second DIP financing and for distribution of certain proceeds of the sale of Manicouagan Power Company to the Senior Secured Noteholders -- The compromise negotiated in this respect, albeit imperfect, remained the best available and viable solution to deal with the liquidity requirements of the Abitibi Petitioners -- Motion granted.

Motion for the approval of a second DIP financing and for distribution of certain proceeds of the sale of Manicouagan Power Company (MPCo) to the Senior Secured Noteholders (SSNs)-- The only two secured creditor groups of the Abitibi Petitioners did not contest the motion -- However,

while not contesting the request for approval of the second DIP financing, the Bondholders contended that the CDN$200 million immediate proposed distribution to the SSNs was inappropriate and uncalled for at this time -- The MPCo sale transaction was central to the orders sought in the DIP Motion -- HELD: Motion granted -- The second DIP financing should be approved on the amended terms agreed upon by the numerous parties involved -- Based on the compromise reached with the Term Lenders, access to the funds was to be progressive and subject to control -- As well, the use of the funds was subject to considerable safeguards as to the interests of all stakeholders -- The Court was satisfied that, in requesting the approval of the DIP Facility, management was doing so with a broad measure of support and the confidence of its major creditor constituencies -- Similarly to the IP Facility, the proposed distribution should be authorized -- The access to additional liquidity was possible because of the corresponding distribution to the SSNs -- The compromise negotiated in this respect, albeit imperfect, remained the best available and viable solution to deal with the liquidity requirements of the Abitibi Petitioners -- It was fair to say that the SSNs were not depriving the Abitibi Petitioners of liquidity -- Further, the Bondholders had no economic interest in the MPCo assets and resulting proceeds of sale that are subject to a first ranking security interest in favor of the SSNs.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.2, s. 11.2(4)

Counsel:

Me Sean Dunphy, Me Joseph Reynaud, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Me Robert Thornton, Attorney for the Monitor.

Me Jason Dolman, Attorney for the Monitor.

Me Alain Riendeau, Attorney for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Administrative Agent under the Credit and Guarantee Agreement Dated April 1, 2008.

Me Marc Duchesne, Attorney for the Ad hoc Committee of the
Senior Secured Noteholders and U.S. Bank National Association,
Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders.

Me Frederick L. Myers, Co-Counsel for the Ad Hoc Committee of Unsecured Noteholders of AbitibiBowater Inc. and certain of its Affiliates.

[Editor's note: A Corrected Judgment was released by the Court on November 23, 2009. The corrections have been made to the text and the text of the Corrected Judgment is appended to this document].

JUDGMENT

ON RE-AMENDED MOTION FOR THE APPROVAL OF A SECOND DIP FINANCING AND FOR DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN PROCEEDS OF THE MPCo SALE TRANSACTION TO THE TRUSTEE FOR THE SENIOR SECURED NOTES (#312)

INTRODUCTION

1 [1] In the context of their *CCAA*[1] restructuring, the Abitibi Petitioners[2] present a Motion[3] for 1) the approval of a second DIP financing and 2) the distribution of certain proceeds of the Manicouagan Power Company (**MPCo**) sale transaction to the Senior Secured Noteholders (**"SSNs"**).

2 [2] More particularly, the Abitibi Petitioners seek:

> [1] Orders authorizing Abitibi Consolidated Inc. (**ACI**) and Abitibi Consolidated Company of Canada Inc. (**ACCC**) to enter into a Loan Agreement (the **ULC DIP Agreement**) with 3239432 Nova Scotia Company (**ULC**), as lender, providing for a CDN$230 million super-priority secured debtor in possession credit facility (the **ULC DIP Facility**).
>
> The ULC DIP Facility is to be funded from the ULC reserve of approximately CDN$282.3 million (the **ULC Reserve**), with terms that will be substantially in the form of the term sheet (the **ULC DIP Term Sheet**) attached to the ULC DIP Motion;
>
> [2] Orders authorizing the distribution to the SSNs of up to CDN$200 million upon completion of the sale of ACCC's 60% interest in MPCo and Court approval of the ULC DIP Agreement.
>
> The distribution is to be paid from the net proceeds of the MPCo sale transaction after the payments, holdbacks, reserves and deductions provided for in the Implementation Agreement agreed upon in regard to that transaction; and
>
> [3] Orders amending the Second Amended Initial Order to increase the super priority charge set out in paragraph 61.3 (the **ACI DIP Charge**) in respect of the ACI DIP Facility by an amount of CDN$230 million in favour of ULC for all amounts owing in connection with the ULC DIP Facility.

> This increase in the ACI DIP Charge is to still be subordinated to any and all subrogated rights in favour of the SSNs, the lenders under the ACCC Term Loan (the **Term Lenders**) and McBurney Corporation, McBurney Power Limited and MBB Power Services Inc. (the **Lien Holders**) arising under paragraph 61.10 of the Second Amended Initial Order.

3 [3] The SSNs and the Term Lenders, the only two secured creditor groups of the Abitibi Petitioners, do not, in the end, contest the ULC DIP Motion. Pursuant to intense negotiations and following concessions made by everyone, an acceptable wording to the orders sought was finally agreed upon on the eve of the hearing. The efforts of all parties and Counsel involved are worth mentioning; the help and guidance of the Monitor and its Counsel as well.

4 [4] Of the unsecured creditors and other stakeholders, only the Ad Hoc Unsecured Noteholders Committee (the **"Bondholders"**) opposes the ULC DIP Motion, and even there, just in part. At hearing, Counsel for the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors set up in the corresponding U.S. proceedings pending in the State of Delaware also voiced that his client shared some of the Bondholders' concerns.

5 [5] In short, while not contesting the request for approval of the second DIP financing, the Bondholders contend that the CDN$200 million immediate proposed distribution to the SSNs is inappropriate and uncalled for at this time.

6 [6] Before analyzing the various orders sought, an overview of the MPCo sale transaction and of the ULC DIP Facility that are the subject of the debate is necessary.

THE MPCo SALE TRANSACTION

7 [7] The MPCo sale transaction is central to the orders sought in the ULC DIP Motion.

8 [8] Under the terms of an Implementation Agreement signed in that regard, Hydro-Québec (**"HQ"**) agreed to pay ACCC CDN$615 million (the **Purchase Price**) for ACCC's 60% interest in MPCo.

9 [9] Of this amount, it is expected that (i) CDN$25 million will be paid at closing to Alcoa, the owner of the other 40% interest in MPCo, for tax liabilities; (ii) approximately CDN$31 million will be held by HQ for two years to secure various indemnifications (the **HQ Holdback**); (iii) certain inter-party accounts will be settled; (iv) the CDN$282.3 million ULC Reserve, set up primarily to guarantee potential contingent pension liabilities and taxes resulting from the Proposed Transactions, will be held by the Monitor in trust for the ULC pending further Order of the Court; and (v) the ACI DIP Facility will be repaid.

10 [10] That said, until the sale, ACCC's 60% interest in MPCo remains subject to the SSN's first ranking security. This first ranking security interest has never been contested by any party. In fact, after their review of same, the Monitor's Counsel concluded that it is valid and enforceable[4].

11 [11] Accordingly, the proceeds of the sale less adjustments, holdbacks and reserve would normally be paid to the SSNs as holders of valid first ranking security over this asset.

12 [12] To that end, the SSNs' claim of US$477,545,769.53 (US$413 million in principal and US$64,545,769.53 in interest as at October 1st, 2009) is not really contested except for a 0.5% to 2% additional default interest over the 13.75% original loan rate.

13 [13] In that context, on September 29, 2009, the Court issued an Order approving the sale of ACCC's 60% interest in MPCo on certain conditions. Amongst others, the Court:

a) Approved the terms and conditions of the Implementation Agreement;
b) Authorized and directed ACI and ACCC to implement and complete the Proposed Transactions with such non-material alterations or amendments as the parties may agree to with the consent of the Monitor;
c) Declared that (i) the proceeds from the Proposed Transactions, net of certain payments, holdbacks, reserves and deductions, and (ii) the shares of the ULC, shall constitute and be treated as proceeds of the disposition of ACCC's MPCo shares (collectively, the **MPCo Share Proceeds**);
d) Declared that the MPCo Share Proceeds extend to and include (a) ACCC's interest in the HQ Holdback and (b) ACCC's interest in claims arising from the satisfaction of related-party claims;
e) Declared that the MPCo Share Proceeds will be subject to a replacement charge (the **MPCo Noteholder Charge**) in favour of the SSNs with the same rank and priority as the security held in respect of the ACCC's MPCo shares;
f) Declared that the ULC Reserve is subject to a charge in favour of the SSNs which is subordinate to a charge in favour of Alcoa (the **ULC Reserve Charge**); and
g) Ordered that the cash component of the MPCo Share Proceeds and the ULC Reserve be paid to and held by the Monitor in an interest bearing account or investment grade marketable securities pending further Order of the Court.

14 [14] The Proposed Transactions are not expected to close until the latter part of November or early December 2009. ACI has requested and obtained an extension from Investissement Quebec (**IQ**) to December 15, 2009 for the repayment of the ACI DIP Facility that matured on November 1st, 2009.

15 [15] Based on the amounts of the significant payments, holdbacks, reserves and deductions from the Purchase Price, and considering that the amount drawn under the ACI DIP Facility presently stands at CDN$54.8 million, the Net Available Proceeds after payment of the ACI DIP

Facility would be approximately CDN$173.9 million.

THE ULC DIP FACILITY

16 [16] Pursuant to the Implementation Agreement, ULC is required to maintain the ULC Reserve. On the closing of the Proposed Transactions, ULC will hold the ULC Reserve in the amount of approximately CDN$282.3 million.

17 [17] This amount may be used for a limited number of purposes (the **Permitted Investments**) that are described in the Implementation Agreement. Such Permitted Investments include making a DIP loan to either ACI or ACCC.

18 [18] Based on that, the ULC DIP Term Sheet provides that the ACI Group will borrow CDN$230 million from the ULC Reserve as a Permitted Investment.

19 [19] According to the Monitor[5], the significant terms of the ULC DIP Term Sheet are as follows:

> **i) Manner of Borrowing** - Initially, the ULC DIP Facility was to be available by way of an immediate draw of CDN$230 million. After negotiations with the Term Lenders, it was rather agreed that (i) a first draw of CDN$130 million will be advanced at closing, (ii) subsequent draws for a maximum total amount of CDN$50 million in increments of up to CDN$25 million will be advanced upon a five (5) business day notice and in accordance with paragraph 61.11 of the Second Amended Initial Order, and (iii) the balance of CDN$50 million shall become available upon further order of the Court.
>
> **ii) Interest Payments** - no interest will be payable on the ULC DIP Facility;
>
> **iii) Fees** -No fees are payable in respect of the ULC DIP Facility;
>
> **iv) Expenses** - The borrowers will pay all reasonable expenses incurred by ULC and Alcoa in connection with the ULC DIP Facility;
>
> **v) Reporting** - Reporting will be similar to that provided under the ACI DIP Facility and copies of all financial information will be placed in the data room. Reporting will include notice of events of default or maturing events of default;
>
> **vi) Use of Proceeds**- The ULC DIP Facility will be used for general corporate

purposes in material compliance with the 13-week cash flow forecasts to be provided no less frequently than the first Friday of each month (the **Budget**);

vii) Events of Default - The events of default include the following:

(a) Substantial non-compliance with the Budget;
(b) Termination of the *CCAA* Stay of Proceedings;
(c) Failure to file a *CCAA* Plan with the Court by September 30, 2010; and
(d) Withdrawal of the existing Securitization Program unless replaced with a reasonably similar facility;

viii) Rights of Alcoa - Alcoa will receive all reporting noted above and notices of events of default. Alcoa's consent is required for any amendments or waivers;

ix) Rights of Senior Secured Noteholders - The Senior Secured Noteholders' rights consist of:

(a) Receiving all reporting noted above and any notice of an Event of Default;
(b) Consent of Senior Secured Noteholders holding a majority of the principal amount of the Senior Secured Notes is required for any amendments to the maximum amount of the ULC DIP Facility or any change to the Outside Maturity Date or the interest rate;
(c) Upon an Event of Default, there is no right to accelerate payment or maturity, subject to the right to apply to Court for the termination of the ULC DIP Facility, which right is without prejudice to the right of ACI, ACCC, the ULC or Alcoa to oppose such application;
(d) Entitlement to review draft of documents, but final approval of such documents is in Alcoa's sole discretion; and
(e) Entitlement to request the approval of the Court to amend any monthly cash flow budget which has been filed;

x) Security - Security is similar to the existing ACI DIP Facility and ranking immediately after the existing ACI DIP Charge. There are no charges on the assets of the Chapter 11 Debtors (as defined in the existing ACI DIP Facility).

20 [20] The Monitor notes that the ULC DIP Facility will provide the ACI Group with additional net liquidity (after the retirement of the ACI DIP Facility and after the payment of the proposed

distribution to the SSNs) in the amount of some CDN$167 million.

THE QUESTIONS AT ISSUE

21 [21] In light of this background, the Court must answer the following questions:

> [1] Should the ULC DIP Facility of CDN$230 million be approved?
>
> [2] Should the proposed distribution of CDN$200 million to the SSNs be authorized?
>
> [3] Is the wording of the orders sought appropriate, notably with regard to the additions proposed by the Bondholders in terms of the future steps to be taken by the Abitibi Petitioners?

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

1) THE APPROVAL OF THE DIP FINANCING

22 [22] In the Court's opinion, the second DIP financing, that is, the ULC DIP Facility of CDN$230 million, should be approved on the amended terms agreed upon by the numerous parties involved.

23 [23] In this restructuring, the Court has already approved DIP financing in respect of both the Abitibi Petitioners and the Bowater Petitioners.

24 [24] On April 22, 2009, it issued a Recognition Order (U.S. Interim DIP Order) recognizing an Interim Order of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for a DIP loan of up to US$206 million to the Bowater Petitioners. On May 6, 2009, it approved the ACI DIP Facility, a US$100 million loan to the Abitibi Petitioners by Bank of Montreal (**"BMO"**), guaranteed by IQ.

25 [25] The jurisdiction of the Court to approve DIP financing and the requirement of the Abitibi Petitioners for such were canvassed at length in the May 6 Judgment. The requirements of the Abitibi Petitioners for liquidity and the authority of the Court to approve agreements to satisfy those requirements have already been reviewed and ruled upon.

26 [26] There have been no circumstances intervening since the approval of the ACI DIP Facility that can fairly be characterized as negating the requirement of the Abitibi Petitioners for DIP financing.

27 [27] The only issue here is whether this particular ULC DIP Facility proposal, replacing as it does the prior ACI DIP Facility, is one that the Court ought to approve. As indicated earlier, the

answer is yes.

28 [28] At this stage in the proceedings where the phase of business stabilization is largely complete, the Court is not required to approach the subject of DIP financing from the perspective of excessive caution or parsimony.

29 [29] On the one hand, as highlighted notably by the Monitor[6], the Abitibi Petitioners have presented substantial reasons to support their need for liquidity by way of a DIP loan. Suffice it to note to that end that:

a) Without an adequate cushion, in view of potential adverse exchange rate fluctuations and further adverse price declines in the market, the Abitibi Petitioners' liquidity could easily be insufficient to meet the requirements of its Securitization Program (Monitor's 19th Report at paragraphs 49, 50 and chart at paragraph 61);
b) Absent a DIP loan, there is, in fact, a high risk of default under the Securitization Program (Monitor's 19th Report at paragraph 32);
c) Despite Abitibi Petitioners' best efforts at forecasting, weekly cash flow forecasts have varied by as much as US$26 million. Weekly disbursements have varied by 100%. Each 14 variation in the foreign exchange rate as against the US dollar could produce a US$17 million negative cash flow variation. The ultimate cash flow requirements will be highly dependent on variables that the Abitibi Petitioners' cannot control (Monitor's 19th Report at paragraphs 54, 60 and 61);
d) The market decline has eroded the Abitibi Petitioners' liquidity, while foreign exchange fluctuations are placing further strain on this liquidity. Even if prices increase, the resulting need for additional working capital to increase production will paradoxically put yet further strain on this liquidity;
e) Without the ULC DIP Facility, the Abitibi Petitioners would lack access to sufficient operating credit to maintain normal operations. They would be significantly impaired in their ability to operate in the ordinary course and they would face an increase in the risk of unexpected interruptions; and
f) The Abitibi Petitioners have yet to complete their business plan and it is premature to predict the length of the proceedings (Monitor's 19th Report at paragraphs 47 and 48).

30 [30] In fact, based upon its sensitivity analysis, the inter-month variability of the cash flows, the minimum liquidity requirements under the Securitization Program, and the requirement to repay the ACI DIP Facility, the Monitor is of the view that the Abitibi Petitioners need the new ULC DIP Facility to ensure that ACI has sufficient liquidity to complete its restructuring.

31 [31] On the other hand, the reasonableness of the amount of the ULC DIP Facility is supported by the following facts:

(a) Only about CDN$168 million of incremental liquidity is being provided and post-transaction, the Abitibi Petitioners will have, at best, about CDN$335 million of liquidity (Monitor's 19th Report at paragraph 68);

(b) The Bowater Petitioners, a group of the same approximate size as the Abitibi Petitioners, enjoy liquidity of approximately US$400 million (Monitor's 19th Report at paragraph 69) and a DIP facility of approximately US$200 million;

(c) Even with the ULC DIP Facility, the Abitibi Petitioners will be at the low end of average relative to their peers in terms of available liquidity relative to their size;

(d) The cash flow of the Abitibi Petitioners is subject to significant intra-month variations and has risks associated with pricing and currency fluctuations which are larger the longer the period examined; and

(e) The Abitibi Petitioners are required by the Securitization Facility to maintain liquidity on a rolling basis above US$100 million.

32 [32] In addition, the Court and the stakeholders have all the means necessary at their disposal to monitor the use of liquidity without, at the same time, having to ration its access at a level far below that enjoyed by the peers with whom the Abitibi Petitioners compete.

33 [33] In this regard, it is important to emphasize that the ULC DIP Facility includes, after all, particularly interesting conditions in terms of interest payments and associated fees. Because ULC is the lender, none are payable.

34 [34] Finally, the provisions of section 11.2 of the amended *CCAA*, and in particular the factors for review listed in subsection 11.2(4), are instructive guidelines to the exercise of the Court's discretion to approve the ULC DIP Facility.

35 [35] Pursuant to subsection 11.2(4) of the amended *CCAA*, for restructurings undertaken after September 18, 2009, the judge is now directed to consider the following factors in determining whether to exercise his or her discretion to make an order such as this one:

(a) The period during which the company is expected to be subject to *CCAA* proceedings;
(b) How the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the

proceedings;

(c) Whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
(d) Whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made;
(e) The nature and value of the company's property;
(f) Whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
(g) The Monitor's report.

36 [36] Applying these criteria to this case, it is, first, premature to speculate how long the Abitibi Petitioners will remain subject to proceedings under the *CCAA*.

37 [37] The Monitor's 19th Report has considered cash flow forecasts until December 2010. The Abitibi Petitioners are hopeful of progressing to a plan outline by year-end with a view to emergence in the first or second quarter of 2010.

38 [38] In considering a DIP financing proposal, the Court can take note of the fact that the time and energies ought, at this stage in the proceedings, to be more usefully and profitably devoted to completing the business restructuring, raising the necessary exit financing and negotiating an appropriate restructuring plan with the stakeholders.

39 [39] Second, even if the ULC DIP Facility of CDN$230 million is a high, albeit reasonable, figure under the circumstances, access to the funds and use of the funds remain closely monitored.

40 [40] Based on the compromise reached with the Term Lenders, access to the funds will be progressive and subject to control. The initial draw is limited to CDN$130 million. Subsequent additional draws up to CDN$50 million will be in maximum increments of CDN$25 million and subject to prior notice. The final CDN$50 million will only be available with the Court's approval.

41 [41] As well, the use of the funds is subject to considerable safeguards as to the interests of all stakeholders. These include the following:

(a) The Monitor is on site monitoring and reviewing cash flow sources and uses in real time with full access to senior management, stakeholders and the Court;
(b) Stakeholders have very close to real time access to financial information regarding sources and use of cash flow by reason of the weekly cash flow forecasts provided to their financial advisors and the weekly calls with such financial advisors, participated in by senior management;
(c) The Monitor provides regular reporting to the Court including as to the tracking of variances in cash use relative to forecast and as to evolution of the business environment in which the Abitibi Petitioners are operating; and
(d) All stakeholders have full access to this Court to bring such motions as they see fit should a material adverse change in the business or affairs intervene.

42 [42] Third, there has been no suggestion that the management of the Abitibi Petitioners has lost the confidence of its major creditors. To the contrary:

a) Management has successfully negotiated a settlement of very complex and thorny issues with both the Term Lenders and the SSNs, which has enabled this ULC DIP Motion to be brought forward with their support;
b) While management does not agree with all positions taken by the Bondholders at all times, it has by and large enjoyed the support of that group throughout these proceedings;
c) Management has been attentive to the suggestions and guidance of the Monitor with the result that there have been few if any instances where the Monitor has been publicly obliged to oppose or take issue with steps taken;
d) Management has been proactive in hiring a Chief Restructuring Officer who has provided management with additional depth and strength in navigating through difficult circumstances; and
e) The Abitibi Petitioners' management conducts regular meetings with the financial advisors of their major stakeholders, in addition to having an "open door" policy.

43 [43] The Court is satisfied that, in requesting the approval of the ULC DIP Facility, management is doing so with a broad measure of support and the confidence of its major creditor constituencies.

44 [44] Fourth, with an adequate level of liquidity, the Abitibi Petitioners will be able to run their business as a going concern on as normal a basis as possible, with a view to enhancing and preserving its value while the restructuring process proceeds.

45 [45] By facilitating a level of financial support that is reasonable and adequate and of sufficient duration to enable them to complete the restructuring on most reasonable assumptions, the Abitibi Petitioners will have the benefit of an umbrella of stability around their core business operations.

46 [46] In the Court's opinion, this can only facilitate the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being found.

47 [47] Fifth, there are only two secured creditor groups of the Abitibi Petitioners: the SSNs and the Term Lenders. After long and difficult negotiations, they finally agreed to an acceptable wording to the orders sought. no one argues any longer that it is prejudiced in any way by the proposed security or charge.

48 [48] Lastly, sixth, the Monitor has carefully considered the positions of all of the stakeholders as well as the reasonableness of the Abitibi Petitioners' requirements for the proposed ULC DIP Facility. Having reviewed both the impact of the proposed ULC DIP Facility on stakeholders and its

beneficial impact upon the Abitibi Petitioners, the Monitor recommends approval of the ULC DIP Facility.

49 [49] On the whole, in approving this ULC DIP Facility, the Court supports the very large consensus reached and the fine balance achieved between the interests of all stakeholders involved.

2) THE DISTRIBUTION TO THE SSNs

50 [50] The approval of the terms of the ULC DIP Facility by the SSNs is intertwined with the Abitibi Petitioners' agreement to support a distribution in their favor in the amount of CDN$200 million.

51 [51] The Abitibi Petitioners and the SSNs consider that since the MPCo proceeds were and are subject to the security of the SSNs, this arrangement or compromise is a reasonable one under the circumstances.

52 [52] They submit that the proposed distribution will be of substantial benefit to the Abitibi Petitioners. Savings of at least CDN$27.4 million per year in accruing interest costs on the CDN$200 million to be distributed will be realized based on the 13.75% interest rate payable to the SSNs.

53 [53] Needless to say, they maintain that the costs saved will add to the potential surplus value of SSNs' collateral that could be utilized to compensate any creditor whose security may be impaired in the future in repaying the ULC DIP Facility.

54 [54] The Bondholders oppose the CDN$200 million distribution to the SSNs.

55 [55] In their view, given the Abitibi Petitioners' need for liquidity, the proposed payment of substantial proceeds to one group of creditors raises important issues of both propriety and timing. It also brings into focus the need for the *CCAA* process to move forward efficiently and effectively towards the goal of the timely negotiation and implementation of a plan of arrangement.

56 [56] The Bondholders claim that the proposed distribution violates the *CCAA*. From their perspective, nothing in the statute authorizes a distribution of cash to a creditor group prior to approval of a plan of arrangement by the requisite majorities of creditors and the Court. They maintain that the SSNs are subject to the stay of proceedings like all other creditors.

57 [57] By proposing a distribution to one class of creditors, the Bondholders contend that the other classes of creditors are denied the ability to negotiate a compromise with the SSNs. Instead of bringing forward their proposed plan and creating options for the creditors for negotiation and voting purposes, the Abitibi Petitioners are thus eliminating bargaining options and confiscating the other creditors' leverage and voting rights.

58 [58] Accordingly, the Bondholders conclude that the proposed distribution should not be

considered until after the creditors have had an opportunity to negotiate a plan of arrangement or a compromise with the SSNs.

59 [59] In the interim, they suggest that the Abitibi Petitioners should provide a business plan to their legal and financial advisors by no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 27, 2009. They submit that a restructuring and recapitalization term sheet on terms acceptable to them and their legal and financial advisors should also be provided by no later than 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2009.

60 [60] With all due respect for the views expressed by the Bondholders, the Court considers that, similarly to the ULC DIP Facility, the proposed distribution should be authorized.

61 [61] To begin with, the position of the Bondholders is, under the circumstances, untenable. While they support the CDN$230 million ULC DIP Facility, they still contest the CDN$200 million proposed distribution that is directly linked to the latter.

62 [62] The Court does not have the luxury of picking and choosing here. What is being submitted for approval is a global solution. The compromise reached must be considered as a whole. The access to additional liquidity is possible because of the corresponding distribution to the SSNs. The amounts available for both the ULC DIP Facility and the proposed distribution come from the same MPCo sale transaction.

63 [63] The compromise negotiated in this respect, albeit imperfect, remains the best available and viable solution to deal with the liquidity requirements of the Abitibi Petitioners. It follows a process and negotiations where the views and interests of most interested parties have been canvassed and considered.

64 [64] To get such diverse interest groups as the Abitibi Petitioners, the SSNs, the Term Lenders, BMO and IQ, and ULC and Alcoa to agree on an acceptable outcome is certainly not an easy task to achieve. Without surprise, it comes with certain concessions.

65 [65] It would be very dangerous, if not reckless, for the Court to put in jeopardy the ULC DIP Facility agreed upon by most stakeholders on the basis that, perhaps, a better arrangement could eventually be reached in terms of distribution of proceeds that, on their face, appear to belong to the SSNs.

66 [66] The Court is satisfied that both aspects of the ULC DIP Motion are closely connected and should be approved together. To conclude otherwise would potentially put everything at risk, at a time where stability is most required.

67 [67] Secondly, it remains that ACCC's interest in MPCo is subject to the SSNs' security. As such, all proceeds of the sale less adjustments, holdbacks and reserves should normally be paid to the SSNs. Despite this, provided they receive the CDN$200 million proposed distribution, the SSNs have consented to the sale proceeds being used by the Abitibi Petitioners to pay the existing ACI

DIP Facility and to the ULC Reserve being used up to CDN$230M for the ULC DIP Facility funding.

68 [68] It is thus fair to say that the SSNs are not depriving the Abitibi Petitioners of liquidity; they are funding part of the restructuring with their collateral and, in the end, enhancing this liquidity.

69 [69] The net proceeds of the MPCo transaction after payment of the ACI DIP Facility are expected to be CDN$173.9 million. Accordingly, out of a CDN$200 million distribution to the SSNs, only CDN$26.1 million could technically be said to come from the ULC DIP Facility. Contrary to what the Bondholders alluded to, if minor aspects of the claims of the SSNs are disputed by the Abitibi Petitioners, they do not concern the CDN$200 million at issue.

70 [70] Thirdly, the ULC DIP Facility bears no interest and is not subject to drawdown fees, while a distribution of CDN$200 million to the SSNs will create at the same time interest savings of approximately CDN$27 million per year for the ACI Group. There is, as a result, a definite economic benefit to the contemplated distribution for the global restructuring process.

71 [71] Despite what the Bondholders argue, it is neither unusual nor unheard of to proceed with an interim distribution of net proceeds in the context of a sale of assets in a *CCAA* reorganization. Nothing in the *CCAA* prevents similar interim distribution of monies. There are several examples of such distributions having been authorized by Courts in Canada[7].

72 [72] While the SSNs are certainly subject to a stay of proceedings much like the other creditors involved in the present *CCAA* reorganization, an interim distribution of net proceeds from the sale of an asset subject to the Court's approval has never been considered a breach of the stay.

73 [73] In this regard, the Bondholders have no economic interest in the MPCo assets and resulting proceeds of sale that are subject to a first ranking security interest in favor of the SSNs. Therefore, they are not directly affected by the proposed distribution of CDN$200 million.

74 [74] In *Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd.* (Re)[8], Morawetz J. dealt with the opposition of unsecured creditors to an Approval and Distribution Order as follows:

> 13 Although the outcome of this process does not result in any distribution to unsecured creditors, this does not give rise to a valid reason to withhold Court approval of these transactions. I am satisfied that the unsecured creditors have no economic interest in the assets.

75 [75] Finally, even though the Monitor makes no recommendation in respect of the proposed distribution to the SSNs, this can hardly be viewed as an objection on its part. In the first place, this is not an issue upon which the Monitor is expected to opine. Besides, in its 19th report, the Monitor notes the following in that regard:

a) According to its Counsel, the SSNs security on the ACCC's 60% interest in MPCo is valid and enforceable;
b) The amounts owed to the SSNs far exceed the contemplated distribution while the SSNs' collateral is sufficient for the SSNs' claim to be most likely paid in full;
c) The proposed distribution entails an economy of CDN$27 million per year in interest savings; and
d) Even taking into consideration the CDN$200 million proposed distribution, the ULC DIP Facility provides the Abitibi Petitioners with the liquidity they require for most of the coming year.

76 [76] All things considered, the Court disagrees with the Bondholders' assertion that the proposed distribution is against the goals and objectives of the *CCAA*. For some, it may only be a small step. However, it is a definite step in the right direction.

77 [77] Securing the most needed liquidity at issue here and reducing substantially the extent of the liabilities towards a key secured creditor group no doubt enhances the chances of a successful restructuring while bringing stability to the on-going business.

78 [78] This benefits a large community of interests that goes beyond the sole SSNs.

79 [79] From that standpoint, the Court is satisfied that the restructuring is moving forward properly, with reasonable diligence and in accordance with the *CCAA* ultimate goals.

80 [80] Abitibi Petitioners' firm intention, reiterated at the hearing, to shortly provide their stakeholders with a business plan and a restructuring and recapitalization term sheet confirms it as well.

3) THE ORDERS SOUGHT

81 [81] In closing, the precise wording of the orders sought has been negotiated at length between Counsel. It is the result of a difficult compromise reached between many different parties, each trying to protect distinct interests.

82 [82] Nonetheless, despite their best efforts, this wording certainly appears quite convoluted in some cases, to say the least. The proposed amendment to the subrogation provision of the Second Amended Initial Order is a vivid example. Still, the mechanism agreed upon, however complicated it might appear to some, remains acceptable to all affected creditors.

83 [83] The delicate consensus reached in this respect must not be discarded lightly. In view of the role of the Court in *CCAA* proceedings, that is, one of judicial oversight, the orders sought will thus be granted as amended, save for limited exceptions. To avoid potential misunderstandings, the Court felt necessary to slightly correct the specific wording of some conclusions. The orders granted reflect this.

84 [84] Turning to the conclusions proposed by the Bondholders at paragraphs 8 to 11 of the draft amended order (now paragraphs 6 to 9 of this Order), the Court considers them useful and appropriate. They assist somehow in bringing into focus the need for this *CCAA* process to continue to move forward efficiently.

85 [85] Minor adjustments to some of the wording are, however, required in order to give the Abitibi Petitioners some flexibility in terms of compliance with the ULC DIP documents and cash flow forecast.

86 [86] For the expected upcoming filing by the Abitibi Petitioners of their business plan and restructuring and recapitalization term sheet, the Court concludes that simply giving act to their stated intention is sufficient at this stage. The deadlines indicated correspond to the date agreed upon by the parties for the business plan and to the expected renewal date of the Initial Order for the restructuring and recapitalization term sheet.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

ULC DIP Financing

87 [1] **ORDERS** that the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized and empowered to enter into, obtain and borrow under a credit facility provided pursuant to a loan agreement (the "**ULC DIP Agreement**") among ACI, as borrower, and 3239432 Nova Scotia Company, an unlimited liability company ("**ULC**"), as lender (the "**ULC DIP Lender**"), to be approved by Alcoa acting reasonably, which terms will be consistent with the ULC DIP Term Sheet communicated as **Exhibit R-1** in support of the ULC DIP Motion, subject to such non-material amendments and modifications as the parties may agree with a copy thereof being provided in advance to the Monitor and to modifications required by Alcoa, acting reasonably, which credit facility shall be in an aggregate principal amount outstanding at any time not exceeding **$230** million.

88 [2] **ORDERS** that the credit facility provided pursuant to the ULC DIP Agreement (the "**ULC DIP**") will be subject to the following draw conditions:

(d) a first draw of $130 million to be advanced at closing;
(e) subsequent draws for a maximum total amount of $50 million in increments of up to $25 million to be advanced upon a five (5) business day notice and in accordance with paragraph 61.11 of the Second Amended Initial Order which shall apply mutatis mutandis to advances under the ULC DIP; and
(f) the balance of $50 million shall become available upon further order of the Court.

At the request of the Borrower, all undrawn amounts under the ULC DIP shall either (i) be transferred to the Monitor to be held in an interest bearing account for the benefit of the Borrower providing that any requests for advances thereafter shall continue to be made and processed in

accordance herewith as if the transfer had not occurred, or (ii) be invested by ULC in an interest bearing account with all interest earned thereon being for the benefit of and remitted to the Borrower forthwith following receipt thereof.

89 [3] **ORDERS** the Petitioners to communicate a draft of the substantially final ULC DIP Agreement (the "**Draft ULC DIP Agreement**") to the Monitor and to any party listed on the Service List which requests a copy of same (an "**Interested Party**") no later than five (5) days prior to the anticipated closing of the MPCo Transaction, as said term is defined in the ULC DIP Motion.

90 [4] **ORDERS** that any Interested Party who objects to any provisions of the Draft ULC DIP Agreement as not being substantially in accordance with the terms of the ULC DIP Term Sheet, Exhibit R-1, or objectionable for any other reason, shall, before the close of business of the day following delivery of the Draft ULC DIP Agreement, make a request for a hearing before this Court stating the grounds upon which such objection is based, failing which the Draft ULC DIP Agreement shall be considered to conform to the ULC DIP Term Sheet and shall be deemed to constitute the ULC DIP Agreement for the purposes of this Order.

91 [5] **ORDERS** that the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized and empowered to execute and deliver the ULC DIP Agreement, subject to the terms of this Order and the approval of Alcoa, acting reasonably, as well as such commitment letters, fee letters, credit agreements, mortgages, charges, hypothecs and security documents, guarantees, mandate and other definitive documents (collectively with the ULC DIP Agreement, the "**ULC DIP Documents**"), as are contemplated by the ULC DIP Agreement or as may be reasonably required by the ULC DIP Lender pursuant to the terms thereof, and the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized and directed to pay and perform all of their indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to the ULC DIP Lender under and pursuant to the ULC DIP Documents as and when same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

92 [6] **ORDERS** that the Abitibi Petitioners shall substantially comply with the terms and conditions set forth in the ULC DIP Documents and the 13-week cash flow forecast (the "Budget") provided to the financial advisors of the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party.

93 [7] **ORDERS** that, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the ULC DIP Documents, the Abitibi Petitioners shall use the proceeds of the ULC DIP substantially in compliance with the Budget, that the Monitor shall monitor the ongoing disbursements of the Abitibi Petitioners under the Budget, and that the Monitor shall forthwith advise the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party of the Monitor's understanding of any pending or anticipated substantial non-compliance with the Budget and/or any other pending or anticipated event of default or termination event under any of the ULC DIP Documents.

94 [8] **GIVES ACT** to the Abitibi Petitioners of their stated intention to provide a business plan to the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party by

no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 27, 2009.

95 [9] **GIVES ACT** to the Abitibi Petitioners of their stated intention to provide a restructuring and recapitalization term sheet (the "Recapitalization Term Sheet") to the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party by no later than 5:00 p.m. on December 15, 2009.

96 [10] **ORDERS** that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, the Abitibi Petitioners shall pay to the ULC DIP Lender when due all amounts owing (including principal, interest, fees and expenses, including without limitation, all fees and disbursements of counsel and all other advisers to or agents of the ULC DIP Lender on a full indemnity basis (the "**ULC DIP Expenses**") under the ULC DIP Documents and shall perform all of their other obligations to the ULC DIP Lender pursuant to the ULC DIP Documents and this Order.

97 [11] **ORDERS** that the claims of the ULC DIP Lender pursuant to the ULC DIP Documents shall not be compromised or arranged pursuant to the Plan or these proceedings and the ULC DIP Lender, in such capacity, shall be treated as an unaffected creditor in these proceedings and in any Plan or any proposal filed by any Abitibi Petitioner under the *BIA*.

98 [12] **ORDERS** that the ULC DIP Lender may, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order or the Initial Order:

(c) take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to register, record or perfect the ACI DIP Charge and the ULC DIP Documents in all jurisdictions where it deems it to be appropriate; and

(d) upon the occurrence of a Termination Event (as each such term is defined in the ULC DIP Documents), refuse to make any advance to the Abitibi Petitioners and terminate, reduce or restrict any further commitment to the Abitibi Petitioners to the extent any such commitment remains, set off or consolidate any amounts owing by the ULC DIP Lender to the Abitibi Petitioners against any obligation of the Abitibi Petitioners to the ULC DIP Lender, make demand, accelerate payment or give other similar notices, or to apply to this Court for the appointment of a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or for a bankruptcy order against the Abitibi Petitioners and for the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy of the Abitibi Petitioners, and upon the occurrence of an event of default under the terms of the ULC DIP Documents, the ULC DIP Lender shall be entitled to apply to the Court to seize and retain proceeds from the sale of any of the Property of the Abitibi Petitioners and the cash flow of the Abitibi Petitioners to repay amounts owing to the ULC DIP Lender in accordance with the ULC DIP Documents and the ACI DIP Charge.

99 [13] **ORDERS** that the foregoing rights and remedies of the ULC DIP Lender shall be enforceable against any trustee in bankruptcy, interim receiver, receiver or receiver and manager of

the Abitibi Petitioners or the Property of the Abitibi Petitioners, the whole in accordance with and to the extent provided in the ULC DIP Documents.

100 [14] **ORDERS** that the ULC DIP Lender shall not take any enforcement steps under the ULC DIP Documents or the ACI DIP Charge without providing five (5) business day (the "**Notice Period**") written enforcement notice of a default thereunder to the Abitibi Petitioners, the Monitor, the Senior Secured Noteholders, Alcoa, the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party. Upon expiry of such Notice Period, and notwithstanding any stay of proceedings provided herein, the ULC DIP Lender shall be entitled to take any and all steps and exercise all rights and remedies provided for under the ULC DIP Documents and the ACI DIP Charge and otherwise permitted at law, the whole in accordance with applicable provincial laws, but without having to send any notices under Section 244 of the *BIA*. For greater certainty, the ULC DIP Lender may issue a prior notice pursuant to Article 2757 *CCQ* concurrently with the written enforcement notice of a default mentioned above.

101 [15] **ORDERS** that, subject to further order of this Court, no order shall be made varying, rescinding, or otherwise affecting paragraphs 61.1 to 61.9 of the Initial Order, the approval of the ULC DIP Documents or the ACI DIP Charge unless either (a) notice of a motion for such order is served on the Petitioners, the Monitor, Alcoa, the Senior Secured Noteholders and the ULC DIP Lender by the moving party and returnable within seven (7) days after the party was provided with notice of this Order in accordance with paragraph 70(a) hereof or (b) each of the ULC DIP Lender and Alcoa applies for or consents to such order.

102 [16] **ORDERS** that 3239432 Nova Scotia Company is authorized to assign its interest in the ULC DIP to Alcoa pursuant to the security agreements and guarantees to be granted pursuant to the Implementation Agreement and this Court's Order dated September 29, 2009.

103 [17] **AMENDS** the Initial Order issued by this Court on April 17, 2009 (as amended and restated) by adding the following at the end of paragraph 61.3:

> "**ORDERS** further, that from and after the date of closing of the MPCo Transaction (as said term is defined in the Petitioners' ULC DIP Motion dated November 9, 2009) and provided the principal, interest and costs under the ACI DIP Agreement (as defined in the Order of this Court dated May 6, 2009), are concurrently paid in full, the ACI DIP Charge shall be increased by the aggregate amount of **$230** million (subject to the same limitations provided in the first sentence hereof in relation to the Replacement Securitization Facility) and shall be extended by a movable and immovable hypothec, mortgage, lien and security interest on all property of the Abitibi Petitioners (other than the property of Abitibi Consolidated (U.K.) Inc.) in favour of the ULC DIP Lender for all amounts owing, including principal, interest and ULC DIP Expenses and all obligations required to be performed under or in connection with the ULC DIP

Documents. The ACI DIP Charge as so increased shall continue to have the priority established by paragraphs 89 and 91 hereof provided such increased ACI DIP Charge (being the portion of the ACI DIP Charge in favour of the ULC DIP Lender) shall in all respects be subordinate (i) to the subrogation rights in favour of the Senior Secured Noteholders arising from the repayment of the ACI DIP Lender from the proceeds of the sale of the MPCo transaction as approved by this Court in its Order of September 29, 2009 and as confirmed by paragraph 11 of that Order, notwithstanding the amendment of paragraph 61.10 of this Order by the subsequent Order dated November 16, 2009, as well as the further subrogation rights, if any, in favour of the Term Lenders; and (ii) rights in favour of the Term Lenders arising from the use of cash for the payment of interest fees and accessories as determined by the Monitor. no order shall have the effect of varying or amending the priority of the ACI DIP Charge and the interest of the ULC DIP Lender therein without the consent of the Senior Secured Noteholders and Alcoa. The terms "ULC DIP Lender", "ULC DIP Documents", "ULC DIP Expenses", "Senior Secured Noteholders" and "Alcoa" shall be as defined in the Order of this Court dated November 16, 2009. Notwithstanding the subrogation rights created or confirmed herein, in no event shall the ULC DIP Lender be subordinated to more than approximately $40 million, being the aggregate of the proceeds of the MPCo Transaction paid to the ACI DIP Lender plus the interest, fees and expenses paid to the ACI DIP Lender as determined by the Monitor."

ACI DIP Agreement

104 [18] **ORDERS** that the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized to make, execute and deliver one or more amendment agreements in connection with the ACI DIP Agreement providing for (i) an extension of the period during which any undrawn portion of the credit facility provided pursuant to the ACI DIP Agreement shall be available and (ii) the modification of the date upon which such credit facility must be repaid from November 1, 2009 to the earlier of the closing of the MPCo Transaction and December 15, 2009, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the ACI DIP Agreement, save and except for non-material amendments.

Senior Secured Notes Distribution

105 [19] **ORDERS** that the Abitibi Petitioners are authorized and directed to make a distribution to the Trustee of the Senior Secured Notes in the amount of $200 million upon completion of the MPCo Transaction (as said term is defined in the ULC DIP Motion) from the proceeds of such sale and of the ULC DIP Facility, providing always that the ACI DIP is repaid in full upon completion of the MPCo Transaction.

106 [20] **ORDERS** that, subject to completion of the ULC DIP (including the initial draw of $130 million thereunder) and providing always that the ACI DIP is repaid in full upon completion

of the MPCo Transaction, the distribution referred to in the preceding paragraph and the flow of funds upon completion of the MPCo Transaction and the ULC DIP shall be arranged in accordance with the following principles: (a) MPCo Proceeds shall be used, first, to fund the distribution to the Senior Secured Notes referenced in the previous paragraph and, secondly, to fund the repayment of the ACI DIP; (b) the initial draw of $130 million made under the ULC DIP shall fund any remaining balance due to repay in full the ACI DIP and this, upon completion of the MPCo Transaction. The Monitor shall be authorized to review the completion of the MPCo Transaction, the ULC DIP and the repayment of the ACI DIP and shall report to the Court regarding compliance with this provision as it deems necessary.

Amendment to the Subrogation Provision

107 [21] **ORDERS** that Subsection 61.10 of the Initial Order, as amended and restated, is replaced by the following:

> **Subrogation to ACI DIP Charge**
>
> [61.10] **ORDERS** that the holders of Secured Notes, the Lenders under the Term Loan Facility (collectively, the "**Secured Creditors**") and McBurney Corporation, McBurney Power Limited and MBB Power Services Inc. (collectively, the "**Lien Holder**") that hold security over assets that are subject to the ACI DIP Charge and that, as of the Effective Time, was opposable to third parties (including a trustee in bankruptcy) in accordance with the law applicable to such security (an "**Impaired Secured Creditor**" and "**Existing Security**", respectively) shall be subrogated to the ACI DIP Charge to the extent of the lesser of (i) any net proceeds from the Existing Security including from the sale or other disposition of assets, resulting from the collection of accounts receivable or other claims (other than Property subject to the Securitization Program Agreements and for greater certainty, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the ACI DIP Charge shall in no circumstances extend to any assets sold pursuant to the Securitization Program Agreements, any Replacement Securitization Facility or any assets of ACUSFC, the term "Replacement Securitization Facility" having the meaning ascribed to same in Schedule A of the ACI DIP Agreement) and/or cash that is subject to the Existing Security of such Impaired Secured Creditor that is used directly to pay (a) the ACI DIP Lender or (b) another Impaired Secured Creditor (including by any means of realization) on account of principal, interest or costs, in whole or in part, as determined by the Monitor (subject to adjudication by the Court in the event of any dispute) and (ii) the unpaid amounts due and/or becoming due and/or owing to such Impaired Secured Creditor that are secured by its Existing Security. For this purpose "**ACI DIP Lender**" shall be read to include Bank of Montreal, IQ,

the ULC DIP Lender and their successors and assigns, including any lender or lenders providing replacement DIP financing should same be approved by subsequent order of this Court. no Impaired Secured Creditor shall be able to enforce its right of subrogation to the ACI DIP Charge until all obligations to the ACI DIP Lender have been paid in full and providing that all rights of subrogation hereunder shall be postponed to the right of subrogation of IQ under the IQ Guarantee Offer, and, for greater certainty, no subrogee shall have any rights over or in respect of the IQ Guarantee Offer. In the event that, following the repayment in full of the ACI DIP Lender in circumstances where that payment is made, wholly or in part, from net proceeds of the Existing Security of an Impaired Secured Creditor (the "**First Impaired Secured Creditor**"), such Impaired Secured Creditor enforces its right of subrogation to the ACI DIP Charge and realizes net proceeds from the Existing Security of another Impaired Secured Creditor (the "**Second Impaired Secured Creditor**"), the Second Impaired Secured Creditor shall not be able to enforce its right of subrogation to the ACI DIP Charge until all obligations to the First Impaired Secured Creditor have been paid in full. In the event that more than one Impaired Secured Creditor is subrogated to the ACI DIP Charge as a result of a payment to the ACI DIP Lender, such Impaired Secured Creditors shall rank pari passu as subrogees, rateably in accordance with the extent to which each of them is subrogated to the ACI DIP Charge. The allocation of the burden of the ACI DIP Charge amongst the assets and creditors shall be determined by subsequent application to the Court if necessary."

[21.1] **DECLARES** that for the purposes of paragraphs 1, 5, 10, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of the present Order, the term "Abitibi Petitioners" shall not include Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc. added to the schedule of Abitibi Petitioners by Order of this Court on November 10, 2009;

108 [22] **ORDERS** the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security.

109 [23] **WITHOUT COSTS**.

CLÉMENT GASCON, J.S.C.

* * * * *

SCHEDULE "A"

ABITIBI PETITIONERS

1. **ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED INC.**
2. **ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED COMPANY OF CANADA**
3. **3224112 NOVA SCOTIA LIMITED**
4. **MARKETING DONOHUE INC.**
5. **ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED CANADIAN OFFICE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS INC.**
6. **3834328 CANADA INC.**
7. **6169678 CANADA INC.**
8. **4042140 CANADA INC.**
9. **DONOHUE RECYCLING INC.**
10. **1508756 ONTARIO INC.**
11. **3217925 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY**
12. **LA TUQUE FOREST PRODUCTS INC.**
13. **ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED NOVA SCOTIA INCORPORATED**
14. **SAGUENAY FOREST PRODUCTS INC.**
15. **TERRA NOVA EXPLORATIONS LTD.**
16. **THE JONQUIERE PULP COMPANY**
17. **THE INTERNATIONAL BRIDGE AND TERMINAL COMPANY**
18. **SCRAMBLE MINING LTD.**
19. **9150-3383 QUÉBEC INC.**
20. **ABITIBI-CONSOLIDATED (U.K.) INC.**

SCHEDULE "B"

BOWATER PETITIONERS

[1] BOWATER CANADIAN HOLDINGS INC.

[2] BOWATER CANADA FINANCE CORPORATION

[3] BOWATER CANADIAN LIMITED

[4] 3231378 NOVA SCOTIA COMPANY

[5] ABITIBIBOWATER CANADA INC.

[6] BOWATER CANADA TREASURY CORPORATION

[7] BOWATER CANADIAN FOREST PRODUCTS INC.

[8] BOWATER SHELBURNE CORPORATION

[9] BOWATER LAHAVE CORPORATION

[10] ST-MAURICE RIVER DRIVE COMPANY LIMITED

[11] BOWATER TREATED WOOD INC.

[12] CANEXEL HARDBOARD INC.

[13] 9068-9050 QUÉBEC INC.

[14] ALLIANCE FOREST PRODUCTS (2001) INC.

[15] BOWATER BELLEDUNE SAWMILL INC.

[16] BOWATER MARITIMES INC.

[17] BOWATER MITIS INC.

[18] BOWATER GUÉRETTE INC.

[19] BOWATER COUTURIER INC.

SCHEDULE "C"

18.6 CCAA PETITIONERS

[1] ABITIBIBOWATER INC.

[2] ABITIBIBOWATER US HOLDING 1 CORP.

[3] BOWATER VENTURES INC.

[4] BOWATER INCORPORATED

[5] BOWATER NUWAY INC.

[6] BOWATER NUWAY MID-STATES INC.

[7] CATAWBA PROPERTY HOLDINGS LLC

[8] BOWATER FINANCE COMPANY INC.

[9] BOWATER SOUTH AMERICAN HOLDINGS INCORPORATED

[10] BOWATER AMERICA INC.

[11] LAKE SUPERIOR FOREST PRODUCTS INC.

[12] BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH LLC

[13] BOWATER NEWSPRINT SOUTH OPERATIONS LLC

[14] BOWATER FINANCE II, LLC

[15] BOWATER ALABAMA LLC

[16] COOSA PINES GOLF CLUB HOLDINGS LLC

CORRECTED JUDGMENT

ON RE-AMENDED MOTION FOR THE APPROVAL OF A SECOND DIP FINANCING AND FOR DISTRIBUTION OF CERTAIN PROCEEDS OF THE MPCo SALE TRANSACTION TO THE TRUSTEE FOR THE SENIOR SECURED NOTES (#312)

WHEREAS the Abitibi Petitioners and the Term Lenders have requested the Court to issue this Corrected Judgment so as to clarify that it does not apply to Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc., a Petitioner that was added to the schedule of Abitibi Petitioners by Order of this Court rendered on November 10, 2009, namely after the ULC DIP Motion was argued but before the related Judgment of the Court was rendered on November 16, 2009;

WHEREAS the request is justified to avoid any misunderstanding as to the exact scope of this Court's Judgment;

WHEREAS a small correction to paragraph [17] of the conclusions and the addition of a new paragraph [21.1] are necessary to that end;

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:

ULC DIP Financing

ORDERS that the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized and empowered to enter into, obtain and borrow under a credit facility provided pursuant to a loan agreement (the "**ULC DIP Agreement**") among ACI, as borrower, and 3239432 Nova Scotia Company, an unlimited liability company ("**ULC**"), as lender (the "**ULC DIP Lender**"), to be approved by Alcoa acting reasonably, which terms will be consistent with the ULC DIP Term Sheet communicated as **Exhibit R-1** in support of the ULC DIP Motion, subject to such non-material amendments and modifications as the parties may agree with a copy thereof being provided in advance to the Monitor and to modifications required by Alcoa, acting reasonably, which credit facility shall be in an aggregate principal amount outstanding at any time not exceeding **$230** million.

ORDERS that the credit facility provided pursuant to the ULC DIP Agreement (the "**ULC**

DIP") will be subject to the following draw conditions:

(d) a first draw of $130 million to be advanced at closing;
(e) subsequent draws for a maximum total amount of $50 million in increments of up to $25 million to be advanced upon a five (5) business day notice and in accordance with paragraph 61.11 of the Second Amended Initial Order which shall apply mutatis mutandis to advances under the ULC DIP; and
(f) the balance of $50 million shall become available upon further order of the Court.

At the request of the Borrower, all undrawn amounts under the ULC DIP shall either (i) be transferred to the Monitor to be held in an interest bearing account for the benefit of the Borrower providing that any requests for advances thereafter shall continue to be made and processed in accordance herewith as if the transfer had not occurred, or (ii) be invested by ULC in an interest bearing account with all interest earned thereon being for the benefit of and remitted to the Borrower forthwith following receipt thereof.

ORDERS the Petitioners to communicate a draft of the substantially final ULC DIP Agreement (the "**Draft ULC DIP Agreement**") to the Monitor and to any party listed on the Service List which requests a copy of same (an "**Interested Party**") no later than five (5) days prior to the anticipated closing of the MPCo Transaction, as said term is defined in the ULC DIP Motion.

ORDERS that any Interested Party who objects to any provisions of the Draft ULC DIP Agreement as not being substantially in accordance with the terms of the ULC DIP Term Sheet, Exhibit R-1, or objectionable for any other reason, shall, before the close of business of the day following delivery of the Draft ULC DIP Agreement, make a request for a hearing before this Court stating the grounds upon which such objection is based, failing which the Draft ULC DIP Agreement shall be considered to conform to the ULC DIP Term Sheet and shall be deemed to constitute the ULC DIP Agreement for the purposes of this Order.

ORDERS that the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized and empowered to execute and deliver the ULC DIP Agreement, subject to the terms of this Order and the approval of Alcoa, acting reasonably, as well as such commitment letters, fee letters, credit agreements, mortgages, charges, hypothecs and security documents, guarantees, mandate and other definitive documents (collectively with the ULC DIP Agreement, the "**ULC DIP Documents**"), as are contemplated by the ULC DIP Agreement or as may be reasonably required by the ULC DIP Lender pursuant to the terms thereof, and the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized and directed to pay and perform all of their indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to the ULC DIP Lender under and pursuant to the ULC DIP Documents as and when same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

ORDERS that the Abitibi Petitioners shall substantially comply with the terms and conditions set forth in the ULC DIP Documents and the 13-week cash flow forecast (the "Budget")

provided to the financial advisors of the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party.

ORDERS that, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the ULC DIP Documents, the Abitibi Petitioners shall use the proceeds of the ULC DIP substantially in compliance with the Budget, that the Monitor shall monitor the ongoing disbursements of the Abitibi Petitioners under the Budget, and that the Monitor shall forthwith advise the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party of the Monitor's understanding of any pending or anticipated substantial non-compliance with the Budget and/or any other pending or anticipated event of default or termination event under any of the ULC DIP Documents.

GIVES ACT to the Abitibi Petitioners of their stated intention to provide a business plan to the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party by no later than 5:00 p.m. on November 27, 2009.

GIVES ACT to the Abitibi Petitioners of their stated intention to provide a restructuring and recapitalization term sheet (the "Recapitalization Term Sheet") to the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party by no later than 5:00 p.m. on December 15, 2009.

ORDERS that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, the Abitibi Petitioners shall pay to the ULC DIP Lender when due all amounts owing (including principal, interest, fees and expenses, including without limitation, all fees and disbursements of counsel and all other advisers to or agents of the ULC DIP Lender on a full indemnity basis (the "**ULC DIP Expenses**") under the ULC DIP Documents and shall perform all of their other obligations to the ULC DIP Lender pursuant to the ULC DIP Documents and this Order.

ORDERS that the claims of the ULC DIP Lender pursuant to the ULC DIP Documents shall not be compromised or arranged pursuant to the Plan or these proceedings and the ULC DIP Lender, in such capacity, shall be treated as an unaffected creditor in these proceedings and in any Plan or any proposal filed by any Abitibi Petitioner under the *BIA*.

ORDERS that the ULC DIP Lender may, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order or the Initial Order:

(c) take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to register, record or perfect the ACI DIP Charge and the ULC DIP Documents in all jurisdictions where it deems it to be appropriate; and

(d) upon the occurrence of a Termination Event (as each such term is defined in the ULC DIP Documents), refuse to make any advance to the Abitibi Petitioners and terminate, reduce or restrict any further commitment to the Abitibi Petitioners to the extent any such commitment remains, set off or consolidate any amounts owing by the ULC DIP Lender to the Abitibi Petitioners against any obligation of

> the Abitibi Petitioners to the ULC DIP Lender, make demand, accelerate payment or give other similar notices, or to apply to this Court for the appointment of a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or for a bankruptcy order against the Abitibi Petitioners and for the appointment of a trustee in bankruptcy of the Abitibi Petitioners, and upon the occurrence of an event of default under the terms of the ULC DIP Documents, the ULC DIP Lender shall be entitled to apply to the Court to seize and retain proceeds from the sale of any of the Property of the Abitibi Petitioners and the cash flow of the Abitibi Petitioners to repay amounts owing to the ULC DIP Lender in accordance with the ULC DIP Documents and the ACI DIP Charge.

ORDERS that the foregoing rights and remedies of the ULC DIP Lender shall be enforceable against any trustee in bankruptcy, interim receiver, receiver or receiver and manager of the Abitibi Petitioners or the Property of the Abitibi Petitioners, the whole in accordance with and to the extent provided in the ULC DIP Documents.

ORDERS that the ULC DIP Lender shall not take any enforcement steps under the ULC DIP Documents or the ACI DIP Charge without providing five (5) business day (the "**Notice Period**") written enforcement notice of a default thereunder to the Abitibi Petitioners, the Monitor, the Senior Secured Noteholders, Alcoa, the Notice Parties (as defined in the Second Amended Initial Order) and any Interested Party. Upon expiry of such Notice Period, and notwithstanding any stay of proceedings provided herein, the ULC DIP Lender shall be entitled to take any and all steps and exercise all rights and remedies provided for under the ULC DIP Documents and the ACI DIP Charge and otherwise permitted at law, the whole in accordance with applicable provincial laws, but without having to send any notices under Section 244 of the *BIA*. For greater certainty, the ULC DIP Lender may issue a prior notice pursuant to Article 2757 *CCQ* concurrently with the written enforcement notice of a default mentioned above.

ORDERS that, subject to further order of this Court, no order shall be made varying, rescinding, or otherwise affecting paragraphs 61.1 to 61.9 of the Initial Order, the approval of the ULC DIP Documents or the ACI DIP Charge unless either (a) notice of a motion for such order is served on the Petitioners, the Monitor, Alcoa, the Senior Secured Noteholders and the ULC DIP Lender by the moving party and returnable within seven (7) days after the party was provided with notice of this Order in accordance with paragraph 70(a) hereof or (b) each of the ULC DIP Lender and Alcoa applies for or consents to such order.

ORDERS that 3239432 Nova Scotia Company is authorized to assign its interest in the ULC DIP to Alcoa pursuant to the security agreements and guarantees to be granted pursuant to the Implementation Agreement and this Court's Order dated September 29, 2009.

AMENDS the Initial Order issued by this Court on April 17, 2009 (as amended and restated) by adding the following at the end of paragraph 61.3:

"**ORDERS** further, that from and after the date of closing of the MPCo Transaction (as said term is defined in the Petitioners' ULC DIP Motion dated November 9, 2009) and provided the principal, interest and costs under the ACI DIP Agreement (as defined in the Order of this Court dated May 6, 2009), are concurrently paid in full, the ACI DIP Charge shall be increased by the aggregate amount of **$230** million (subject to the same limitations provided in the first sentence hereof in relation to the Replacement Securitization Facility) and shall be extended by a movable and immovable hypothec, mortgage, lien and security interest on all property of the Abitibi Petitioners (other than the property of Abitibi Consolidated (U.K.) Inc.) in favour of the ULC DIP Lender for all amounts owing, including principal, interest and ULC DIP Expenses and all obligations required to be performed under or in connection with the ULC DIP Documents. The ACI DIP Charge as so increased shall continue to have the priority established by paragraphs 89 and 91 hereof provided such increased ACI DIP Charge (being the portion of the ACI DIP Charge in favour of the ULC DIP Lender) shall in all respects be subordinate (i) to the subrogation rights in favour of the Senior Secured Noteholders arising from the repayment of the ACI DIP Lender from the proceeds of the sale of the MPCo transaction as approved by this Court in its Order of September 29, 2009 and as confirmed by paragraph 11 of that Order, notwithstanding the amendment of paragraph 61.10 of this Order by the subsequent Order dated November 16, 2009, as well as the further subrogation rights, if any, in favour of the Term Lenders; and (ii) rights in favour of the Term Lenders arising from the use of cash for the payment of interest fees and accessories as determined by the Monitor. no order shall have the effect of varying or amending the priority of the ACI DIP Charge and the interest of the ULC DIP Lender therein without the consent of the Senior Secured Noteholders and Alcoa. The terms "ULC DIP Lender", "ULC DIP Documents", "ULC DIP Expenses", "Senior Secured Noteholders" and "Alcoa" shall be as defined in the Order of this Court dated November 16, 2009. Notwithstanding the subrogation rights created or confirmed herein, in no event shall the ULC DIP Lender be subordinated to more than approximately $40 million, being the aggregate of the proceeds of the MPCo Transaction paid to the ACI DIP Lender plus the interest, fees and expenses paid to the ACI DIP Lender as determined by the Monitor."

ACI DIP Agreement

ORDERS that the Abitibi Petitioners are hereby authorized to make, execute and deliver one or more amendment agreements in connection with the ACI DIP Agreement providing for (i) an extension of the period during which any undrawn portion of the credit facility provided pursuant to the ACI DIP Agreement shall be available and (ii) the modification of the date upon which such credit facility must be repaid from November 1, 2009 to the earlier of the closing of the MPCo Transaction and December 15, 2009, subject to the terms and conditions set forth in the ACI DIP

Agreement, save and except for non-material amendments.

Senior Secured Notes Distribution

ORDERS that the Abitibi Petitioners are authorized and directed to make a distribution to the Trustee of the Senior Secured Notes in the amount of $200 million upon completion of the MPCo Transaction (as said term is defined in the ULC DIP Motion) from the proceeds of such sale and of the ULC DIP Facility, providing always that the ACI DIP is repaid in full upon completion of the MPCo Transaction.

ORDERS that, subject to completion of the ULC DIP (including the initial draw of $130 million thereunder) and providing always that the ACI DIP is repaid in full upon completion of the MPCo Transaction, the distribution referred to in the preceding paragraph and the flow of funds upon completion of the MPCo Transaction and the ULC DIP shall be arranged in accordance with the following principles: (a) MPCo Proceeds shall be used, first, to fund the distribution to the Senior Secured Notes referenced in the previous paragraph and, secondly, to fund the repayment of the ACI DIP; (b) the initial draw of $130 million made under the ULC DIP shall fund any remaining balance due to repay in full the ACI DIP and this, upon completion of the MPCo Transaction. The Monitor shall be authorized to review the completion of the MPCo Transaction, the ULC DIP and the repayment of the ACI DIP and shall report to the Court regarding compliance with this provision as it deems necessary.

Amendment to the Subrogation Provision

ORDERS that Subsection 61.10 of the Initial Order, as amended and restated, is replaced by the following:

Subrogation to ACI DIP Charge

> [61.10] **ORDERS** that the holders of Secured Notes, the Lenders under the Term Loan Facility (collectively, the "**Secured Creditors**") and McBurney Corporation, McBurney Power Limited and MBB Power Services Inc. (collectively, the "**Lien Holder**") that hold security over assets that are subject to the ACI DIP Charge and that, as of the Effective Time, was opposable to third parties (including a trustee in bankruptcy) in accordance with the law applicable to such security (an "**Impaired Secured Creditor**" and "**Existing Security**", respectively) shall be subrogated to the ACI DIP Charge to the extent of the lesser of (i) any net proceeds from the Existing Security including from the sale or other disposition of assets, resulting from the collection of accounts receivable or other claims (other than Property subject to the Securitization Program Agreements and for greater certainty, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the ACI DIP Charge shall in no circumstances extend to any assets sold pursuant to the Securitization Program Agreements, any Replacement

Securitization Facility or any assets of ACUSFC, the term "Replacement Securitization Facility" having the meaning ascribed to same in Schedule A of the ACI DIP Agreement) and/or cash that is subject to the Existing Security of such Impaired Secured Creditor that is used directly to pay (a) the ACI DIP Lender or (b) another Impaired Secured Creditor (including by any means of realization) on account of principal, interest or costs, in whole or in part, as determined by the Monitor (subject to adjudication by the Court in the event of any dispute) and (ii) the unpaid amounts due and/or becoming due and/or owing to such Impaired Secured Creditor that are secured by its Existing Security. For this purpose "**ACI DIP Lender**" shall be read to include Bank of Montreal, IQ, the ULC DIP Lender and their successors and assigns, including any lender or lenders providing replacement DIP financing should same be approved by subsequent order of this Court. no Impaired Secured Creditor shall be able to enforce its right of subrogation to the ACI DIP Charge until all obligations to the ACI DIP Lender have been paid in full and providing that all rights of subrogation hereunder shall be postponed to the right of subrogation of IQ under the IQ Guarantee Offer, and, for greater certainty, no subrogee shall have any rights over or in respect of the IQ Guarantee Offer. In the event that, following the repayment in full of the ACI DIP Lender in circumstances where that payment is made, wholly or in part, from net proceeds of the Existing Security of an Impaired Secured Creditor (the "**First Impaired Secured Creditor**"), such Impaired Secured Creditor enforces its right of subrogation to the ACI DIP Charge and realizes net proceeds from the Existing Security of another Impaired Secured Creditor (the "**Second Impaired Secured Creditor**"), the Second Impaired Secured Creditor shall not be able to enforce its right of subrogation to the ACI DIP Charge until all obligations to the First Impaired Secured Creditor have been paid in full. In the event that more than one Impaired Secured Creditor is subrogated to the ACI DIP Charge as a result of a payment to the ACI DIP Lender, such Impaired Secured Creditors shall rank pari passu as subrogees, rateably in accordance with the extent to which each of them is subrogated to the ACI DIP Charge. The allocation of the burden of the ACI DIP Charge amongst the assets and creditors shall be determined by subsequent application to the Court if necessary."

[21.1] **DECLARES** that for the purposes of paragraphs 1, 5, 10, 12, 13, 17 and 18 of the present Order, the term "Abitibi Petitioners" shall not include Abitibi-Consolidated (U.K.) Inc. added to the schedule of Abitibi Petitioners by Order of this Court on November 10, 2009;

ORDERS the provisional execution of this Order notwithstanding any appeal and without the necessity of furnishing any security.

WITHOUT COSTS.

cp/e/qlspt/qlana

1 *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the "***CCAA***").

2 In this Judgment, all capitalized terms not otherwise defined have the meaning ascribed thereto in either: 1) the *Second Amended Initial Order* issued by the Court on May 6, 2009; 2) the *Motion for the Distribution by the Monitor of Certain Proceeds of the MPCo Sale Transaction to U.S. Bank National Association, Indenture and Collateral Trustee for the Senior Secured Noteholders* (the "**Distribution Motion**") of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Senior Secured Noteholders and U.S. Bank National Association, Indenture Trustee for the Senior Secured Notes (respectively, the "**Committee**" and "**Trustee**", collectively the "**SSNs**") dated October 6, 2009; or 3) the Abitibi Petitioners' *Re-Amended Motion for the Approval of a Second DIP Financing in Respect of the Abitibi Petitioners and for the Distribution of Certain Proceeds of the MPCo Sale Transaction to the Trustee for the Senior Secured Notes* (the "**ULC DIP Motion**") dated November 9, 2009.

3 *Re-Amended Motion for the Approval of a Second DIP Financing in Respect of the Abitibi Petitioners and for the Distribution of Certain Proceeds of the MPCo Sale Transaction to the Trustee for the Senior Secured Notes* dated November 9, 2009 (the "**ULC DIP Motion**").

4 See Monitor's 19th Report dated October 27, 2009.

5 See Monitor's 19th Report dated October 27, 2009.

6 See Monitor's 19th Report dated October 27, 2009.

7 See *Re Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd.*, [2009] O.J. No. 3195, 2009 CarswellOnt 4505 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); *Re Rol-Land Farms Limited* (October 5, 2009), Toronto 08-CL-7889 (Ont. Sup. Ct.); and *Re Pangeo Pharma Inc.*, (August 14, 2003), Montreal 500-11-021037-037 (Que. Sup. Ct.).

8 *Re Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd.*, [2009] O.J. No. 3195, 2009 CarswellOnt 4505 (Ont. Sup. Ct.).

TAB 16

Case Name:

Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd. (Re)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C., c. C-36, as Amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Windsor Machine & Stamping Limited, Lipel Investments Ltd., WMSL Holdings Ltd., 442260 Ontario Ltd., Winmach Canada Ltd., Production Machine Services Ltd., 538185 Ontario Ltd., Southern Wire Products Limited, Pellus Manufacturing Ltd., Tilbury Assembly Ltd., St. Clair Forms Inc., Centroy Assembly Ltd., Pioneer Polymers Inc., G&R Cold Forging Inc., Windsor Machine De Mexico, Winmach Inc., Windsor Machine Products, Inc. Wayne Manufacturing Inc. and 383301 Ontario Limited, Applicants

[2009] O.J. No. 3196

55 C.B.R. (5th) 241

2009 CarswellOnt 4471

179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 513

Court File No. CV-08-7672-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

G.B. Morawetz J.

Heard: March 11, 2009.
Judgment: March 11, 2009.
Released: July 28, 2009.

(14 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Proposals -- Motion by Monitor for approval and distribution

order, vesting order relating to sale of personal and real property and approval of Monitor and counsel fees allowed -- Applicants had explored many restructuring options under CCAA proceedings and Monitor ran sale process with no success -- Applicants unable to carry on as structured and proposed orders would preserve business, nominally repay secured creditors and promote efficiency -- Outcome did not result in distribution to unsecured creditors, but they had no economic interest in assets in question -- Records supported requested relief.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36,

Counsel:

Tony Reyes and Evan Cobb, for RSM Richter Inc., Monitor.

Raong Phalavong, for Saginaw Pattern.

Andrew Hatnay, Andrea McKinnon and D. Youkaris, for U.A.W. Local 251.

Joseph Marin, for Windsor Machine & Stamping Ltd.

D. Dowdall and J. Dietrich, for Bank of Montreal.

J. Archibald, for Magna.

John D. Leslie, for Ford Motor Company.

P. Shea, for Johnson Controls Inc.

Jackie Moher, for Ryder Finance Corporation.

ENDORSEMENT

1 G.B. MORAWETZ J.:-- On March 11, 2009, the motion of RSM Richter Inc. was heard and granted with reasons to follow. These are those reasons.

2 RSM Richter Inc., in its capacity as Monitor, brought this motion for:

(a) an Approval and Distribution Order;
(b) a Vesting Order relating to the sale of personal property assets from WMSL to

the Canadian Purchaser;

(c) a Vesting Order relating to the sale of real property from Lipel Investments Ltd. to the Canadian Purchaser;

(d) a Vesting Order relating to the sale of real property from 383301 to the Canadian Purchaser;

(e) an Order approving the fees and disbursements of the Monitor and its counsel.

3 The motion has the support of the Applicants, Bank of Montreal (the "Bank"), Magna, Ford and Johnson Controls. The Union was not opposed to the sale. An unsecured creditor, Saginaw Pattern, objected. Ryder Finance, an unaffected party did not oppose.

4 I am satisfied that the record supports the requested relief. During these CCAA proceedings, the Applicants explored a number of restructuring alternatives. The Monitor also ran a sale process to identify a potential buyer or buyers for the business. The Applicants were unable to implement a restructuring within the current corporate entities and were unable to identify an arm's length buyer of the business that would pay an amount greater than the forced liquidation value of the business. The sale process conducted by the Monitor did not result in any offers being submitted to purchase the Applicants' assets.

5 The Monitor is of the view that the Applicants could not carry on as currently structured. Both the Bank and EDC indicated that they would continue their support for the business and they have had negotiations with the Purchasers and the Applicants, with a view to financing the Purchasers and then working with the Applicants to complete a sale of the business to the Purchasers.

6 The Monitor is of the view that the proposed transactions result in an outcome that preserves the business. The Monitor supports the approval of the transactions described in the Seventh Report.

7 With respect to the Approval and Distribution Order and the three Vesting Orders, these transactions notionally result in the Bank's loans being repaid by the Purchasers (who are being financed by the Bank and EDC) and will permit the business to continue. A portion of the secured debt owing by WMSL to WMSL Holdings Ltd. will be paid by way of a promissory note from the Canadian Purchaser to WMSL Holdings Ltd. The Canadian Purchaser will not have the burden of the remaining secured debt owing to WMSL Holdings Inc., nor the burden of substantial unsecured debt.

8 The Monitor is of the view that the holdbacks described in the Approval and Distribution Order are desirable and appropriate in the circumstances so that goods and services supplied post-filing can be paid, and so that the Union, if it is successful in its claims, can be paid.

9 In addition to the three transactions for which the Vesting Orders are sought, a fourth transaction is covered by the Approval and Distribution Order. The fourth transaction is with respect to personal property owned by two U.S. companies. These companies operate in the State of Michigan. The Applicants did not seek formal recognition of the CCAA proceedings in the United

States. The parties are of the view that the most cost efficient means of completing the transaction with respect to these assets would be for the Bank to take its remedies under the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code, ("UCC") and issue notices of sale under the UCC with respect to the personal property. The Monitor consented to this process and notices were issued by the Bank.

10 It is specifically noted, that notwithstanding anything in the Approval and Distribution Order, Vesting Orders or purchase agreements referenced therein, the purchase orders or releases issued by Magna Structural Systems Inc. and/or Magna Seating of America, Inc. (collectively, "Magna") or Ford Motor Company ("Ford") to WMSL or any other Applicant will be assigned and vested in and to the purchaser, upon the consent of Magna or Ford, as the case may be, to the assignment of such purchase orders and releases being provided to WMSL and the Purchaser on Closing and the Certificate having been filed.

11 Further, nothing in the Approval and Distribution Order or the Vesting Orders made in accordance with such Approval and Vesting Order shall, unless JCI consents, impact or terminate the IP licence or option to purchase assets granted to JCI pursuant to the Accommodation Agreement dated October 24, 2008 and approved by the Order dated October 29, 2008, and the vesting of assets pursuant to Approval and Distribution Order or the Vesting Orders shall, unless JCI otherwise consents, be subject to the IP licence and option in favour of JCI.

12 Finally, it is noted that employee matters are specifically addressed at Article 2.13 of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

13 Although the outcome of this process does not result in any distribution to unsecured creditors, this does not give rise to a valid reason to withhold court approval of these transactions. I am satisfied that the unsecured creditors have no economic interest in the assets.

14 As previously indicated, the record supports the requested relief in all respects. Orders have been signed and issued in the form requested.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

cp/e/qllxr/qlmxb/qlaxw/qlced/qlmlt

TAB 17

Case Name:

PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. (Re)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended;
AND IN THE MATTER OF a plan of compromise or arrangement of PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. and 2163279 Ontario Inc., Applicants

[2012] O.J. No. 2639

2012 ONSC 3367

91 C.B.R. (5th) 285

216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 551

2012 CarswellOnt 7248

Court File No. CV-12-9656-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

D.M. Brown J.

Heard: June 5 and 6, 2012.
Judgment: June 9, 2012.

(69 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Administration of estate -- Distribution of property -- Scheme of distribution -- Sale of property -- Motion for orders approving agreement of purchase and sale and termination of CCAA proceedings allowed -- Successful bidder provided $250,000 to fund applicants' operations until closing and consideration was combination of assumption of secured liabilities, cash and promissory notes -- Secured creditors and Monitor supported orders -- sale and investor solicitation process properly conducted and proposed purchase price fair -- DIP lender and senior secured creditors entered Pari Passu agreement where DIP lender would pay proceeds to senior secured creditors and receive upcoming tax credits -- Bankruptcy most efficient way to

wind up, so $100,000 earmarked for trustee appropriate.

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Claims -- Priority -- Monitors -- Reports -- Sanction by court -- Motion for orders approving agreement of purchase and sale and termination of CCAA proceedings allowed -- Successful bidder provided $250,000 to fund applicants' operations until closing and consideration was combination of assumption of secured liabilities, cash and promissory notes -- Secured creditors and Monitor supported orders -- sale and investor solicitation process properly conducted and proposed purchase price fair -- DIP lender and senior secured creditors entered Pari Passu agreement where DIP lender would pay proceeds to senior secured creditors and receive upcoming tax credits -- Bankruptcy most efficient way to wind up, so $100,000 earmarked for trustee appropriate.

Motion for orders approving the agreement of purchase and sale and termination of CCAA proceedings. The applicants were healthcare and technology companies that encountered financial difficulties in the pre-commercialization phase. The initial order under the CCAA was made in March 2012 and the Monitor worked with the applicants to develop a sale and investor solicitation process, with the DIP lender making a stalking horse bid. Three bids were received and reviewed. One was late and provided no cash consideration and one did not satisfy the requirements of a qualified bid. The successful bid was made by a California-based investment firm and the only bid in the form of a formal asset purchase agreement with a cash deposit. The purchaser provided $250,000 to fund the applicants' operations until the June sixth closing. Consideration was a combination of the assumption of secured liabilities, cash and the issuance of promissory notes to creditors. The applicants planned to distribute $235,315 to employees' statutory priority claims, pay cash to the DIP lender, distribute $261,000 to beneficiaries of KERP charge and pay $100,000 to the proposed trustee for fees. Three creditors had claimed priority to the DIP lender. The purchaser would assume liability for one and the DIP lender had negotiated a Pari Passu agreement with the others. The DIP lender would distribute cash to these creditors on closing and then receiving substantial tax credits coming to the applicant in a few weeks. The senior secured creditors and the Monitor supported the orders.

HELD: Motion allowed. The Monitor was involved at all stages and the SISP process complied with the order. The bids were carefully considered and the proposed purchase price was fair and reasonable. With the payment of employees' statutory claims, s. 6(5)(a) of the CCAA was met. The distribution of sale proceeds was straightforward, other than the validity of one creditor's security in respect of HST refunds. While s. 67 of the Financial Administration Act prohibited transactions assigning Crown debts, the DIP lender would receive these as property of the applicants even if the security was declared ineffective. The DIP lender's charge over the property was created by a court order, not a transaction, and it was open to the DIP lender to agree to pay out the secure creditor. As there were no further funds available for operation, bankruptcy was the most efficient way to wind up, so the proposed payment to the trustee was appropriate.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 6(5)(a), s. 11.2(1), s. 36, s. 36(3), s. 36(7)

Excise Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. E-15,

Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11, s. 67

Counsel:

S. Babe and I. Aversa, for the Applicants.

M. Wasserman and J. MacDonald, for the Monitor, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

J. Porter and A. Shepherd, for 2320714 Ontario Inc., the DIP Lender.

B. O'Neill, for Castcan Investments (secured creditor).

R.M. Slattery, for Royal Bank of Canada (secured creditor).

M. Laugesen and G. Finlayson, for the Successful Bidder, DashRx, LLC.

C. Besant, for Walgreen Co.

A. Scotchmer, for Lanworks Inc.

P. Saunders, a shareholder, for himself and other shareholders.

B. Jaffe, for Merge, a potential bidder.

S-A. Wilson, for Dan Brintnell, a shareholder.

REASONS FOR DECISION

D.M. BROWN J.:--

I. Request for sale approval, vesting and distribution orders under the *CCAA*

1 PCAS Patient Care Automation Services Inc. and 2163279 Ontario Inc. move under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* for orders approving the agreement of purchase and sale between the Applicants and DashRx, LLC ("DashRx") dated May 29, 2012 (the "Purchase

Agreement"), vesting the Purchased Assets in DashRx and distributing the sale proceeds, together with certain other related orders, including the termination of this *CCAA* proceeding.

2 At the continuation of the hearing on June 6, 2012, I granted the requested orders. These are my reasons for so doing.

II. The proposed sale

A. The sales and investor solicitation process

3 The Applicants are healthcare technology companies which were developing an automated pharmacy dispensing platform. They were in the pre-commercialization phase of operations and encountered financing difficulties. The Initial Order under the *CCAA* was made by Morawetz J. on March 23, 2012; it appointed PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. as Monitor.

4 The subsequent history of this matter is set out my previous Reasons.[1]

5 On May 14, 2012, I approved a sale and investor solicitation process ("SISP"). The Applicants developed the SISP with the assistance of the Monitor, the Monitor's agent, PricewaterhouseCoopers Corporate Finance Inc. ("PwCCF") and the DIP Lender. The SISP sought to maximize stakeholder value either through (i) a going concern sale of the Applicants' business and assets or (ii) new investment and a plan of compromise or arrangement. The SISP set out the procedural and substantive requirements for a qualified purchase or investment bid (a "Qualified Bid").

6 A feature of the approved SISP was the DIP Lender's "stalking horse" bid under which the DIP Lender would pay the Stalking Horse Price by a release of the DIP Indebtedness and the assumption of the outstanding senior secured claims. The terms of the Stalking Horse Bid were not required to be emulated in other Qualified Bids; the Stalking Horse Bid served to set a floor price in the SISP. The Stalking Horse Agreement was posted in the Applicants' data-room.

7 The SISP was conducted by the Applicants with the support and assistance of the Monitor. Under the terms of the SISP, bids were due by 12:00 p.m. on May 24, 2012. Two bids, including the DashRx bid, were received before the Bid Deadline, and one further bid was received on May 24, 2012, but after the Bid Deadline. These three bids were reviewed in a series of meetings held by the Applicants, the DIP Lender, the Monitor and their counsel on May 24 and May 25, 2012.

8 In a Confidential Appendix to its Seventh Report the Monitor described the financial terms of each bid and disclosed the materials filed by each bidder, as well as the written communications with each bidder.

B. The Unsuccessful Bids

9 As described in detail in the evidence, the bid submitted by Unsuccessful Bidder 1 was received

the evening of May 24, but provided no cash consideration to the Applicants. On the evening of May 25, 2012, Applicants' counsel sent a letter to Unsuccessful Bidder 1 advising that its bid was not a Qualified Bid and that certain additional details would need to be provided before it could be considered a Qualified Bid. Unsuccessful Bidder 1 did not respond to the request for clarification and its bid was not treated as a Qualified Bid.

10 By letter dated May 23 Unsuccessful Bidder 2 offered to buy PCAS for cash. On May 23 the Applicants wrote to Unsuccessful Bidder 2 about how it would need to alter its bid to satisfy the requirements for a Qualified Bid in the SISP. Notwithstanding follow-up communications, Unsuccessful Bidder 2 did not respond to the Applicants' inquiries until Sunday, May 27, 2012 and it did not provide any material new information. The bid by Unsuccessful Bidder 2 therefore was not treated as a Qualified Bid under the SISP.

C. The Successful Bid

The purchaser

11 DashRx is a Delaware limited liability corporation formed by a large, California-based investment fund to purchase the assets of the Applicants. The fund's Investment Manager has approximately US$500 million in assets under management, almost exclusively in the health care and pharmaceutical sectors.

12 On May 24, 2012, prior to the bid deadline, DashRx submitted a version of the Purchase Agreement. It was the only bid received in the form of a formal asset purchase agreement. DashRx also remitted a cash deposit to the Monitor.

13 The Investment Manager had been performing due diligence and engaging in talks with the Applicants for several months prior to the commencement of the *CCAA* proceedings with an aim to investing in or purchasing PCAS. A major U.S. retail pharmacy chain, Walgreen Co. is participating in the Successful Bid as a substantial investor in DashRx. Walgreen was the potential large U.S. customer identified in previous evidence in this proceeding.

14 The Monitor requested that it be allowed to reveal the name of the Investment Manager; the latter expressed a strong preference that its identity not be disclosed. Against that background the Monitor reported that it had requested independent evidence of the financial position of the Investment Manager:

> [T]he Monitor has received additional information regarding the Investment Manager and is satisfied that the Purchaser should have the financial wherewithal to close the transaction. The Purchaser and Walgreens have shown their commitment by jointly paying the deposit and agreeing to fund the operating needs of the Company to June 6, 2012 (with a cap of $250,000). The Monitor also notes that Walgreens' participation provides another source of financial

support to the Purchaser.

15 By May 27, 2012, following further negotiations and an enhancement of the DashRx bid to permit some recovery for unsecured creditors, the material terms of the DashRx Purchase Agreement were settled to a point that the Applicants, in consultation with the DIP Lender and the Monitor, were prepared to recognize the Purchase Agreement as a Qualified Bid, as a bid superior to the Stalking Horse Bid, and to identify it as the Successful Bid under the SISP, subject to final negotiation of the APA.

16 The Purchase Agreement was finalized, executed and delivered by the parties on June 1, 2012. DashRx committed to provide $250,000 to fund the Applicants' operations from May 31, 2012 until closing on June 6. That funding was received on May 31, 2012.

Purchased and Excluded Assets

17 Under the Purchase Agreement the purchaser will acquire Purchased Assets on an "as is, where is" basis. Certain tax credit entitlements are treated as Excluded Assets.

The purchase price and consideration

18 The consideration payable under the Purchase Agreement is a combination of the assumption of secured liabilities, cash, and the issuance of secured and unsecured convertible promissory notes to the Applicants' creditors, including unsecured creditors. The Applicants do not expect that there will be any surplus proceeds from the transaction for PCAS shareholders.

19 The cash portion of the purchase price is designated for:

(i) distribution in payment of all statutory priority claims, comprised of approximately $235,000 in accrued and unpaid vacation pay;
(ii) distribution to the DIP Lender to be used by the DIP Lender:

a. first, to obtain the consent of the Senior Secured Creditors, RBC and Castcan, to the discharge of their security interests and charges over the Purchased Assets and to obtain their consent for the issuance of an approval and vesting order in respect of the Sale Agreement; and,
b. as to the balance, in partial satisfaction of the DIP Indebtedness;

(iii) payment of the amounts payable under the court-approved key employee retention plan; and
(iv) payment of $100,000 to the Applicants, in trust for a trustee in bankruptcy to be appointed in respect of the Applicants, and the other direct and

indirect subsidiaries of PCAS, to pay for the costs of administering their anticipated bankruptcies

20 The non-cash portion of the purchase price in the transaction will be comprised of:

(i) the assumption of the secured obligations to IBM;
(ii) interest-bearing promissory notes issued in favour of the DIP Lender, secured against the assets of DashRx and ranking junior only to the secured assumed obligations to IBM ("Secured Note"); and,
(iii) interest-bearing unsecured promissory notes issued to the Applicants, in trust, for the pool of unsecured creditors of the Applicants ("Unsecured Note").

21 At the commencement of the hearing on June 5 one unsecured creditor, Lanworks, raised concerns about the lack of transparency regarding the terms of the Unsecured Notes. The details of the terms of the Notes had been placed in the Monitor's Confidential Appendix. Prior to the resumption of the hearing on June 6 Lanworks was provided with information about the terms of the Unsecured Note, as a result of which Lanworks indicated that it neither consented to nor opposed the orders sought. The terms of the Secured and Unsecured Notes were finalized by the time of the continuation of the hearing on June 6.

Proposed releases

22 In its Seventh Report the Monitor noted that under the terms of the Purchase Agreement certain claims against former employees of the Applicants were included in the Purchased Assets and the Agreement required the Applicants to deliver a broad release in favour of the Purchaser and related parties. The Monitor observed that the releases were negotiated as part of the comprehensive arrangements in respect of the transactions contemplated by the Agreement.

Proposed occupancy agreements

23 A condition of the Sale Agreement was that PCAS provided DashRx with post-Closing occupancy and access to the Applicants' leased premises at 2440 Winston Park Drive. DashRx will pay all rent and other occupancy costs and will indemnify the Applicants. The Applicants are seeking approval of, and authorization to enter into, an occupancy agreement with DashRx.

III. The proposed distribution of sale proceeds

24 The Applicants seek an order under which the sale proceeds would be distributed to the following persons or groups:

(i) To use $235,315 to satisfy statutory priority claims relating to employee accrued and unpaid vacation pay claims;
(ii) To pay the cash component of the purchase price to the DIP Lender to be

used by the DIP Lender (i) to obtain the consent of the secured creditors, RBC and Castcan Investments Inc., to discharge their security interests and charges over the Purchased Assets and (ii) as to the balance, to make partial repayment of the DIP Lending Facility;

(iii) To distribute $261,000 to the beneficiaries of the KERP Charge; and,

(iv) To pay $100,000 to PwC, the proposed Trustee in Bankruptcy, for fees in connection with the anticipated bankruptcies of the Applicants.

Payment to the DIP Lender

25 The only parties claiming interests in priority to the DIP Lender are IBM, RBC and Castcan. The Purchaser will assume the liability for IBM. As to RBC and Castcan, at the time the DIP Lending Facility was put in place the DIP Lender negotiated a Pari Passu Agreement with RBC and Castcan. An issue arose concerning the validity of the security taken by Castcan in respect of certain assets, specifically Harmonized Sales Tax Refunds (the "HST Refunds"). I will discuss that issue in more detail below. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the Applicants propose that upon paying out the claims of the Senior Secured Creditors from the cash proceeds received on Closing, the DIP Lender will be subrogated to and/or take an assignment of the Senior Secured Creditor's claims. The Applicants are expected to receive sizable tax credit entitlements within a matter of weeks. Those entitlements are Excluded Assets under the Purchase Agreement. As a result, any claims on them will not be vested out by operation of the proposed Approval and Vesting Order.

26 Against this background the Applicants seek an order authorizing and directing them, and any Trustee, to distribute to the DIP Lender amounts equal to any specified tax credit entitlements received. Such distributions would enable the DIP Lender to recoup part of the purchase price it will flow through to one of the Senior Secured Creditors - Castcan - on Closing.

27 If the aggregate amount of all tax credit entitlements received by the Applicants/Trustee post-Closing and distributed to the DIP Lender end up being less than the aggregate amount that the DIP Lender paid to RBC and Castcan out of the cash proceeds of the Transaction on Closing, then the DIP Lender will be issued an Additional Secured Note to cover the difference. The amount of the Additional Secured Note will come out of the pool of funds otherwise set aside for the unsecured creditors of the Applicants. The Unsecured Note therefore will be less than the total pool of possible proceeds for unsecured creditors, and an additional Unsecured Note will be issued to the Trustee for the benefit of the unsecured creditors once the face amount of the Additional Secured Note is known.

28 Although the DIP Indebtedness is not being paid out in full on Closing, the DIP Lender has consented to the payments of cash on account of the KERP and the future costs of bankruptcy estate administration.

29 Under the Initial Order the Directors' Charge ranked ahead of the KERP Charge. The Applicants asked the Court to terminate the Directors' Charge. Those benefiting from the Directors'

Charge did not oppose that request.

KERP employees

30 The KERP originally benefitted twenty employees and allowed for a total maximum allocation of $500,000. The KERP was to be paid in the following installments: (i) 20% upon the raising of $8,000,000 for funding the DIP Facility, and PCAS receiving the authorization of this Court to borrow up to or in excess of that amount; (ii) 20% at the midway mark of the SISP; and, (iii) the balance of 60% upon the earliest of (i) the closing of a sale of all or substantially all of the assets, property and undertaking of the Applicants, or (ii) Court approval and sanction of a plan of arrangement or compromise in the *CCAA* Proceedings.

31 The commitment under the DIP Facility never reached $8 million, so the initial payment was not made. The second scheduled 20% payment was made on May 25, 2012. Payment of the 60% balance will be made from the cash proceeds on closing. Due to attrition, only sixteen employees remain in the KERP. The final 60% installment payable from the transaction proceeds will total $242,100, resulting in total KERP payments of $322,800.

IV. Positions of the Parties

32 The Senior Secured Creditors supported the orders sought by the Applicants. The Monitor recommended that the Court grant the orders. As noted, one unsecured creditor, Lanworks, sought to obtain further information and, on so doing, advised that it neither consented to nor opposed the orders sought. No other creditors appeared on the return of the motion.

33 The hearing of the motion started at 4:45 p.m. on June 5, 2012. At that time Mr. Peter Saunders, a shareholder, stated that he appeared on behalf of himself and other shareholders. He read a statement which expressed concern about the bidding process, and Mr. Saunders indicated that he and other shareholders would be meeting with counsel at 8:00 a.m. on June 6. Over the opposition of the Applicants and the Purchaser, I adjourned the hearing to June 6 at 10:00 a.m.

34 On June 6 Mr. Saunders returned, but without counsel. Ms. Wilson appeared for the first time on behalf of another shareholder, Mr. Dan Brintnell, and asked to make submissions. Also, Mr. Jaffe appeared on behalf of a potential bidder, Merge, which had not participated in the SISP and asked for leave to submit an offer. What then transpired was described in the following portions of my handwritten endorsement of June 6:

> This is the continuation of the approval/vesting/distribution motion commenced yesterday @ 4:45 p.m. At yesterday's hearing I asked questions of counsel for the applicants, Monitor and DIP lender on certain points and was provided answers.
>
> ...

Yesterday Mr. Peter Saunders, a shareholder, on behalf of himself and some other SHs, read a statement dated June 5/12 expressing concern about the bidding process. Mr. Saunders indicated they would be meeting counsel today @ 8 a.m. I adj'd the matter to 10 a.m. today to facilitate that meeting. This morning Mr. Saunders advised that counsel was unable to meet them; they plan to meet this afternoon. Mr. Saunders indicated that their counsel would like a 5-day adjm't of this motion.

I will not grant the requested adjm't. By reasons dated May 14/12 I approved the SISP. By reasons dated May 28 I granted an extension of the stay until June 6. Both Reasons made clear the urgent nature of the SISP in the particular circumstances of these companies. No appeal was taken from, nor stay sought in respect of, either order. The public portion of the present motion materials provide detailed information about the conduct of the SISP and the bids. The portions sought to be sealed meet the test in *Sierra Club*. From previous motions I am aware that the applicants have communicated frequently with shareholders; the Monitor has posted all materials on its website.

I am satisfied in the circumstances reasonable notice of this motion and the SISP has been given to all affected parties. The shareholders have not previously participated; that was their choice. It is unreasonable for them to seek to adjourn matters at this stage. The applicants run out of money tomorrow; the shareholders offer no concrete alternative.

After writing these Reasons, on my return to Court, I was advised by counsel for Merge that they only learned of the sale process on May 30 and now wish to tender an Offer. I did not accept the Offer. The SISP was an open and transparent process. The OCA in *Soundair* spoke about the need to maintain the integrity of a court-approved sale process.[2] I am not prepared to accept an offer at this late stage. I note [that] Merge did not have counsel at yesterday's hearing.

Ms. Wilson appeared for a SH, Dan Brintnell. After obtaining instructions, Ms. Wilson advised she had no further submissions.

V. Analysis of the proposed sale transaction

A. Guiding legal principles

35 In most circumstances resort is made to the *CCAA* to "permit the debtor to continue to carry on business and, where possible, avoid the social and economic costs of liquidating its assets" and to create "conditions for preserving the *status quo* while attempts are made to find common ground amongst stakeholders for a reorganization that is fair to all". The reality, however, is that "reorganizations of differing complexity require different legal mechanisms." This has led courts to recognize that the *CCAA* may be used to sell substantially all of the assets of a debtor company to preserve it as a going concern under new ownership, or to wind-up or liquidate it.[3]

36 The portions of section 36 of the *CCAA* relevant to this proposed sale to a non-related person are as follows:

> 36. (1) A debtor company in respect of which an order has been made under this Act may not sell or otherwise dispose of assets outside the ordinary course of business unless authorized to do so by a court. Despite any requirement for shareholder approval, including one under federal or provincial law, the court may authorize the sale or disposition even if shareholder approval was not obtained.
>
> (2) A company that applies to the court for an authorization is to give notice of the application to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition.
>
> (3) In deciding whether to grant the authorization, the court is to consider, among other things,
>
> (*a*) whether the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition was reasonable in the circumstances;
>
> (*b*) whether the monitor approved the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition;
>
> (*c*) whether the monitor filed with the court a report stating that in their opinion the sale or disposition would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy;
>
> (*d*) the extent to which the creditors were consulted;
>
> (*e*) the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties; and

> (*f*) whether the consideration to be received for the assets is reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value.

(6) The court may authorize a sale or disposition free and clear of any security, charge or other restriction and, if it does, it shall also order that other assets of the company or the proceeds of the sale or disposition be subject to a security, charge or other restriction in favour of the creditor whose security, charge or other restriction is to be affected by the order.

(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

B. Consideration of the factors

Was notice of the application given to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the proposed sale or disposition?

37 The applicants have satisfied this requirement. The Purchaser will assume the liability owing to IBM Canada. The other two secured creditors, RBC and Castcan, support the proposed transaction.

The reasonableness of the process leading to the proposed sale

38 The SISP was approved by this Court by order made May 14, 2012. In my Reasons of that date I stated:

> Given the extensive efforts to date by management of the applicants to solicit interest in the business and given the liquidity crunch facing the applicants, I was satisfied that the proposed SISP would result, in the specific circumstances of this case, in a fair, transparent and commercially efficacious process which should allow a sufficient opportunity for interested parties to come forward with a superior offer and thereby optimize the chances of securing the best possible price for the assets up for sale or the best possible investment in the continuing operations of the applicants. For those reasons I approved the SISP.[4]

39 Although the applicants took the lead in running the SISP, the evidence disclosed that the Monitor was involved in all stages of the process.

40 Before the commencement of these *CCAA* proceedings, members of the PCAS Board of Directors had engaged in separate dialogues with a significant number of parties who were interested in either investing in the DIP Lender to provide financing to the Applicants, purchasing

the assets of the Applicants, or buying PCAS. During the SISP PCAS, with the assistance of PwCCF and the Monitor, (i) ran an electronic due diligence data-room, (ii) identified 184 potential bidders from around the globe and contacted 164 of them, (iii) developed a "teaser" which was circulated to 121 of the identified parties, as well as a confidential information memorandum which was posted to the data room and sent to the all of the 18 interested parties who had executed a non-disclosure agreement, (iv) conducted site tours at its Premises, with the Monitor in attendance, for seven potential bidders, (v) developed a non-reliance letter for Qualified Bidders to sign in order to be able to review third-party review of the PCAS technology prepared for the Board and facilitated meetings with the authors of the Technology Review at the request of two potential bidders.

41 In its Sixth Report dated May 28, 2012 the Monitor described in detail the steps taken up until that point of time in conducting the SISP. The Monitor provided updated information in its Seventh Report dated June 1, 2012. In its Confidential Appendix to the Seventh Report the Monitor presented detailed, un-redacted information about the bids which were tendered, the resulting communications with the bidders, and its comparative evaluation of the bids.

42 I am satisfied that the SISP run by the Applicants, with the extensive involvement of the Monitor, complied with the terms of the SISP approved in my May 14 Order.

43 As mentioned, on the continuation of the approval hearing on June 6 counsel appeared for a potential bidder, Merge, seeking to submit an offer on behalf of his client. In *Royal Bank of Canada v. Soundair*, in the context of an approval motion for a sale by a court-appointed receiver, Galligan J. considered the approach which a court should take where a second offer was made after a receiver had entered into an agreement of purchase and sale. He cited two judgments by Saunders J. which had held that the court should consider the second offer, if constituting a "substantially higher bid",[5] and Galligan J.A. continued:

> What those cases show is that the prices in other offers have relevance only if they show that the price contained in the offer accepted by the receiver was so unreasonably low as to demonstrate that the receiver was improvident in accepting it. I am of the opinion, therefore, that if they do not tend to show that the receiver was improvident, they should not be considered upon a motion to confirm a sale recommended by a court-appointed receiver. If they were, the process would be changed from a sale by a receiver, subject to court approval, into an auction conducted by the court at the time approval is sought. In my opinion, the latter course is unfair to the person who has entered bona fide into an agreement with the receiver, can only lead to chaos, and must be discouraged.
>
> If, however, the subsequent offer is so substantially higher than the sale recommended by the receiver, then it may be that the receiver has not conducted

> the sale properly. In such circumstances, the court would be justified itself in entering into the sale process by considering competitive bids. However, I think that that process should be entered into only if the court is satisfied that the receiver has not properly conducted the sale which it has recommended to the court.[6]

44 In the present case I departed from the process described in the *Soundair* case and declined to accept Merge's offer for consideration. The facts in *Soundair* are quite distinguishable. In the *Soundair* case the second bidder had secured a court order permitting it to make an offer. By contrast, in the present case the court had approved a SISP which set a May 24, 2012 bid deadline. All other bids complied, or came very close to complying, with that court-approved deadline. Merge contended that it did not learn of the bidding process until May 30, a week after the bid deadline. The prompt posting of all court orders on the Monitor's website, when combined with Merge's delays in pursuing an offer after learning of this proceeding make it completely unreasonable for Merge to expect that a court would grant it leave to submit an offer for consideration. The court-approved SISP would be stood on its head were that allowed.

45 Moreover, as was apparent from the Monitor's detailed narration of the consideration given to the bids which were filed on or just after the court-approved bid deadline, time was spent during the SISP process for discussions amongst the Applicants, the Monitor and the bidders to ascertain whether their bids constituted Qualified Bids. The stay of proceedings in this case was set to expire on June 6, the date Merge came forth in court with its offer. The only cash available for Applicants' operations through to June 6 was the advance of $250,000 by the Purchaser to the Applicants on May 31. The Applicants stated that they would be out of funds by day's end on June 6 or early on June 7. Consequently, there was no realistic prospect that any offer tendered on June 6 could receive a measured consideration while the companies continued to operate.

46 Finally, Merge did not tender its offer at the commencement of the approval motion on June 5. Its counsel made no submissions that day nor signed the counsel sheet. The only reason I adjourned the hearing to June 6 was to afford some shareholders a brief opportunity to consult with counsel. I made it clear on the record on June 5 that hearing from those shareholders was the only order of business for June 6. Merge did not come forth until the resumption of the hearing on June 6. In those circumstances it was difficult to treat Merge's proffer of a bid as a serious one.

47 In sum, the compliance of the Applicants with the court-approved SISP and the unreasonableness of the timing of Merge's offer led me to conclude that the process leading to the proposed sale was reasonable.

Did the Monitor approve the process leading to the proposed sale or disposition?

48 In its Fifth Report dated May 11, 2012 the Monitor recommended approving the SISP.

Did the Monitor file with the court a report stating that in its opinion the sale or disposition

would be more beneficial to the creditors than a sale or disposition under a bankruptcy?

49 In its Seventh Report the Monitor set out at some length its views about the proposed sale transaction:

> The Monitor is of the view that the transaction contemplated by the APA meets the factors set out in section 36(3) of the *CCAA*. As previously described in the Fifth Report and the Sixth Report, the Monitor is of the view that an expedited SISP was likely the only viable process to maximize the value of the Company for the benefit of its stakeholders given the Company's dire liquidity situation.
>
> The APA provides for a going concern sale of the Company's business that maintains some Canadian operations and should allow for some continued employment.
>
> The Company and the DIP Lender developed the SISP in consultation with Monitor and, in the Monitor's view, the Company implemented a fair, transparent and efficient SISP in the circumstances in accordance with the Orders of this Court and the Court's reasons for decision dated May 14, 2012. Given the Company's liquidity situation, the necessity of implementing an expedited SISP and the bids received, it is the Monitor's view that the price obtained for the Company's assets is fair and reasonable in the circumstances. In addition, as reported in the Second Report, the Monitor is of the view that it is unlikely that a Trustee would have been able to appropriately take possession, market and sell the technology, intellectual property and other assets of the Company as a result of the Company having effectively no cash, limited accounts receivable and few unencumbered assets available to be monetized quickly in liquidation.

The Monitor recommended approving the Successful Bid.

To what extent were the creditors consulted?

50 The record disclosed that discussions had taken place with the secured creditors. Appropriate notice was given by the Applicants of all steps taken to seek approval of the DIP Lending Facility, the various extensions of the stay and approval of the SISP. As noted, only one unsecured creditor appeared at the approval hearing and its information questions were answered.

What are the effects of the proposed sale or disposition on the creditors and other interested parties?

51 As summarized by the Monitor in its Seventh Report:

> The APA does not provide for any recovery for the Company's shareholders. The APA provides as follows:
>
> a) statutory priority claims are paid in full in cash.
> b) The beneficiaries of the KERP are to be paid in full and in cash.
> c) The claim of the DIP Lender will be partially satisfied through a combination of cash and interest bearing secured notes convertible at maturity into cash or common shares of the Purchaser.
> d) The Company's unsecured creditors will receive their pro rata share of a pool of interest bearing unsecured notes convertible at maturity into cash or common shares of the Purchaser.
> e) The Company will assume the Assumed Liability [IBM].
>
> In addition, the APA also provides funding for a bankruptcy of the Company or a continuation of the CCAA Proceedings in respect of the Company. As described in further detail below, it is anticipated that the Company will be assigned into bankruptcy and that the entitlement of the unsecured creditors to the unsecured convertible notes will be determined through the statutory claims process provided under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*... It is anticipated that one unsecured note will be provided to a trustee in bankruptcy to be appointed in respect of the Company.

Is the consideration to be received for the assets reasonable and fair, taking into account their market value?

52 In its Seventh Report the Monitor expressed its view that "the price obtained for the Company's assets is fair and reasonable in the circumstances". In the *Soundair* case Galligan J.A. stated:

> At the outset, I think that the fact that the OEL offer was the only acceptable one available to the receiver on March 8, 1991, after ten months of trying to sell the airline, is strong evidence that the price in it was reasonable.[7]

So, too, in this case. Although no valuation was filed in respect of the companies' assets, the evidence filed on previous motions disclosed that the applicants had made efforts for many months prior to initiating *CCAA* proceedings to secure further investment in or the sale of the companies. The state of the companies, and the potential business opportunity they offered, were extensively known. Notwithstanding the short SISP, the Monitor reported that contact was made with a large number of potentially interested parties. Only three bids resulted. Of those three, two were not treated as Qualified Bids. The record, especially the Monitor's Confidential Appendix, supported the selection of the DashRx offer as the Successful Bid. Against the backdrop of those efforts, I

concluded that the proposed purchase price was fair and reasonable.

Does the proposed transaction satisfy the requirements of section 36(7) of the *CCCA*?

53 The applicants did not sponsor a pension plan for its employees. With the payment of the statutory priority claims from the proceeds of sale, obligations under section 6(5)(a) of the *CCAA* will be satisfied.

C. Conclusion

54 In sum, the proposed Purchase Agreement met the specific factors enumerated in section 36(3) of the *CCAA* and, when looked at as a whole in the particular circumstances of this case, represented a fair and reasonable transaction.[8] For those reasons I authorized the proposed Purchase Agreement and granted the vesting order which was sought.

VI. Analysis of the proposed distribution

55 The distribution of the sale proceeds proposed by the Applicants, and supported by the Monitor, was straight-forward, save for one issue - the validity of Castcan's security in respect of HST Refunds.

A. The Castcan security issue described

56 In its Seventh Report the Monitor described the Pari Passu Agreement which the DIP Lender had negotiated with two secured creditors, RBC and Castcan, at the time of putting in place the DIP Lending Facility:

> The Monitor has been advised that the DIP Lender entered into an agreement with Castcan and others, whereby the DIP Lender agreed that its claims against the Company would be subordinate to the claims of Castcan (the "Pari Passu Agreement"). Pursuant to the Pari Passu Agreement, Castcan has the right to be repaid in full before the DIP Lender receives any consideration for the amounts it advanced under the DIP Facility... The Monitor has been advised that the DIP Lender has agreed that its position will also be subordinate to RBC, as provided for in the Initial Order.
>
> Although the Purchaser was willing to assume the liabilities owed to RBC and Castcan, they both advised that they were not willing to become creditors of the Purchaser and wanted to be paid in cash in full on closing. In order to accommodate the secured creditors' requests, the DIP Lender has agreed to pay RBC and Castcan in full in cash from the amount payable to the DIP Lender pursuant to the terms of the APA. As a result of that payment, the DIP Lender

> will be subrogated to or take an assignment of the positions of RBC and Castcan in respect of their validly perfected and secured positions, subject to the lack of clarity in the law in respect of the Castcan Loan and Security discussed below.

57 The lack of clarity in the law in respect of the Castcan Loan stemmed from the assignment of Crown debts, on a full recourse basis, made in the March 6, 2012 Factor Agreement between Castcan and the Applicants. The Crown debts assigned to Castcan included certain Scientific Research and Experimental Development ("SR&ED") refundable tax credit entitlements, Ontario Innovation Tax Credit ("OITC") refunds and harmonized sales tax ("HST") refunds. The Applicants executed a GSA in favour of Castcan to secure the obligations owing to Castcan, including those under the Factor Agreement.

58 Counsel to the Monitor provided an opinion that the assignment of the SR&ED Tax Credits and the OITC Tax Credits under the Factor Agreement was valid and the security granted in each GSA in respect of such assignments was valid and enforceable.

59 Section 67 of the *Financial Administration Act (Canada)*, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11 (the "*FAA*") provides as follows:

> Except as provided in this Act or any other Act of Parliament,
>
> (a) a Crown debt is not assignable; and
> (b) no transaction purporting to be an assignment of a Crown debt is effective so as to confer on any person any rights or remedies in respect of that debt.

In light of that section, counsel to the Monitor advised that the HST Refunds might not be assignable and that the security granted in respect of the HST Refunds might not be valid and enforceable because no provision in the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada) or the *FAA* exempted the HST Refunds from section 67 of the *FAA*.

60 Castcan took the position that certain provisions in the Factor Agreement entitled it, in any event, to receive the HST Refunds. The Monitor commented on part of the argument advanced by Castcan:

> Section 12 of the Factor Agreement provides that if any right or entitlement that, as a matter of law is not assignable, the Company will: (a) co-operate with Castan to provide the benefits of these Non-Assignable Rights to Castcan, including, holding them in trust; (b) enforce any rights of Castcan arising from these Non-Assignable Rights; (c) take all actions to ensure that the value of these Non-Assignable Rights are preserved; and (d) pay over to Castcan all monies collected in respect of these Non-Assignable Rights. One interpretation is that the obligations set out in Section 12 of the Factor Agreement with respect to the HST

> Refunds are enforceable and are secured by the GSAs. Another interpretation is that Section 12 simply gives rise to a claim in equity against the Company and that such an equitable claim may not be secured by the GSAs.
>
> The Monitor is of the view that there is strong argument that Castcan has a claim against the Company for unjust enrichment and, to the extent of such unjust enrichment, a Court may order that a constructive trust applies to the monies advanced by Castcan in respect of the HST Refunds.
>
> Given the provisions of the FAA and existing case law, counsel to the Monitor has advised that it cannot conclude with certainty that the obligations in the Factor Agreement in favour of Castcan with respect to the HST Refunds are secured by the GSAs. Accordingly, the Monitor is of the view that it is unclear whether any payment by the Company to Castcan in respect of the HST Refunds should be made in priority to other creditors.
>
> The Monitor is of the view that the equities clearly favour paying Castcan the full amount owed to it under the Factor Agreement, including the amounts in respect of the HST Refunds. The Monitor notes that Castcan paid $1,000,000 to the Company in good faith on a full recourse basis at a time when the Company was in dire need of liquidity. The vast majority of the amounts paid by Castcan were used to fund the Company's payroll. In the Monitor's view, it would be inequitable for the Company or any of its creditors to get a windfall at the expense of a creditor that provided value to the Company as a result of lack of clarity in the existing law and the wording of the Factor Agreement.

61 The Applicants proposed that upon paying out the claims of the Senior Secured Creditors from the cash proceeds received on closing, the DIP Lender would be subrogated to and/or take an assignment of the Senior Secured Creditor's claims. The Applicants also sought an order which provided, in part, that they, or the proposed Trustee, pay to the DIP Lender any tax credit entitlements received in respect of the HST Refund, notwithstanding section 67 of the *FAA*. The Monitor explained the rationale for this request:

> The DIP Lender is of the view that since there is likely no secondary market for the secured convertible notes, the net present value of the secured convertible notes is less than the face value of such notes. As a result, the DIP Lender is taking the position that the consideration it is receiving is insufficient to satisfy the full amount of the DIP Lender's claim against the Company. The DIP Lender is also of the view that the DIP Lender's Charge should continue to secure the

obligations owing to the DIP Lender as a result of its shortfall after distribution of the proceeds to it on closing of the transaction contemplated by the APA. The Monitor supports the DIP Lender's views.

The DIP Lender is also of the view that the value of the notes should be discounted by an amount that is at least as great as the amount of the HST Refunds in order to permit the proceeds of the HST Refunds once received by the estate to be paid to the DIP Lender on account of its DIP Charge. The Monitor supports the DIP Lender's views with respect to the DIP Lender's Charge. Accordingly, the Monitor is of the view that the DIP Lender's Charge should remain effective over all of the Excluded Assets until such time as such refunds are received and become proceeds of the estate and the DIP Lender is repaid in full.

The parties with an economic interest in the proceeds of the transaction and the Tax Credit Entitlements have agreed to the arrangement with the DIP Lender described above with respect to the HST Refunds. Such an arrangement will permit the DIP Lender to satisfy its obligations under the Pari Passu Agreement while still receiving the consideration that was agreed to be paid to it pursuant to the APA.

B. Legal analysis

62 Section 67 of the *FAA* provides that "no transaction purporting to be an assignment of a Crown debt is effective" except as provided in that Act or any other federal Act. In *Mazetti v. Marzetti* the Supreme Court of Canada held that under section 67 "a purported assignment of a Crown debt is rendered absolutely ineffective, as between debtor and creditor, and as between assignor and assignee."[9] The Court of Appeal, in *Profitt v. A.D. Productions Ltd. (Trustee of)*, held that purported assignments of federal sales tax refunds were invalid.[10]

63 In their factum the Applicants pointed to several cases which they contended might limit the application of the decisions in *Mazetti* and *Profitt*.[11] Castcan had submitted to the Monitor that several provisions of the Factor Agreement operated to give it priority to the HST Refund notwithstanding the *Mazetti* and *Profitt* decisions. I did not need to address those points to decide the motion. Assuming, for purposes of argument, the ineffectiveness of Castcan's security as it related to the HST Refund, that refund would constitute property of the Applicants. Pursuant to the Initial Order the DIP Lender was granted a charge on the "Property" of the Applicants which was defined as the Applicants' "current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof". The "Property" of the applicants included their entitlement to the HST Refund. Accordingly, in the event of a failure of

Castcan's security, the DIP Lender would be entitled to the HST Refund.

64 Section 67 of the *FAA* does not prevent such a result since it only renders ineffective any "*transaction* purporting to be an assignment of a Crown debt". The DIP Lender's Charge created by the Initial Order was not such a "transaction". As the Supreme Court of Canada pointed out in *Bank of Montreal v. i Trade Finance Inc.*, rights which result from a court order are not rights stemming from a "transaction".[12] Section 67 of the *FAA* does not apply to rights created by a court order, including a DIP lending charge granted over all of a company's property pursuant to section 11.2(1) of the *CCAA*.

65 Since the DIP Lender would be entitled to the HST Refund in the event of a defect in Castcan's security, it was open to the DIP Lender to agree, with Castcan, as a matter of contract, that Castcan should receive full payout as contemplated by the Pari Passu Agreement.

66 As to the Applicants' request for an order that they, or the proposed Trustee, pay to the DIP Lender any tax credit entitlements received in respect of the HST Refund, I was satisfied that it was appropriate to exercise my discretion under section 11 of the *CCAA* to make such an order. I accepted the Monitor's view that the DIP Lender was entitled to be repaid in full upon the conclusion of the *CCAA* proceedings and that its charge should continue to secure the obligations to it as a result of the shortfall after distribution of the transaction proceeds. The use of the Secured Note to repay the DIP Lender entails a risk that the DIP Lender might not receive full repayment of its DIP Lending Facility. Consequently, I accepted the Monitor's view that it would be appropriate to discount the value of the note by an amount equal to the HST Refund. Such a result promotes, in part, the remedial purposes of the *CCAA* by ensuring that DIP lenders, whose role often is critical to the successful completion of a re-organization, can advance interim financing with the reasonable assurance of receiving repayment of their DIP loans.

67 As to the distribution of $100,000 of the sales proceeds to fund bankruptcy proceedings involving the Applicants, I accepted the Monitor's view that since no further funds existed to continue the *CCAA* proceedings, a bankruptcy would serve as the most cost effective and efficient way in which to complete the winding-up of the companies' affairs, including establishing a mechanism to determine the quantum for unsecured claims.

68 For those reasons I approved the distribution of the sale proceeds proposed by the Applicants, as well as the related orders terminating the *CCAA* proceedings upon the Monitor filing its discharge certificate and approving the Monitor's Seventh Report and the activities described therein.

VII. Sealing order

69 The information contained in the Confidential Appendix to the Monitor's Seventh Report clearly met the criteria for a sealing order set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*.[13] In order to protect the integrity of the SISP and the proposed sales transaction, I granted

an order that the appendix be sealed until the completion of the Purchase Agreement transaction.

D.M. BROWN J.

cp/e/qlaim/qljxr/qlhcs

1 April 20, 2012 (2012 ONSC 2423); May 5, 2012 (2012 ONSC 2714); May 8 (2012 ONSC 2778); May 14, 2012 (2012 ONSC 2840); May 28, 2012 (2012 ONSC 3147).

2 *Royal Bank v. Soundair* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) 1 (C.A.). See in particular the Reasons of Galligan J.A. at pp. 7d to 10c.

3 See the cases summarized in *First Leaside Wealth Management Inc. (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 1299, para. 32.

4 2012 ONSC 2840, para. 19.

5 *Re Selkirk* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 245 (Ont. Bkcy.); *Re Beauty Counsellors of Canada Ltd.* (1986), 58 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Ont. Bkcy.).

6 *Soundair, supra.*, pp. 9h-10c.

7 *Soundair, supra.*, p. 8g.

8 *White Birch Paper Holding Company*, 2010 QCCS 4915, paras. 48 and 49.

9 [1994] 2 S.C.R. 765, para. 99.

10 (2002), 32 C.B.R. (4th) 94 (O.C.A.), para. 28.

11 *Cargill Ltd. v. Ronald (Trustee of)* (2007), 32 C.B.R. (5th) 169 (Man. C.A.); *McKay & Maxwell, Ltd., Re* (1927), 8 C.B.R. 534 (N.S.S.C.); *Christensen, Re* (1961), 2 C.B.R. (N.S.) 324 (Ont. S.C.); *Front Iron & Metal Co., Re* (1980), 38 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317 (Ont. S.C.).

12 [2011] 2 S.C.R. 360, para. 30. See also, *Torstar Corp. v. ITI Information Technology Institute Inc.* (2002), 36 C.B.R. (4th) 114 (N.S.S.C.), paras. 29 and 32.

13 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522.

TAB 18

Case Name:

Northstar Aerospace, Inc. (Re)

IN THE MATTER OF the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.36, as amended
AND IN THE MATTER OF a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Northstar Aerospace, Inc., Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc., 2007775 Ontario Inc. and 3024308 Nova Scotia Company, Applicants

[2012] O.J. No. 3689

2012 ONSC 4423

91 C.B.R. (5th) 268

2012 CarswellOnt 9607

Court File No. CV-12-9761-00CL

Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Commercial List

G.B. Morawetz J.

Heard: July 24, 2012.
Judgment: July 30, 2012.

(88 paras.)

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Administration of estate -- Sale of property -- Motion by applicants for approval of agreement for sale of assets, vesting order and authorization for Monitor to close transaction and distribute proceeds allowed -- Applicants were under CCAA protection -- There was contamination at applicants' Cambridge site -- Ministry of Environment issue March 15 order imposing remediation obligations and opposed motion -- All financial obligations, including March 15 order, were stayed by CCAA proceedings -- MOE was attempting to use order to create priority it would otherwise not have -- Sale agreement result of broad and comprehensive process and in best interests of applicants' stakeholders.

Bankruptcy and insolvency law -- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) matters -- Compromises and arrangements -- Claims -- Priority -- Crown claims -- Monitors -- Powers, duties and functions -- Sanction by court -- Motion by applicants for approval of agreement for sale of assets, vesting order and authorization for Monitor to close transaction and distribute proceeds allowed -- Applicants were under CCAA protection -- There was contamination at applicants' Cambridge site -- Ministry of Environment issue March 15 order imposing remediation obligations and opposed motion -- All financial obligations, including March 15 order, were stayed by CCAA proceedings -- MOE was attempting to use order to create priority it would otherwise not have -- Sale agreement result of broad and comprehensive process and in best interests of applicants' stakeholders.

Environmental law -- Environmental liability -- Contaminated land -- Site remediation -- Motion by applicants for approval of agreement for sale of assets, vesting order and authorization for Monitor to close transaction and distribute proceeds allowed -- Applicants were under CCAA protection -- There was contamination at applicants' Cambridge site -- Ministry of Environment issue March 15 order imposing remediation obligations and opposed motion -- All financial obligations, including March 15 order, were stayed by CCAA proceedings -- MOE was attempting to use order to create priority it would otherwise not have -- Sale agreement result of broad and comprehensive process and in best interests of applicants' stakeholders.

Motion by the applicants for an order approving the agreement of the sale of assets, vesting order and authorization to the Monitor to close the transaction and distribute the proceeds. The applicants were granted protection under the CCAA in June 2012. The applicants supplied components of commercial and military aerospace needs. The applicants had conducted voluntary remediation activities since the discovery of an environmental contamination at its Cambridge site. When the Ministry of the Environment learned of the applicants' insolvency, it issued the March 15 order, which imposed remediation obligations on the applicants. The applicants had performed monitoring, mitigation and remediation pursuant to the order but advised the MOE that any payments were without prejudice. The TCE contamination was a significant concern to the MOE and municipality as it posed heath risks. The MOE was concerned about the future of remediation efforts as the applicants made no provision for continuing efforts after the close of the transaction. The applicants estimated that fully respecting the order would take 20 years and cost $25 million. The assets being sold in the transaction did not include the Cambridge Facility, which no bidders were interested in. The net proceeds of sale would result in a shortfall but the transaction was still approved by creditors. The DIP lenders would not fund voluntary remediation efforts after the close of the proposed transaction. The MOE argued the March 15 order was a regulatory order and not stayed by the CCAA proceedings, or the stay should be lifted.

HELD: Motion allowed. There was a significant doubt regarding the applicants' ability to continue. The applicants were insolvent and the Cambridge facility had been closed since 2010 and no one was willing to buy it. The purpose of the March 15 order was to attempt to require the applicants to

comply with financial obligations that were in conflict with the priorities enjoyed by other creditors. The applicants' financial obligations were stayed by the initial CCAA order and this included the March 15 order. The MOE was entitled to file a claim against the applicants for the costs of remediation but was not entitled to use the March 15 order to create a priority it would not otherwise have. The sales agreement was the result of a broad and comprehensive marketing process and the applicants had complied with the terms of the sales process order. The Monitor supported the agreement and consideration being received for the assets was fair. The creditors were adequately consulted and the effects of the transaction were positive. If the transaction was not approved, a creditor with a superior priority position to the MOE would seek to enforce its rights, so there would be no assets left. The transaction was in the best interests of the applicants' stakeholders. The transaction was approved and the MOE's efforts to enforce the order were stayed. The Monitor was authorized to make distributions to the DOP lenders and other lenders in accordance with their legal priorities.

Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C.36, s. 6(4), s. 6(5), s. 11.1(2), s. 11.1(3), s. 11.1(4), s. 11.1(8), s. 11.1(9), s. 36(3), s. 36(7)

Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5, s. 91(21), s. 92(3), s. 92(16)

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 109

Environmental Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19,

Counsel:

A.J. Taylor and K. Esaw, for the Applicants.

Craig J. Hill, for Ernst & Young Inc., Court-Appointed Monitor.

D.S. Grieve, for Heligear Canada.

A. Dale, for CAW-Canada.

G. Moffat, for Chief Restructuring Officer.

J.L. Wall, for Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario as Represented by the Ministry of the Environment.

R. Brookes, for the Region of Waterloo.

S. Weisz, L. Rogers and J. Willis, for Fifth Third Bank as Pre-filing Agent and DIP Lender.

W.P. Meagher, for the Corporation of the City of Cambridge.

R.M. Slattery, for 180 Market Portfolio.

M. Jilesen, for General Electric Canada.

C. Prophet, for Boeing Capital Loan Corporation.

S. Pickens - U.S. Counsel for Fifth Third Bank, by phone.

ENDORSEMENT

G.B. MORAWETZ J.:--

OVERVIEW

1 Northstar Aerospace, Inc. ("Northstar Inc."), Northstar Aerospace (Canada) Inc. ("Northstar Canada"), 2007775 Ontario Inc. and 3024308 Nova Scotia Company (collectively, the "CCAA Entities") brought this motion for:

(a) approval of an agreement dated June 14, 2012 (the "Heligear Agreement") between Northstar Inc. and Northstar Canada (together, the "Canadian Vendors"), Northstar Aerospace (U.S.A.) Inc. ("Northstar USA") and other Northstar U.S. entities, (collectively, the U.S. Vendors", and together with the Canadian Vendors, the "Vendors") and Heligear Acquisition Co. (the "U.S. Purchaser") and Heligear Canada Acquisition Corporation (the "Canadian Purchaser" and, together with the U.S. Purchaser, "Heligear") for the sale of the Purchased Assets (the "Heligear Transaction");

(b) a vesting order of all of the Canadian Purchased Assets in the Canadian Purchaser free and clear of all encumbrances and interests, other than Canadian permitted encumbrances;

(c) if necessary, assigning the rights and obligations of the Canadian Vendors under the Canadian Assumed Contracts to the Canadian Purchasers; and

(d) authorization and directions to the Monitor, on closing of the Heligear Transaction, to distribute cash or cash equivalents from the proceeds of the Heligear Transaction in an amount equal to the outstanding DIP obligations owing under the DIP Agreement to the DIP Agent for the DIP Lenders (defined below).

2 The CCAA Entities applied for and were granted protection under the *Companies' Creditors*

Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") pursuant to an Initial Order of this court dated June 14, 2012 (the "Initial Order"). Ernst & Young Inc. was appointed as Monitor (the "Monitor") of the CCAA Entities and FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI Consulting") was appointed Chief Restructuring Officer ("CRO") of the CCAA Entities.

3 Certain of Northstar Canada's direct and indirect U.S. subsidiaries (the "Chapter 11 Entities") commenced insolvency proceedings (the "Chapter 11 Proceedings") pursuant to Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on June 14, 2012 in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court"). The CCAA Entities and the Chapter 11 Entities are sometimes collectively referred to herein as "Northstar".

4 Argument on the motion was heard in two parts. In the morning, argument was heard on Canadian only issues. In the afternoon, argument was heard on Northstar issues in a cross-border hearing with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware. The cross-border hearing was held in accordance with the provisions of the previously approved Cross-Border Protocol between the U.S. Court and this court.

5 The motion for approval of the Heligear Transaction was opposed by the Ministry of the Environment ("MOE"), GE Canada, the Region of Waterloo and the City of Cambridge.

6 At the conclusion of argument, a brief oral endorsement was issued approving the Heligear Transaction, with reasons to follow. These are the reasons.

FACTS

7 Northstar supplies components and assemblies for the commercial and military aerospace markets, and provides related services. Northstar provides goods and services to customers all over the world, including military defence suppliers Boeing, Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation and AgustaWestland Ltd., as well as the U.S. army. Northstar's products are used in the Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters, Boeing AH-64 Apache helicopters, Sikorsky UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters, AgustaWestland Links/Wildcat helicopters, the Boeing F-22 Raptor Fighter aircraft and various other helicopters and aircraft.

8 Northstar owns and leases operating facilities in the United States and Canada. In addition, Northstar owns a dormant facility located at 695 Bishop Street North in Cambridge, Ontario (the "Cambridge Facility").

9 The Cambridge Facility has been non-operational since April 2010, when Northstar Canada closed it to focus on its core business of manufacturing aerospace gears and transmissions.

10 Operations at the Cambridge Facility historically involved the use of industrial solvents, including trichloroethylene ("TCE").

11 In 2004, Northstar Canada notified the MOE of potential environmental contamination at the Cambridge Facility including TCE. Additional investigations determined that the contamination had migrated from beneath the Cambridge Facility to beneath nearby homes. In response, Northstar Canada has spent in excess of $20 million for environmental testing and remediation at and near the Cambridge Facility through April 2012.

12 A separate contamination source, not attributable to Northstar Canada or its operations, has also been identified near the Cambridge Facility. This second source is known as the Borg-Warner Site. GE Canada is the corporate successor to Borg-Warner Canada Inc.

13 Since the discovery of the environmental condition at the Cambridge Facility in 2004, Northstar has conducted remediation activities, on a voluntary basis, including after the granting of the Initial Order, with the consent of the DIP Lenders.

14 On March 15, 2012, an Ontario MOE director (the "Director"), pursuant to powers under the *Environmental Protection Act*, issued Order Number 6076-8RJRUP (the "March 15 Order") to Northstar Inc. and Northstar Canada. The March 15 Order was issued as a direct result of the MOE's concerns regarding Northstar Canada's solvency.

15 The purpose of the March 15 Order was stated as "to ensure the potential adverse effects from TCE and hexavalent chromium impacted groundwater to human health and the environment continues to be monitored, mitigated and remediated where necessary".

16 The March 15 Order requires Northstar to undertake the following activities, among others:

(a) the operation of a laboratory and retention of a professional engineer to supervise the laboratory, which will operate to prepare, complete and/or supervise the work set out in the March 15 Order;
(b) the creation and implementation of an indoor air monitoring protocol, with annual assessment reports submitted to the MOE;
(c) continued:

(i) operation and monitoring of the indoor air mitigation systems ("IAMS") voluntarily installed by Northstar Canada prior to the issuance of the March 15 Order;
(ii) operation and monitoring of the soil vapour extraction systems ("SVES") voluntarily installed by Northstar prior to the issuance of the March 15 Order;
(iii) operation and maintenance of a pump and treat system;
(iv) groundwater remediation on or around the Cambridge Facility;
(v) groundwater and surface water monitoring;

(d) the submission of detailed annual assessment reports regarding the measures described above and, on the direction of the MOE, installation of such additional systems and adoption of such additional reporting requirements as may be required by the MOE; and

(e) submission of an updated interim remedial action plan to the MOE and, upon approval, implementation of same, with bi-annual updated plans unless otherwise advised by the MOE.

17 These obligations and others are fully set out at pages 8-19 of the March 15 Order.

18 On May 31, 2012, the Director issued a further order, Order Number 2066-8UQP82, (the "May 31 Order", and together with the March 15 Order, the "Director's Orders") ordering Northstar Inc. and Northstar Canada to provide financial assurance in the amount of $10,352,906 by certified cheque payable to the Ontario Ministry of Finance or irrevocable Letter of Credit issued by a Canadian chartered bank by June 6, 2012 to fund the measures contemplated by the March 15 Order.

19 Northstar has continued to perform monitoring, mitigation and remediation activities contemplated by the March 15 Order to the extent it was permitted to do so under the Initial Order. In addition, the CCAA Entities, with the consent of the DIP Lenders, have sought and obtained authorization to pay the utility payments associated with the IAMS. The CCAA Entities, however, advised the MOE that any payment of utility payments by the CCAA Entities was without prejudice to their position that the Director's Orders were stayed by the Initial Order and did not constitute an admission that the CCAA Entities were obligated to make or continue to make such payments - and further that they were not committed to continue making such payments.

20 The concerns raised by the MOE, the Region of Waterloo and the City of Cambridge are significant. TCE is a carcinogen. The effects of TCE were described in the affidavit filed by Dr. Liana Nolan, the Medical Officer of Health ("MOH") for the Regional Municipality of Waterloo. Chronic effects of exposure to TCE, other than cancer, are less well understood but potential effects include those to the central nervous system, kidney, liver, respiratory, developmental and reproductive systems.

21 TCE vapour has migrated into the basements of many homes from the groundwater beneath those homes.

22 To reduce TCE vapour intrusion to more acceptable levels, there are 59 homes that have subslab depressurization systems and 93 homes that are serviced by soil vapour extraction units. These systems were installed and are operated by Northstar. In addition, Northstar has attempted to reduce the extent and concentration of the TCE contamination in the groundwater beneath the Bishop Street community through the installation and operation of a groundwater pump and treat system.

23 Dr. Nolan is of the opinion that Northstar's remediation plan should continue in order to protect the health of residents of the Bishop Street community. It is also her opinion that discontinuing the current pump and treat system will result in increased levels and concentrations of TCE contamination. It is also her belief that discontinuing the operation and maintenance of the indoor air mitigation systems (soil vapour extraction units and subslab depressurization systems) will result in increased levels of TCE vapours in affected homes and will expose residents to undue and increased health risks.

24 The materials filed by the MOE describe a number of other environmental issues, which to date have been monitored:

* Ongoing groundwater monitoring by Northstar Canada
* Continued indoor air monitoring and mitigation
* Ongoing surface water monitoring - the Grand River
* Ongoing drinking water monitoring

25 The MOE is justifiably concerned about the future of the remediation efforts as Northstar Canada has made no provision for the continuation of its investigation, monitoring, mitigation and remediation of TCE contamination after the close of the Heligear Transaction.

26 Essentially, if the monitoring, mitigation and remediation of TCE contamination is discontinued as a result of the Heligear Transaction, there will be, according to the MOE and Dr. Nolan, the City of Cambridge and the Region of Waterloo, a significant public health issue.

27 The CCAA Entities take the position that the March 15 Order requires extensive further remediation steps and they estimate that fully responding to it would require a minimum expenditure of $25 million over the next 20 years.

28 As detailed in the affidavit filed on the initial application, the CCAA Entities have been facing severe liquidity issues for many months and are unable to meet various financial and other covenants with their secured lenders and do not have the liquidity to meet their ongoing pre-filing obligations.

29 Since late 2011, Northstar has issued press releases discussing, among things, concerns about its ability to continue as a going concern.

30 After a comprehensive marketing process conducted with the assistance of Harris Williams Inc. ("Harris Williams"), on June 14, 2012, the Canadian Vendors and Heligear entered into the Heligear Agreement for the sale of substantially all of Northstar's assets (the "Heligear Transaction").

31 The assets to be purchased by Heligear do not include the Cambridge Facility and related assets. It is apparent that during the Sales Process, no bidder that expressed an interest in the assets

of Northstar was willing to purchase or expressed any interest in purchasing the non-operating Cambridge Facility, either on its own or together with the other assets of Northstar.

32 Two significant credit facilities have security over the property of the CCAA Entities.

33 In 2010, the CCAA Entities entered into a $66 million secured credit agreement (the "Credit Facility") between certain of the CCAA and Chapter 11 Entities and Fifth Third Bank ("Fifth Third") and other lenders (collectively, the "Lenders").

34 The Monitor has found the security related to the Credit Facility to be valid, perfected and enforceable.

35 In the Initial Order, the court approved a Debtor-in-Possession Facility (the "DIP Facility") under which Fifth Third, as the DIP Agent, and other lenders (together, the "DIP Lenders"), agreed to provide up to a principal amount of $3 million to finance the CCAA Entities' working capital requirements and other general corporate purposes and capital expenditures. A court-ordered charge over the CCAA Entities' property in favour of the DIP Lenders (the "DIP Lenders' Charge") was also granted and was given super priority status by court order dated June 27, 2012.

36 As of August 3, 2012, the proposed closing date for the proposed Heligear Transaction, the aggregate amount owing under the DIP Facility, the U.S. Dip Facilities (to which the CCAA Entities are guarantors) and the Credit Facility will be approximately $75 million. Net proceeds from the Heligear Transaction are expected to be less than $65 million after transaction costs, payment of outstanding post-filing obligations and prior ranking claims. As a result, if the Transaction is approved, Northstar's secured creditors are expected to realize a shortfall.

37 Notwithstanding this shortfall, the secured creditors support approval of the Heligear Transaction.

38 The DIP Lenders have advised Northstar that they will not fund the continued voluntary remediation efforts after closing of the proposed Heligear Transaction, which is scheduled for August 3, 2012.

ANALYSIS

39 The MOE takes the position and has served a motion for a declaration that the March 15 Order is a "regulatory order" pursuant to s. 11.1(2) of the CCAA and is not subject to the stay of proceedings provided by the Initial Order; or, in the alternative, the MOE seeks an order lifting the stay.

40 The MOE also seeks an order that the Heligear Transaction not be approved.

41 Alternatively, if the Heligear Transaction is approved, the MOE seeks an order that no proceeds be distributed pending the release of the decision on this motion and the hearing of further

submissions on the allocation of proceeds.

42 The issues on this motion, from the standpoint of the MOE, are:

(a) is the March 15 Order subject to the stay of proceedings granted in the Initial Order?
(b) should the court declare, pursuant to s. 11.1(4) of the CCAA that the MOE is seeking to enforce its rights as a creditor and that the enforcement of those rights is stayed?

43 In addition, the MOE takes the position that the court should not approve the sale where the effect of such an order would so seriously prejudice the public interest.

44 The MOE also takes the position that:

(i) the March 15 Order is regulatory in nature and not subject to the stay;
(ii) the Order is not a "claim" within the meaning of ss. 11.8(8) and 11.8(9) of the CCAA; and
(iii) any other interpretation of these provisions upsets the balance between the federal power over bankruptcy and insolvency in s. 91(21) of the *Constitution Act, 1867* and provincial regulatory authority over the environment, founded on s. 92(13) and s. 92(16).

45 Alternatively, the MOE requests an order lifting the stay of the March 15 Order in order to permit continued enforcement of the March 15 Order as against Northstar.

46 Turning first to the constitutional argument, the MOE acknowledged that it was not until July 23, 2012, the day before the scheduled hearing, that notice of a constitutional question was provided to the Attorney General of Canada as required by s. 109 of the *Courts of Justice Act.*

47 Counsel to the MOE advised that the Attorney General of Canada was not in a position to respond on such a short time frame. Counsel to the MOE requested an adjournment of this aspect of the motion. This request was opposed by the CCAA Entities and those supporting the CCAA Entities.

48 After hearing argument on the adjournment request, I denied the request for several reasons: the environmental issue raised by the MOE has been known about since the outset of the CCAA Proceedings and, in fact, since before the issuance of the CCAA Proceedings; a similar issue was litigated in *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, 2012 ONSC 1213 ("*Nortel*"); and, the proposed Heligear Transaction is scheduled to close August 3, 2012 and it is not feasible to adjourn this aspect of the motion and still comply with commercial requirements. In addition, I also accept the arguments of both counsel to the CCAA Entities and Fifth Third that the MOE should not be permitted to bifurcate its case.

49 The first substantive issue raised by the submissions of the MOE is whether the March 15 Order is subject to the stay of proceedings granted in the Initial Order.

50 The Initial Order grants a broad stay of proceedings in favour of the CCAA Entities, subject to certain limitations, including investigations, acts, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body that are permitted by s. 11.1 of the CCAA.

51 Exceptions to the stay should be narrowly interpreted so as to accord with the objectives of the CCAA: *Nortel Networks Corporation (Re)*, 2009 ONCA 833 at para. 17; *Nortel*, *supra*, at para. 55.

52 Subsection 11.1(2) of the CCAA provides that, subject to subsection 11.1(3), a stay of proceedings shall not affect an action, suit or proceeding that is taken by a regulatory body, other than the enforcement of a payment ordered by the regulatory body.

53 I recently considered this issue in *Nortel*. Counsel to the CCAA Entities submits that the facts in this case are virtually identical to those in *Nortel*. He cites as an example the fact that the March 15 Order requires, among other things, the continued pumping and treatment of groundwater, the submission of an action plan to be reviewed and amended by the MOE, if necessary, and additional remediation work. Counsel submits that these requirements significantly overlap with the obligations set forth by the MOE in the orders at issue in *Nortel*.

54 In *Nortel*, at para. 104, I stated that: "[t]he Ministry has the discretion under the legislation and, if the Minister is solely acting in is regulatory capacity, it can do so unimpeded by the stay. This is the effect of section 11.1(2) of the CCAA".

55 However, at para. 105 I stated that:

> [w]hen the entity that is the subject of the MOE's attention is insolvent and not carrying on operations at the property in question, it is necessary to consider the substance of the MOE's actions. If the result of the issuance of the MOE Orders is that [the debtor] is required to react in a certain way, it follows, in the present circumstances, that [the debtor] will be required to incur a financial obligation to comply. It is not a question of altering its operational activities in order to comply with the EPA on a going forward basis. There is no going forward business. [The debtor] is in a position where it has no real option but to pay money to comply with any environmental issue. In my view, if the MOE moves from draft orders to issued orders, the result is clear. The MOE would be, in reality, enforcing a payment obligation, which step is prohibited by the Stay.

56 Counsel to the CCAA Entities pointed out one distinction between *Nortel* and the present scenario. In *Nortel*, the MOE had not issued draft orders against *Nortel* until after the CCAA proceedings had already commenced, whereas in this case, the March 15 Order was issued pre-filing as a result of concern about the CCAA Entities' financial situation. As stated in the

conclusion to the provincial officer's report issued in connection with the March 15 Order:

57 While Northstar has undertaken all needed investigation, mitigation and remediation programs on a voluntary basis without the need for a director's order, recent financial disclosures made by Northstar have revealed there is significant doubt regarding the corporation's ability to continue as a going concern which could impact on the environmental remediation programs.

58 The record in this case is clear. The CCAA Entities are insolvent. The Cambridge Facility was shut down in 2010 and no operations (other than environmental remediation activities) have been conducted there since that time. The CCAA Entities have conducted a court approved Sales Process. During the Sales Process, no bidder expressed any interest in purchasing the Cambridge Facility or was willing to assume the obligations associated with it.

59 I agree with the submission of counsel to the CCAA Entities that the purpose of the March 15 Order and the MOE's motion is to attempt to require the CCAA Entities to continue to comply with the March 15 Order and all of the financial obligations associated therewith in perpetuity and in conflict with the priorities enjoyed by other creditors.

60 At paragraph 127 in *Nortel*, I stated that, "the moment that [the debtor] is "required" to undertake such an activity, it is "required" to expend monies in response to actions being taken by the MOE. In my view, any financial activity that [the debtor] is required to undertake is stayed by the provisions of the Initial Order".

61 In this case, it seems to me quite clear that the March 15 Order seeks to enforce a payment obligation and it is therefore stayed by the Initial Order: see also *Abitibi Bowater Inc. (Re)* 2010 QCCS 1261 ("*Abitibi*") at para. 160.

62 Counsel to the CCAA Entities submits that the MOE is attempting to create a priority claim through the issuance of the March 15 Order that does not exist at law and contrary to the priority scheme provided in the CCAA.

63 Counsel to the CCAA Entities cites *Harbert Distressed Investment Fund, LP v. General Chemical Canada Ltd.*, 2007 ONCA 600 ("*General Chemical*") at para. 46, for the proposition that federal insolvency statutes were amended to delineate the priority for the MOE in insolvency scenarios and, thus, "giving effect to provincial environmental legislation in the face of these amendments... would impermissibly affect the scheme of priorities in the federal legislation".

64 The scope of the MOE's security is set out in the CCAA at s. 11.8(8) which provides:

> 11.8(8) Any claim by Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province against a debtor company in respect of which proceedings have been commenced under this Act for costs of remediating any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting real property of the company is secured by a charge on the real

property and on any other real property of the company that is contiguous thereto and that is related to the activity that caused the environmental condition or environmental damage, and the charge

(a) is enforceable in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the real property is located, in the same way as a mortgage, hypothec or other security on real property; and
(b) ranks above any other claim, right or charge against the property, notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or anything in any other federal or provincial law.

65 Subsection 11.8(9) of the CCAA provides:

> 11.8(9) A claim against a debtor company for costs of remedying any environmental condition or environmental damage affecting real property of the company shall be a claim under this Act, whether the condition arose or the damage occurred before or after the date on which proceedings under this Act were commenced.

66 In my view, the MOE is entitled to file a claim against Northstar for any costs of remedying the environmental condition at the Cambridge Facility. However, the MOE is not entitled to attempt to use the March 15 Order to create a priority that it otherwise does not have access to under the legislation.

67 This conclusion is consistent with the views that I expressed in *Nortel* at paras. 107 and 116 and is in accordance with the reasoning of *Abitibi* at paras. 132 and 148, as well as *General Chemical* at para. 46.

68 With respect to the Heligear Transaction, full details are contained in the affidavit filed in support of the motion.

69 I have considered the factors listed under s. 36(3) of the CCAA. I am satisfied that the record establishes that the Heligear Agreement was the result of a broad and comprehensive marketing process conducted with the assistance of Harris Williams. The Sales Process Order approved key elements of the Sales Process, including (a) the execution of the Heligear Agreement, *nunc pro tunc*, for the purpose of establishing a stalking horse bid and (b) the Bidding Procedures which governed the determination of the successful bid.

70 I am satisfied that the CCAA Entities complied with the terms of the Sales Process Order.

71 I am also satisfied that while Northstar conducted a broad and comprehensive marketing process prior to the commencement of these proceedings, the Monitor has reviewed and supported

the approval of the execution of the Heligear Agreement *nunc pro tunc* and the approval of the Bidding Procedures as granted in the Sales Process Order.

72 The CCAA Entities take the position that the Heligear Transaction is in the best interests of Northstar's stakeholders, including its employees, suppliers and customers.

73 I am satisfied that the record establishes that the creditors were adequately consulted and the effects of the Heligear Transaction are positive. I am also satisfied that the consideration to be received for the Canadian Purchased Assets is reasonable and fair in the circumstances.

74 In making these statements, I do not in any way wish to diminish the arguments put forth by the MOE and supported by the Region of Waterloo, the City of Cambridge and GE Canada. The concerns raised by the MOE are real and serious. However, the reality of the situation is that during the Sales Process, no bidder was willing to purchase - or expressed any interest in purchasing - the Cambridge Facility, either alone or together with the other assets of Northstar.

75 The reality of the situation was also expressed by counsel to Fifth Third. Counsel submitted that the record is clear that, if the Heligear Transaction is not approved, Fifth Third will proceed to enforce its rights. As a result of ss. 11.8(8) and (9) of the CCAA, Fifth Third Bank has a superior priority position to the MOE and would be in a position to commence proceedings to enforce its rights as such.

76 The practical result at that point would be that Northstar would have no assets available and no ability to comply with the MOE Order.

77 The reality of the situation is that, regardless of whether the Heligear Transaction is approved, Northstar will not have the practical ability to comply with the MOE Order. In this respect, the sale of the Canadian Purchased Assets to the Canadian Purchaser has no real effect on the MOE or any other party with an interest in the Cambridge Facility.

78 The Heligear Transaction is supported by the Monitor, the CRO, Fifth Third Bank (both as DIP Agent and as Agent for the Lenders under Northstar's existing secured facility), Boeing, Boeing Capital and the CAW.

79 In addition to the factors set out in s. 36(3), discussed above, s. 36(7) of the CCAA sets out the following restrictions on the disposition of assets within CCAA proceedings:

> 36(7) The court may grant the authorization only if the court is satisfied that the company can and will make the payments that would have been required under paragraphs 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) if the court had sanctioned the compromise or arrangement.

80 The CCAA Entities have advised that they intend to make the payments of the amounts

described in subsections 6(4)(*a*) and (5)(*a*) of the CCAA on their normal due dates from the proceeds of the Heligear Transaction.

81 Counsel to the CAW made reference to issues of successor liability. These issues are not directly before the court today and do not factor into this endorsement.

DISPOSITION

82 In conclusion, I am satisfied that the Heligear Transaction is in the best interests of Northstar's stakeholders, including its employees, suppliers and customers. The proceeds of the Transaction will be available for distribution to the CCAA Entities' creditors in accordance with their legal priorities. The Lenders have asserted a claim against the proceeds of the Heligear Transaction. Independent counsel to the Monitor has reviewed the Lenders' security and concluded that the security granted under the Credit Facility is valid, perfected and enforceable.

83 In the result, I am satisfied that the Heligear Transaction should be approved.

84 An order is also made declaring that the MOE is seeking to enforce its rights as a creditor and that the enforcement of those rights is stayed.

85 Further, MOE's request to lift the stay is denied on the basis that the MOE is seeking to create a super priority claim by way of the March 15 Order. Such a priority is not recognized at law and, consequently, it is appropriate that the MOE's enforcement of its rights as a creditor should be stayed.

86 An order is also granted vesting all of the Canadian Purchased Assets in the Canadian Purchaser free and clear of all restrictions.

87 Finally, the Monitor is authorized and directed, on closing of the Heligear Transaction, to make distributions to the DIP Agent for the DIP Lenders and to the Lenders in accordance with their legal priorities.

88 I thank counsel for their comprehensive submissions and argument in connection with this matter.

G.B. MORAWETZ J.

cp/e/qlmdl/qlpmg/qlhcs

TAB 19

Court File No. CV12 – 9767 – 00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE MR.	)	FRIDAY, THE 19TH
	)	
JUSTICE MORAWETZ	)	DAY OF OCTOBER, 2012

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INC., CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INCOME FUND, CII TRUST AND THE COMPANIES LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

Applicants

ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE / DISTRIBUTION / TRANSITION ORDER

THIS MOTION, made by C International Inc., formerly Cinram International Inc., C International Income Fund, formerly Cinram International Income Fund, CII Trust and the companies listed in Schedule "A" hereto (collectively, the "**Applicants**"), pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended (the "**CCAA**") was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Affidavit of Neill May sworn October 12, 2012, the Fourth Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. in its capacity as Court-appointed Monitor (the "**Monitor**") dated 12, 2012 (the "**Monitor's Fourth Report**"), the Affidavit of Paul Bishop sworn October 12, 2012 (the "**Bishop Affidavit**") and the Affidavit of Daphne MacKenzie sworn October 11, 2012 (the "**MacKenzie Affidavit**"), and on hearing the submissions of counsel for the Applicants and Cinram International Limited Partnership (together with the Applicants, the "**CCAA Parties**"), the Monitor, the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent (as defined in the Initial Order) and the Pre-Petition Second Lien Agent (as defined in the Initial Order, together with

the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, the "**Agent**"), and with the consent of the Ad Hoc Committee of Former Canadian Cinram Employees, and no one appearing and making submissions for any other person served with the Motion Record, although properly served as appears from the affidavit of Jesse Mighton sworn October 15, 2012, filed,

SERVICE

1. THIS COURT ORDERS that the time for service of the Notice of Motion, the Monitor's Fourth Report and the Motion Record is hereby abridged and validated so that this Motion is properly returnable today and hereby dispenses with further service thereof.

CAPITALIZED TERMS

2. THIS COURT ORDERS that unless otherwise indicated or defined herein, capitalized terms have the meaning given to them in the Monitor's Fourth Report or in the Initial Order.

ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE

3. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to deposit the amount of US$4.2 million (the "**Administrative Reserve Amount**") from the sale proceeds received and held by it arising from the closing of the Asset Sale Transaction (the "**August Asset Sale Proceeds**"), and any additional amount, from time to time, as agreed to by the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent or upon further Order of this Court, from Additional Proceeds (defined below) and/or available cash on hand at any of the CCAA Parties, into a segregated account established by the Monitor for the payment of Administrative Reserve Costs (the "**Administrative Reserve Account**"). "**Administrative Reserve Costs**" shall mean all professional costs and expenses associated with the completion of the administration of the estates of the CCAA Parties in these proceedings, the Chapter 15 proceedings and any other proceedings commenced in respect of the CCAA Parties or any of them, including, without limitation: (a) fees of the Monitor, the Receiver, their respective counsel, Canadian and U.S. counsel to the CCAA Parties, Canadian and U.S. counsel to the Agent and the financial advisor to the Agent, and such other Persons retained by the Monitor; and (b) directors' and trustees' fees.

4. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Administrative Reserve Account shall constitute "Charged Property" within the meaning of and in accordance with the Initial Order and the applicable provisions of the Initial Order shall apply *mutatis mutandis* thereto.

5. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor is hereby authorized and directed to make payments out of the Administrative Reserve Account, on behalf of the CCAA Parties, to the following Persons in the following amounts in respect of the payment of Administrative Reserve Costs and such other costs specifically provided for herein by way of cheque (sent by prepaid ordinary mail to the Monitor's last known address for such Persons) or by wire transfer (in accordance with the wire instructions provided by such Persons to the Monitor at least three (3) business days prior to the payment date set by the Monitor):

(a) the Monitor, its Canadian and U.S. counsel, the Receiver, its counsel, Canadian and U.S. counsel to the CCAA Parties, Canadian and U.S. counsel to the Agent and the financial advisor to the Agent in amounts sufficient to satisfy payment in full of their respective reasonable professional fees and disbursements incurred at their respective standard rates and charges in respect of their performance of their respective duties and obligations relating to completion of the administration of the estates of the CCAA Parties in these proceedings, the Chapter 15 proceedings and any other proceedings commenced in respect of the CCAA Parties or any of them;

(b) payments to directors and trustees of the CCAA Parties of fees owing to them for acting as directors or trustees of a CCAA Party in amounts sufficient to satisfy payment in full of amounts owing thereto; and

(c) such other fees and costs properly incurred by Persons retained by the Monitor in connection with completion of the administration of the estates of the CCAA Parties in these proceedings, the Chapter 15 proceedings and any other proceedings commenced in respect of the CCAA Parties or any of them as determined by the Monitor in its sole and unfettered discretion, after consultation with the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent or its advisors.

6. THIS COURT ORDERS that notwithstanding any other provision of this Order and without in any way limiting the protections for the Monitor set forth in the Initial Order or the CCAA, the Monitor shall have no obligation to make any payment, and nothing in this Order shall be construed as obligating the Monitor to make any such payment, unless and until the Monitor is in receipt of funds adequate to effect any such payment in full and that in the event the amount at any time in the Administrative Reserve Account is insufficient to satisfy any such amounts, the Monitor shall have no liability with respect to the payment thereof and the Monitor is authorized and empowered to determine in its sole and unfettered discretion which of the amounts shall be paid and when.

TRANSITIONAL COSTS RESERVE

7. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to deposit the amount of US$2.3 million (the "**Transitional Costs Amount**") from the August Asset Sale Proceeds, and any additional amount, from time to time, as agreed to by the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent or upon further Order of this Court, from Additional Proceeds and/or available cash on hand at any of the CCAA Parties, into a segregated account established by the Monitor for the payment of Transitional Costs (the "**Transitional Costs Account**"). "**Transitional Costs**" shall mean: (a) costs and expenses relating to the Excluded Assets, including, without limitation, property taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance costs, security costs, property management fees (collectively the "**Excluded Assets Costs**"); and (b) costs incurred for transitional services relating to the Share Sale Transaction, the Excluded Assets and administration of these proceedings.

8. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Transitional Costs Account shall constitute "Charged Property" within the meaning of and in accordance with the Initial Order and the applicable provisions of the Initial Order shall apply *mutatis mutandis* thereto.

9. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor is hereby authorized and directed to make payments out of the Transitional Costs Account, on behalf of the CCAA Parties, to the following Persons in the following amounts in respect of the payment of Transitional Costs and such other costs specifically provided for herein by way of cheque (sent by prepaid ordinary mail to the Monitor's last known address for such Persons) or by wire transfer (in accordance

with the wire instructions provided by such Persons to the Monitor at least three (3) business days prior to the payment date set by the Monitor):

(a) payments to applicable Persons relating to Excluded Assets Costs in amounts sufficient to satisfy payment in full of Excluded Assets Costs;

(b) payments to the Purchaser for amounts owing by the CCAA Parties pursuant to the Transition Services Agreement in connection with any costs incurred for the provision of transitional services relating to the Share Sale Transaction, the Excluded Assets and administration of these proceedings; and

(c) payments to applicable counterparties under contracts and agreements with the CCAA Parties that are not Excluded Assets and which are incurred following the Closing of the Asset Sale Transaction and prior to their assumption or disclaimer pursuant to the provisions of the CCAA;

10. THIS COURT ORDERS that notwithstanding any other provision of this Order and without in any way limiting the protections for the Monitor set forth in the Initial Order or the CCAA, the Monitor shall have no obligation to make any payment, and nothing in this Order shall be construed as obligating the Monitor to make any such payment, unless and until the Monitor is in receipt of funds adequate to effect any such payment in full and that in the event the amount at any time in the Transitional Costs Account is insufficient to satisfy any such amounts, the Monitor shall have no liability with respect to the payment thereof and the Monitor is authorized and empowered to determine in its sole and unfettered discretion which of the amounts shall be paid and when.

DISTRIBUTION TO THE PRE-PETITION FIRST LIEN AGENT

11. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor is hereby authorized and directed to: (a) distribute on behalf of the CCAA Parties US$24,890,000 from the August Asset Sale Proceeds to the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent on behalf of the Pre-Petition First Lien Lenders; and (b) take all necessary steps and actions to effect the foregoing distribution.

12. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor is hereby authorized to make one or more further distributions, at such time(s) as the Monitor may deem appropriate, without further order of this Honourable Court, to the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent on behalf of the Pre-Petition First Lien Lenders from: (a) additional sale proceeds received by the Monitor from the Asset Sale Transaction subsequent to the Closing; (b) sale proceeds received by the Monitor from the Share Sale Transaction; (c) any additional funds that come into the Monitor's possession in respect of the assets or property of the CCAA Parties (clauses (a), (b), and (c) collectively, the "**Additional Proceeds**"); (d) any available cash on hand at any of the CCAA Parties in such amount(s) as the Monitor deems appropriate; (e) any net balance remaining in the Administrative Reserve Account following payment therefrom of the Administrative Reserve Costs enumerated in paragraphs 3 and 5 of this Order and (f) any net balance remaining in the Transitional Costs Account following payment therefrom of the Transitional Costs enumerated in paragraphs 7 and 9 of this Order (the amounts in clauses (a) to (f) above, collectively, the "**Excess Funds**"); provided that in no circumstance shall the aggregate amount of the distributions to the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent contemplated in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Order exceed the total amount of the secured indebtedness plus interest accrued thereon owing by the CCAA Parties to the Pre-Petition First Lien Lenders under the Pre-Petition First Lien Credit Agreement. The Monitor is hereby authorized to take all necessary steps and actions to effect the distributions described in this paragraph.

13. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that, notwithstanding:

(a) the pendency of these proceedings;

(b) any application for a bankruptcy order now or hereafter issued pursuant to the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Canada) in respect of any one or more of the CCAA Parties and any bankruptcy order issued pursuant to any such application; or

(c) any assignment in bankruptcy made in respect of any of the CCAA Parties,

the distributions and payments made pursuant to paragraphs 5, 9, 11 and 12 of this Order are final and irreversible and shall be binding upon any trustee in bankruptcy that may be

appointed in respect of any of the CCAA Parties and shall not be void or voidable by creditors of any of the CCAA Parties, nor shall the payments constitute or be deemed to be settlements, fraudulent preferences, assignments, fraudulent conveyances, or other reviewable transactions under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or any other applicable federal or provincial legislation, nor do they constitute conduct which is oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to or which unfairly disregards the interests of any person.

TRANSITION POWERS OF THE MONITOR

14. THIS COURT ORDERS that in addition to its prescribed rights in the CCAA and the powers granted by the Initial Order, the Monitor is empowered and authorized, *nunc pro tunc*, but not obligated, to take such actions and execute such documents, in the name of and on behalf of the CCAA Parties, as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable in order to:

(a) perform its functions and fulfill its obligations under this Order or the Initial Order;

(b) facilitate the completion of the Share Sale Transaction;

(c) in consultation with the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent or its advisors, market, collect, monetize, liquidate, realize upon, sell or otherwise dispose of any of the Excluded Assets, pay any commissions and marketing expenses incurred in connection therewith and apply the net proceeds thereof in accordance with this Order or further Order of the Court;

(d) facilitate the completion of the administration of the estates of the CCAA Parties in these proceedings, the Chapter 15 proceedings and any other proceedings commenced in respect of the CCAA Parties or any of them;

(e) supervise the management of the business and affairs of Cinram Wireless LLC;

(f) issue notices of disclaimer of contracts pursuant to section 32 of the CCAA;

(g) effect liquidation, bankruptcy, winding-up or dissolution of the CCAA Parties;

(h) act, if required, as trustee in bankruptcy, liquidator, receiver or a similar official of such entities; and

(i) perform such other functions as the Court may order from time to time on a motion brought on at least three (3) days' notice to the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent or such other notice as deemed appropriate by the Court,

and in each case where the Monitor takes any such actions or steps, it shall be exclusively authorized and empowered to do so, to the exclusion of all other Persons including the CCAA Parties, and without interference from any other Person, including any trustee in bankruptcy of any of the CCAA Parties; provided that in the event of a disagreement between the Monitor and the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent with respect to the exercise of powers by the Monitor under this paragraph 14 (except subsection (e)), the Monitor or the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent may apply to this Court for advice and directions in connection with the exercise of such powers.

15. THIS COURT ORDER that from and after the date of this Order, the Monitor is authorized, empowered and directed, to the exclusion of all other Persons including the CCAA Parties, to:

(a) take control of the existing bank account(s) of the CCAA Parties outlined in Schedule "B" (the "**Bank Accounts**"), and the funds credited thereto or deposited therein;

(b) give instructions from time to time to transfer the funds credited to or deposited in such existing Bank Accounts (net of any fees to which the financial institutions maintaining such Bank Accounts are entitled) to such other account as the Monitor may direct and give instructions to close the existing Bank Accounts; and

(c) execute and deliver such documentation and take such other steps as are necessary to give effect to the powers set out in this paragraph 15(a) and 15(b) above; and

(d) the financial institutions maintaining such Bank Accounts shall not be under any obligation whatsoever to inquire into the propriety, validity or legality of any transfer, payment, collection or other action taken in accordance with the instructions of the Monitor or as to the use or application of funds transferred, paid, collected or otherwise dealt with in accordance with such instructions and such financial institutions shall be authorized to act in accordance with and in reliance upon such instructions without any liability in respect thereof to any Person. For greater certainty and except to the extent that any of the terms of the documentation applicable to the Banking and Cash Management System (as defined in the Initial Order) are inconsistent with the authorities granted to the Monitor pursuant to paragraphs 15(a) and 15(b) above, nothing in this Order shall or shall be deemed to derogate from, limit, restrict or otherwise affect the protections granted pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Initial Order in favour of any bank providing cash management services to the CCAA Parties.

16. THIS COURT ORDERS that notwithstanding any other provisions of this Order, the Monitor shall consult with the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent or its advisors with respect to the Administrative Reserve Account, the Transitional Costs Account, the Bank Accounts and any payments therefrom, and with respect to the Excess Funds and any distributions therefrom, and in the event of a disagreement between the Monitor and the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent with respect to any of the foregoing, the Monitor or the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent may apply to this Court for advice and directions in connection with any of the foregoing, including the making of proposed payment from any of the Administrative Reserve Account, the Transitional Costs Account and the Bank Accounts, and any failure to make, or in respect of the amount of, one or more additional distributions from the Excess Funds pursuant to paragraph 12 of this Order.

17. THIS COURT ORDERS that from and after the date of this Order, the Monitor is authorized, but not required, to prepare and file the CCAA Parties' employee-related remittances, T4 statements and records of employment for the CCAA Parties' former employees on behalf of the CCAA Parties based solely upon information provided by the

CCAA Parties and on the basis that the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation to any Person with respect to such returns, remittances, statements, records or other documentation.

18. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Monitor shall be at liberty, after consultation with the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, to engage such Persons (including any Persons currently representing or retained by the CCAA Parties), in its capacity as Monitor, as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under the Initial Order and this Order and to facilitate the completion of these proceedings, and in the event of a disagreement between the Monitor and the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent with respect to the engagement of any such Persons, the Monitor or the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent may apply to this Court for advice and directions.

19. THIS COURT ORDERS that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, the CCAA Parties shall remain in possession and control of the Property (as defined in the Initial Order) which remains following completion of the Sale Transaction (other than the Limited Receivership Property as defined and described in the Appointment Order granted by this Court on October 19, 2012) and the Monitor shall not be deemed to be in possession and/or control of any such remaining Property.

20. THIS COURT ORDERS that all employees of the CCAA Parties shall remain the employees of the CCAA Parties until such time as the Monitor, on the CCAA Parties' behalf, may terminate the employment of such employees. The Monitor shall not be liable for any employee-related liabilities, including any successor employer liabilities as provided for in section 14.06(1.2) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3, other than such amounts as the Monitor may specifically agree in writing to pay.

21. THIS COURT ORDERS that all Persons in possession or control of the Property which remains following completion of the Sale Transaction, other than the Limited Receivership Property, shall forthwith advise the Monitor of such and shall grant immediate and continued access to such property to the Monitor and shall forthwith deliver all such property as directed by the Monitor upon the Monitor's request, other than documents or information which may not be disclosed or provided to the Monitor due to the privilege attaching to solicitor-client communication or due to statutory provisions prohibiting such disclosure.

22. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that nothing in this Order shall constitute or be deemed to constitute the Monitor as a receiver, assignee, liquidator, administrator, receiver-manager, agent of the creditors or legal representatives of any of the CCAA Parties within the meaning of any relevant legislation.

23. THIS COURT ORDERS that from and after the date of this Order, the stay of proceedings provided for in the Initial Order may be lifted by Court Order or with the written consent of the Monitor and no further consent of any other Person shall be required to commence or continue a proceeding or enforcement process in any court or tribunal against or in respect of any of the CCAA Parties.

MONITOR PROTECTIONS

24. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that the Monitor is not a legal representative within the meaning of Section 159(3) of the *Income Tax Act* (Canad a), as amended (the "**ITA**") or a person subject to Section 150(3) of the ITA and that the Monitor shall have no obligation to prepare or file any tax returns of the CCAA Parties with any taxing authority.

25. THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES that any distributions under this Order shall not constitute a "distribution" for the purposes of section 159 of the ITA, section 270 of the *Excise Tax Act* (Canada), section 107 of the *Corporations Tax Act* (Ontario), section 22 of the *Retail Sales Tax* (Ontario), section 117 of the *Taxation Act, 2007* (Ontario) or any other similar federal, provincial or territorial tax legislation (collectively, the "**Tax Statutes**"), and the Monitor in making any such payments is not "distributing", nor shall be considered to "distribute" nor to have "distributed", such funds for the purpose of the Tax Statutes, and the Monitor shall not incur any liability under the Tax Statutes in respect of its making any payments ordered or permitted under this Order, and is hereby forever released, remised and discharged from any claims against it under or pursuant to the Tax Statutes or otherwise at law, arising in respect of payments made under this Order and any claims of this nature are hereby forever barred.

26. THIS COURT ORDERS that in addition to the rights and protections afforded to the Monitor under the Initial Order, the Monitor shall not be liable for any act or omission on the part of the Monitor, or any reliance thereon, including without limitation, with respect to any information disclosed, any act or omission pertaining to the discharge of duties under this Order or as requested by the CCAA Parties or with respect to any other duties or obligations set out in this Order or the Initial Order, save and except for any claim or liability arising out of any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the Monitor. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA, any other applicable legislation or the Initial Order.

27. THIS COURT ORDERS that no action or other proceeding shall be commenced against the Monitor in any way arising from or related to its capacity or conduct as Monitor except with prior leave of this Court and on prior written notice to the Monitor.

28. THIS COURT ORDERS that upon fulfilment of its obligations under this Order, the Monitor is hereby authorized and directed to apply to Court for its discharge.

RELEASE

29. THIS COURT ORDERS that the former and current trustees, directors and officers of the CCAA Parties (collectively, the "**Directors and Officers**", and each a "**Director**" or "**Officer**") are hereby fully, finally, irrevocably and forever released and discharged from any and all claims, obligations and liabilities that they may have incurred or may have become subject to as Directors or Officers of the CCAA Parties after the commencement of the within proceedings, provided that nothing herein shall release or discharge any of the Directors or Officers if such Director or Officer is adjudged by the express terms of a judgment rendered on a final determination on the merits to have committed gross negligence, fraud or wilful misconduct in its capacity as a Director or Officer.

EXTENSION OF THE STAY PERIOD

30. THIS COURT ORDERS that the Stay Period (as defined in the Initial Order) be and is hereby extended to 11:59 p.m. on February 1, 2013.

TITLE OF PROCEEDINGS

31. THIS COURT ORDERS that the title of these proceedings is amended to reflect the new names of the Applicants as follows:

> IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED
>
> AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF C INTERNATIONAL INC., C INTERNATIONAL INCOME FUND, CII TRUST AND THE COMPANIES LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"
>
> Applicants

APPROVAL OF MONITOR'S REPORTS, ACTIVITIES AND FEES

32. THIS COURT ORDERS that the First Report of the Monitor dated July 9, 2012, the Second Report of the Monitor dated August 17, 2012, the Third Report of the Monitor dated September 9, 2012 and the Monitor's Fourth Report and the activities described therein are hereby approved.

33. THIS COURT ORDERS that the fees and disbursements of the Monitor for the period June 25, 2012 to September 30, 2012 and its counsel, Stikeman Elliott LLP, for the period June 25, 2012 to August 31, 2012, all as particularized in the Bishop Affidavit and the MacKenzie Affidavit are hereby approved.

SEALING

34. THIS COURT ORDERS that pursuant to Section 10(3) of the CCAA the cash flow forecast attached as Appendix "A" to the Confidential Supplement to the Monitor's Fourth Report be sealed and not form part of the public record, but rather shall be placed separate and apart from all other contents of the Court file, in a sealed envelope attached to a notice that sets out the title of these proceedings and a statement that the contents are subject to a sealing order and shall only be opened upon further Order of this Court.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

35. THIS COURT ORDERS that the CCAA Parties or the Monitor may apply to this Court for advice and directions, or to seek relief in respect of, any matters arising from or under this Order.

36. THIS COURT ORDERS that any interested party (including the CCAA Parties and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order, provided that no order shall be made varying, rescinding or otherwise affecting the provisions of this Order unless notice of a motion is served on the Service List in these proceedings on not less than five (5) days' notice, or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order, returnable November 2, 2012.

37. THIS COURT ORDERS that the amount of the Directors' Charge may be decreased upon the consent of the Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, counsel to the CCAA Parties and the Monitor or upon further Order of this Court.

38. THIS COURT HEREBY REQUESTS the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada, in the United States or in any other foreign jurisdiction, to give effect to this Order and to assist the CCAA Parties, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the CCAA Parties and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to CRW International ULC, formerly Cinram International ULC in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the CCAA Parties and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

39. THIS COURT ORDERS that each of the CCAA Parties and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order and any other Order issued in these proceedings.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

OCT 19 2012

SCHEDULE A

Additional Applicants

C International General Partner Inc., formerly Cinram International General Partner Inc.
CRW International ULC, formerly Cinram International ULC
1362806 Ontario Limited
CUSH Inc., formerly Cinram (U.S.) Holding's Inc.
CIHV Inc., formerly Cinram, Inc.
IHC Corporation
CMFG LLC, formerly Cinram Manufacturing LLC
CDIST LLC, formerly Cinram Distribution LLC
Cinram Wireless LLC
CRSMI LLC, formerly Cinram Retail Services, LLC
One K Studios, LLC

SCHEDULE B

Bank Accounts

CUSH Inc.'s USD Concentration/Funding account at JPMorgan Chase

CUSH Inc.'s USD Benefits payments account at JPMorgan Chase

CUSH Inc.'s USD Money Market Account at Community Bank

CUSH Inc.'s USD account at JPMorgan Chase, N.A., Toronto Branch

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT* ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INC., CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INCOME FUND, CII TRUST AND THE COMPANIES LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

Applicants

Court File No: CV12 – 9767 – 00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE-COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

ORDER

GOODMANS LLP
Barristers & Solicitors
333 Bay Street, Suite 3400
Toronto, Canada M5H 2S7

Robert J. Chadwick LSUC#: 35165K
Melaney J. Wagner LSUC#: 44063B
Caroline Descours LSUC#: 58251A

Tel: (416) 979-2211
Fax: (416) 979-1234

Lawyers for the Applicants

\6127359

TAB 20

Court File No. CV-10-8533-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

THE HONOURABLE	)	TUESDAY, THE 6th DAY
	)	
MADAM JUSTICE PEPALL	)	OF JULY, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

APPLICANTS

ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE AND TRANSITION ORDER

THIS MOTION made by Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("**CPI**"), Canwest Books Inc. and Canwest (Canada) Inc. (the "**Applicants**") and Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Societe en Commandite (the "**Limited Partnership**", collectively and together with the Applicants, the "**LP Entities**", and each an "**LP Entity**"), for an order establishing and directing the administration of the Administrative Reserve (as defined herein) was heard this day at 330 University Avenue, Toronto, Ontario.

ON READING the Notice of Motion, the Affidavit of Douglas E.J. Lamb sworn June 29, 2010, the Twelfth Report of FTI Consulting Canada Inc. (the "**Monitor's 12th Report**") in its capacity as Court-appointed monitor of the LP Entities (the "**Monitor**") and on hearing from counsel for the LP Entities, the Monitor, the ad hoc committee of holders of 9.25% notes and senior subordinated debt issued by the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia in its capacity as Administrative Agent for the Senior Lenders (as defined in the Plan), the court-appointed representatives of the salaried employees and retirees and such other counsel as were present, no one else appearing although duly served as appears from the affidavit of service, filed.

DEFINITIONS

1. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that any capitalized terms not otherwise defined in this Order shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the consolidated plan of compromise concerning, affecting and involving the LP Entities dated as of May 20, 2010, as amended (the "**Plan**").

SERVICE

2. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the time for service of the Notice of Motion and the Motion Record herein be and is hereby abridged and that the motion is properly returnable today and service upon any interested party other than those parties served is hereby dispensed with.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE

3. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, pursuant to and in accordance with the Plan, the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to arrange for the opening and set up of the Administrative Reserve Account prior to the Plan Implementation Date.

4. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on the Plan Implementation Date, pursuant to and in accordance with the Plan, the LP Entities shall be and are hereby authorized and directed to pay to the Monitor from the Cash and Equivalents the amount of $9,000,000 (the "**Reserve Amount**") by way of wire transfer (in accordance with the wire transfer instructions provided by the Monitor to the LP Entities at least three (3) Business Days prior to the Plan Implementation Date). The LP Entities shall have no liability or obligation to the Monitor in respect of the Reserve Amount set out in this paragraph 4 once the wire transfer to the Monitor has been received.

5. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that pursuant to and in accordance with the Plan, the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to deposit the Reserve Amount into the Administrative Reserve Account, which Reserve Amount and the funds from time to time on deposit in the Administrative Reserve Account (the "**Administrative Reserve**") shall be held and administered by the Monitor in accordance with the Plan, the Plan Sanction Order of the

Honourable Madam Justice Pepall dated June 18, 2010 (the "**Plan Sanction Order**") and this Order.

6. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that the Administrative Reserve shall not constitute property of the LP Entities or of any one of them and that the purpose of the Administrative Reserve is to effect payment of the Administrative Reserve Costs and such other costs specifically provided for herein on behalf of the LP Entities in accordance with the Plan, the Asset Purchase Agreement and this Order, including those payments set out in paragraphs 8 and 10 herein, with any remaining balance therein to be distributed to the Purchaser in accordance with paragraph 11 herein.

7. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on the Plan Implementation Date, the LP Administration Charge (as defined in the Initial Order) shall be terminated, discharged and released as against the Acquired Assets, the Unsecured Creditors' Pool and all payments made to or on behalf of the Administrative Agent, the DIP Administrative Agent or any other Senior Secured Creditor, but will continue as against the Administrative Reserve but only with respect to and to secure payment of the fees, costs and expenses of the Monitor, any trustee in bankruptcy of the LP Entities and their respective counsel and other advisors, which charge shall rank in priority to all other Encumbrances, notwithstanding the order of perfection or attachment, and that the provisions of paragraphs 55, 58 and 60 of the Initial Order shall apply thereto, *mutatis mutandis*.

PAYMENTS BY THE MONITOR FROM THE ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE

8. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on or following the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to make payments out of the Administrative Reserve, on behalf of the LP Entities, to the following Persons in the following amounts in respect of the payment of Administrative Reserve Costs and such other costs specifically provided for herein by way of cheque (sent by prepaid ordinary mail to the Monitor's last known address for such Persons) or by wire transfer (in accordance with the wire instructions provided by such Persons to the Monitor at least three (3) Business Days prior to the payment date set by the Monitor) unless such costs are otherwise assumed by the Purchaser:

(a) counsel to the LP Entities, Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP (to the extent engaged by the Monitor), counsel to the directors and officers of the LP Entities, Lenczner Slaght Royce Smith Griffin LLP (to the extent engaged by the Monitor), the Monitor, the Monitor's counsel, Stikeman Elliott LLP and counsel to the Court-appointed representatives of the salaried employees and retirees (subject to such fee arrangements to be agreed to by the Monitor or as have been ordered by this Court), in amounts sufficient to satisfy payment in full of their respective reasonable professional fees and disbursements incurred at their respective standard rates and charges in respect of the performance of their respective duties and obligations whether arising before or after the Plan Implementation Date;

(b) Persons entitled to payments pursuant to the LP Entities' management incentive plan (the "**LP MIP**") and the Consulting Agreement as defined and described in the confidential supplement to the Fifth Report of the Monitor (the "**Fifth Report Confidential Supplement**") and the payment schedules thereto, in amounts sufficient to satisfy all such payments that become due and owing following the Plan Implementation Date in accordance with the terms of the LP MIP and the Consulting Agreement described in the Fifth Report Confidential Supplement, net of any withholdings required under applicable legislation. For greater certainty, acceptance of employment with Holdco or any purchaser of the LP Entities' business shall not prejudice such Persons' entitlements under the LP MIP and the Monitor shall make the payments to any such Persons who continue employment with Holdco or any purchaser of the LP Entities' business, subject to and in accordance with the terms of the LP MIP;

(c) employees of the LP Entities receiving retention payments pursuant to the authority granted in the Order of this Honourable Court dated March 26, 2010, in an amount sufficient to satisfy payment in full of such retention payments, net of any withholdings required under applicable legislation. For greater certainty, acceptance of employment with Holdco or any purchaser of the LP Entities' business shall not prejudice such Persons' entitlements to receive such retention payments and the Monitor shall make the retention payments to any such Persons who continue employment with Holdco or any purchaser of the LP Entities'

business, subject to and in accordance with the terms of the Order of this Honourable Court dated March 26, 2010;

(d) the LP CRA in an amount sufficient to satisfy payment in full of amounts owing under the retainer letter agreement dated as of July 1, 2010;

(e) Taxing Authorities in amounts sufficient to satisfy any remittances required under applicable legislation in respect of any payments to employees or former employees referred to in this paragraph 8 or in respect of the Withholding Arrangements (as defined below);

(f) any trustee in bankruptcy that may be appointed in respect of the LP Entities or any one of them following the completion of the Acquisition, in an amount sufficient to satisfy payment in full of the fees and costs of such trustee in bankruptcy;

(g) such other Persons engaged by the Monitor in accordance with this Order or other Orders of this Court in amounts sufficient to satisfy payment in full of amounts owing thereto; and

(h) such other fees and costs properly incurred by Persons in connection with completion of these proceedings or the winding up of the LP Entities' estates as determined by the Monitor in its sole and unfettered discretion, after consultation with the Purchaser.

9. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that notwithstanding any other provision of this Order or the Plan, and without in any way limiting the protections for the Monitor set forth in the Initial Order, the Plan or the CCAA, and except for the Monitor's obligations under the Withholding Arrangements (as defined herein), the Monitor shall have no obligation to make any payment, and nothing in this Order or the Plan shall be construed as obligating the Monitor to make any such payment, unless and until the Monitor is in receipt of funds adequate to effect any such payment in full and that in the event the Administrative Reserve is insufficient to satisfy any such amounts, the Monitor shall have no liability with respect to the payment thereof and the Monitor is authorized and empowered to determine in its sole and unfettered discretion which of the amounts shall be paid and when.

10. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that following the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to withhold from distributions of Shares and cash, to deposit Shares with brokers of its choice, to instruct brokers to sell Shares in one or more trades, to remit payments from the net sale proceeds of withheld Shares or from the Administrative Reserve to the Canada Revenue Agency, the Minister of Finance (Quebec) and other applicable Taxing Authorities, to prepare and file T4, T4A forms, T4 summary documentation and any other forms and to take such other steps, on behalf of the LP Entities, as are necessary to effect the withholding and remittance arrangements ("**Withholding Arrangements**") that are or that will be agreed by the Monitor and the LP Entities with the Canada Revenue Agency, the Minister of Finance (Quebec) and other applicable Taxing Authorities in connection with Withholding Obligations under the Plan.

11. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that following (i) payment of the amounts set out in paragraph 8 of this Order and the distributions, remittances and other steps set out in paragraph 10 of this Order, (ii) completion by the Monitor of its duties in respect of the LP Entities pursuant to the CCAA and the Initial Order, the Amended Claims Procedure Order, the Plan Sanction Order, this Order and all other orders granted in these proceedings (collectively the "**Orders**"), including without limitation the Monitor's duties in respect of the Amended Claims Procedure Order, distributions in accordance with the Plan, the completion of these proceedings and the winding up of the LP Entities' estates, and (iii) the establishment of arrangements satisfactory to any trustee in bankruptcy of the LP Entities or of any one of them to ensure payment of the fees and costs of such trustee in bankruptcy, the Monitor shall be and is hereby authorized and directed to pay the balance of the Administrative Reserve, if any, to the Purchaser by way of wire transfer (in accordance with the wire transfer instructions provided by the Purchaser to the Monitor at least three (3) Business Days prior to the payment date as set by the Monitor).

12. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except for the Monitor's obligations under the Withholding Arrangements, the Monitor shall have no liability or obligation to any Person in respect of the withholdings and remittances made in accordance with the Withholding Arrangements or in respect of the payments set out in paragraphs 8, 10 and 11 of this Order once the payment to such Person has been received or in respect of the preparation and filing of

any T4, T4A forms, T4 summary documentation and any other forms, which forms and documentation shall be exclusively based upon information provided by the LP Entities.

TRANSITION POWERS OF THE MONITOR

13. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on and after the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall continue to be authorized and directed to (a) complete the claims procedure established by the Amended Claims Procedure Order without consulting with the LP Entities, the LP CRA or any other Person; and (b) take such further steps and seek such amendments to the Amended Claims Procedure Order or additional orders as the Monitor considers necessary or appropriate in order to fully determine, resolve or deal with any Claims.

14. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on and after the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor is authorized, but not required, in the name of and on behalf of the LP Entities, to prepare and file the LP Entities' tax returns, employee-related remittances, T4 statements and records of employment for the LP Entities' former employees based solely upon information provided by the LP Entities and on the basis that the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation to any Person with respect to such returns, remittances, statements, records or other documentation.

15. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that any distributions under the Plan, the Plan Sanction Order or this Order shall not constitute a "distribution" for the purposes of section 107 of the *Corporations Tax Act* (Ontario), section 22 of the *Retail Sales Tax Act* (Ontario), section 117 of the *Taxation Act, 2007* (Ontario), section 34 of the *Income Tax Act* (British Columbia), section 104 of the *Social Service Tax Act* (British Columbia), section 49 of the *Alberta Corporate Tax Act*, section 22 of *The Income Tax Act* (Manitoba), section 73 of *The Tax Administration and Miscellaneous Taxes Act* (Manitoba), section 14 of *An Act respecting the Ministère du Revenu* (Québec), section 85 of *The Income Tax Act, 2000* (Saskatchewan), section 48 of *The Revenue and Financial Services Act* (Saskatchewan) and section 56 of *the Income Tax Act* (Nova Scotia) or any other similar provincial or territorial tax legislation (collectively, the "**Tax Statutes**"), and the Monitor in making any such payments is not "distributing", nor shall be considered to "distribute" nor to have "distributed", such funds for the purpose of the Tax Statutes, and the Monitor shall not incur any liability under the Tax Statutes in respect of its making any payments ordered or permitted under the Plan, the Plan Sanction Order and this

Order, and is hereby forever released, remised and discharged from any claims against it under or pursuant to the Tax Statutes or otherwise at law, arising in respect of payments made under the Plan, the Plan Sanction Order and this Order and any claims of this nature are hereby forever barred.

16. THIS COURT ORDERS that any of the Taxing Authorities that administer the Tax Statutes referenced specifically in paragraph 15 above may apply to this Court within the next six days to vary or amend paragraph 15 hereof on not less than three days' notice to the Monitor, the LP Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order. For greater certainty, no order shall be made varying, rescinding or otherwise affecting paragraph 15 hereof unless notice of a motion for such Order is served on the Monitor, the LP Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee returnable no later than July 12, 2010. The Monitor shall be entitled to apply to vary any term of this Order if an Order varying, amending or rescinding paragraph 15 (if any) is granted.

17. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that on and after the Plan Implementation Date, the Monitor shall be at liberty to engage such Persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under the Orders and to facilitate the completion of these proceedings and the winding up of the LP Entities' estates.

18. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in addition to its prescribed rights in the CCAA and the powers granted by the Orders, the Monitor is empowered and authorized on and after the Plan Implementation Date to:

(a) execute or complete any documents which may be necessary to assign the LP Entities or any one of them into bankruptcy and, for such purpose, to file an assignment in bankruptcy for the LP Entities or any one of them; and

(b) to take such additional actions and execute such documents, in the name of and on behalf of the LP Entities, as the Monitor considers necessary or desirable in order to perform its functions and fulfill its obligations under this Order and to facilitate the completion of these proceedings and the winding up of the LP Entities' estates;

and in each case where the Monitor takes any such actions or steps, it shall be exclusively

authorized and empowered to do so, to the exclusion of all other Persons including the LP Entities, and without interference from any other Person.

19. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, without limiting the provisions of the Initial Order, on and after the Plan Implementation Date, the LP Entities shall remain in possession and control of the LP Property (as defined in the Initial Order), if any, which remains following implementation of the Plan and the Monitor shall not be deemed to be in possession and/or control of any such remaining LP Property.

20. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that on or prior to the Plan Implementation Date, the employees of the LP Entities will be offered employment on substantially similar terms and conditions of employment from the Purchaser in accordance with the Asset Purchase Agreement. Any employee of the LP Entities that does not accept the offer of employment contemplated in the immediately preceding sentence and any employee of the LP Entities who is on long-term disability who receives a conditional offer of employment (the **"Conditional Offer"**) from the Purchaser are hereby terminated on the Plan Implementation Date provided that, for greater certainty, the termination of any employee who receives a Conditional Offer shall not affect the validity and existence of such Conditional Offer. Nothing in the Plan, this Order or any the other Orders shall cause the Monitor to be responsible for any employee-related liabilities or duties including, without limitation, wages, severance pay, termination pay, vacation pay or pension benefit amounts. For greater certainty, any Person having employee related claims arising as a result of Plan implementation (or any of the transactions contemplated thereby) on or after the Plan Implementation Date will not have any recourse to the Administrative Reserve, the Unsecured Creditors' Pool or the Monitor.

21. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND DECLARES** that nothing in this Order shall constitute or be deemed to constitute the Monitor as a receiver, assignee, liquidator, administrator, receiver-manager, agent of the creditors or legal representative of any of the LP Entities within the meaning of any relevant legislation.

22. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that, except as specifically provided for herein, nothing in this Order shall vary or amend any order or endorsement previously granted in these proceedings.

MONITOR PROTECTIONS

23. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that in addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA, the Plan and the Orders, the Monitor shall not be liable for any act or omission on the part of the Monitor, or any reliance thereon, including without limitation, with respect to any information disclosed, any act or omission pertaining to the discharge of duties or obligations under the Orders or the Plan or as requested by the LP Entities, save and except for any claim or liability arising out of any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on the part of the Monitor. Subject to the foregoing, and in addition to the protections in favour of the Monitor as set out in the Orders, any claims against the Monitor in connection with the performance of its duties or obligations as set out in the Orders or the Plan are hereby released, stayed, extinguished and forever barred and the Monitor shall have no liability in respect thereof. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA, any other applicable legislation or the Orders.

24. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that no action or other proceeding shall be commenced against the Monitor in any way arising from or related to its capacity or conduct as Monitor except with prior leave of this Court and on prior written notice to the Monitor and such further order securing, as security for costs, the full indemnity costs of the Monitor in connection with any proposed action or proceeding as the Court hearing the motion for leave to proceed may deem just and appropriate.

ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS

25. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that Schedule "B" to the Vesting Order of this Court dated June 18, 2010 be and is hereby amended to reflect that the purchase agreement between London Life Insurance Company and Southam Inc. in respect of the Edmonton Leasehold Property municipally described as 10006-101 Street, Edmonton, AB is dated as of April 1, 1991.

26. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that this Order shall have full force and effect in all Provinces and Territories of Canada and abroad as against all Persons and parties against whom it may otherwise be enforced.

27. **THIS COURT ORDERS** that the LP Entities or the Monitor may apply to this Court for advice and direction, or to seek relief in respect of, any matters arising from or under this Order.

28. **THIS COURT ORDERS AND REQUESTS** the aid and recognition (including assistance pursuant to Section 17 of the CCAA) of any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body in any Province or Territory of Canada and any judicial, regulatory or administrative tribunal or other court constituted pursuant to the Parliament of Canada or the legislature of any Province or Territory or any court or any judicial, regulatory or administrative body of the United States and the states or other subdivisions of the United States and of any other nation or state to act in aid of and to be complementary to this court in carrying out the terms of this Order.

ENTERED AT / INSCRIT À TORONTO
ON / BOOK NO:
LE / DANS LE REGISTRE NO.:

JUL 06 2010

PER / PAR:

IN THE MATTER OF the *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

APPLICANTS

Court File No: CV-10-8533-00(

Ontario
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

ADMINISTRATIVE RESERVE AND TRANSITIO ORDER

OSLER, HOSKIN & HARCOURT LLP
1 First Canadian Place
P.O. Box 50
Toronto, ON M5X 1B8

Lyndon A.J. Barnes (LSUC#13350D)
Tel: (416) 862-6679

Alexander Cobb (LSUC#45363F)
Tel: (416) 862-5964

Elizabeth Allen Putnam (LSUC#53194L)
Tel: (416) 862-6835
Fax: (416) 862-6666

Lawyers for the Applicants

F. 1117119

IN THE MATTER OF THE *COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF EXTREME FITNESS, INC.

Court File No CV-13-10000-00CL

ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
COMMERCIAL LIST

Proceeding commenced at Toronto

BRIEF OF AUTHORITIES

AIRD & BERLIS LLP
Barristers and Solicitors
Brookfield Place
181 Bay Street, Suite 1800
Toronto, Ontario M5J 2T9

Steven L. Graff (LSUC # 31871V)
Tel: 416.865.7726
Fax: 416.863.1515
Email: sgraff@airdberlis.com

Ian Aversa (LSUC # 55449N)
Tel: 416.865.3082
Fax: 416.863.1515
Email: iaversa@airdberlis.com

James A. Desjardins (LSUC # 62493E)
Tel: 416.865.4641
Fax: 416.863.1515
Email: jdesjardins@airdberlis.com

Lawyers for Extreme Fitness, Inc.